PEACEKEEPING IN ASEAN AND THE OAS

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

BY

MR. JORDAN ARNE PETERSON

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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PRIDI BANOMYONG INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE
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ENTITLED

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ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping has undergone considerable changes in the last quarter century. One of the most consequential changes has been the growing profile of peacekeeping operations conducted by regional organizations. The last quarter century from the end of the Cold War to the present has witnessed a proliferation of peacekeeping operations organized by regional organizations. Peace keeping and peace enforcement have been the traditional domains of the United Nations peacekeeping, 'blue helmets', forces. The nature of peacekeeping has also changed. Peacekeeping has gone from operations that have involved mediating and observing ceasefires between states, to direct intervention in conflicts where state authority has been overthrown or has collapsed. A corollary to this has been the growing focus on issues that fall outside the realm of traditional military topics but touch on issues of democracy, human rights, economic development and environmental issues. These non-traditional security challenges have redefined the scope of peacekeeping.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has in recent years expressed a desire to develop an ASEAN peacekeeping force. This paper addresses the question of whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has developed an institutional framework that would lead to an ASEAN peacekeeping or peacebuilding force. A historical survey of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations by ASEAN states shows that while these states intervened in other Southeast Asian states this was done as part of Cold War era coalitions. Furthermore, no ASEAN peacekeeping framework

has yet appeared that would facilitate the development of a regional peacekeeping force. ASEAN states have participated in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations as individual states under the auspices of other states, ad hoc coalitions or regional organizations. ASEAN's legal and institutional framework lacks the capacity to develop a peace keeping force.

ASEAN, as a regional organization, has been curtailed from its inception due to the structural constraints of the organization as it has been constituted. ASEAN lacks the legal and institutional mechanisms that would enable it to engage in peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations. ASEAN's structural impediments are delineated by a historical survey of peacekeeping in the regional organization. This paper then addresses ASEAN's contemporary peacekeeping dilemma. A comparative analysis of ASEAN with the Organization of American States serves to highlight the ongoing deficiencies in ASEAN. This comparison with another regional organization that shares a similar profile indicates where ASEAN has failed to make critical reforms that would enable peacekeeping or peacebuilding. This comparative analysis shows that ASEAN despite its move to create a political-security community with a peacekeeping component lacks the institutional capabilities that the Organization of American States has instituted.

The paper suggests that a possible explanation for the failure of ASEAN in comparison with the OAS could lie in the historical and cultural development of the two organizations. The reticence of ASEAN members to yield sovereignty to a regional body may be traced to the formative years of ASEAN as dedicated to stopping the advance of communism. The OAS by way of contrast has had a history of regional interaction, pan- Americanism and movements for democratic governance stretching back over two hundred years.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations	Terms
APSC	ASEAN Political-Security Community
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EEAS	European Union External Action Service
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
MILF	Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OSCE	Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Objectives

The objective of this paper is to determine whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has developed an institutional framework that would lead to an ASEAN peacekeeping or peacebuilding force. The paper also seeks to determine how the legal and institutional mechanisms of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have constrained the regional body from developing peacekeeping or peace building forces. ASEAN has made rhetorical gestures consonant with aspirations to develop peacekeeping and peace building mechanisms at the regional level. ASEAN has however not been able to yet create any form of peacekeeping or peace building force. This paper seeks to understand why, in spite of repeated gestures to the contrary, ASEAN has not yet developed a peacekeeping or peace building force at the regional level. A comparative analysis with the Organization of American States has been conducted to evaluate ASEAN as well as a historical survey of ASEAN peacekeeping efforts at the level of individual member states.

1.2 Research Questions

There are several research questions that have been raised in this paper that will attempt to be answered these include:

Why has ASEAN been unable to develop substantive regional peacekeeping or peace building mechanisms despite its emphasis on peacekeeping and peace building at the regional level?

How does ASEAN compare to other regional organizations in approaches to peacekeeping and peace building?

Why have ASEAN states regressed in democratic practices and human rights in spite of attempts by ASEAN to promote these values at the regional level?

Is there a cultural, ideological, theoretical component to ASEAN's inability to promote peacekeeping or peace building at the regional level?

How has ASEAN approached peacekeeping and peace building in the past?

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A large corpus has been written about peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the context of regional organizations. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new doctrines of peacekeeping such as the 'Responsibility to protect' has become a focal point for scholars. There has also been the emergence of new trends in peacekeeping such as 'non-traditional' security challenges and an emphasis on human security in conjunction with state security. As with prior security studies the divisions in peace studies often fracture along the lines of theoretical backgrounds of the scholars in question. This has been the case especially with regards to ASEAN and peacekeeping. ASEAN has generated many studies on peacekeeping and peace building and more generally on peace and security.

Scholars like Mely Caballero-Anthony and Amitav Acharya emphasize the new approach being taken to peacekeeping and peace building as more than simple state operations that emphasize one dimension such as the cessation of hostilities (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). These Caballero- Anthony and Acharya rather emphasize the more malleable concept of peacebuilding and human security which have become more prominent among scholars studying peacekeeping and peace and security studies (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). Prior to the end of the Cold War the emphasis in peace and security studies was from a state-centric view (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). This privileged the state as the dominant actor and emphasized state security (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). New trends emerged with an emphasis on human security and the concept of 'securitization' which has focused on the rhetorical gestures made about peace and security (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). This emphasizes how states speak about security and peace and how the concepts of security are theorized and utilized. This approach has roots in linguistic theory (Anthony & Acharya, 2005).

UN Peace Operations and Asian Security edited by Acharya and Caballero-Anthony shows how the new conceptions of security as human security are approached by contemporary scholars of ASEAN and peacekeeping (Anthony &

Acharya, 2005). This book has a collection of essays by scholars specializing in ASEAN (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). Despite the variety of authors an underlying thread in the book is on how peacekeeping has changed definition from one of state-centricity which entails peacekeeping operations led by military personnel with clear mandates to one of peace building (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). This movement towards human security rather than state security has broadened the realm of security studies and entailed a rethinking of how security is dealt with by ASEAN (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). The changes have implied an erosion of state sovereignty that ASEAN has been slow to grapple with (Anthony & Acharya, 2005). The emerging trends also have created new openings for an invigorated approach to peacekeeping and peace building within ASEAN as non-traditional actors such as non-governmental organizations and civil society groups become more active (Anthony & Acharya, 2005).

A contrasting approach to this has been taken by Lee Jones. In *ASEAN's unchanged melody? The theory and practice of non-interference in Southeast Asia,* Jones argues against the scholarly consensus that ASEAN has been a regional organization whose member states have been reluctant to intervene in each other's domestic affairs (Jones, 2007). Jones argues that ASEAN states have frequently intervened in the domestic political affairs of member states despite rhetoric to the contrary. ASEAN states have been flexible and selective in applying the norm of non-intervention when it comes to other states (Jones, 2007). Jones looks at the domestic political and cultural dynamics of member states to determine how and why the norm of non-intervention has been broached (Jones, 2007).

Jones makes the assertion that the selective engagement of ASEAN member states in the internal affairs of fellow member states can be traced to the Cold War era when ASEAN states sought to protect inherently weak state structures and the encroaching communist advance (Jones, 2007). As the Cold War ended ASEAN states have been forced to liberalize their economic structures resulting in the rise of a more politically engage middle class like that seen during the middle of the 1990's (Jones, 2007). These middle classes clashed with the military-business elites who had captured the machinery of the state (Jones, 2007). This state led capitalism was responsible for the selective interventions seen during the intervention in Cambodia

and various incursions into Myanmar by Thai elites (Jones, 2007). Jones argues that the elites of ASEAN member states do not act only to enrich themselves or hold power but are part of a complex dynamic wherein they both seek to wield power and also to shape the identity of the states (Jones, 2007). Elites see themselves as perpetuating a certain social order and view of national identity. Jones sees national identity and nationalism as significant world views in shaping the structure of ASEAN as a regional organization (Jones, 2007).

Jones asserts that ASEAN has faced a crisis of confidence following the end of the Cold War (Jones, 2007). The patronage of Western powers, especially the United States, has been contingent on reforms of ASEAN member states in the realms of democracy and human rights (Jones, 2007). Jones contends that these reforms will be difficult for ASEAN member states to undertake as they entail fundamental changes to the configuration of power relations in member states and the way that national identity is structured and iterated (Jones, 2007). ASEAN's emphasis on creating security frameworks that encompass more of Asia belies the lack of coherence in ASEAN and a search for a raison detre that the regional organization lacks (Jones, 2007).

The work of Muthiah Alagappa examines whether ASEAN has created peace and security in Southeast Asia and what this might entail for the rest of Asia (Alagappa, 1997). Alagappa argues that ASEAN has not led to peace and security in Southeast Asia but a series of factors have led to the recent era of peace (Alagappa, 1997). ASEAN states have been preoccupied with regime stability and with maintaining intact the states they inherited from their colonial predecessors (Alagappa, 1997). Alagappa divides the type of conflicts occurring in ASEAN, and the greater Asian landmass, as those that entail conflict between states, those that entail political change, and those that entail ethnic separatism (Alagappa, 1997). The last of these has been the most enduring and remains the primary challenge of states in ASEAN today (Alagappa, 1997). As with Jones, Alagappa emphasizes that the question of state identity remains vital for peace and security in an ASEAN context (Alagappa, 1997).

Noel Morada argues that ASEAN has been more successful in its recent efforts towards peacekeeping and peace building and the responsibility to protect

(Morada, 2013). Morada emphasizes the current approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in ASEAN with the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint and the efforts made in the ASEAN Charter to promote a more comprehensive view of peacekeeping and human security (Morada, 2013). Morada also argues that ASEAN has in practice developed norms of human rights and democracy in spite of member states retaining their sovereignty (Morada, 2013). The development of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights has been a step in this direction (Morada, 2013).

Few studies of comparative analysis have been done of ASEAN and other regional organizations in regards to peace and security structures. As other regional organizations grapple with the same dilemmas as ASEAN it seems inevitable that more scholarly work will emerge to compare the mechanisms for peace and security between regional organizations. One case of comparative analysis between ASEAN and another regional organization comes from Jürgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams. Haacke and Williams compare the African Union and ASEAN in their paper titled *Regional Arrangements, Securitization and Transnational Security Challenges: The African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (Haacke & Williams, 2008).

In this paper Haacke and Williams apply the concept of securitization to regional arrangements including the African Union and ASEAN (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The concept of securitization has played a significant role in the study of peace and security following its development by the Copenhagen School of theorists (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The most prominent two theorists associated with the development of this approach are Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan who developed the theory of securitization as a means of understanding how states conceptualized security dilemmas (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The contention, according to Haacke and Williams, was that securitization entails a speech act that identifies something as a 'security dilemma' (Haacke & Williams, 2008). This 'securitization' of an issue then abrogates the political approach to an issue by making it a security dilemma which entails 'securitized' solutions (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The security approach also requires that the target audience be convinced that the threat be recognized as a security dilemma and dealt with as such (Haacke & Williams, 2008).

The securitization of issues approaches the dilemmas of peace and security from a different theoretical viewpoint than has been traditional in realist approaches (Haacke & Williams, 2008). Securitization requires the identification of an issue as an existential threat then the acceptance of the need for security measures to tackle this threat by a group (Haacke & Williams).

Also, the approach to securitization as developed by the Copenhagen School focuses more on how security has been perceived by different actors and how this has shaped the discourse on security (Haacke & Williams, 2008). Rather than seeing security threats as outside the realm of political discourse the Copenhagen School views them as being constructed through speech acts which then must be legitimated by the target audience making these threats real (Haacke & Williams, 2008). This view has become more influential and has risen in tandem with a broader focus in peace and security studies on the amorphous concepts of non-traditional security challenges and transnational security challenges (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The securitization of issues has also allowed for a movement away from the realist focus on state-actors as the focal point for peace and security studies to the recognition of a broader array of actors that affect discourse on security including individuals, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations and corporations (Haacke & Williams, 2008).

Haacke and Williams applied the concept of the securitization to issues pertaining to regional arrangements by comparing the African Union and ASEAN (Haacke & Williams, 2008). Their approach sought to see whether securitization had occurred in ASEAN and the African Union and if so, how different issues were securitized (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The issue of securitization had occurred at the regional level in ASEAN and the African Union but different issues had been securitized Haacke and Williams concluded (Haacke & Williams, 2008).

ASEAN has prioritized the securitization of issues including transnational crime, terrorism and Avian Bird flu as well as SARS (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The African Union has also securitized terrorism as well as small arms and weapons trafficking, aggressive action by non-state actors and HIV/AIDS (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The comparative analysis between the regional organizations shows how the two regional organizations have prioritized different security threats which

correspond to the way the regional organizations work (Haacke & Williams, 2008). ASEAN for instance has securitized threats have been deemed as more destabilizing to state security rather than citizen security whereas the African Union has called for more cognizance of citizen security (Haacke & Williams, 2008). Another difference has been that ASEAN has been more successful in its implementation of counter-measures as opposed to the African Union (Haacke & Williams, 2008).

Haacke and Williams analysis has been significant for the comparison of peace and securitization between ASEAN and the African Union (Haacke & Williams, 2008). An interesting component has been exploring the role that rhetoric plays in how both regional organizations securitize different threats. ASEAN has traditionally relied on member states to implement their own security agendas at the national level and has not prioritized transnational threats to peace or security (Haacke & Williams, 2008). The significance of this for understanding why ASEAN has not developed peacekeeping or peace building capacity has been critical (Haacke & Williams, 2008). As Haacke and Williams state in their paper, "continuing mutual suspicions and sensitivities between Southeast Asian states" have been a factor for the lack of cooperation in developing a region wide security agenda (Haacke & Williams, p. 806, 2008).

There has also been significant literature on the role of peacekeeping and peace building in the context of the Organization of American States. This paper focuses primarily on ASEAN and uses comparison of the OAS to serve to highlight the lack of progress ASEAN has made in reaching its peacekeeping and peace building agenda. The survey of scholarly literature on the OAS, for the above reason, has been smaller in comparison to ASEAN to better meet the goals of this paper. Significant works on the OAS have guided the direction and analysis of this paper however.

A significant work that has informed the contents of this paper that remains outside the consensus of contemporary scholarship on peace and security studies for regional organizations has been work by Lawrence Harrison. In particular Harrison's book, *The Pan-American dream: Do Latin America's cultural values discourage true partnership with the United States and Canada?,* has been utilized. Harrison contends that cultural values influence the configurations of societies which

can influence the way that regional organizations have been configured (Harrison, 1997). The cultural values of Latin America and the United States have created antagonistic relations in the Americas hampering regional cooperation (Harrison, 1997).

The argument that cultural values have significant impact on the organization of states and regional organizations has been utilized for this paper. The divergence between the OAS and ASEAN can be ascribed in part to the differing levels of regional cooperation which draw upon the different political and historic trajectories of the two regional bodies. ASEAN's unwillingness and inability to make reforms to its approach to peacekeeping and peace building in spite of rhetorical gestures to the contrary reveals a lack of political will which can be ascribed to the desire of states to maintain sovereignty and cede as little power as possible to a regional body. The OAS has been able to develop an institutional structure that includes mechanisms that require members to cede power to a regional body to uphold the values of democracy and human rights. The willingness of states to do so in the OAS rests upon meaningful regional cooperation and a willingness to uphold values of democracy and human rights. The pan-regional movements that have suffused the Americas from their independence struggles and a shared political discourse of democracy and pan-Americanism facilitate this institutionalization in the OAS. This paper therefore upholds Harrison's claim that the cultural values are the foundation for political and regional cooperation in the Americas (Harrison, 1997).

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

This paper uses a qualitative methodological approach. This paper uses both primary source documents, and secondary source documents including multi-media, scholarly journals, books and reviews. A focus on a comparative analysis between ASEAN and the OAS uses the legal documents available from both regional organizations to compare the rhetorical and discursive gestures made by each regional organization. These rhetorical gestures are then compared with their actual implementation via institutional mechanisms or actual peacekeeping or peace building operations. The theoretical framework for this paper relies on analyzing the legal and institutional documents of the regional organizations of ASEAN and the OAS and comparing these with their actual implementation. A constructivist approach has been used although adherence to such an approach has not been dogmatically followed and inputs from scholars across a broad array of theoretical and methodological schools has enriched and informed this paper.

CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 The Evolution of Modern Peace Operations

4.1.1 Introduction

The nature of peacekeeping has changed considerably in the decades following the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations. In order to understand whether ASEAN has not developed a peacekeeping or peace building presence or force capable of tackling the challenges that may evolve in the region, this chapter will look at the historical evolution of the concept of peacekeeping. The focus of peacekeeping has changed following the Cold War era. This chapter analyzes what the significance of this change entails for ASEAN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding endeavors. This chapter gives a brief history of what constitutes peacekeeping and how the definition of peacekeeping has morphed to incorporate many different functions which amount more and more to what can be called state-building. This chapter addresses how the burden of peacekeeping has shifted in varying degrees to regional organizations.

4.1.2 Peacekeeping After the Second World War

The changing dynamics of peacekeeping require an examination of the history of peacekeeping operations and how these relate to ASEAN's peacekeeping dilemma. Through undertaking an historical survey of peacekeeping from after the end of the Second World War through to the end of the Cold War and into present time we can discern the evolving trends which indicate the growing strength of the 'regionalism' of peacekeeping. There has also been a movement towards what can be termed 'neo-trusteeship' or state-building operations. These state-building operations have emerged as a way to create long lasting resolutions to the challenges that have emerged from state collapse. Another trend that has emerged and has affected ASEAN has been the broadening of the definition of peacekeeping from one that focuses on the security of states to one that focuses on the security of individuals. This focus on the security of individuals has sought to redress the focus

on state security and has often been focused on transnational challenges like the environment, refugee movements, human rights and other security challenges.

Discussions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding after 1945 must begin with the United Nations. The United Nations has been regarded as the international entity with the most legitimate authority to undertake peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. The authority of the United Nations derives from the broad membership structure of the organization. Almost every state in the world has a membership in the United Nations. The General Assembly of the United Nations has 193 member states represented, with only a few exceptions such as the Holy See, Palestine, Western Sahara, the European Union and disputed states such as South Ossetia and the Republic of China (Member States of the United Nations, n.d.). Following the Second World War the United Nations has come to be seen as the most important source of legitimacy for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

Following the Second World War the United Nations provided in the Charter of the United Nations the possibility for peacekeeping operations under both Chapters VI and Chapters VII (U.N. Charter chap. 6 & chap. 7). Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter authorizes the United Nations Security Council to take action in the resolution of a dispute using means at its disposal if: The dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide [the United Nations Security Council] whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate (U.N. Charter, chap. 6, art. 37, para. 3).

Article 36 under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter allows the Security Council to, "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment", but the Security Council, "should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties" (U.N. Charter chap. 6, art. 36, para.1& 2, p. 8). The language of Chapter VI clearly stressed that while the United Nations Security Council can authorize peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI these cannot use force. These Chapter VI mandates are usually said to be weak mandates as Chapter VI does not authorize the use of force for United Nations peacekeepers (U.N. Charter chap. 6).

Traditionally, Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter accorded more with the understanding of what constituted peacekeeping in the United Nations (Clark, 1997). In the first few years after the formation of the United Nations, the organization was indelibly shaped by the experiences of the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War period (Clark, 1997). The period in which the United Nations emerged placed paramount importance on the sovereignty of the state. The structure of the United Nations was predicated on the state as the foundational actor for an international order of peace and security. The state was the principal actor in international affairs. This notion was shaped by the experience of the Second World War and the failure of the League of Nations in the inter-war period. The Second World War was a war between states and thinking revolved around the need to mitigate disputes between states which could lead to further inter-state warfare (Clark, 1997). Peacekeeping practices at this time were therefore oriented to preventative diplomacy and the creation of ceasefire agreements where states could settle disputes through the mechanisms of the United Nations or through direct peace negotiations (Clark, 1997). The lapse into inter-state warfare, the kind seen during the First and Second World Wars, represented the greatest threat to international peace and stability for those who drafted the Charter of the United Nations (Clark, 1997).

The great wave of decolonization in Africa and Asia, including Southeast Asia, also oriented the United Nations towards inter-state wars and conflict as the focus of peacekeeping operations (Clark, 1997). The colonial empires, the last great contender with the nation-state, had collapsed and the number of sovereign states swelled the United Nations General Assembly (Clark, 1997). These new states were carved from the dismembered remnants of the former colonial territories that had been administered from the metropolitan centers of the West. The boundaries were in many cases superficially imposed over unlike groupings of peoples often divided by religious affiliation, ethnic affiliation, and linguistic affiliation; and in some cases geography. These states were sensitive to outside interference due to their history of colonial subjugation as well as their weak domestic regimes which often lacked legitimacy for ruling (Alagappa, 1997). These new post-colonial states therefore sought to curtail the use of peacekeeping which they feared as a tool of neo-

colonial interference and oppression (Ayoob, 1995). They also sought to solidify the power of the state apparatus (Alagappa, 1997).

Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter was used to help states observe ceasefires and monitor these cease fire agreements (Clark, 1997). The initial United Nations peacekeeping missions sought to observe and monitor ceasefires. These included the cessation of hostilities between Israel and what then constituted the Palestinian territories and the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the disputed area of Kashmir (Clark, 1997). During this period the United Nations also deployed its first armed peacekeeping force following the invasion and capture of the Sinai peninsula and Suez Canal by France, the United Kingdom and Israel in 1956 (Clark). The force was called the United Nations Emergency Force and sought to ensure that a ceasefire amongst the combatants was adhered to in the Sinai Peninsula (Clark, 1997). This was the first peacekeeping mission authorized by the United Nations to be armed although the intent was still to oversee and implement a ceasefire (Clark, 1997).

The United Nations also enshrined in its Charter the inalienable sovereignty of the state and respect for non-interference in the internal affairs of states (Clark, 1997). This can clearly be seen in the first chapter of the United Nations charter under Chapter VII which states: Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (U.N. Charter chap.7, art. 51, pp. 10-11).

The implication was that the United Nations had the right to intervene only given the express permission of the states involved in the conflict (Clark, 1997). The United Nations therefore held the right of state sovereignty to supersede its ability or willingness to promote the purposes of the United Nations Charter including international peace (Clark, 1997).

The state-centered logic for peacekeeping operations by the United Nations made sense when the charter was written (Clark, 1997). After the Second World War the sovereignty achieved by former colonies in the form of nation-states led to a wave of optimism and also reluctance to have their sovereignty violated by

international or regional institutions. The organizational structure of the United Nations also inhibited its ability to facilitate peacekeeping missions with more robust rules of engagement. The United Nations Security Council had to authorize peacekeeping missions (Clark, 1997). The UNSC, however, was often riven with tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union (Clark, 1997). It was difficult to get authorization for robust peacekeeping forces in the conflicts that would begin to emerge in many parts of the world including Africa, Asia and Latin America (Clark, 1997). The United Nations General Assembly was also a venue where a multitude of states were reluctant to see their power or sovereignty eroded by peacekeeping missions, especially those newly independent states from former European colonies in Africa and Asia (Clark, 1997). These states were focused on creating domestic regimes capable of governing the geographical territories they had inherited from their colonial predecessors. The legitimacy of these regimes were often contested and they needed to ensure that they were focused, at least in Southeast Asia, on creating legitimate states supported by their populations (Alagappa, 1997).

An example of the tense relationship between newly independent states and the United Nations was illustrated when Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations under Sukarno from the 20th of January 1965 until 1966 (Blum, 1967). The withdrawal by Indonesia was to protest the actions of Malaysia during the time of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation (Blum, 1967). In a letter addressed to the United Nations Secretary-General (at that the Secretary-General was U-Thant from Burma) by Dr. Subandrio (Indonesia's Foreign Minister under Sukarno at the time) it was stated that Indonesia intended to withdraw from the United Nations (Blum, 1967). In his letter dated on the 20th of January 1965 Dr. Subandrio stated that Indonesia's reason for withdrawal was due to, "The seating of 'Malaysia' as member of the Security Council" (Subandrio, 1964, p. 364). Indonesia considered Malaysia to be a "neo-colonialist" state and Dr. Subandrio couched Indonesia's resignation in anti-colonial language saying:

> In the circumstances which have been created by colonial powers in the
> United Nations so blatantly against our anti-colonial struggle and indeed
> against the lofty principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter,

my government felt no alternative had been left for Indonesia but
withdrawal from the United Nations. (Subiandro, 1964, p. 364).

This action can be construed as Indonesia's attempt to refute all external constraints being imposed on the state. The desire of Indonesia to unite the entire Malay-Muslim world into a single state was indelibly tied to the legitimacy of Indonesia itself (Alagappa, 1997). This motive underlay the designs Indonesia had in absorbing not only Malaysia, but also what was then Netherlands New Guinea and Portuguese Timor as well (Alagappa, 1997). The heightened sensitivity of newly independent post-colonial states towards state sovereignty meant the United Nations was hampered in its ability to enforce peace in many parts of the world had it the desire to do so.

Although respect for state sovereignty curtailed United Nations peacekeeping operations the organization did conduct some more robust peacekeeping operations in the cold war era. These peacekeeping operations were done under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter which gave more flexible rules of engagement for peacekeeping forces (Clark, 1997). Chapter VII Article 42 allows that the United Nations: May take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (U.N. Charter, chap. 7, art. 42, p. 9).

This gives the United Nations more flexible options in sending peacekeeping forces abroad but these forces must be approved by the United Nations Security Council permanent members (U.N. Charter chap. 7, art. 39). During the Cold War it was difficult to have forces authorized to engage in peacekeeping missions due to the highly politicized and antagonistic nature of the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations Security Council was divided by mutual antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union even boycotted the United Nations Security Council from both states used their position on the Security Council to veto peacekeeping operations that clashed with their national interests. From 1945-1990 279 proposed peacekeeping operations were vetoed by the Security Council and only 14 were passed (Clark, 1997). Of the 14 peacekeeping operations

authorized during the Cold War six fell under the Chapter VI mandate of the United Nations charter meaning that they were missions that observed ceasefire agreements or were monitoring missions like those in Israel/Palestine, the Sinai, and Kashmir (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

4.1.3 Peacekeeping after the Cold War

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsiding of Cold War tensions the United Nations faced new challenges which began to emerge for peacekeeping missions (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The role of the United Nations was also invigorated by the subsidence of Cold War tensions on the United Nations Security Council which made it possible for the United Nations to authorize more peacekeeping missions (Alagappa, 1997). The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a United Nations Security Council less polarized by political disagreement. The People's Republic of China was still a nascent power focused on achieving economic growth rather than confronting the Western powers on the UNSC. The UNSC was far less constrained in its ability to authorize peacekeeping forces and missions than it had been during the several long decades of Cold War era rivalry.

During the 1990's the threat to global security moved from a possible confrontation between states or a conventional armed conflict, to the threat posed by the collapse of states (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). This was made apparent in the early 1990's with the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia into its constituent republics of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The partition of the former Yugoslavia took place in the heart of Europe and posed a more significant dilemma for the European Union, NATO and OSCE than conflicts in Africa or Asia ever could have. Revanchist movements motivated by the ideology of ethnic and religious ideology engulfed the Balkans and led to widespread ethnic cleansing (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The ethnic bloodletting in the Balkans would be echoed in Africa in the case of Rwanda with its spillover effects on Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

The dramatic new challenge of state collapse and protracted ethnic conflicts in the post-cold war era reoriented the focus of the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The Brahimi report showed that there was a dire need for more extensive peacekeeping operations in order to stabilize states

and prevent them from falling into total collapse (Brahimi Report, 2001). The trend moved away from the monitoring of ceasefires between two states at war to the more prescient need for state rehabilitation following total regime collapse (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). This pattern was repeated throughout the 1990's including in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, Liberia, and others. It also occurred in Timor-Leste itself where the United Nations was responsible for building a state apparatus after the withdrawal of Indonesia who had managed the province as an internal colonial possession (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

Fearon and Laitin argued that civil wars and ethnic conflicts were not in fact a phenomenon that emerged following the end of the cold war (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). This fact was easily demonstrated by the many conflicts that plagued Africa, Asia and Latin America during the Cold War era (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The ethnic or religious nature of these conflicts, like those in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Angola, were often masked by the perceived ideological differences of the parties fighting (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). These parties leveraged these supposed ideological differences to gain aid, material and diplomatic support from their super-power sponsors; the United States or the Soviet Union (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

What changed following the end of the Cold War and the end of the super-power rivalry was the type of peacekeeping operation authorized by the United Nations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The type of peacekeeping missions that were authorized by the United Nations were quite different and included more of what are termed neo-trusteeship operations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). This type of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation was unique and had not been undertaken by the United Nations since the end of the Second World War (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The neo-trusteeships operated wholly or in part by the United Nations were focused on essentially building viable states in order to avert total state collapse (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). This state-building project can be seen in the case of the former Yugoslavia after the Dayton Accords were signed in 1995 which required the appointment of a High Commissioner to essentially oversee the viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the long term presence of peacekeepers (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). Analogous situations could also be seen in the case of Kosovo, Haiti, and Somalia (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The United Nations neo-trusteeship system reached its apogee in Timor-Leste during

the UNTAET administration which had more far reaching powers than any other prior United Nations peacekeeping operation including the ability to conduct agreements with international financial institutions on behalf of the Timorese people (Chopra, 2000).

The proliferation of peacekeeping operations coupled with the new depth and breadth of the missions posed several significant dilemmas for the United Nations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). In particular, the United Nations had to grapple with the cost and viability of the new types of peacekeeping operations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The expanded scope of United Nations peacekeeping missions required that they not only see to the implementation of ceasefire agreements between combatant forces but that they conduct a host of new activities including, but not limited to, disarmament, land mine clearing, building infrastructure, training security forces, providing health services, providing educational services, training civil servants, tariff and customs responsibilities, border security and organizing elections (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). These new peacekeeping missions required a long term commitment to building a state overseen by the United Nations which could last years or, perhaps, even decades (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). This new type of peacebuilding operation was often incompatible with the organizational capacities and financial resources of the United Nations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

These new types of peacebuilding operations constituted a new type of trusteeship, or neo-trusteeship, and entailed new difficulties (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The traditional methods of United Nations peacekeeping were not adequate to sustain the new types of peace operations that the organization had embarked on (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The rules of engagement had to change considerably in order to make the neo-trusteeship operations viable. Unlike the peacekeeping operations of the Cold War era the new peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations of the post-cold war era often saw the United Nations engaged in combat operations that precluded a neutral stance (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). Fearon and Laitin argued that it has become increasingly difficult for the United Nations to adhere to its position of impartiality and neutrality in peacekeeping operations from the end of the cold war (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

The genocides perpetrated in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo led to a re-working of the notion of sovereignty and, in particular, the heretofore inviolable sanctity of state sovereignty (Clark, 1997). The intervention of NATO in Bosnia which averted an even more catastrophic ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims led Kofi Annan to write *Two Concepts of Sovereignty* for the Economist which, among other things, indicated that sovereignty was not an inviolable right of the state (Clark, 1997). The new definition of sovereignty entailed a two-fold conception which included not only the rights of the state but the responsibility of the state to protect its own citizens and those living within its borders (Clark, 1997). This led to the famous notion of the 'Responsibility to Protect' or 'R2P' as it was sometimes abbreviated (Clark, 1997).

The collapse of Cold War competition and the proliferation of state collapse in the states that comprised the former colonies of Europe laid the groundwork for this shift in peacekeeping operations. The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect had the implication that if states were not protecting their citizens or were actively harming them then it was incumbent on the international community and the United Nations to intervene militarily, if needs be, to protect the lives these citizens (Clark, 1997). Responsibility to protect was used as a rationale for the intervention of the United Nations in Timor-Leste with the help of Australia (Clark, 1997). Kofi Annan himself said that the fact that the United Nations had to ask Indonesia for consent was a problem (Clark, 1997).

The Responsibility to protect doctrine has led to an increased frequency, duration and commitment to peacekeeping operations internationally (Clark, 1997). During the cold war era only 14 peacekeeping operations were approved by the United Nations Security Council and six of these could be said to fall under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter which put a considerable constraint on the scope of the mandates of the peacekeeping operations and did not authorize use of force for achieving the mandate (Clark, 1997). In the time from 1988 to 1993, however, the United Nations allowed more than four times the number of peacekeeping operations than it had during the period from 1945 until 1988 during the height of the cold war (Clark, 1997). This drastic increase was also followed by more robust Chapter VII missions which authorized the use of force (Clark, 1997).

These changes created tensions with the states where the United Nations peacekeepers were engaged (Clark, 1997). The United Nations effectively became a participant in the civil wars and conflicts that it intended to arbitrate which led to a conflict of interest and also criticism (Clark, 1997). The original intention of the United Nations peacekeeping forces as envisioned by their architect, former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld was a threefold one (Clark, 1997).

The first was to have the consent of the host nation where forces were deployed and to have the consent of all parties in the case of a civil conflict (Clark, 1997). This was tandem with the notion of state sovereignty as enshrined in the United Nations charter and, as has been demonstrated, was observed by the United Nations during the cold war era (Clark, 1997). The second principle was for the United Nations to maintain impartiality which meant that UN peacekeeping or peace enforcement troops were not to support one side of combatants (Clark, 1997). The third principle was that UN forces were not to take offensive actions or those that could be deemed offensive but were to follow as strict protocol for self-defense (Clark, 1997). This protocol was in place to make sure that the UN peacekeeping forces did not become implicated in anything that could be deemed an offensive action (Clark, 1997). These three principles guided UN peacekeeping actions during the cold war and could be said to be more or less effective during this time (Clark, 1997). It has been demonstrated that recent UN peacekeeping actions have however violated these principles especially in the case of the INTERFET and UNTAET missions in Timor-Leste (Clark, 1997).

The phases of peacekeeping from the end of the Second World War to the present can be summarized as two phases (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The first as discussed above was the phase following the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations as well as the United Nations Charter (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). During this era the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping operations was constrained by the strengthened sovereignty of the state (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The former colonial empires of Europe crumbled and in their place new states were demarcated in Asia and Africa (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). These states were focused on maintaining maximum sovereignty and resisted the intrusion of outside powers and

institutions that could threaten their sovereignty (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). This was shown by Indonesia's unilateral withdrawal from the United Nations following the seating of Malaysia as a non-permanent member on the United Nations Security Council during the *konfrontasi* period (Blum, 1967). Cold War rivalry also made robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement more difficult. This was due to the rivalry on the United Nations Security Council between the United States and the Soviet Union and their liberal use of their powers to veto peacekeeping operations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). Many peacekeeping operations were vetoed due to the perceived negative effects such missions would have on the national security interests of the superpowers (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

This phase lasted until the end of the cold war when the collapse of the Soviet Union reoriented the United Nations away from the potential threat of state-centric warfare to the emerging threat of state collapse and the threat this posed to the international system (Clark, 1997). At this time the United Nations became more active in authorizing robust peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Clark, 1997). These operations eroded the clear distinction between the United Nations as an impartial observer and as a participant in civil conflicts (Clark, 1997). The erosion of sovereignty in states on the verge of collapse led to a break down in the Westphalian system and the threat of transnational conflict engulfing large regions of the globe such as had happened in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and parts of the Americas (Clark, 1997). The United Nations peace operations morphed into long term commitments that resembled the trusteeships of the past (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). These 'neo-trusteeships' sought to rebuild the conflict ridden states and societies where they were engaged into viable states that would no longer pose a threat to the peace and welfare of the international system (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

The United Nations new orientation towards a partisan position in the realm of geo-politics, with a robust mandate to protect civilians and rebuild societies in its own image, was not a viable solution to the emerging threats to global peace (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). Scholars, academicians, politicians and military personnel have all been highly critical of the new role that the United Nations has undertaken (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The United Nation's new role as a guardian of

neo-trusteeships has, however, been undertaken with much reluctance by the organization itself (Fearon & Laitin, 2004). The United Nations lack of capacity to engage in robust military peacekeeping operations and the tenuous relation between the Charter of the United Nations and what has been required to build viable states has led to more regional organizations leading peacekeeping operations with and without the support of the United Nations (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

4.1.4 Regional Organization and Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping by regional organizations has been rising steadily due to the increased stature of regional organizations internationally. Regional organizations have not displaced the United Nations in peacekeeping but have in most instances been complementary. A division of labor seems to have taken place in international peace operations with the United Nations Security Council giving its imprimatur while regional organizations undertake the actual peacekeeping. The United Nations remains the most legitimate actor for authorizing peace operations within an international context and itself has become a more robust presence in peacekeeping and peacebuilding on a global scale after the end of the cold war. The United Nations has, however, limited in its ability to conduct peace operations of the scale that modern challenges to peace and security require. Regional organizations and *ad hoc* coalitions have become more active in peacekeeping operations.

Other regional organizations have also progressed in developing peacekeeping operations. These peacekeeping functions entail both peace enforcement operations as well as political and diplomatic missions including the monitoring of elections as well as the overseeing of ceasefire agreements. The European Union has been particularly active in engaging in peacekeeping operations in its periphery. The European Union and its member states have been embedded in a complex web of security arrangements and multilateral organizations which have been utilized to engage in peacekeeping operations. This includes security operations undertaken in conjunction with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. An example of Europe's peace and security instruments includes the European Union's European External Action Service (EEAS) (European External Action Service, n.d.). The EEAS acts as the diplomatic branch of the European Union and has carried out

17 peacekeeping operations with another 17 still underway (European External Action Service, n.d.). These missions include both military and civilian components (European External Action Service, n.d.).

The peacekeeping operations of the EEAS are integrated into the political and security structure of the European Union itself with the EEAS acting as the foreign policy branch of the organization (European External Action Service, n.d.). The majority of the peacekeeping missions conducted by the EEAS are in the periphery of the European Union such as the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the South Caucuses, the Middle East and Africa (European External Action Service Security and Defense, 2016). Some however have taken place much further abroad such as the Aceh Monitoring Mission which was conducted jointly with ASEAN nations to, "monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)" (European External Action Service Aceh Monitoring Mission, n.d.). This mission lasted from 15 September 2005 until it concluded on 15 December 2006 (European External Action Service Aceh Monitoring Mission, n.d.).

Aside from the European Union several other regional organizations have been involved in peacekeeping operations these include the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of American States (OAS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and several other ad hoc coalitions (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze [ZIF] Peace Operations 2015/2016, 2015). The 2015 invasion of Yemen by the Gulf Cooperation Council, with the exception of Oman, can also be considered a peacekeeping intervention although one that has been much more controversial.

4.2 Peacekeeping in ASEAN

4.2.1 Introduction

ASEAN, as a regional organization, has not authorized nor has it deployed peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Individual states within ASEAN have, however, singly and in a multilateral context, engaged in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations under the auspices of the United Nations and as part of *ad hoc* coalitions. As of 2016, ASEAN members have engaged in prolonged, militarized, peacekeeping operations in a fellow, current ASEAN member in only one case; that of Timor-Leste during its occupation by Indonesia in 1999 (Jones, 2010). ASEAN member states also served as peacekeepers in Cambodia during the UNTAC mission prior to the admission of Cambodia to ASEAN (Jones, 2007). Following this initial foray into peacekeeping operations into a fellow ASEAN member, ASEAN states have also engaged in missions observing ceasefires and disarmament agreements in fellow ASEAN states. ASEAN states have not engaged in any peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions comparable to the INTERFET and UNTAET missions in fellow ASEAN member states. ASEAN, as a regional organization, has lacked the formal and legal institutional framework to develop a peacekeeping force and has furthermore relied on outside powers to lead peace keeping missions. This was the case in the UNTAET and INTERFET missions where Australia played a critical role as lead nation (Connery, 2010).

In the Cold War era, as can be seen below, ASEAN was a much smaller regional organization with five member states, later to be six with the accession of Brunei Darussalam following its independence from the United Kingdom in 1984 (ASEAN Members, n.d.). ASEAN at this time was focused on stability in relationships between member states in order to consolidate the authority and legitimacy of the regimes who had inherited the post-colonial state machinery after the Second World War. Another goal was to halt the advance of communism in Southeast Asia which all ASEAN member states agreed was a threat to the internal cohesion and stability of their states (Jones, 2010). In this last goal ASEAN was neatly aligned with the goals of the United States and other Western capitalist powers

in their desire to create a unified bloc of pro-capitalist states, if only in name and not in practice, in Southeast Asia (Jones, 2010).

At this time these goals served the interests of Western powers as well as ASEAN members. Following the end of the Cold War, however, the interests of ASEAN states have diverged from those of the West and its ally, Japan (Jones, 2010). The emphasis on democratic reforms, complete economic liberalization, and a greater emphasis on human rights has put some ASEAN states at a distance from their former Western allies (Jones, 2010). ASEAN has been forced to grapple with the new focus on human rights which has often entailed political and economic reforms that some ASEAN states have been uncomfortable with making (Jones, 2010).

ASEAN has set non-interference and non-intervention as cherished principles of the organization. Individual ASEAN member states have intervened in other states within Southeast Asia but have never done so with the official consent of ASEAN as a regional organization. When ASEAN member states have intervened in other countries they have done so contrary to the official institutional arrangements and principles of ASEAN. These principles have been reiterated in ASEAN documents from the foundation of the organization to the more recent call for the creation of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network. The historical evolution of non-interference and non-intervention emerged as a specific response to the political and security environment that followed the emergence of post-colonial states in Southeast Asia. This environment included cold war era rivalry that occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union. ASEAN member states aligned with the capitalist Western forces and were crucial allies during the cold war rivalry that split Southeast Asia.

4.2.2 Cold War Era

Historically ASEAN as a regional organization has been reluctant to interfere in the affairs of its fellow member states. This reluctance to intervene can be seen from the inception of the organization during to 8 August 1967 with the ASEAN or Bangkok Declaration. The ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration enshrined among its principles, "security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve national identities" (ASEAN Declaration, 1967, Preamble p. 1). This foundational document was signed by the foreign ministers of the original five

ASEAN members including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines (ASEAN Declaration, 1967).

The founding nations could likely not have envisaged that this preliminary grouping would morph into the regional organization it subsequently became but the ASEAN Declaration has been reiterated through the years with like-minded agreements among member states and set a tone of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. The stated raison d'être of ASEAN at the time of its founding was to ensure a safe, prosperous and stable region in Southeast Asia (ASEAN Declaration, 1967).

The 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration was another example of ASEAN's strong commitment to non-interference amongst member states. The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration was signed by the foreign ministers of the original ASEAN five members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). As with the ASEAN Declaration the wording of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality was vague but espoused, "the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any interference by outside Powers" (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration [ZOPFAN], 1971, p.2). The above wording of the ZOPFAN Declaration and the wording in several other portions of the text leaves no doubt as to the intention of the ASEAN states to maintain non-interference and respect for state sovereignty as the overriding principles of the organization (ZOPFAN, 1971).

The tone of the ZOPFAN Declaration also intimates that ASEAN was neutral in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was indicated by the Declaration's adherence to the, "continuing validity of the 'Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation' of the Bandung Conference of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles by which states may coexist peacefully" (ZOPFAN, 1971, p. 1). ASEAN professed to adhere to the principles of the Bandung Conference of 1955 which sought to create a group of non-aligned states that supported neither the Soviet Union nor the United States in the Cold War era. ASEAN's commitment to neutrality in the cold war can be doubted

however as individual member states were key allies of the United States and Western powers in the fight against communist throughout the Asia-Pacific.

ASEAN's desire to avoid outside interference by global powers in the region and the desire of member states to avoid interference in domestic affairs by both outside powers and fellow member states was complicated by the Cold War. Southeast Asia was a region fiercely contested by the forces aligned with the United States and the Soviet Union, and later the People's Republic of China who would constitute a third force nominally aligned with the United States (Jones, 2007). In the midst of the between global communism and capitalism ASEAN states sought to preserve their regimes by aligning with the United States and its Western allies (Jones, 2007). The motivation for ASEAN was to prevent a collapse of the capitalist autocracies of the five founding members and to preserve the states that had been formed which were subject to the centrifugal forces of ethnic separatism and communist insurrection (Jones, 2007). Prior to the formation of ASEAN several of the states that would become the original five ASEAN members had participated in military operations led by Western powers and were integrated into anti-communist Western led alliances. The Philippines and Thailand, in particular, supported Western-led military interventions in the Asia-Pacific (Hunt & Levine, 2012).

One of the earliest of these interventions was the Korean War where both Thailand and the Philippines sent armed forces as part of the United States led military intervention to push back the armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who had invaded the Republic of Korea on 25 June, 1950 (Hunt & Levine, 2012). This participation in the Korean War was perceived and justified by some Southeast Asian states as a 'peacekeeping' operation (Niumphradit, 2002). Resolution 83 of the United Nations Security Council declared, in response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area" (UNSC resolution S/RES/83, [S/1588], 1950 p. 5). UNSC Resolution 83, however, was controversial and cannot be defined as a UN peacekeeping operation, due to the lack of support from the entire UNSC (Hunt & Levine, 2012). This was due to the fact that

the UNSC at the time of Resolution 83 was boycotted by the Soviet Union who abstained from voting (Hunt & Levine, 2012).

This boycott of the UNSC by the Soviet Union was due to the representation of China by the Republic of China on the UNSC rather than the People's Republic of China (Hunt & Levine, 2012). The vote of the UNSC on Resolution 83 was conducted without the Soviet Union and with participation by the Republic of China rather than the People's Republic of China (Hunt & Levine, 2012). The Korean War and its contested legitimacy as a peace operation shows the powerful effects of Cold War rivalry in the realm of UN peacekeeping and the implications for the five Southeast Asian nations who would become the founding members of ASEAN. It also shows that if any peacekeeping occurred in the pre-ASEAN era by the original five ASEAN member states it was undertaken in conjunction with Western powers and in the context of the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN members at this time contributed no peacekeeping personnel to the United Nations.

In the formative years of ASEAN, the focus of the organization quickly adhered to two main principles. The first was to create a grouping of like-minded states that would provide a bulwark against the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia and act to curtail conflict within the organization by sanctioning the norms of non-interference and non-intervention. ASEAN limited conflicts in the region by preventing intervention in the affairs of fellow member states and also sought to deflect international criticism by uniting in defense of fellow members (Alagappa, 1993).

The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia reaffirmed ASEAN's allegiance to the principles of non-interference amongst member states and their attempts to protect the sovereignty of member states from external interference (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1976). Under Chapter one article two of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia maintained signatories had, "the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion" (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, chap. 1, art. 2, 1976). The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, while it adhered to the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in domestic affairs of member states also made provisions for

conflict resolution (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1976). This included the creation of a high council with ministers from each of the High Contracting countries who would, "take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation" (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, chap. 4, art. 14, 1976).

ASEAN's attempts at the pacific resolution of conflicts in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia indicated that the organization sought to create an area of peace and stability free from outside interference (Alagappa, 1993). The weakness of the mechanisms for conflict resolution as provided by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia were indicated by the vague language of the treaty itself and its lack of enforcement mechanisms (Alagappa, 1993).

The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and ongoing tensions between Vietnam and ASEAN, which culminated in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, created a tense atmosphere in the Southeast Asian mainland and a crisis for ASEAN (Alagappa, 1993). The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was an attempt by ASEAN, however feeble, to broaden the principles of non-intervention and non-interference among member states to states outside ASEAN especially Vietnam (Alagappa, 1993). ASEAN was handicapped by the vague wording of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of Southeast Asia and the unwillingness of Vietnam to sign the treaty (Alagappa, 1993).

As with the United Nations at this time ASEAN as a regional organization was, in spite of the rhetoric contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, subject to the international dynamics of the Cold War (Alagappa, 1997). ASEAN tried to prevent conflict in the region and engage in conflict containment, especially in the case of Vietnamese actions in Cambodia, by enlisting the support of Cold War sponsors, especially the United States and the People's Republic of China (Alagappa, 1997). Vietnam in its turn received support from its cold war benefactor the Soviet Union (Alagappa, 1997). The ASEAN-United States-China axis initially supported Democratic Kampuchea which was opposed by the Vietnamese supported government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea

(Jones, 2007). Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and installed a government aligned with Vietnam (Jones, 2007).

This conflict took place in Cambodia which at the time was not a member of ASEAN. The way ASEAN dealt with the conflict in Cambodia was a significant departure from its rhetorical stance of non-intervention (Jones, 2007). The intervention in Cambodia again illustrated the power of cold war rivalries in shaping ASEAN and the fragility of ASEAN who contended with domestic support for communist insurgencies (Jones, 2007). Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines with the backing of Western powers vociferously opposed the rule of the People's Republic of Kampuchea government which was established under the auspices of Vietnam (Jones, 2007). ASEAN went so far as to contest the legitimacy of the seating of the People's Republic of Kampuchea at the seat designated for the government of Cambodia at the United Nations General Assembly (Jones, 2007).

They argued that this seating would constitute a violation of the United Nations Charter as the People's Republic of Kampuchea was not the legitimate government of Cambodia but a puppet state under Vietnamese control (Jones, 2007). ASEAN members were especially active in funding, coordinating and legitimizing an opposition coalition to contend with the People's Republic of Cambodia (Jones, 2007). This Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was composed of former Khmer Rouge political leaders and royalist factions including those aligned with Prince Sihanouk (Jones, 2007).

ASEAN's self-proclaimed principles of non-intervention and non-interference were in the case of Cambodia malleable when they served the interests of the prevailing domestic regimes (Jones, 2007). ASEAN members sought to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and to strengthen domestic political regimes that often lacked legitimacy and weak foundations to their post-colonial heritages where nationalism was often contrived (Jones, 2007). ASEAN's interests were aligned with those of the West in regards to preventing the spread of communism and the West saw ASEAN as a grouping of like-minded states as a bulwark to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia (Jones, 2007).

While these interests aligned ASEAN was able to find a common cause and supported Western military interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia and

Laos (Jones, 2007). ASEAN often acted at the behest of the United States and its cold war allies including Japan and the European Economic Community as was the case when ASEAN states sent peacekeeping forces to Korea, Vietnam and intervened to a greater degree in Cambodia following the invasion by Vietnam (Jones, 2007). The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia can be read as barring external influence from outside actors that were communist or supported communist regimes including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China until its diplomatic realignment with the West which culminated in the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979 (Jones, 2007).

The intervention in Cambodia reached a zenith with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia which was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 745 (Jones, 2007). Five ASEAN member states participated in the UNTAC mission including Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (UN Department of Information, 2003). This intervention was not coordinated by ASEAN itself but had significant backing from ASEAN member states who desired to see the Paris Peace Accords implemented (Jones, 2007). The Paris Peace Accords were derived from internal ASEAN communications which had been formulated by ASEAN states including Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia (Jones, 2007). The UNTAC mission was a significant intervention by ASEAN member states in a neighboring country although it was undertaken in conjunction with support of the United Nations, and especially Western powers (Jones, 2007).

During the Cold War era ASEAN can be said to pursue two contradictory approaches to peacekeeping operations and intervention (Jones, 2007). Officially the regional organization adhered to a policy of non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of ASEAN member states (Jones, 2007). This non-interference and non-intervention were enshrined in the ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration, the Declaration for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Jones, 2007). These multilateral documents were consonant with the United Nations Charter which upheld the right of state sovereignty (Jones, 2007). The need to strengthen domestic political regimes which lacked legitimacy and to contain possible separatist movements was a

motivation behind the emphasis on state sovereignty as enshrined in these ASEAN documents (Jones, 2007).

At the same time ASEAN states were subject to the Cold War geopolitical dynamics that were at the heart of global conflict during this period. Rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, and their allies, created a political dilemma in Southeast Asia as these two superpowers sought to enlist Southeast Asian states in global alliances. At this time ASEAN had no means for peacekeeping operations nor any desire to create a peacekeeping force or apparatus due to the inherent weakness of the organization based on mutual consent of its member states and the emphasis on strong state sovereignty. There was, however, a desire to protect member states from what was perceived to be aggressive communist insurgencies that threatened Southeast Asia. The Philippines and Thailand, to this end, supported the United States and engaged in multilateral Western led military missions in Korea, which they deemed were peacekeeping missions which had the backing of the United Nations (Niumphradit, 2012). The United Nations Security Council at this time was boycotted by the Soviet Union and China was represented by the Republic of China rather than the People's Republic of China.

The need to contain communism while adhering to the official stance of non-intervention and non-interference created a dilemma for ASEAN and its member states (Jones, 2011). ASEAN states supported intervention in non-ASEAN states on their periphery which was most evident in the case of Cambodia and also the Indonesian annexation of Timor-Leste (Jones, 2011). The ASEAN intervention in Cambodia was a response to the overthrow of the Democratic Kampuchea regime by the Vietnamese army and the installation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in 1978 (Jones, 2007). ASEAN states were active in contesting the seating of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in the United Nations General Assembly and also waged a war of attrition against Vietnam through proxy forces such as the Khmer Rouge, and Cambodian royalists and nationalists (Jones, 2007). This reached a zenith with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia governed Cambodia as a United Nations protectorate and saw a coalition government installed that was friendly to the interests of ASEAN members (Jones, 2007).

Trends in peacekeeping in ASEAN during the Cold War mirrored global trends in peacekeeping. Post-colonial states such as those in Southeast Asia promoted the norms of non-intervention and non-interference as inviolable principles. State sovereignty was cherished and any attempts at foreign interference were deemed unacceptable even in the forms of United Nations peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Threats were perceived to come from inter-state warfare at the global level. Cold War rivalry forced ASEAN states to take sides as partners of the United States led Western military alliance and led to their active intervention and support of peacekeeping operations in Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. These peacekeeping operations had, in the best of circumstances, only partial and dubious United Nations sanction (Hunt &Levine, 2012). The United Nations itself was a contested field for Cold War rivalry and the United Nations Security Council was especially riven by acrimonious disputes between the Soviet Union, the United States and later on the People's Republic of China (Hunt & Levine, 2012).

The historical ambivalence of ASEAN to peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War consisted of the organizations desire to protect state sovereignty from external interference. Protection of state sovereignty was selectively applied by the original ASEAN five members to the threat of communist aggression which was seen as emanating from state sponsors such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Vietnam (Jones, 2010). Internal communist insurrections were seen to draw support from external state sponsors (Jones, 2007). The writ of ASEAN states at this time was weak both in terms of state legitimacy, resources, and the ability to enforce state power in geographically remote areas (Alagappa, 1993). The need to contain perceived communist aggression forced ASEAN member states to focus on the conventional threat of invasion by communist countries and their proxy forces within the state and on the internal threat of state overthrow by communist insurrection (Jones, 2010). Peacekeeping in ASEAN at this time amounted to fighting in the interests of domestic regimes in ASEAN who had the backing of the United States and its Western allies (Jones, 2010).

4.2.3 Post-Cold War Era

Following the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has become more engaged in peacekeeping interventions and peace building within the greater Asia-

Pacific as well as further afield in a more international context (Alagappa, 1993). This shift has been part of a larger global trend towards regional organizations engaging in peacekeeping missions. As noted above the end of the Cold War provided shifted the divisive ideological rhetoric away from confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States towards more nuanced security challenges. The responsibility to protect doctrine and the notion of securitization of issues led to a broader scope of challenges that were perceived as transnational security threats (Jones, 2011).

Peacekeeping in ASEAN began to gain more momentum in the 1990's. ASEAN states increased their participation in United Nations Peacekeeping operations both within Southeast Asia and also abroad as part of United Nations peacekeeping operations (Peou, 2015). Prior to this, ASEAN members had contributed peacekeepers to the United Nations but their forces had been token contributions on a scale that was much smaller than other states (Peou, 2015).

ASEAN began to take cognizance of the new security challenges that threatened the regional organization. During the 1990's the movement towards the responsibility to protect gained momentum. The doctrine of responsibility to protect began to be formulated as a response to the new security challenges that had been ignored during the cold war era and began to take on a greater impact as the support for communist and capitalist post-colonial regimes withered (Jones, 2007).

ASEAN states engage in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992 which was the most significant participation of ASEAN states in peacekeeping in Southeast Asia's periphery. ASEAN members also participated in missions in Timor-Leste during the crisis that followed the referendum for independence there in 1999. The INTERFET and UNTAET missions, which were under the auspices of the United Nations, will be discussed below. These missions were significant steps in having ASEAN peacekeeping forces serving in a fellow ASEAN member.

4.2.3.1 ASEAN Contributions to INTERFET/UNTAET

Even though initially reluctant to contribute forces to the INTERFET mission in Timor-Leste, ASEAN members contributed personnel to the INTERFET and later UNTAET missions (Niumphradit, 2002). Four ASEAN member states including Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore contributed

personnel and as well as military supplies including hardware (Dupont, 2000). ASEAN countries contributed a substantial portion of the peacekeeping mission operating under the INTERFET security umbrella. Of a total of 9,900 personnel involved in the mission 2,500 came from the nations of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines (Dupont, 2000). These nations provided the most troops save for Australia which contributed 5,500 of the personnel involved (Dupont, 2000). Not only did ASEAN countries supply a large contingent of personnel but the deputy commander of the INTERFET mission was a Thai major general Songkitti Jaggabatara (Dupont, 2000). Thus ASEAN countries provided a significant portion of the INTERFET forces and were also involved in high ranking administrative positions within the mission as demonstrated by major general Songkitti Jaggabatara's role as the deputy commander. A breakdown of the force personnel and material contributions by country also reveals the large scope of the ASEAN peacekeeping troops and specialists (Dupont, 2000). Thailand sent the bulk of the troops from ASEAN which included 1,230 infantry from the Royal Thai Army's 31st Infantry Regiment, as well as 350 medical staff, engineering staff, naval staff and airforce staff (Dupont, 2000). In addition, Thailand also a naval ship and a C-130 transport aircraft as well as the deputy commander (Dupont, 2000).

The next most represented ASEAN country among the INTERFET was the Philippines which provided 600 personnel for combat missions, as well as engineers, medical teams and a C-130 transport aircraft (Dupont, 2000). Singapore provided the third largest contingent of 254 personnel for combat missions including a medical team, logistics support, and two heavy landing ships (Dupont, 2000). Malaysia provided 30 interpreters to the mission and probably did not provide combat personnel due to the sensitive nature of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia (Dupont, 2000). All the ASEAN countries that provided personnel were part of the original ASEAN-5 that had signed the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. The newer states of ASEAN in the CLMV countries were generally less supportive of intervention than the original ASEAN-5 members. Myanmar was especially reluctant to have ASEAN nations participate or intervene in the conflict in Timor-Leste due to its own restive minority populations and secessionist movements.

In spite of ASEAN member states commitments to the INTERFET, and later UNTAET missions, the lead actor in the INTERFET mission was undoubtedly Australia. ASEAN member forces in the INTERFET mission played a subsidiary role and ASEAN as a regional organization played no significant role in Timor-Leste (Jones, 2010). This can be seen from the outset of the mission (Connery, 2010). Both Malaysia and Singapore were both initially reluctant to supply forces to the INTERFET mission (Connery, 2010). The recruitment for the initial stages of the INTERFET mission, when countries were vetted as to whether they would be willing to contribute peacekeeping forces, was also done by Australia (Connery, 2010). This indicated that Australia was the lead regional actor in promoting the peacekeeping force and also the one coordinated the initial deployment of the ASEAN member state forces (Connery, 2010). As David Connery wrote in his seminal work on the policymaking leading up to the INTERFET mission in Australia:

> Defense's third response involved obtaining support for INTERFET through direct and indirect representations to regional governments. This effort involved sending the VCDF, Air Marshal Doug Riding, on a rapid tour of the region to solicit troop contributions for INTERFET. Building upon the discussions between Howard and regional leaders at the Auckland APEC Meeting, Riding and a team of three staff officers set out to conduct detailed discussions in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei. The visit started poorly when the Malaysian Government changed its mind about contributing to INTERFET and Singapore offered a much smaller group than anticipated. (Connery, pp. 37-18, 2010).

This solicitation of regional forces by Australia shows that Australia was the prime actor leading the INTERFET mission and ASEAN nations were the primary troop contributing countries (Connery, 2010). This also indicates the strong leadership of Australia during the early recruitment phase of the INTERFET operation (Connery, 2010).

4.2.3.2 Aceh and Mindanao

ASEAN states individually also participated as observers in the Aceh Monitoring Mission which was launched on the 15 September, 2005 (Aceh Monitoring Mission- EEAS, n.d.). The European Union funded the mission and was organizationally responsible for its implementation but worked in conjunction with ASEAN members (Aceh Monitoring Mission- EEAS, n.d.). The five ASEAN member states, which included Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, provided observers to monitor and implement a peace agreement (Aceh Monitoring Mission- EEAS, n.d.). The peace agreement was between the Republic of Indonesia and the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) which had signed a memorandum of understanding that paved the way for a ceasefire and disarmament of GAM forces (Aceh Monitoring Mission- EEAS, n.d.).

Malaysia played the chief role as part of the International Monitoring Team that established a peace agreement between the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao (Abubakar, 2006). On 22 June, 2001 Malaysia brokered a peace agreement between the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) called the Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front which was also known as the Tripoli Agreement (Abubakar, 2006). Several further agreements clarified security and humanitarian roles for the parties of the agreement but the most substantive portion was established by June 2001 (Abubakar, 2006). This agreement was not a permanent one but a ceasefire implemented till a more permanent peace solution could be devised for the conflict in Mindanao (Abubakar, 2006).

Malaysia was the chief enforcing nation in the International Monitoring Mission which began on 10 October, 2004 (Abubakar, 2006). Malaysia contributed 46 peacekeepers and Brunei Darussalam contributed another ten peacekeepers (Abubakar, 2006). Of the 60 member force two ASEAN states, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia, contributed the overwhelming majority (Abubakar, 2006). The International Monitoring Team was responsible for implementing a ceasefire and overseeing reconstruction and rehabilitation in the conflict zone in Mindanao (Abubakar, 2006). As with the Aceh Monitoring Mission the International Monitoring

Team indicates that ASEAN states were individually active in participating in peacekeeping missions both overseas and in the Southeast Asian region, even in fellow ASEAN states.

4.2.4 Regional Frameworks

As a regional organization ASEAN lacked the political will or the institutional ability to implement peacekeeping missions in a regional or extra-regional context. ASEAN continued to rely on the norms of 'non-intervention', 'non-interference', 'consultation' and 'consensus' as mechanisms for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. ASEAN sought to transition from a group of states united by a desire to limit the advance of communism in Southeast Asia and protect nascent post-colonial states to a more deeply integrated regional organization. The 1990's saw the accession of the rest of mainland Southeast Asia into ASEAN including Vietnam in 1995, then Myanmar and Laos in 1997 and finally Cambodia in 1999 (ASEAN Member states, n.d.). The broadening of ASEAN was also matched by a desire for a more deeply integrated regional organization that would serve as a linchpin for peace, security and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions (History ASEAN, n.d.).

New security architecture began to emerge with ASEAN as the foundation stone for several multilateral regional organizations that encompassed more of the Asia-Pacific region and included security components. The ASEAN Regional Forum was founded on 25 July 1994 to "foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern" in the wider Asia-Pacific region. (ASEAN Regional Forum). The ASEAN Regional Forum has 28 members to date and all ASEAN members are automatically admitted to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ASEAN Regional Forum). These also included the East Asia Summit which has a membership encompassing states in the Asia-Pacific including Australia, New Zealand, the People's Republic of China, Korea, Japan, India as well as the United States and Russia (ASEAN). The East Asia Summit was commenced on 14 December 2005 (ASEAN). It allowed for a multilateral dialogue grouping between members of the most powerful economic and military powers with their ASEAN partners and other states in the Asia-Pacific (Jones, 2010).

ASEAN has laid the groundwork for an ASEAN Political-Security Community (ASEAN Political-Security [APSC] Blueprint, 2009). The ASEAN Political-Security Community was envisioned as the political-security component of ASEAN which called for a more deeply integrated ASEAN along the lines of the ASEAN Economic Community which went into effect in 2016. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint was adopted in 2009 at the 14th ASEAN Summit in Cha-am/Hua Hin Thailand by ASEAN leaders (APSC Blueprint, 2009). The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint built on the ASEAN Charter and addresses aspects of peacekeeping including calling for more preventive diplomacy and confidence building measures among ASEAN states (APSC Blueprint, 2009). The ASEAN Political- Security Community Blueprint also addresses several dilemmas that ASEAN has faced in the form of non-traditional security challenges and peacebuilding in post-conflict societies (APSC Blueprint, 2009).

The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint addressed issues of peacebuilding in post-conflict settings and the threat of non-traditional security challenges (APSC Blueprint, 2009). An instance of this was shown in the call for ASEAN to establish, "a network among existing ASEAN Member States' peace keeping centers to conduct joint planning, training, and sharing of experiences, with a view to establishing an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability" (APSC Blueprint, B.2.3., iii., 2009). This statement resulted in the most significant step ASEAN member states have taken so far to realizing a joint ASEAN peacekeeping force which is the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network. This ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network was reiterated at the 5th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting which has become an important venue for discussion of security and peace issues for ASEAN members and dialogue partners. At the 5th meeting of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia on the 19th of May, 2011 the proposal for establishing such a network was included in the policymaking plan for the ASEAN Political-Security Community (Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, 2011).

The ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network was a proposal to establish centers for peacekeeping in each ASEAN country. At the 5th ADMM a

Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network called for the creation of such a network to:

> Promote and enhance cooperation among defence and armed forces within ASEAN Member States through sharing experiences, expertise and other related capacities in peacekeeping. (Fifth ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, II., 4., 2011).

The long term goals of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network included establishing specialized expertise in peacekeeping among ASEAN members and increase interoperability (Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network, 2011). The United States has been a key proponent of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network (Capie, 2014). The United States provided funding for six ASEAN countries through an initiative in the State Department called the Global Peace Operations Initiative (Capie, 2014). The United States also has cooperated with ASEAN countries including certifying Malaysia's Peacekeeping Training Centre as Full Training Capability in 2013 (Capie, 2014). Malaysia's Peacekeeping Training Centre was the first to have achieved this distinction (Capie, 2014).

The ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network has provided a framework for developing more interoperability, training and education for ASEAN members to coordinate peacekeeping activities (APSC Blueprint, 2009). The network has still fallen short of creating a full-fledged peacekeeping force, however. The ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network's incremental approach also does not address the thornier issues of creating a legal and institutional framework that would be required for the deployment of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. It also does not address how an ASEAN peacekeeping force would be deployed in the future in the event of a crisis in either ASEAN or in ASEAN's periphery. Unlike other regional organizations or major powers, the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network did not intend to develop a peacekeeping force or arrangement but deferred this possibility to the distant future (APSC Blueprint, 2009). ASEAN states considered this strategy

prudent due to the difficulties that ASEAN states face in coordinating military forces, peacekeeping or otherwise.

The ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network while focused on increasing the peacekeeping capabilities of individual ASEAN states and enhancing, their interoperability still does not address the underlying structural problems of peacekeeping in an ASEAN context. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint called for enhanced cooperation with the United Nations in peacekeeping as well as more confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and crisis management at a regional level (APSC Blueprint, 2009). These measures while indicate that ASEAN has resolved that a greater peacekeeping presence would be in the best interest of ASEAN. ASEAN has not also adequately addressed the rules for deployment of a joint ASEAN force or under what context these forces would be deployed. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint and subsequent Action Plans of the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting have reiterated their commitment to an ASEAN peacekeeping force (APSC Blueprint, 2009). Under what circumstances this ASEAN Peacekeeping force would emerge and be deployed remain absent from discussions however.

On 18 March, 2015 Malaysia as the Chair of ASEAN suggested that ASEAN create a peacekeeping force (Moss, 2015). The Defense Minister for Malaysia Hishamuddin Hussein suggested that ASEAN could use the peacekeeping force to monitor disputes between member states including the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear Temple complex (Moss, 2015). This proposal for peacekeeping was welcomed by fellow ASEAN members including Cambodia but is unlikely to make progress beyond the rhetorical flourishes given to it by the Malaysian Defense Minister Hashimuddin Hussein (Moss, 2015). ASEAN members have not found a reason to create a peacekeeping force capable of tackling the challenges that contemporary non-traditional security threats pose to the peace and stability of Southeast Asia. In the past the threat of communist encroachment created the need for a unified front and led to several interventions by ASEAN states in support of Western powers. Contemporary ASEAN movements towards peacekeeping forces as embodied in the ASEAN Political-Security Community

Blueprint and proposals at various intervals by ASEAN states for a united peacekeeping force have not led to substantial changes in ASEAN's policy.

4.2.5 ASEAN and the United States

Peacekeeping contributions from ASEAN members to the United Nations have also increased. ASEAN has sought to make itself the center of regional multilateral security frameworks that encompass the most powerful actors in Asia, including the United States and China, and to engage more with the United Nations. Prior to the establishment of ASEAN several of the original five member states contributed peacekeepers to United Nations Peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations (Capie, 2014). Malaysia, at that time Malaya, sent peacekeepers to the United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960 and would contribute over 1,400 troops to this mission (Capie, 2014). Malaysian peacekeepers have been involved in 35 United Nations peacekeeping missions including those in Cambodia and Timor-Leste (Malaysian Peacekeeping Centre, n.d.). As of 2015 Malaysia had the 34th largest contingent of personnel in United Nations peacekeeping operations with 883 (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). This included 112 police, 24 United Nations military experts and 844 troops (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Malaysia's peacekeeping contribution in troops has slowly declined over the last 15 years with a peak contribution of 1,117 troops in 2012 (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Contributions in 2015 were still much higher than the 178 peacekeepers that were contributed in 2000 and the general trend has been one of a steady upward contribution of peacekeepers (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016).

Indonesia began contributing peacekeeping personnel even earlier beginning in 1957 when Indonesian personnel participated in the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt to observe the ceasefire there (Capie, 2014). In total Indonesia has contributed 32,181 peacekeepers to 27 United Nations missions from 1957 until 2015 (Indonesian Peacekeeping Center, n.d.). They have also had 32 casualties including ten during their initial participation in the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (Indonesian Peacekeeping Center, n.d.). Indonesia has contributed personnel to nine ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operations

(Indonesian Peacekeeping Center, n.d.). A special group of peacekeepers from the Indonesian National Armed Forces called the "Garuda Contingent" has been instrumental in several United Nations peacekeeping operations and continues to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations (Mulyana, 2012). Indonesia has stated that they intend to deploy 10,000 troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations and have the goal of being one of the top ten contributing countries to United Nations peacekeeping operations (Capie, 2014).

In 2015 Indonesia was the 12th largest contributor in total personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions with 2,727 total personnel (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Indonesia contributed 2,524 troops, as well as 35 United Nations military experts and 24 police (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Indonesia contributed only 44 peacekeepers to United Nations peacekeeping operations in 2000 at the time of the crisis in Timor-Leste (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). This low point has increased drastically to the present number of 2,727 peacekeepers in 2015 (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016).

Along with Malaysia and Indonesia, the Philippines have had a longstanding role contributing peacekeepers to United Nations peacekeeping operations (Capie, 2014). Also like Indonesia and Malaysia, and unlike other ASEAN member states, the Philippines began contributing to United Nations peacekeeping missions before the end of the cold war. The first mission that the Philippines contributed peacekeeping forces to was the United Nations Operations in the Congo in December 1962 (Belleza & Hermoso, 2015). The Philippines has contributed peacekeeping personnel to 18 missions and has contributed peacekeepers to two ongoing missions in Kashmir and Haiti (Belleza & Hermoso, 2015).

The Philippines was ranked 60th in total number of peacekeeping personnel with 180 including 137 troops, of whom 132 also constitute police personnel, and six United Nations military experts (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Over the last 15 years the number of peacekeepers that the Philippines have contributed to the United Nations has fluctuated dramatically (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database,

2016). In 2000 the Philippines contributed 749 peacekeepers largely to the UNTAET mission in Timor-Leste (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). This number dropped to a low of 196 in 2003 and then rose again to a high of 987 (United Nations Peacekeeping). In 2015 the contributions dropped to their lowest point in the last fifteen years with only 180 peacekeepers from the Philippines serving in the United Nations (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016).

Thailand has contributed to United Nations peacekeeping operations to a lesser extent than Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The contribution of Thai peacekeepers has also been more sporadic than the aforementioned countries due to the volatile political environment in Thailand (Capie, 2014). Although Thailand contributed peacekeepers to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958 this contribution was a token one and not sustained in subsequent missions (Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, n.d.). After this initial foray into peacekeeping Thailand contributed to only one other mission with United Nations peacekeepers which was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) from April 1989 to March 1990 (Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, n.d.).

Thailand increased its peacekeeping contributions to the United Nations substantially in 1991 (Capie, 2014). Thailand contributed seven military officers to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission to observe a demilitarized border following the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Peou, 2015). Prior to this Thailand had contributed troops to the coalition that repelled North Korean forces from South Korea but as addressed above the legitimacy of this operation was contested as a peacekeeping exercise. In addition, the UNIKOM mission was a prelude to the first significant peacekeeping contributions of Thailand, excluding the controversial Korean War contribution. Following the UNIKOM Thailand contributed a substantial contingent of peacekeepers to the United Nations Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and its larger follow-on mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, n.d.). These missions as addressed above supported the implementation of a Cambodian government friendly to the interests of several

ASEAN members including Thailand itself and followed several decades of intervention in Cambodia by ASEAN member states with Western complicity (Jones, 2007). Thailand's contribution to the UNTAC mission was 705 military engineers (Peou, 2015). In all Thailand contributed peacekeeping personnel to 23 United Nations peacekeeping missions from its initial contribution in 1958 to the most recent contributions in 2015 (Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, n.d.).

Thailand also had the largest contribution of any ASEAN member to the INTERFET and UNTAET missions in Timor-Leste (Niumphradit, 2002). Thailand contributed the deputy- commander, Major General Songkitti Jagabattra to the INTERFET mission (Niumphradit, 2002). Thailand also contributed the commander, Major General Boonsrang Niumphradit, to the UNTAET mission (Niumphradit, 2002). In 2000 Thai peacekeepers in United Nations peacekeeping missions numbered 799 then dropped to 28 in 2004 to rise again to 819 in 2011 (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). The rise in the number of Thai peacekeepers was due to the contribution of 800 Thai troops to the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur which was a hybrid mission sponsored by the United Nations and the African Union (Peou, 2015). After this high, contribution Thai peacekeeping contributions again dropped. As of 2015 24 peacekeepers from Thailand served in United Nations peacekeeping missions (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Of these personnel nine were police contributions, seven were military experts, and eight were troops (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016).

Thailand's contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions have been contingent on the domestic political environment of Thailand (Jones, 2007). The tumultuous politics of Thailand has forced the Thai military and political establishment to focus more on what have been perceived as domestic threats rather than engaging in international security dilemmas (Jones, 2007). Thai contributions were most often apportioned to regional peacekeeping operations such as those to Timor-Leste missions in INTERFET and UNTAET and the UNAMIC and UNTAC missions in Cambodia (Peou, 2015). These missions as they took place in the Southeast Asian region were perceived as more pertinent to the interests of policy-makers in Thailand (Jones, 2010).

The contribution of 800 peacekeepers to Darfur for the United Nations-African Union hybrid mission in 2011 indicated that Thailand had begun to opt for a more vigorous peacekeeping presence abroad (Peou, 2015). This was the most significant contribution of Thai peacekeeping forces to a United Nations mission outside of the Asia-Pacific region (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). The political crisis in subsequent years has curtailed the deployment of Thai peacekeepers to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Thailand has however sought to develop a more active peacekeeping presence in the United Nations in order to be seated as a non-permanent representative on the United Nations Security Council in 2017-2018 (Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, n.d.).

Singapore along with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand was one of the original five signatories to the ASEAN (Bangkok) Declaration and one of the original ASEAN members (ASEAN Declaration, 1967). Singapore contributed to its first peacekeeping operation in 1989 (Capie, 2014). This mission was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) (Capie, 2014). During the UNTAET mission in Timor-Leste Singapore provided 95 peacekeeping personnel which was the third highest number of the four ASEAN member states that contributed peacekeepers to the UNTAET mission (Niumphradit, 2002). Singapore's highest participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations was in 2003 when 192 peacekeepers participated in operations (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). After this the number of Singaporean peacekeepers dropped significantly never rising above 25 (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016).

As of 2015 Singapore contributed no peacekeeping personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Singapore has however signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations which committed Singapore to," placing planning officers, military observers, medical personnel and police officers on standby to support UN peacekeeping missions" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, n.d.). Singapore was one of only seven nations to have signed the Memorandum of Understanding on United Nations Standby Arrangements. Singapore

has also provided high level personnel to United Nations missions including a Deputy Force Commander, a Deputy Chief of Staff, a Force Commander and a Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary-General for the Security Sector and Rule of Law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, n.d.).

Brunei Darussalam was the sixth member of ASEAN to join in 1984 following its independence from the United Kingdom. Brunei Darussalam prior to independence was reliant on the United Kingdom to manage its foreign affairs and security and still has British Gurkha units stationed in the sultanate (Capie, 2014). In 2008 Brunei Darussalam contributed peacekeepers for the first time to United Nations peacekeeping operations (Capie, 2014). The peacekeepers from Brunei Darussalam were deployed in Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon a longstanding mission begun 1978 to verify Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). The Bruneian deployment served under Malaysian command (Capie, 2014). Brunei Darussalam has also sent peacekeepers to the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao a mission under the auspices of Malaysia (Abubakar, 2006).

Brunei Darussalam has preferred to work closely with Malaysia in peacekeeping operations within the United Nations peacekeeping framework. As of 2015 Brunei Darussalam deployed 30 peacekeepers, all of them troops, to the UNIFIL mission and ranked as the 88th largest troop contributing state to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Brunei Darussalam's contributions have increased steadily from its initial deployment in 2008. Per capita Brunei Darussalam contributed the highest number of peacekeepers of any ASEAN state although this was due to the relatively small population compared to other members such as Indonesia.

The newer ASEAN members have until recently not contributed peacekeepers to the United Nations (Capie, 2014). Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were zones of intense conflict between capitalist and communist forces during the cold war era (Jones, 2010). Communist guerrillas were able to overthrow first colonial regimes and then establish communist states aligned with either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China (Jones, 2010). The proxy wars that raged in these countries prevented them from sending peacekeepers to the United Nations which

itself was paralyzed by cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Myanmar also did not contribute peacekeepers to the United Nations due to the isolation of the regime by its authoritarian, military rulers (Tucker, 2001). The Union of Burma, the name of the state that would later be renamed the Union of Myanmar, became independent on the fourth of January 1948 with a democratic government holding multi-party elections (Tucker, 2001). U Thant, from the Union of Burma, became the third Secretary- General of the United Nations after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld. Prior to this U Thant had served as the Union of Burma's Permanent Representative to the United Nations as well as Secretary to the Prime Minister. During his tenure as Secretary- General from 30 November 1961 to the 31st of December 1971 he presided over the most intense era of cold war rivalry including the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. He was also the first Secretary- General from Asia and one of only two Asians who have served as Secretary- Generals of the United Nations the other being Secretary- General Ban Ki-Moon.

This initial period of engagement with the international community was ended with a coup on the 2 March 1962 by General Ne Win who pursued a policy of isolation (Tucker, 2001). During this time contributions of peacekeepers to the United Nations were non-existent. The admission of Myanmar to ASEAN on the 23rd of June 1997 was fraught with controversy due to the repressions of dissidence and the lack of democratic reform in the country. Myanmar's preoccupation with stifling internal dissent from those calling for political reform and ethnic separatists has created a myopic view of peace and security. There have been, therefore, no efforts to send peacekeepers to the United Nations especially due to frequent criticisms from the United Nations on the violations of human rights and civil liberties in Myanmar.

Recent efforts aimed at constitutional reform and democratic elections have led to some progress towards Myanmar reengaging with the international community, especially the United Nations. In 2015 for the first time Myanmar was invited by the United Nations to send peacekeeping troops to engage in peace operations. As of 2015 Myanmar sent a total of four peacekeepers to participate in United Nations missions (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors

Database, 2016). These four peacekeepers included two military experts who served in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country, 2016). Two troops from Myanmar were deployed to the Republic of South Sudan as part of the United Nations Mission to the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country, 2016).

Though the contribution to United Nations peacekeeping by Myanmar has been, to date, a token one it has signified a nascent opening for the participation of the country in peace and security operations under the auspices of the United Nations. Like Vietnam the presence of peacekeepers from Myanmar has political significance and also the potential for a larger peacekeeping contribution due to the large size of Myanmar's population which amounts to 56,320,206 (Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook [CIA World Factbook], n.d.).

Vietnam abolished its constitutional provision in 2014 that forbade the service of Vietnamese military personnel in any other force but the Vietnam People's Armed Forces (Thayer, 2014). This allowed Vietnamese military personnel to officially join United Nations peacekeeping missions (Capie, 2014). Vietnam has been the largest and most consequential ASEAN state to have not engaged in peacekeeping operations (Capie, 2014). The size and military capabilities of the Vietnam People's Armed Forces made its absence from United Nations peacekeeping missions all the more conspicuous especially in contrast to the trend toward greater participation in peacekeeping operations by other ASEAN members (Capie, 2014). Vietnam has since made peacekeeping a priority of its security policy and contributed five peacekeepers to United Nation missions in 2015 from an initial contribution of just one peacekeeper in 2014 (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). These five peacekeeping personnel included three troops and two United Nations military experts (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). These peacekeepers were deployed to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic [UN MINUSCA], n.d.).

Vietnam's contribution to United Nations peacekeeping forces coincided also included the opening of the Vietnam Peacekeeping Centre in 2014 (Maxwell, 2015). The United States worked to support Vietnamese peacekeeping activities through the Global Peace Operations Initiatives (GOPI) an assistance program funded by the United States Department of State (United States [US] Department of State Global Peace Operations Initiative [GOPI], n.d.). Under GOPI Vietnam was given financial support for the building of the Vietnam Peacekeeping Centre (Capie, 2014). Vietnam's participation in peacekeeping operations in conjunction with the United Nations and with the support of the United States has been a major recent development for peacekeeping in ASEAN (Capie, 2014). The change has coincided with greater tensions between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China concerning territorial disputes in the South China Sea and a strengthening of bilateral relations with the United States and Japan.

The Laos People's Democratic Republic has not contributed peacekeepers to any United Nations mission (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Laos remains the lone member of ASEAN not to have engaged in any peacekeeping missions under United Nations auspices (UN Peacekeeping Troop and Police Contributors Database, 2016). Laos has the third smallest population of ASEAN but unlike Brunei Darussalam and Singapore, who are the smallest members of ASEAN in population, the country has a low level of economic development. Laos consistently ranks as both one of the poorest ASEAN members as well as one of the least democratic (Lintner, 2003). Laos was the Chair for ASEAN beginning in 2016. The prospects for Laos developing a peacekeeping force remain unlikely in the near future as the country lacks the resources that other newer ASEAN members have in terms of population size, economic strength or military capacity. Cambodia would be the closest to Laos in terms of population and economic size but the country has made far more progress in contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations.

4.3 ASEAN and the OAS

4.3.1 Introduction

When compared with other regional organizations ASEAN has not developed an institutional arrangement for peacekeeping. Individual member states have engaged in peacekeeping operations primarily under the auspices of the United Nations but also with ad hoc coalitions, other regional organizations and states including the United States. The reasons for ASEAN's lack of an institutional framework for peacekeeping are primarily rooted in the historical evolution of the organization and the structure of the organization. ASEAN has failed to redress its deficit in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In spite of recent advances by individual member states and as a regional organization, ASEAN will not alter their policy of non-intervention and non-interference. Individual ASEAN member states will instead rely on selective engagement in peacebuilding operations under the auspices of outside partners such as the United States, Australia, the United Nations, and the European Union. As has been the case in the past, ASEAN will rely on others to initiate peacebuilding functions in the ASEAN neighborhood. This will curtail the influence of the regional organization and undermine their influence as a partner for peace and stability in the region.

ASEAN's emphasis on post- conflict and civilianized peacebuilding operations faces another impediment. ASEAN has been debilitated by the human rights violations committed by its member states and the lack of democratic governance by member states. The recent efforts to develop a strengthened human rights framework in ASEAN have not been adequate to address the considerable challenges that have proliferated in ASEAN and in the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN has been inhibited in its ability to address the new security challenges due to the lack of political will of member states to coordinate peacekeeping and peacebuilding at a regional level and the lack of democratic reform within the ASEAN states.

A comparative analysis of how peacekeeping has been conducted in ASEAN and the Organization of American States is beneficial in showing how the institutional arrangement of ASEAN precludes a more engaged peacekeeping presence in the region. The comparative analysis will focus on the way that both

organizations, similar in many respects, have yet diverged in recent years in their respective approaches to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. ASEAN has not developed a region wide mechanism to facilitate peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations. ASEAN's approach has been a piecemeal one that emphasis building state peacekeeping capacities for the eventual creation of an ASEAN standby force. This is contrasted with the OAS where the regional organization has developed organizational approaches to peacekeeping and the issues of democracy and human rights.

ASEAN has not yet developed the institutional capabilities for a peacekeeping force. A number of factors have stood in the way of ASEAN developing a peacekeeping force capable of engaging in peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions in ASEAN or in ASEAN's neighborhood. The first as has been addressed above has been ASEAN's emphasis on non- intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. This non-interference and non-intervention has been codified through the foundational documents of ASEAN and only slightly modified by the ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN Charter, however, does not provide for any mechanisms whereby ASEAN can engage, as a regional organization, in peacekeeping operations that would involve any of the scope or breadth warranted by a state collapse.

ASEAN must rely on member states to enact reforms to ensure democracy, human rights and human security. The inability of ASEAN to in anyway influence the behavior of member states means that ASEAN as a regional organization has been paralyzed by the behavior of the member states that comprise the organization. The recent military coup in Thailand, ongoing human rights violations in Myanmar and the imposition of Sharia law in Brunei Darussalam indicate that ASEAN member states violate the principles of ASEAN with impunity. ASEAN's emphasis on creating norms and confidence building measures will not alter the inability to develop peacekeeping or peace building infrastructure in the region. ASEAN relies on member states to implement norms of democracy, human rights and human security which have been identified as crucial components of ASEAN's peacebuilding agenda. Member states have, however, been the most egregious violators of these peace building goals and act with impunity. ASEAN's

reluctance to administer the least chastisement to member states bodes ill for the creation of regional mechanisms for peacekeeping or peace building.

The treaties of ASEAN up to the ASEAN Charter do not provide any mechanisms for developing a regional peacekeeping force. This has been true of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint as well. In spite of the official rhetoric, individual ASEAN states, especially during the Cold War era, engaged in interventions outside their national borders and meddled in the domestic affairs of different states. This was especially apparent during the Cold War era. The rationale for such interventions and peacekeeping missions was to prevent the rise of communist states that threatened the national interests of ASEAN members (Jones, 2010). These interventions were also conducted with the support of Western powers (Jones, 2010). This has been clearly demonstrated with interventions in Cambodia and Laos by Thailand which was supported by other ASEAN members as well as the unilateral and illegal annexation of Portuguese Timor by Indonesia (Jones, 2010). These interventions were conducted with the support of Western powers in general and especially condoned by the United States (Jones, 2010).

ASEAN also lacks the organizational structure allowing it to create operable peacekeeping missions within or without the borders of ASEAN. The deficiencies of ASEAN's organizational structure as it has been constituted become apparent when compared to other regional organizations. One salient comparison is between ASEAN and the Organization of American States. A comparison with the Organization of American States makes clear that the organizational structure of ASEAN as constituted has impeded the creation of a peacekeeping force or peacebuilding operations.

A comparative analysis between ASEAN and the OAS best conveys how ASEAN's goals for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are not substantiated by any efforts to change the institutional framework or organizational structure that inhibits the realization of these goals. A comparison between the OAS and ASEAN is salient due to the similar membership composition of each organization and the remarkably similar histories of the two organizations during the Cold War era. Though the OAS and ASEAN both share these similar membership profiles and historical trajectories in relation to peacekeeping, the two regional

organizations show a divergence in the critical area of organizational structure and institutional protocols. These divergences have allowed the OAS to progress in peacekeeping and show how ASEAN has lacked the ability to progress in its agenda to build a peacekeeping force or make substantial contributions to regional peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations. The root causes of the divergence in strategies towards peacekeeping may be attributed to the greater degree of pan-American cooperation and dialogue in the member states of the OAS. This has been facilitated by the use of common languages, political democracy in member states and an intellectual tradition of pan- Americanism stretching back to the independence of Latin American states in the early 1800's.

4.3.2 Membership Profiles of ASEAN and the OAS

The organizations share many of the same features and challenges for peacekeeping. One of the significant similarities between ASEAN and the OAS has been the diverse membership profiles of both organizations. The two regional organizations encompass huge geographic distances and thus variations. Like ASEAN the OAS must contend with the magnitude of differences between member states. All 35 member states of the Western Hemisphere have signed and ratified the Organization of American States Charter (OAS Who We Are Member States, 2016). This grouping of states extends 14,000 kilometers (8,700 miles) from its northernmost point in Canada to its southernmost point in Chile ("America", The World Book Encyclopedia, p. 407, 2006) This vast geographic space has created logistics hurdles and lends itself to the creation of sub-regional initiatives and dynamics.

The sheer geographic size of the OAS has been complemented by the gap in income and development between its member states. The OAS has some of the most developed nations in the world and some of the least developed. The highest developed states in the OAS included the United States and Canada at 8th and 9th place on the United Nations Human Development Report Index respectively (UN Human Development Report Index, 2014). Somewhat further below them were the states of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay which ranked 40th, 42nd and 52nd respectively (UN Human Development Report Index, 2014). At the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index were the states of Honduras and Haiti which ranked 131st and 163rd respectively (UN Human Development Report Index, 2014).

This composition is paralleled in ASEAN where Singapore ranks as 11th on the United Nations Human Development Index followed by Brunei Darussalam at 31st and Malaysia at 62nd (UN Human Development Report Index, 2014). Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam rank 93rd, 110th, 115th and 116th respectively (UN Human Development Report Index, 2014). At the lower reaches of the United Nations Human Development Index are ranked Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar which are 141st, 143rd and 148th respectively (UN Human Development Report Index, 2014).

In both regional organizations the disparity in human development as matched by the United Nations Human Development Index rankings is reinforced by both the per capita income of states and the overall size of economies. In the OAS the Gross Domestic Product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity in the United States and Canada was $54,629.5 and $44,057.2 respectively (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). These two states were the highest per capita incomes for the OAS and contrasted starkly with the lowest Gross Domestic Product per capita incomes adjusted for purchasing power parity of Haiti which stood at $1,731.8 (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). ASEAN has as great as great a disparity as the OAS with Singapore and Brunei Darussalam having a GDP per capita (PPP) of $82,763.4 and $71,184.8 respectively (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). The lowest ranked members of ASEAN for GDP per capita (PPP) as of 2014 were Cambodia and Laos at $3,262.6 and $5,320.9 respectively (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). This however does not reflect the GDP per capita (PPP) of Myanmar for which there was no information in 2014 (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016).

Income inequality between states is also exacerbated by the high level of income inequality between individuals within states and also between regions within states in both regional organizations. The size of populations and economies are also similar between the OAS and ASEAN. The economic, political and military power of the United States has been the focal point of the OAS and has determined the characteristic of the organization. The United States has played an inordinately significant role in creating and shaping the dynamics of the OAS including its peacekeeping. The United States has the largest economy in the world valued at $17.419 trillion (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). The United States economy by

GDP is larger than the economies of all members of the OAS combined (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). This is more startling given that the OAS has some of the largest economies in the world including Brazil, Canada, and Mexico which ranked as the 7th, 11th and 15th largest economies in the world (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). The smallest economy of the OAS was the tiny Caribbean island state of Dominica which had a GDP of $524 million a miniscule quantity compared with the United States (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016)

ASEAN also has disparities in the overall size of the economies of member states. Indonesia has a nominal GDP of $888 billion and is the 16th largest economy in the world but the largest economy in ASEAN itself (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). Thailand ranks as the 29th largest economy in the world and 2nd in ASEAN with a nominal GDP of $404 billion (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). Following ASEAN is Malaysia which ranked as the 35th largest economy in the world and the 3rd in ASEAN with a nominal GDP of $338 billion (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). Singapore in spite of its small population was the 36th largest economy in the world and the 4th largest in ASEAN with a nominal GDP of $307 billion (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). These three members, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, had a combined nominal GDP of $1.049 trillion which exceeded the nominal GDP of the largest member Indonesia. The disparity of the overall size of the economies in ASEAN was not as great as it was in the OAS with the United States economic dominance (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). The smallest economy of ASEAN, Laos People's Democratic Republic, stood at 134th globally in size of nominal GDP at $11 billion (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016). The size of Indonesia's economy was more than 80 times the size of Laos's economy (World Bank GDP ranking, 2016).

Both ASEAN and the OAS also share the large difference in population size of their largest and smallest members. The United States was the state with the third largest population in the world, excluding the European Union in 2015 with a population of the 321, 368, 864 (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] World Factbook, n.d.). The OAS also includes several other populous states including Brazil with the world's sixth most populous state with 204,259,812 persons (CIA World Fact book, n.d.). The third most populous state in the OAS and the 12th most populous

state in the world is Mexico with a population of 121,736,809 persons (CIA World Fact book, n.d.). The smallest states in population in the OAS include Saints Kitts and Nevis which ranked 210th in population size with only 51,936 persons (World Bank, 2016). Dominica ranked only slightly higher in population with 73,607 persons and placed at 202nd in global population size (CIA World Factbook, n.d.). Overall the OAS has a total population of 910,720,588 persons (CIA World Factbook, n.d.).

ASEAN also has a great divergence in the size of member states with the smallest in population, Brunei Darussalam having 429,646 persons and ranked as 175th among nations in population size (CIA World Fact book, n.d.). The largest nations in ASEAN by order of their population sizes includes Indonesia which ranked as the world's fourth most populous nation after the United States with 255,993,674 persons (CIA World Fact book, n.d.). This was followed by the Philippines which were ranked as the 13th most populous nation in the world with 100,998,376 persons (CIA World Fact book, n.d.). Vietnam was ranked as the 15th most populous nation in the world with 94,348,853 persons living there (CIA World Fact book, n.d.). Altogether ASEAN had a population of approximately 625,000,000 (Members ASEAN, n.d.).

The populations both in size and cultural differences represent another example of how ASEAN and the OAS are in many respects similar. In spite of ASEAN's oft repeated declaration that it is the most diverse regional organization in the world the OAS is perhaps more striking in its diversity. While ASEAN has a proliferation of cultures in its region including languages, religions, and ethnicities and so on these differences do not often cohere into regional sub-groupings. There is no 'Malay' bloc for instance within ASEAN. Nor is there a 'Theravada Buddhist' bloc within the regional organization. At the regional level the diversity of languages and cultures that are confined to a nation-state such as Indonesia, only infrequently impinge on the regional level, most often in the form a crisis or ethnic separatism. At the state level ASEAN's diversity has coalesced around the diverse nation-states. The key identity at the regional level is therefore the nation-states themselves who often think of themselves as unique repositories of their ethno-linguistic national heritage.

In the OAS there is just as much diversity at the level just below the nation-state as there is in ASEAN. There are thousands of indigenous minorities in the

Americas who still speak their own native languages (OAS Who We Are Member States, 2016). Several states have indigenous American languages as co-official languages of the state or as official regional languages such as in Peru (Quecha & Aymara), Paraguay (Guarani), Bolivia (over 33 official indigenous languages), and Canada (nine official languages at the regional level) (OAS Who We Are Member States, 2016). These languages are coterminous with separate indigenous ethnic groups as well. Pan- American indigenous movements have been late in coming due to the discrimination against indigenous peoples and languages and the isolation of indigenous communities restricted to the confines of reservations and separate nation-states.

However, the most important division of the OAS has also been divided by the divide between the North American English-speaking states of the United States and Canada and the Latin American Spanish and Portuguese speaking states. This divide reflects the linguistic, religious, historical and cultural divide of the Americas from the era before independence when the Spanish and Portuguese colonized Latin America and the English were able to colonize the North.

This is in contrast to ASEAN where each nation-state, as delineated by colonial borders, perceived itself as a unique cultural and linguistic entity and sought to reinforce this uniqueness with a distinct nationalism. Indonesia was an anomaly during the Sukarno era when it sought to create a Malay super-state by subsuming Malaya who it considered a colonial creation and therefore illegitimate (Subandrio, 1964). Within ASEAN states a uniformity based on a nationalist ideology was imposed but there was little to unite these states into groupings within the region. The salient groupings were cold war ideologies based on capitalism or communism not on pan-Southeast Asian ideologies.

The OAS differs from ASEAN in this respect due to the colonial history of the regional organization. The elites of the colonies in Latin America were descended by and large from Spanish and Portuguese nobility and shared the same language, customs and religion. Spanish and Portuguese rule was uniform across Latin American and so these states shared an intimate connection to the metropole. During the wars of independence, the Spanish colonies sought to create a confederation of American states. Simon Bolivar is celebrated as a national hero

across South America and has been seen as a pan- American figure. Even the larger states of Brazil and the United States show the ability to form large cohesive states that, in spite of their many sub-regional divisions, were united by a single language and culture.

Both ASEAN and the OAS have had to develop ways to incorporate diverse cultural membership. With ASEAN this diversity manifests itself, by and large, through ten nation-states each with their own unique identities as represented by their languages, history, culture and religions. These states do not form, for political purposes, any cohesive regional blocs along the lines of language or religion which would be the most obvious, cohesive pan- regional identities. There is in ASEAN, no Malay bloc for instance or 'Islamic' or 'Theravada Buddhist' bloc. The cultural divisions, such as they are, have been confined to either the nation-state or sub-national levels with ethnic minorities striving to create their own nation-states based on a specific ethnicity. This can be seen in the case of Malay-Muslim separatist movements in Thailand, Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines in Mindanao, and the movement towards an independent sultanate by Filipino Muslims in Sarawak.

4.3.3 Peacekeeping in ASEAN and the OAS

The OAS and ASEAN bear remarkable similarities when their historical peacekeeping trajectories are compared. Both regional organizations were formed following the Second World War in the context of a massive wave of decolonization that enabled states in Africa and Asia to gain independence. The five initial ASEAN states, with the exception of Thailand, gained independence following the Second World War. The 21 states, later to become 35, which signed the OAS Charter in 1948, were independent long before their formation of a regional organization (OAS Charter, 1948). They were however subject to frequent cases of neo-colonial intervention by the United States. This included the occupation of the Dominican Republic from 1916-1924 (Fortna, 1993).

In the case of both regional organizations the states that comprised their membership sought to maintain a degree of sovereignty. The weakness of most states that comprised the OAS and ASEAN was acutely felt by the regimes, democratic or not, that ruled the countries. Centuries of foreign domination and

exploitation had left an indelible mark on the elites that ruled the countries and they sought to create autonomous, sovereign entities. The weakness of state identity and legitimacy, especially for newly independent ASEAN states, also strengthened the resolve of national leaders to prevent any intervention or interference from foreign states, organizations or entities.

ASEAN and the OAS were also wracked by the global rivalry between communism and capitalism that came to define geopolitics from the end of the Second World War until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The rivalry between the two global superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were overriding security and peace concerns for the two regional organizations during their formative years. The social and political ills of these regimes were seen through the prism of cold war era ideological tensions between capitalism and communism and national elites were complicit in manipulating superpower rivalry to serve their ends. This was as much the case in the OAS as in ASEAN with the caveat that the power of the United States in the Western hemisphere was far greater due to proximity than it was in ASEAN and Southeast Asia which was more distant. This did not prevent the United States from putting a greater importance on preventing the spread of communism in Southeast Asia than in Latin America due to the People's Republic of China and the need to protect vital shipping lanes.

Starting with the inception of the OAS in 1948 and that of ASEAN in 1967 the dilemma that has manifested itself in both regional organizations was the support of human rights and democracy as against that of non-intervention in sovereign states. The Charter of the OAS, just as the ASEAN Declaration, enshrined the principles of non-interference and non-intervention in the states of the America's. The Charter was drafted in Bogotá, Colombia on the 30th of April, 1948 and was signed by the 21 member states of the Organization of the Americas (OAS Charter, 1948). All 35 members of the OAS would later ratify the OAS Charter (OAS Charter, 1948).

The Charter had several historical antecedents that had provided for a framework of regional cooperation in the Americas stretching back to 1826 and the Congress of Panama, and including security components. Article 19 of the Charter of the OAS explicitly stated, "No State or group of States has the right to intervene,

directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State" (OAS Charter, chap.4, art. 19, 1948). This included the prohibition against "armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements" (OAS Charter, chap. 4, art. 19, 1948). Article 21 of the Charter likewise stated, "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever" (OAS Charter, chap. 4, art. 21, 1948). Like the ASEAN Declaration but in language even more forceful the OAS Charter held up the principles of non-interference and non-intervention.

Critical differences, however, were apparent even in the beginning between ASEAN and the OAS. The most glaring difference was that the OAS began with a stronger mandate in the form of a charter. The charter being signed and ratified by member states endowed the OAS with a stronger legal mandate than the declaration of ASEAN. Also the OAS Charter structured the organization around the principle of representative democracy. This emphasis on democratic governance was a critical difference between the OAS and ASEAN. The OAS Charter stated under Chapter two Article three that, "The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy" (OAS Charter, chap. 2, art. 3, 1948). Elsewhere under Chapter One Article Two the Charter stated that its purpose was to, "promote and consolidate representative democracy" with the caveat added, "with due respect for the principle of nonintervention" (OAS Charter, chap. 1, art. 2, 1948).

The OAS Charter also established decision- making to be conducted by a General Assembly where under Chapter nine Article 56, "All Member States have the right to be represented in the General Assembly" and "Each State has the right to one vote" (OAS Charter, chap. 9, art. 56, 1948). The OAS Charter calls for decisions to be approved by an absolute majority or by a two-thirds vote under certain circumstances (OAS Charter, 1948). The other organs of the OAS which serve to consult and implement decisions made by the General Assembly are also subject to two-thirds majority voting to render their decisions legal (OAS Charter, 1948).

The decision making process was made both more efficient for peacekeeping operations and more democratic by these provisions in the OAS Charter. American states were protected, in principle, from undue influence that would threaten their territorial sovereignty or in any way interfere in the domestic operations of their states by Articles 19 and Articles 21 as well as other Articles (OAS Charter, 1948). It was therefore unnecessary and impractical to have a system of consensus and consultation as had been implemented in ASEAN and continues to the present day. The creation of democratic majority rule also provided a regional model for state governments to follow.

This democratic institutionalization of peacekeeping allowed member states from Latin America the ability to engage with the United States in a democratic regional venue and to diminish the ability of the United States to dominate the organization through military or economic means. This was clear during the intervention in the Dominican Republic which was undertaken with the consent of the Organization of American States in 1965.

The events that precipitated the crisis included the assassination of the dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina who had ruled the Dominican Republic from 1930 until 30th of May 1961 (Fortna, 1993). After his assassination the Dominican Republic was ruled by a military government until the election of Juan Emilio Bosch Gaviño as the President of the Dominican Republic in February 1963 (Fortna, 1993). Bosch was overthrown in a military coup who installed Donald Reid Cabral (Fortna, 1993). Supporters of the ousted Bosch demonstrated in April 1965 leading to popular unrest that threatened to overthrow the government of Cabral and called for the return of Bosch who had been exiled (Fortna, 1993).

The United States sent a force of 400 Marines to secure the embassy and foreign personnel who wanted to be evacuated (Fortna, 1993). At the behest of the Dominican government the United States convened a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS after sending in the United States 82nd Airborne division to secure the city of Santo Domingo (Fortna, 1993). The Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS pushed for the creation of an Inter-American Peace Force to help stabilize the country and restore democratic governance (Fortna, 1993). The creation of this force was supported by a two-thirds vote as required by the OAS and

included support from Latin American states (Fortna, 1993). The Inter-American Peace Force was largely funded by the United States with supplementary funding from Brazil and relied mostly on troop contributions from the United States and other Latin American states including Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Costa Rica and El Salvador (Fortna, 1993). All these states contributed personnel either military or civil (Fortna, 1993).

The role of the United States in orchestrating and coordinating the restoration of democratic governance in the Dominican Republic was clear from the outset of the mission (Fortna, 1993; MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). As with peacekeeping forces in Southeast Asia the United States supported the intervention in regimes in order to pursue national interests and to prevent the threat of communist expansion. A distinction can be made, however, between the interventions of the United States in Southeast Asia and in the case of the OAS due to the membership of the United States in the latter organization. This membership required that the United States at least formally adhere to the institutional roles provided by the organization. The United States was required to garner the support of like-minded Latin American states in order to implement its goals for an Inter-American Peace Force.

The intervention by the Inter-American Peace Force enabled the stabilization of Santo Domingo which paved the way for the reconciliation and the creation of an interim government under Héctor Rafael García-Godoy Cáceres on the 31st of August, 1965 (Fortna, 1993). Elections were held and monitored by the OAS which led to the victory of Joaquín Antonio Balaguer Ricardo in the Presidential elections held on the 1st of June, 1966 (Fortna, 1993). The OAS was instrumental in implementing a peace agreement, staging the elections and facilitating a return to democracy in the Dominican Republic (Fortna, 1993). The Dominican Republic remains a democratic state and has not lapsed into authoritarian or military dictatorship following the intervention of the OAS.

4.3.4 OAS Post-Cold War

Following the Cold War the OAS diverged from ASEAN in its willingness to promote democratic governance among its member states. Two key changes made were made to the legal and institutional structure that enhanced the ability of the OAS to promote democratic governance amongst member states. The

first of these was Resolution 1080 adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS on the 5th of June, 1991 at the fifth plenary session in Santiago, Chile (Organization of American States [OAS] Resolution 1080, 1991). Resolution 1080 became known thereafter as the 'Santiago Declaration' (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). The Santiago Declaration was instrumental after the cold war in setting the OAS on a path of democratic governance.

The Santiago Declaration made provisions for the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states. (OAS Resolution 1080, 1991).

The Santiago Declaration further called for the Permanent Council of the OAS to convene an *ad hoc* meeting of the Foreign Ministers Meeting or of a special session of the General Assembly within ten days of the occurrence in question (OAS Resolution 1080, 1991). The Santiago Declaration left it at the discretion of the Foreign Ministers or the General Assembly as to what actions to take though whatever these actions were they had to be in accordance with the Charter of the OAS and international law (OAS Resolution 1080, 1991). The purpose of the Santiago Declaration was to, "to preserve and strengthen democratic systems, based on international solidarity and cooperation" (OAS Resolution 1080, 1991).

The Santiago Declaration was a powerful mechanism to support democracy in OAS member states (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). In the event of a coup d'état or the overthrow of a democratically elected government the Permanent Council of the OAS was mandated to respond within ten days and to decide upon a course of action (OAS Resolution 1080, 1991). This amounted to the first steps to creating a regional organization with a solid grounding in representative democratic governance and an emphasis on the rights of the populations rather than a sole focus on state rights.

The Santiago Declaration was followed up with further reforms leading to an organization more responsive to democratic governance. A key provision of this was the protocol of amendment made to OAS Charter in Washington

D.C., signed on the 14th of December 1992 at the sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly, which became known as the Washington Protocol (OAS Charter, Washington Protocol, 1992). The Washington Protocol went into effect after its ratification on the 25th of September 1997 (OAS Charter, Washington Protocol, 1992). The Washington Protocol under Chapter Three Article nine called for the suspension of any member state whose:

> Democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force
> may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in the
> sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the
> Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as
> in the commissions, working groups and any other bodies established.
> (OAS Charter, Washington Protocol, chap. 3, art. 9, 1992).

The Washington Protocol made participation in the OAS contingent upon each member state being a democratically elected government. A state could be suspended by a two-thirds vote if the democratically elected government were to be overthrown. This resolution, though not strictly a form of peacekeeping is consonant with the more broadly defined nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding that has been prevalent from the end of the cold war. It also helps to create peace and security in the region by making isolating states that overthrow legitimate democratic governments. A critical problem facing peacekeeping and peacebuilding today has been the risk of state collapse or state failure and the ills that accompany this. In the case of the OAS, the Washington Protocol by insisting that governments in the region have been democratically elected reduces the risk of conflict in these states. If the governments of the OAS are democratically elected, then there is less likelihood that they will be seen as illegitimate and their rule contested through violence.

ASEAN stands in stark contrast to the mechanisms implemented by the OAS. In ASEAN there remains no mechanism to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the governments of member states. Such a mechanism would constitute a volte face for the organization and has been inconceivable as ASEAN is constituted at the present time. The 2014 Coup d'état in Thailand illustrates the lack of any

mechanism to censure or chastise ASEAN members for violations of democratic governance (Radtke, 2014). In 2014 the elected government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was overthrown by a military coup d'état and replaced with a transitional government that eventually was replaced with military rule led by General Prayuth Chan O Cha (Panda, 2014). ASEAN was unable to muster an effective response to this removal of a legitimate government. Cambodia also faced elections in 2013 that were considered fraudulent by the international community and saw the countries autocratic leader Hun Sen remain in power in spite of acts of intimidation and voting irregularities (Meyn, 2013). The response of ASEAN to both of these cases points to the lack of influence of the regional organization and its inability to prevent the erosion of rights of the citizens of ASEAN member states.

Part of the difficulty lies in the number of non-democratic regimes that make up ASEAN at the present including some of the least democratic regimes in the world including Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia which were ranked as the 155th, 128th, 114th, and 113th least democratic regimes globally (The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, 2014). Even the more prosperous states of ASEAN, however, are considered flawed democracies, at best, by global standards including Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam (The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, 2014).

The fundamental problem, however, is not that ASEAN includes states that are not democratic. The OAS also includes states that are not democratic by global standards including Cuba which ranked as the 129th least democratic country in the world (The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, 2014). The problem has been that ASEAN has no institutional, legal means of helping member states improve democratic governance. The ASEAN Charter while stressing the importance of peace, stability and security as well as the importance of legitimate governments has no mechanism to ensure that governments in the region are democratically elected or adhere to democratic standards.

The Santiago Declaration has been employed in four occasions where the legitimate democratic government of an OAS member state was overthrown or replaced through coercive and illegitimate means (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). The first case where the Santiago Declaration was utilized was in Haiti

in 1991 (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). During this instance the OAS supported the reinstatement of the democratically elected government of President Jean Bertrand Aristide after he was overthrown by unelected Joseph Raoul Cédras (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000).

The second instance where the Santiago Declaration was utilized was in 1992 in Peru where the government of President Alberto Fujimori carried out a series of non-democratic measures in order to strengthen his position in defeating communist guerrillas the *sendero luminoso* (Shining Path) (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). The OAS called for Fujimori to desist in his extra-judicial campaign against the *Sendero Luminoso* and restore congress and the cabinet that he had unilaterally dismissed (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000).

In Guatemala the OAS sought to restore the constitutional government that had been suspended by the then President Jorge Antonio Serrano Elías (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). Guatemala had been plagued by a long standing civil war that had not yet subsided during the time that Elías became president in 1993. The *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteco (URNG)* was active in supporting the cause of indigenous groups which created reprisals by the military of Guatemala (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). Political violence and the threat of military control led to the suspension of the constitution by Elías in 1993 (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). After this the OAS was able to work with international partners to have the constitution restored and the supervision of elections in 1995 which saw a democratically elected candidate Álvaro Enrique Arzú Yrigoyen become President of Guatemala (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). The results of OAS pressure resulted in the stabilization of the country and a return to multi-party elections under the constitution of Guatemala (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000).

Another instance where the OAS used the Santiago Declaration to effect was in Paraguay (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). The country of Paraguay had been ruled under the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). After the overthrow of Stroessner by the military the first democratic elections were held in May 1989 (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). After this, elections were held after the creation of a new constitution in 1993 which resulted in the election of Juan Carlos Wasmosy Monti (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). Wasmosy

was however deposed by the military leaders who still wielded power in Paraguay especially General Lino César Oviedo Silva (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). Oviedo threatened to seize power after being demoted by Wasmosy (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). The OAS invoked the Santiago Declaration and moved quickly to preempt any threat to the democratically elected government of Wasmosy in the face of threats by Oviedo (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000). This swift use of the Santiago Declaration forced Oviedo to relinquish any aspirations he had entertained of overthrowing the government of Wasmosy and prevented Paraguay from returning to military dictatorship (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000).

The Third Summit of the Americas in 2001 in Quebec City, Canada made a comprehensive declaration of support for democratic governance in the Americas (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001). The Summit called for the OAS to strengthen democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms and justice, rule of law and security of the individual (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001). A key feature of the Third Summit of the Americas was a democracy clause which establishes that any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state's government in the Summits of the Americas process (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). This clause was consonant with the previous Santiago Declaration and Washington Protocol in institutionalizing mechanisms to safeguard democracy in the OAS.

The Third Summit of the Americas also called for the strengthening of those instruments already in existence especially the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001). The Third Summit reinforced the commitment the OAS had made to democratic governance in the Americas and detailed how the OAS was to promote democracy through various measures (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001). The promotion of democracy was divided into ways to support reforms of electoral processes and procedures, transparency and good governance, media and communications, fighting against corruption and empowering local governments (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001).

The emphasis on the promotion of democracy, human rights and the security of individuals, among other things, was affirmed by the Third Summit of the Americas and had antecedents in the Santiago Declaration as well as the OAS Charter itself and various amendments including the Washington Protocol. The provisions made in the Third Summit also reflect a move away from the emphasis on state rights to a broader emphasis on the human rights of individuals (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001). This reflects the shift in theoretical foundations for peacekeeping and peace building that had been gaining momentum from the end of the cold war. States have greater responsibilities to provide their citizens with democratic rights, access to legal institutions, greater media access and freedom and the right to self-governance (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001). Far less emphasis was placed on the rights of states to be free from intervention from external threats or the right to non-intervention and non-interference (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001). The right to state sovereignty and non-intervention are enshrined in the OAS Charter but the emphasis in the Third Summit of the Americas was placed on the rights of individuals not the state and urged states to protect the rights of their citizens (Third Summit of the Americas, 2001).

There occurred the same year of the Third Summit of the Americas the enactment of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in Lima, Peru on the 11th of September, 2001 (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). As with the Third Summit of the Americas the Inter-American Democratic Charter reaffirmed the commitment of the OAS to strengthening democracy in the Americas. The Inter-American Democratic Charter under Chapter four legally implemented the provisions declared at the Third Summit of the Americas which called for the suspension of membership of any OAS state where the legitimate democratic government had been overthrown (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). The state in question if it felt its democratic government was under threat could request help from the Permanent Council of the OAS or the Secretary General in facilitating democratic governance (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001).

Under Chapter four Articles 20 and 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter any interruption or alteration to a democratic state or its constitution can warrant the Secretary General or any member state to call a meeting

of the Permanent Council (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). The Permanent Council is to undertake diplomatic actions including mediation and good offices (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). Should these measures fail to suffice then the Permanent Council is to convene a Special Session of the General Assembly who are to undertake the restoration of democracy through whatever measures are at their disposal consonant with the Charter of the OAS (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). The General Assembly can suspend the state in question should all of the efforts entailed above fail to restore democracy to the state in question (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). A two-thirds vote is required to suspend the state whose legitimate democratic regime has been usurped by an illegitimate or unconstitutional entity (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). The state may rejoin once they have returned to democracy and a vote is undertaken by the General Assembly to allow them to resume their membership activities (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). During the time of suspension diplomatic activities are to take place to help democratic governance be resumed (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001).

The Inter-American Democratic Charter can be seen as a clear contrast to the ASEAN Charter which makes no provisions for the restoration of democracy if this should be threatened in member states (ASEAN Charter, 2007). The ASEAN Charter does say that it adheres to, "the principles of democracy" but goes no further in elaborating how democratic governance might be implemented in ASEAN (ASEAN Charter, 2007). ASEAN has also not developed a coherent approach to the restoration of representative democracy should it be threatened in a member state. ASEAN remained silent during a coup d'état on the 20th of May 2014, when the government of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra was deposed by a military-led regime which sought to redraft the constitution without democratic participation (Radtke, 2014). ASEAN did not put pressure on the military led regime to restore democracy or to carry out elections that met with international standards of transparency (Radtke, 2014).

The Inter-American Democratic Charter also established missions for democracy and electoral observations under Chapter five (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). Chapter five the Inter-American Democratic Charter

called for the establishment of political missions to help states observe free and fair elections (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). These electoral observation missions can be requested by the member state of the OAS in order to help observe and monitor elections in the state (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). The OAS cannot impose electoral observation missions on member states whose elections may be contested (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). In spite of this the electoral observation missions do facilitate the promotion of democracy as states that want to have their elections certified as transparent and democratic may avail themselves of the electoral observation missions of the OAS (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). This would lead to enhancing the promotion of democracy by enhancing the legitimacy of the regimes that avail themselves of the OAS electoral observation missions (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001). The OAS provides both incentives for the promotion of democracy by allowing states to request electoral observation missions and by penalizing regimes who flout the democratic will of their people through non-democratic or unconstitutional seizures of the state apparatus (Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2001).

        The electoral observation missions fall under the authority of the Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy (OAS SSD) which falls under the General Secretariat of the OAS (Organization of American States Secretariat for Strengthening Democracy [OAS/SSD], n.d.). The OAS SSD was established as one of six entities to help the General Secretariat of the OAS implements the decisions of the General Assembly (OAS Charter). The goal of the OAS SSD was, "to contribute to the strengthening of political processes in the OAS member states and in particular to support democracy as the best option to ensure peace, security, and development" (OAS SSD, n.d.). The OAS SSD itself consists of three departments that undertake missions that include election monitoring, helping states implement democratic reforms, assisting in legal reforms, and helping reinforce government bureaucracies (OAS SSD, n.d.). The OAS SSD has three departments which include the Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO), the Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions and the Department for Effective Public Management (OAS SSD, n.d.). These three departments are overseen by an Executive

Office who is responsible for coordinating the actions of the departments (OAS SSD, n.d.).

The Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation monitored elections in OAS beginning in 1962 in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic (Organization of American States, n.d.). As of 2016 the OAS has monitored 188 elections in 26 member states (OAS SSD, n.d.). These missions included monitoring of municipal, national assembly, general, presidential, constituent assembly, legislative, and other elections (Organization of American States, n.d.). The number of missions proliferated during the period from 1991 to 2016 during which there was not a single year in which multiple electoral observation missions were not dispatched to member states (Organization of American States, n.d.). The number of states that requested electoral observation missions during a single year was also higher on average from 1991 to 2016 than at any time prior to this (Organization of American States, n.d.). This indicated that the electoral observation missions, which are voluntarily requested by member states, have been an increasingly utilized peacebuilding instrument and have helped to promote the democratic legitimacy (Organization of American States, n.d.).

The OAS SSD also conducts two special missions through the Department of Sustainable Democracy and Special Missions (OAS SSD, n.d.). One of these missions was the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia) or MAPP (MAPP/OEA, n.d.). This mission was initiated with the solicitation of the government of Colombia in the 23rd of January 2004 to help facilitate the peace process in areas of Colombia that had previously been engaged in a long standing civil war (MAPP/OEA, n.d.). The mandate for the mission was signed between the government of Colombia and the Secretary General of the OAS (MAPP/OEA, n.d.).

The mission had several mandates including to formulate recommendations for security, prevention, risk mitigation and new approaches to crime (MAPP/OEA, n.d.). The mission was also tasked with monitoring the ceasefire and demobilizing combatants, as well as bringing to justice members of organized crime groups (MAPP/OEA, n.d.). Several other peacebuilding mandates included the return to civilian life of those persons who had been deprived of liberty, preventing

the recruitment of minors for combat and supporting local initiatives aimed at creating governance (MAPP/OEA, n.d.). The MAPP is comprised of 20 civilian specialists from the OAS (ZIF Peace Operations 2015/2016, 2015). The mission has been ongoing and the goal has been to help rehabilitate those civilians in areas where illegal armed groups have waged civil war against the government of Colombia (MAPP/OEA, n.d.).

The creation of the Santiago Declaration and the ratification of the Washington Protocol are two instruments that have allowed the OAS to work in preventive capacity to ensure that the democratic rights of citizens of the member states of the OAS are protected. This is a clear contrast to ASEAN. ASEAN has sought to develop both peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities to avert the threat of instability and conflict in the region. The lack of institutional mechanisms has hindered the effectiveness of ASEAN's endeavors as is clearly demonstrated when a comparative analysis is done between ASEAN and the OAS. The OAS shares many similarities with ASEAN. Both organizations have diverse membership profiles that include both the richest and poorest states in the world. This is a contrast with the European Union whose admissions criteria essentially precludes those states that have not reached a certain level of economic development and political democracy. It also contrasts with the African Union whose membership does not include the yawning income gaps that exist in the OAS and ASEAN. Other metrics show that ASEAN and the OAS also include some of the largest states in terms of population and economic size as well as some of the smallest.

Historically ASEAN and the OAS have also shared many similarities in their experience of peacekeeping during the cold war era. The OAS and ASEAN were both dominated politically and militarily by the United States who sought to reinforce an alliance of capitalist states that would oppose the advance of communism and help to defend the interests of the United States. During the era of the cold war ASEAN member states were enlisted to help support 'peace missions' by the United States during the Korean War and also in Southeast Asia. The national interests of the regimes that ruled ASEAN countries at this time were closely aligned with the United States. The OAS too was the site of proxy battles between the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States intervened frequently in the internal

affairs of OAS member states to prevent the installation of communist regimes or to destabilized regimes that were felt to be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. A clear example of this was the attempt to overthrow the regime of Fidel Castro in the Bay of Pigs landing which precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis (MacCoubrey & Morris, 2000).

ASEAN has however failed to keep pace with the changes in security that threatens to make the organization irrelevant. ASEAN has not developed an institutional or legal framework that would provide for peacekeeping or peacebuilding in the region. The issue of democratic governance is not incidental to the issue of peacekeeping in the twenty first century. The movement away from state centered conflict has led to a broader realm of issues that can be considered threats to peace and security. In this new framework of 'securitization' the rights of citizens to elect a representative democracy has been considered paramount. The principles of non-interference and non-intervention are still in force but they are slowly being eroded by the growing threat of state failure and state collapse that looms in many areas. ASEAN faces the unsavory prospect of supporting dictatorial regimes and states rather than implementing democratic reforms and governance. Before ASEAN can embark upon building a peacekeeping force it must make comprehensive reforms to the structure of the organization itself.

Scholars who contend that ASEAN has made progress in establishing a security framework that would encompass peacekeeping and peacebuilding fail to make a comparative analysis that if done would show the extent to which ASEAN has been surpassed by other regional organizations. The OAS, as demonstrated above, has made progress in implementing legal mandates that reinforce the organizations commitment to representative democracy as enshrined in the Charter of the OAS. The Santiago Declaration and the Washington Protocol are two such steps that have been taken. These instruments have also been applied to member states where the rule of law and democratic governance where threatened as was the case in Haiti, Peru, Guatemala and Paraguay (McCoubrey & Morris, 2000). ASEAN signed its first Charter in 2007 and implemented the Charter in 2008 (ASEAN Charter, 2007). The Charter does not, however, strengthen ASEAN as a regional organization to undertake peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions. The ASEAN

Charter did not provide a mechanism whereby ASEAN states would be required to uphold representative democracy in their states (ASEAN Charter, 2007).

The decision making provided in the ASEAN Charter also follows a non-democratic procedure. The emphasis on consultation and consensus although seemingly enabling a more democratic result is both impractical and is non-democratic when the states in question are themselves not democratic. Under Chapter Seven Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter it states, "As a basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus" (ASEAN Charter, ch. 7, art. 20, 2007). The emphasis on consultation and consensus makes it difficult for ASEAN states to establish a peacekeeping or peacebuilding agenda at the regional level. The divergent interests of member states are not mitigated through ASEAN but reemerge in other venues.

ASEAN may remain a venue for the discussion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding but without an enforcement mechanism the regional organization will not develop much beyond serving as a dialogue forum. An emphasis on peacebuilding and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as transnational security challenges will entail a *greater* reduction of state sovereignty if they are to work. ASEAN, and scholars who emphasize the capacity for ASEAN to develop peacebuilding as opposed to peacekeeping capacity, fail to fully consider the degree of regional cooperation that would be required to tackle transnational challenges to peace and security. The problems that are frequently mentioned as transnational including drugs, piracy, terrorism, human trafficking, and environmental problems would require comprehensive solutions at the state level. These problems would entail a change in the domestic regimes of member states. ASEAN, as it is constituted, is particularly ill suited to facilitate peacebuilding or preventive diplomacy in comparison with the OAS.

The comparative analysis of regional organizations offers insights into how ASEAN has not been vigilant in addressing the need to reform the institutional structure of the organization in order to develop peacekeeping and peace building capacity. The role of ASEAN has been to facilitate discussion on peacekeeping and peace building in a regional context rather than to make concrete provisions through the ASEAN Charter or the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint.

ASEAN has been aware of the criticism that the regional organization has received and has sought to develop a more comprehensive and coherent approach to peacekeeping and peace building. This more robust approach to peacekeeping and peace building has however been resisted by member states who are reluctant to see their national sovereignty diminish and to make the reforms necessary to create a democratic regional organization. Unlike the OAS, ASEAN has failed to make even the most minor reforms to the structure of the organization that would allow a peacekeeping or peace building presence.

The OAS has been able to make progress by insisting that member states are representative democracies and have the support of their populations as conveyed through electoral mechanisms established by their constitutions. Efforts to support democracy have been instantiated in the OAS through several measures including the Santiago Declaration, the Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter, the Third Summit of the Americas and the Inter-American Democratic Charter.

4.3.5 Cultural Explanations

As to why ASEAN has not progressed in developing stronger regional frameworks for either peacekeeping or peace building, as compared to the OAS, it could be posited that the OAS has a longer history of regional integration. Not only has the OAS had historical antecedents in various forms of pan-Americanism, especially in the Latin American countries, but there has been a greater movement towards developing a theoretical framework for pan- Americanism by thinkers including politicians, writers, scholars, and artists. The Americas have a far longer and deeper history of regional thought than ASEAN has had. Due to the imposition of colonialism in ASEAN the states that have emerged do not, by and large, share a common cultural or intellectual tradition of regionalism. Constructivists have argued that regionalism by definition has to be constructed and that ASEAN has in fact been in the process of building a sharing and caring community. If this were so then ASEAN would not be in the predicament it now faces of gross human rights abuses occurring regularly in member states and a regional organization which has offered only the mutest criticism of member states.

ASEAN member states, as they are comprised, have little history of regional cooperation. There has been no 'tradition' of regionalism in ASEAN and few

intellectual forebears of ASEAN regionalism to shape a regional identity that would form a structural foundation for regionalism. The lack of regional identity cannot be fabricated at the elite level as has been attempted in ASEAN. ASEAN's shift to a people-centered organization shows that even ASEAN leaders have felt that the organization as it has been comprised feels contrived. This has a direct contrast with the OAS whose lengthy history of regionalism has shaped the dynamics of peacekeeping, peace building, security and non-intervention in the Americas for the last two hundred years. The OAS was an evolution of Inter- American cooperation that reached its apex with the Charter of the OAS. The earliest manifestations of pan-Americanism in the Americas began shortly after the independence of most of Latin America from Spain.

ASEAN has not been able to develop a greater level of regional cooperation in peacekeeping due to the reluctance of ASEAN members to vest any of their sovereignty with the organization. ASEAN states have foregone regional peacekeeping and peace building in favor of developing individual state capacities as demonstrated above. This indicates that ASEAN has been more comfortable with a devolved process of decision making in the realm of peacekeeping.

ASEAN has not yet developed a regional framework that would vest a significant amount of authority with a regional body. This has been the *modus operandi* of ASEAN from the inception of the regional organization in 1967. ASEAN's has shallower roots than the OAS. ASEAN has also been less efficacious in promoting the spread of democracy, respect for human rights, and the development of peacekeeping personnel than the OAS.

ASEAN began as a regional organization following the Second World War which saw Southeast Asia under the control of the Japanese empire. Colonial powers again tried to resume control of their former colonies but were thwarted by the strength of liberation movements in these former colonies and the support of the United States for independence. The United States had given up the former colony of the Philippines who had achieved independence after the Second World War. The French and British gradually relinquished control of the last colonial states with Brunei Darussalam achieving independence in 1984.

It was only in 1967 that ASEAN was formally inaugurated as a regional organization. Prior incarnations of ASEAN such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the MAPHILINDO had emerged only after the Second World War. ASEAN also began as an organization that aimed to develop a diplomatic shield to protect member states from external interference and to prevent the spread of communism. ASEAN was at this time an organization with a pragmatic goal of ensuring the survival of nascent states in the region. The goal of ensuring state survival was more likely to be successful if these states adhered to the norms of non-intervention and non-interference, at least in theory.

There was at this time little theoretical common framework for a grouping of Southeast Asian states. Although some scholars would argue that over time these states began to develop a sense of community and a common framework ASEAN's formative years still heavily influence its present disposition towards non-interference, non-intervention and consensual decision-making. This has been all the more the case as the nation-states that emerged after the Second World War are still in the process of consolidating both their political regimes and state identities. Brunei Darussalam, for instance, just announced the imposition of Sharia law making it the only Southeast Asian state to do so. Such radical changes to the fundamental identity of nation-states shows that this process has been ongoing and will likely persist some time into the future.

Regional cooperation has been an endeavor that has had few successes due to the relative insularity of ASEAN member states. This can be contrasted with the OAS which has had a pan- American movement from at least the early 1800's when most Latin American states achieved independence from Spain. The OAS has been conscious of the common identity of the community of states that form the OAS. The movement for independence in the Americas was from an early date marked by a movement towards regional integration. The Spanish Americas, although administered as separate colonies, shared a common provenance with each other; that of the Spain. Exceptions were of course Brazil, the United States of America and Canada, which at the time was still ruled by the United Kingdom. The antecedents for the OAS therefore stretch back further than ASEAN's and also have enabled a greater sense of regional identity and fostered greater cooperation among

member states. The political trajectory of member states of the OAS has also been one that may have helped to create a region more open to peacekeeping and peace building including representative democracy. The independence of many states of the OAS has been plagued by autocracies and brutal dictatorships and a prolonged struggle between liberal and conservative factions. This however has created a dynamic of political debate and an experience of political representation. These political traditions often crossed boundaries in the Americas with political thinkers travelling widely between member states and not only to Europe. The result has been a fostering of representative democracy, an appreciation for human rights and a longer tradition of political reforms.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

ASEAN does not have the means as it is currently structured to develop a peacekeeping or peacebuilding force. As has been demonstrated above ASEAN has been thwarted in its attempts at developing a peacekeeping or peacebuilding presence by the historical evolution of the organization and by institutional impediments. ASEAN has never developed a regionally coordinated peacekeeping presence or operation. During the cold war individual ASEAN states have intervened in other states either unilaterally or in tandem with Western supported or Western led coalitions (Jones, 2007). Cases of this have been the intervention by Thailand and the Philippines in the Korean War as well as interventions by Thailand and other ASEAN states in Cambodia and Laos during the 1960's and 1970's (Jones, 2007). ASEAN's emphasis on post-conflict peacebuilding and on tackling 'non-traditional' security challenges have not met with success either.

In spite of the foreign policy of member states ASEAN, as a regional organization, has been paralyzed by the emphasis on non-intervention and non-interference that have been enshrined in the earliest documents of ASEAN and continue to guide the evolution of the organization. ASEAN's emphasis on the sovereignty of the state and the principles of non-interference and non-intervention were put in place during an era of weak state structures in the region. As with other post-colonial states ASEAN emphasized the absolute sovereignty of the state. This precluded ASEAN early on from taking a more robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement mandate.

ASEAN at the time of the cold war was not unique in the emphasis it placed on the importance of state sovereignty, non-interference and non-intervention. The Charter of the United Nations also emphasized the sovereignty of states and the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. This, and the paralysis of the UNSC during the power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war, led to few United Nations peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Those peace operations that were authorized focused on monitoring

ceasefires between states which was consonant with the state-centric view of the post-colonial and post- Second World War security environment. ASEAN member states and the member states of other regional organizations, such as the OAS, were focused primarily on consolidating the state and on navigating the treacherous dynamics of the cold war era geopolitical rivalry. Peacekeeping was largely thought of as interposing peace forces between enemy combatants to maintain ceasefires.

ASEAN member states supported the United States during the cold war and engaged in missions with the United Nations. During the time of greatest ASEAN engagement, the United Nations was under strong Western influence, especially the UNSC, due to the seating of the Republic of China on the UNSC which caused the Soviets to boycott the UNSC and abstain from voting. The ASEAN Declaration on the 8th of August 1967 set the trajectory of the organization as one condoning non-interference, non-intervention and consensual decision making. The ZOPFAN, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Bali Concord I would all reaffirm the ASEAN Declaration's insistence on non-interference and non-intervention.

At the end of the cold war the dissolution of the Soviet Union allowed the United States and its Western allies a window of opportunity to engage in more vigorous peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations through the United Nations. The emerging threat of state failure and collapse, and its attendant consequences including ethnic violence, displaced the threat of inter-state warfare in the thinking of peace strategists in the United Nations. A new doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect gained momentum. The Brahimi Report provided a framework for the reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations to provide greater security for individuals and incorporated the responsibility to protect. The risk of state collapse also coincided with an emphasis on the rights of the individual and the emphasis on individual security and safety.

The emphasis on the responsibility to protect was ignited by the disintegration of Yugoslavia which unleashed the furies of ethnic cleansing between Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. The genocide in Rwanda and the collapse of Somalia would also recalibrate the United Nations and Western states towards creating peace operations capable of rebuilding states. These new peace operations

required substantial commitments in terms of finances, troop contributions, and logistics. They would also entail the total rebuilding of states with stable democratic systems that could ensure their war-torn societies would have safety and prosperity for their citizens. The prolonged commitment was a task new to the United Nations and had not been undertaken since the end of the Second World War. Other non-state actors also figured prominently in the task of state building to supplement the United Nations. In recent years a division of labor has occurred with the United Nations giving its imprimatur to peace missions, while regional organizations have become active in carrying out the mandate.

The increasing profile of regional organizations in carrying out peace operations owes to the growing stature of regional organizations internationally and increasing demands on the United Nations. Regional organizations have become more influential and more active in engaging in peacekeeping and peace building, especially in their regional neighborhoods. ASEAN has been an exception to the upswing in regional peacekeeping. ASEAN states have relied on outside powers including the United Nations and until recently the United States and its allies to maintain peace and stability in the region.

ASEAN, a quarter century after the cold war, has made the most substantial moves ever to create a peacekeeping and peace building force. After the Asian financial crisis ASEAN states sent peacekeepers to Timor-Leste to participate in the INTERFET and UNTAET missions. Malaysia has become active in sending police and civilian experts to monitor ceasefires in Mindanao in the Philippines and in Aceh. These efforts were complemented by a desire for ASEAN to strengthen its political-security integration first through the ASEAN Charter then through an ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint that included a component for peacekeeping and peace building.

In 2015 Malaysia as Chair of ASEAN called for the creation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. An ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network has appeared with the long term goal of creating an ASEAN Peacekeeping standby force that would be able to deploy during times of emergency. Individual ASEAN states have also worked bilaterally to strengthen their peacekeeping capacities by contributing more peacekeepers to the United Nations. This has especially been true

of Indonesia, a long time peacekeeping presence, who has sought to lead ASEAN towards a more robust peacekeeping and peace building agenda. The opening of the newer ASEAN member states like Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar to sending peacekeepers to the United Nations has also been a significant state in developing peacekeeping capabilities.

These steps however fall short of what needs to be done for ASEAN to develop a peacekeeping force. The failure of ASEAN to fundamentally reform the organization will stymie any gains made in individual states peacekeeping or peace building capacities. As individual ASEAN states move towards a greater peacekeeping presence internationally the organization has been slowly desiccated by its inability to address the fundamental problems of peace building and peacekeeping. ASEAN's emphasis on peace building rather than traditional peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation has a hint of irony given the failure of the organization to uphold democratic governance and human rights in some of its most important member states.

A comparison with another regional organization that has many of the same characteristics of ASEAN, and has been subject to many of the same criticisms, reveals the degree to which ASEAN has failed to address its institutional and organizational impediments to both peacekeeping and peace building. A comparative analysis of the Organization of American States and ASEAN has the benefit of comparing two organizations that bear similarities in both historical evolution of peacekeeping and also in membership profile. Like ASEAN the OAS has a diverse membership. The OAS, as with ASEAN, includes some of the world's wealthiest and poorest states; some of the world's largest states, both in terms of population and economic size, and some of the poorest. The OAS is divided between the English speaking states of the United States and Canada and the Spanish and Portuguese speaking states of Latin America. The overwhelming economic, political and military power of the United States has unsettled many states in Latin America who have endured a history of repeated United States interventions in their domestic affairs. The presence of the United States has been a common denominator in both ASEAN and the OAS.

A critical difference however has occurred as both the OAS and ASEAN have matured in their perspectives on peacekeeping and peace building. The histories of both regional organizations show many parallels including a rhetorical emphasis on new peace building and preventive diplomacy practices including an emphasis on democracy and human rights. In this critical area of peace building and non-traditional security challenges the two regional organizations have diverged from the end of the Cold War. The critical difference has been the willingness of the OAS to make a concerted effort to tackle the challenges of peace building in the Americas by creating organizational structures to encourage democracy and human rights. ASEAN has not encouraged human rights and democracy despite the insistence of the organization that progress has been made in these areas.

The OAS has developed a series of institutional and legal texts that have sought to enact reforms in the organization. The OAS has enhanced the Charter of the OAS with the Washington Protocol and created the Santiago Declaration. These documents in tandem call for the suspension of states whose democratic governments have been overthrown or whose constitutional order has been imperiled with non-democratic regimes. These documents were followed up on with the creation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001 and the Third Summit of the Americas in 2001 which also called for the suspension of states whose democratic governments were overthrown. These efforts have shown that the OAS has moved beyond a purely rhetorical stance to develop mechanisms that would lead to a strengthening of democracy in the Americas.

In addition, the OAS has sent observers to monitor elections in member states. These electoral observation missions must be requested by member states who want to have their national elections monitored. This aspect of the electoral observation missions has been criticized as regimes that are authoritarian or not democratic are unlikely to utilize the electoral observation missions. This argument fails to recognize that the use of the electoral observation missions has been increasing greatly from the end of the Cold War. These missions now act as a means for states to verify their democratic credentials. The use of them serves to illustrate the democratic legitimacy of these states and incentivizes the promotion of democracy in the Americas. Rather than a coercive approach the OAS has used the electoral

observation missions as a marketing approach for democracy. Through ensuring that their elections are sanctioned by the OAS states in the Americas can signal to their people and to the world that the regime elected has been certified as democratic.

The contrast with ASEAN has shown that ASEAN has failed to live up to the rhetoric on peacekeeping and peace building that has been repeated at all levels of the organization. ASEAN has clearly failed to instantiate the norms of peacekeeping or peace building among member states if compared with the OAS. In spite of the similarities between the OAS and ASEAN the two have clearly diverged following the end of the Cold War. ASEAN has not developed any mechanisms to either coerce or entice member states to adhere to even the most basic principles of human security which form the fundamental basis for contemporary approaches to peace building and the tackling of non-traditional security challenges. The ASEAN Charter was an attempt to reform the traditional approach of ASEAN to a host issues. The ASEAN Charter has however failed in the ability to create a community with democratic values, human rights and one that would be people-centered. Attempts at peacekeeping and peace building have been similarly thwarted. Peacekeeping in ASEAN has not been possible in the past and will remain impossible in the future due to the policies of non-interference and non-intervention.

ASEAN has developed no mechanisms to ensure that member states adhere to democracy as in the OAS. The ASEAN Charter provides suggestions but no effective mechanisms to ensure that the member states of ASEAN adhere to democracy. The ASEAN Political-Security Community has also failed to develop effective mechanisms to ensure that human security of the citizens of ASEAN are met. ASEAN has relied on member states to monitor and implement the ideals of ASEAN.

Without effective reform ASEAN will fail to develop either peacekeeping or peacebuilding practices as a regional organization. As can be seen from the past and in comparison with the OAS, member states have been unwilling to develop regional frameworks for peacekeeping. Member states have developed greater peacekeeping capacity by contributing peace keepers to the United Nations or working with external powers like the United States, Australia and Japan to enhance

their peacekeeping capacities but there has been little evidence that these efforts will strengthen ASEAN peacekeeping capacity as a regional organization.

ASEAN has also failed to create any semblance of the calls for greater attention to peace building that it announced were critical goals in the ASPC Blueprint. Unlike the OAS, ASEAN has found it more expedient to let individual member states develop mechanisms to deal with human security challenges like democracy and human rights. This has led to a regression among member states including Thailand, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos and Malaysia all of whom have regressed in their democratic governance or have committed grave human rights abuses. This has been apparent in the 2014 Coup d'état in Thailand and the announcement of the imposition of sharia governance in Brunei Darussalam in 2015.

The question as to why ASEAN has not made the progress in peacekeeping and peace building may be due to the unwillingness of ASEAN to cede sovereignty to a regional body. ASEAN member states never envisioned creating a regional organization with the capacity to enforce human rights and democracy on member states. The creation of ASEAN was one of expediency during a time of weak states that were threatened by communism. The founders of ASEAN made no pretense to creating anything other than a regional bloc of like-minded states in spite of the rhetorical flourishes of the ASEAN Declaration. The emphasis on non-intervention, non-interference and consensual decision making are ASEAN values only because of the initial emphasis on them at ASEAN's creation. They have been reiterated in subsequent treaties and documents due to their efficacy during the early years of ASEAN.

The OAS, by way of contrast, suffers some of the same debilities of ASEAN but has a far longer history of regional thought and action. This may account for the greater ability of the OAS to influence the decisions of member states to adopt mechanisms that curtail the sovereignty of member states. The earliest liberation movements of the Americas from their inception contained pan- American aspirations. Simon Bolivar 'the liberator' sought to bring together the American states in a democratic, continental convention and did so in the Congress of Panama. That these early attempts were unsuccessful in creating a pan- American state or

confederation of states did not extinguish the idea of one. The shared colonial heritage of Latin America, the emphasis on democracy and republicanism by the earliest founders of these states as well the English speaking states of North America has helped to create a cultural bond.

The twin emphasis on democracy and the pan- American ideal has been one that has deep roots in the Americas and emerged from the independence of American states from the Spanish crown. The OAS has long antecedents which may help to explain the relative recent success of its attempts to create region wide mechanisms for democracy and human rights that impinge on the sovereignty of member states.

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