



**U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER
THE 2014 THAILAND MILITARY COUP D'ETAT**

BY

MISS SARUNPHAK KITTIVORAPOOM

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2019
COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY**

**U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER
THE 2014 THAILAND MILITARY COUP D'ETAT**

BY

MISS SARUNHAK KITTIVORAPOOM

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2019
COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY**

THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THESIS

BY

MISS SARUNPHAK KITTIVORAPOOM


ENTITLED

U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER THE 2014 THAILAND
MILITARY COUP D'ETAT

was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Political Science in International Relations


on September 25, 2020

Chairman




(Asst. Prof. M.L. Pinitbhand Paribatra, Ph.D.)

Member and Advisor




(Assoc. Prof. Attakrit Patchimnan, Ph.D.)

Member



(Asst. Prof. Pichit Ratchatapibhunphob, Ph.D.)

Dean



(Asst. Prof. Tavid Kamolvej, Ph.D.)

Thesis Title	THE U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER THE 2014 THAILAND MILITARY COUP D'ETAT
Author	Ms. Sarunphak Kittivorapoom
Degree	Master of Political Science
Major Field/Faculty/University	International Relations Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University
Thesis Advisor	Assoc. Prof. Attakrit Patchimnan, Ph.D.
Academic Years	2019

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates U.S.-Thailand security relations after the 2014 Thai military coup through the lens of neo-realism and focuses on the stances of both the Obama and Trump administrations regarding the junta government of Thailand and the challenges and limitations in cutting security aid and assistance during the post-coup period. The study found that, even though the U.S. was constrained by its law in prohibiting security arrangements with any coup countries, the U.S. tends to prioritize strategic interest and continued with its defense cooperation with Thailand after the coup period. The thesis concludes that security cooperation with Thailand remains considerably unchanged and has become increasingly significant, in particular, during the time of the rising of China.

Keywords: International Relations, The U.S.-Thailand relations, Security Cooperation, the Thailand 2014 military coup d'état, the Thailand 2014 military coup d'état, Neo-Realism, Security Dilemma, Balance of Power, National Interest, National Interest

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my advisor, Associate Professor Dr. Attakrit Patchimnan, who provided perceptive supervision throughout my research. Without the time and effort, he invested, this thesis would not have been done. My sincere thanks also go to my thesis committee members, Assistant Professor Dr. M.L. Pinitbhand Paribatra, and Assistant Professor Dr. Pichit Ratchatapibhunphob, for their valuable suggestions and support during the thesis defense. My special thanks and appreciation go to all the staff of the Master of Political Science (International Relations) program in the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat University for their kindness. I would also like to thank Mr. Sean Meadows for his kind support in proofreading my thesis and correcting my grammar. To my beloved family, friends, thank you for always being there and encouraging with love and understanding throughout the research work. Lastly, I would like to thank all the people who directly or indirectly supported me while completing the thesis writing.

Ms. Sarunphak Kittivorapoom


TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	(3)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	(4)
LIST OF TABLES	(7)
LIST OF FIGURES	(8)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	(9)
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Theoretical framework	3
1.3 Literature review and Related studies	16
1.4 Conceptual framework	19
1.5 Scope of the study	20
1.6 Research Questions	20
1.7 Hypothesis	21
1.8 Methodology	21
1.9 Presentation	21
CHAPTER 2 U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY COOPERATION	22
2.1 The Security Cooperation Between the U.S. and Thailand	22
2.2 Security Arrangements Before the Thailand 2014 military coup	23

CHAPTER 3 U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY ARRANGEMENT AFTER THE 2014 MILITARY COUP	34
3.1 Obama Administration: Rebalancing to Asia	34
3.2 The Security arrangement after the 2014 coup during the Obama Administration	38
3.3 Diplomatic Relations during Obama administration	46
CHAPTER 4 CHINESE FACTOR	49
CHAPTER 5 REBALANCING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION	57
5.1 Trump Administration: Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy	57
5.2 Security arrangements during the Trump Administration	59
5.3 Diplomatic Relations during the Trump Administration	62
REFERENCE	68
APPENDICES	76
APPENDIX A FMS Funding during the Obama Administration	77
APPENDIX B FMS funding during the Trump administration	93
BIOGRAPHY	101

LIST OF TABLES

Tables	Page
3.1 Approximate number of U.S. servicemen during the Obama administration	40
3.2 IMET funding from FY 2008 – 2017	42
3.3 Foreign Military Financing for Thailand during the Obama administration	44
4.1 Total arms sales to Thailand by countries from 2014 -2017	56



LIST OF FIGURES

Figures	Page
1 The conceptual framework of the study	20



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations	Terms
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
ACD	Asia Cooperation Dialogue
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+3	(ASEAN) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Japan
ASEAN+6	Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN and six other countries in the Asia-Pacific region: Australia, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand
CAFTA	Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
CARAT	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CDC	The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CLMT	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
CTIC	The U.S.-Thai Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	The United States Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency



EAS	East Asia Summit
EDA	The Excess Defense Article programs
FOIP	Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FTA	Free Trade Area
GNP	Gross National Product
HMMWVs	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations
ICV	Infantry Carrier Vehicles
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
INCLE	Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISIL	the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
FMS	Foreign military sales program
FY	Fiscal Year
GNP	Gross National Product
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCPO	National Council for Peace and Order
RAND Corporation	Research and Development Cooperation
RTARF	Royal Thai Air Force

RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
TTP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The 2014 military coup d'état in Thailand brought about considerable strain on U.S.-Thailand security cooperation. With the abrupt overthrow of the democratically elected government of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the military coup induced negative reactions by the Obama administration. By the time the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) staged the coup on 22 May 2014, the relationship between the U.S. and Thailand had turned bitter. The statement made by the Secretary of State, John Kerry, on the day of the coup, clearly indicated disagreement of the decision made by the Thai military junta to stage the coup against the constitution and take control over the civilian government. In response to the coup, there were many negative measures executed by the U.S.; for example, reviewing annual military exercises, financial assistance, and engagements (U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 2014). The statement made by the U.S. instigated the backlash of anti-American sentiment in some groups of Thais, which considered the American government as intervening in Thailand's domestic affairs without a deep understanding of the situation (Sucharitkul, 2014). The junta government of Thailand was unlawful in the eyes of the U.S. government. With different points of view regarding transplanting democracy in Thailand abound, the relationship between the Thai military government and the U.S. was rough.

The U.S.' negative reaction towards the Thai military junta was a result of the U.S. maintaining its leading role as a global democratic promoter. Moreover, the promotion of democracy is one of the goals of U.S. foreign policy. The belief that democratic regimes contribute to a more peaceful society and maintain an open economy, in which the United States could advance its national interests, constitutes a more secure, stable, and prosperous global arena (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). For Washington, the toppling of the civilian-elected government was an unrighteous means of acquiring power to govern the country. Many provisions of U.S. legislation play an important role in promoting democracy. Section 508 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance

Act and its 2013 manifestation states that the U.S. State Department has to terminate assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by a military coup d'état or decree, or after the date of enactment of the Act, a coup d'état or decree in which the military plays a decisive role is carried out (Aiello, 2013). In particular, the U.S. act prohibits the U.S. providing assistance to a military-coup backed government. In other words, the U.S. government imposes restrictions on providing aid to countries whose "duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup", until a democratically elected government is elected. The suspension of U.S. aid worth \$60 million to \$70 million soon after the Malian government was deposed by the military coup d'état in 2012, is an example in enforcing the U.S. coup-banned law (Crawford, 2012).

Despite the rigidity in executing the legislation determining the prohibition in providing assistance to a military government, the law itself provides an exemption by permitting the U.S. president to consider its necessity for U.S. interest. Such flexibility in the law allows the U.S. to exempt operations for democratic promotion. In some cases, the U.S. might adopt pragmatic behavior when dealing with a coup government. The U.S. disregards undemocratic acts, like a military coup, whenever national interest involves a coup led country. For example, the U.S., under the Obama administration, avoided calling Egypt's military ouster of Morsi as a "coup" (Why the U.S. doesn't call, 2013). The consequence of Washington's declaration acknowledging the topple of Cairo's government would be equivalent to enforcing the U.S. law calling for the ceasing of aid given to the coup country (Fisher, 2013). Holding back the \$1.5 billion assistance to Egypt's government under President Mohammed Morsi would jeopardize the security and strategic interest of the U.S.

Thailand is recognized as a long-standing ally of the U.S. government. The suspension of the security arrangement provided to Thailand would result in discontinuity of U.S. engagement in Asia. The 2014 Thailand military coup put the U.S. in a difficult position. In this case, the U.S. law prohibited continuing the security arrangement with Thailand and contributed to difficulties for the U.S.' maintaining continuity in implementing its foreign policy goals in Asia through its security cooperation with Thailand. Particularly, the influence of China has been rising and the suspension of security arrangements between the U.S. and Thailand would bring about

a great challenge to U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia. The strategic importance of Thailand, as a close ally, would enhance opportunities for the U.S., which is geographically located far from the region, to engage in regional affairs. Recognizing the security arrangement with Thailand as a guarantee to maintaining the close alliance, as well as an opportunity for the U.S. to remain connected to Asia, the examination of the U.S.-Thailand security arrangement after the coup period would explain complexities of the bilateral relations stemming from the 2014 Thai military coup. In essence, this research attempted to investigate U.S.-Thailand security cooperation after the 2014 Thai military coup.

1.2 Theoretical framework

1.2.1 Neo-realism

In international relations is the study of interaction of the state by focusing on how the natural of international politics affects to the relationship between states. According to realism school of thought, the global politics is visualized as an anarchic realm where state exists as an independent unit and live unequally of power, justice, wealth, and resource. Within the anarchic realm, there is lack of central authority. Namely, there is no supranational entity that will transcend the power of a sovereign state. State is self-interest and always acts as a power maximizer. Each of the state desires power as for its self-preservation.

According to the chaotic condition of the global area, the nature of global politics contributes to both conflict and cooperation of the states. Anarchy is defined by neo-realism as the condition which there is no centralized entity both enforces any commitment or provides protection to the states. Neo-realism is known as structural realism theory. This study adopted the Kenneth Waltz' Neo-realism to study on the state of anarchy. According to Waltz, he believes that states are living in a state of perpetual international anarchy. He points out the significant difference of the domestic politics to the international politics in that the latter is lack of the centrality authority monopolizing the power to enforce. Without the centrality authority, the states seek to preserve their existence. With the capability of each state seeking for the guarantee of

their survival, their attempt to protect themselves from each other could unavoidably cause war.

Surrounded by chaos, each state adopts the self-help strategy by struggling to win over others and sought every possibility mean to employ in order to preserve its survival (Dunne & Schmidt, 2011, p. 95). Rooted in the notion that state is a rational unit, the states become egoist or the state-centric as there is no guarantee of safety.

Within the self-help and egoist, the interplay between states constructs the structural relationship. Waltz explains that such structure systematizes the political system into 3 dimensions which are ordering principles, principle of differentiation, and distribution of capabilities. All dimension entirely affects to the safeness and the interest of the states. With the necessity to survive and maintain its wellness, the behavior of the states is in response to all three dimensions of the political system. In essence, Waltz proposes that anarchy stemmed from the lack of guarantee for safety and protection of the states' interest that leading to the self-help system as well as the desire of power.

1.2.2 Security dilemma

The security dilemma is a phenomenon generally occurring within complex social relations and international relations (Butterfield, 1951; Herz, 1951; Jervis, 1976). Amidst suspicion among states, paranoia can easily cause misunderstandings among actors. The self-protection of their interests is a fundamental factor leading to mistrust among states. Independently living by themselves, states are suspicious of the roles and goals of others. Lacking trust, the enhancement of one state's security capability to ensure its security can be perceived as a threat that jeopardizes another state's safety. According to Waltz's structure of international politics, such a political environment supports the rivalry among states to survive. The competition among actors results in winning or losing states. The defeated states are obliged to abide by the practices determined by the winner. Failure to do so can cause interference by a winning state. Waltz also finds that the consistency of the win or lose phenomenon contributes to the state of balance of power, which is a behavioral pattern of states making power symmetrical. To restate, there is a tendency that a weaker state will attempt to enhance its power to balance a strong state.

1.2.3 Balance of power

In international relations, the balance of power is established to prevent exceeding the desired power of states in enhancing their capability and maintaining or destroying their status quo. Therefore, the system aims at the preservation of symmetrical power among states. According to realism, only the matching of power is required to balance power. Namely, power matching can prevent conflict stemming from the expansion of a state's power. Additionally, the matching of power precludes the predominant state from effectively dominating other states.

1.2.3.1 The principle of balance of power

The Social Equilibrium is the determining factor of balance of power. The factor can cause the collapse of the system because of the asymmetrical possession of power of independent states. Additionally, the imbalance of power can be caused from both endogenous and exogenous factors in one state. When the imbalance of power occurs, rebalancing in the system has to be established. There are two assumptions concerning the existence of the balance of power in international relations. Firstly, the determinant factor causing the balance of power is the necessity of society and the right of existence. Lacking the balance of power can cause the predominant state to take advantage and destroy other states. Therefore, the purpose of the balance of power is to establish stability, to maintain the diversity of actors in society, and to prevent any actor to acquire power predominantly and take control over others. Secondly, there are two main patterns of the balance of power. Fundamentally, the international society has two major characteristics; the diversity and hostility of states. The desire to expand their powers contributes to the contradiction among states. Direct opposition and competition are clearly the two main types of conflict among states. Given that country A attempts to take control over the decision-making process of country B, through its colonialism approach, such intervention can be seen as the desire to establish its predominant power over country B. On the contrary, Country B also responds to the action through its expansion of its power against the pressure applied by country A and vice versa. This is an example of the directional opposition in international conflict.

1.2.3.2 Competition

Conflict between two countries is caused by the competition stemming from trying to take control of country C. The third country is generally a small or weak state. In order to maintain independence, small states balance the power of other states, or even become a dependent state under the sphere of influence of a stronger state. They could also be a neutral state ignoring imperialism completely.

There are two functions of the balance of power; the enhancement of security in international relations, and the guarantee of freedom of one state. However, the balance of power generally causes instability in relationships among states, as well as requires the re-establishment of the system due to vulnerabilities and uncertainties of actors. In other words, the changeable environment permanently stems from the nature of international politics in which states independently exist and protect themselves from each other.

1.2.3.3 A practice of the balance of power

In general, the balance of power limits excesses and emboldens areas of deficiency.

- (1) **Divide and Rule:** The divide and rule strategy compels other states through treaties. In order to reinforce the power of the ruling state, the non-self-governing state is divided into sections to prevent the conglomeration of its people, which limits their ability to fight against the influence of the dominant state.
- (2) **Compensation:** Compensation is one of the instruments employed by states to maintain the balance of power. When a state increases its power by annexing another state's territory, it is balanced by another state, who then compensates and increases its power to maintain the power balance. By taking land from another state, a state can enhance its capabilities through acquiring resources from the provided land, including natural resources, and the population. It is the forceful state that takes advantage over other nations in variety of ways, for example, seeking economic interests, interventions in political and military issues, and establishing governing power.

- (3) Armaments: As the possession of armed forces indicates the status quo of a state, each state attempts to occupy land with their military and armed forces to maintain or newly establish the balance of power. Such action results in armaments, as well as the accumulation of military power. The more a state spends on its military budget, the more mistrust, fear, and suspicion among each state, will exist. Armaments intend to balance all states' military capabilities. At the same time, it requires an adoption of effective disarmament measures to maintain balance. However, the reduction of military capabilities is a sensitive issue. Generally, such action is not accepted by states because of national security and stability concerns. Additionally, the evaluation of the total amount of armaments is difficult.
- (4) Alliances: As an ally, each state is equal. There are various alliance relationships; bilateral relationships, the relationship between a large state and its alliances, and the relationship between each other.
- a. Alliance with a superpower: An alliance with a superpower is the conglomeration of weaker states, aiming to preserve its sovereignty, through the balance of power with the superpower, which is called the "Universal Monarchy".
 - b. The two antagonist alliances: The thirst of power of the two blocs of states to perform colonization and at the same time, protect its sovereignty from its foe. However, being a member of each bloc is not fixed. Namely, it is changeable and depending on the decision making of each member state. As each state is mostly concerned with its interests, and its mind is possessed with fear, the condition contributes to unethical decisions being made by states.
 - c. The balance of power with alliances can work better under the following conditions:

- i. Each independent state will create an alliance depending on the situation they are encountering. Throughout the 18th century, the equilibrium was adjusted by switching between blocs of the states. The adjustment of the alliances can be seen, in particular, during the time Otto von Bismarck took power in 1890.
- ii. In case of an existing alliance, the authority must not execute his power in making any other alliance to surpass the available one.
- iii. When there is a fixed alliance and no other bloc to balance its power, closeness within the bloc is the determinant factor causing the possibility of compromising and switching to another bloc.

Without the aforementioned factors, diplomacy could become precarious and lead to a “Zero-Sum game”, meaning that when one side gains, the other side loses.

- d. The balancer in the balance of the power system is crucial. Within the balance of power system, there are two major components; the persistence of states maintaining the status quo, and the expansion of power of each state. For the latter, there will be a country performing its role as the balancer in the system. Since states pay attention to particular situations, there will be no permanent friend or foe. Also, there will be no commitment to any relationship between states. Each state remains neutral to monitor the external situation, and then makes decisions to position itself in a suitable position. The balancer, therefore, is a key player in the balance of power system and determines the result of the power struggle among states. Generally, a balancer wisely isolates itself from the international community. They employ their power in three ways: 1) joining with any party. 2) promoting peace, and 3) insisting on its national policy in order to maintain the power balance. However, the balancer is condemned for its amoral foreign policy.

1.2.4 National interest

In international relations, the concept of “national interest” is traditionally applied to the study of the behavior of a state or leader within the international environment. Rooted in Latin, the word “interest” refers to “the attention, significance, or the uniqueness, which relates to humankind or things”. Since states are the first and foremost unit in the global arena, the study of a state’s stance is crucial. Regardless of the rationale that drives a state’s action, one cannot understand the current position of a state, reaction among or between states, and expect future stances if you neglect it. Consequently, national interest relates to a state’s goal and expected outcome, which is pursued by a state’s foreign policy.

Even though states are clear on the very concept of being state-centric, which is a major realist proponent, the meaning is restricted to the first and foremost goal of a state, which aims to survive independently in the global arena. The limitations on the autonomy of states leads to a very unsatisfactory definition for IR scholars, especially for realist scholars who assert the concept. To them, the definition of the term needs to be broadened and agreed upon. The common ground in relation to the term is perceived among realists not only as end but as the means of the formulation of a state’s foreign policy. There are many realist scholars who support studying international relations through the concept of national interest. Given that they share the same approach, various definitions are provided. They depend on different understandings and points of view.

According to Hans J. Morgenthau, national interest is the rationale that outlines a state’s foreign policy, as well as political acts in international politics. In other words, it is the motivation of a state, which desires to preserve its survival and autonomy from foreign influence. It is not only its sovereignty, but every aspect representing the autonomy of a state, e.g., political system, economy, religion, and language. Such intangible concepts can be traced back to a state’s foreign policy since it is the motivation behind each policy adoption. It is the determination which shapes the relationship among or between states. To preserve its national interest, according to Morgenthau, a state may apply various strategies to achieve such a variety of goals from allying, balancing, or even competing with others (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 3).

The state centric approach has been adopted by Frankel as well. To him, national interest is an attempt of a state in order to protect its sovereignty and existence. This includes the promotion of a state's reputation, security, and autonomy from any external influence. When a clash with another state's national interest exists, a state will prioritize its interest first (Frankel, 1979, p. 86).

Although his explanation lacks clarity concerning what the national interest actually is, he focuses on the actions of the term and looks at its practical dimensions. It can be applied as a strategic tool in analyzing politics and understanding the behavior of political actors in formulating a state's foreign policy. In other words, national interest becomes the origin of making a decision, and proclaiming and implementing the foreign policy. All in all, the concept of nation interest remains one of the most significant principles for a state to carry out relationships with other states (Rosenau, 1968, p. 34).

To Sondermann, the national interest shares similarities with the concept of "egoism", the sentimentally attached to and an attempt to fulfil oneself. To preserve the national interest, the states are eager to transplant nationalistic emotion to their people by managing their well-being, and in turn, the people will endeavor to employ every means in response to the ultimate goal in achieving the national interest (Sondermann, 1977, pp. 121-138)

National interest is approachable. They claim that it can be speculated through the political behavior of a particular society since it is the transformation of a state's value. It functions as a rudder that helps steer a state's foreign policy direction towards the right position in the global arena. It is a reasonable criterion in response to a particular phenomenon. In other words, both long-term and short-term goals of a state's foreign policy are grounded in national interest.

To Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said, the national interest of every state is based on six principal factors (Lerche & Said, 1972, pp. 26-28);

(1) Self-preservation:

The government, territory, people, and sovereignty are regarded as the fundamental factors that shape a state's foreign policy since they represent statehood and must be preserved.

(2) Security:

This factor is as significant as self-preservation. Since the primary goal of every state is to survive in the anarchic system of international politics, every state attempts to secure their existence by preventing threats from others.

(3) The Well-being of the people:

States also regard the well-being of their people as a national interest. This can be quantified by examining the economic growth of a country as reflected by Gross National Product (GNP).

(4) Prestige:

A state's image and reputation, i.e., its prestige, is also considered one of the most significant factors in determining a state's behavior in the global arena. Attempting to impress other states, such admiration and appreciation towards a particular state contributes to achieving higher status over others.

(5) Ideology:

The dispersion of a state's ideology counts as a national interest. At the same time, it also struggles hard to contain the predominance of other ideologies.

(6) Power:

This factor is defined as the capability of a state to achieve its intentions. The goal of state is to protect its sovereignty and to preserve its autonomy.

Unlike Charles O. Lerche and Abdul A. Said, who defined national interest as the transformation of an intangible value to concrete actions of a state, Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm proposes a different viewpoint on national interest grounded on time and urgency. To them, the order of magnitude is the most significant variable for understanding:

(1) Short-term or Core Goals:

The "Short-term" or "Core Goals" focuses on the preservation of a state's major proponents, which are the fundamental factors indicating the existence of one state in the global arena. Those goals are territorial integrity, national security, the unification within a nation, and the prosperousness of its economy.

(2) Middle-term Goals:

An intermediate goal is different from a short-term goal in terms of the objective it aims to achieve. Generally, this type of goal can be understood in terms of

the extension of a state's status quo. Instead of just striving to "survive", states require better status in terms of political, economic, and social standing in the global arena. , There is a variety of tools, ranging from political to military instruments, to accomplish particular goals. Whether it is seeking international aid, searching for resources, supplying cheap services, increasing a state's military prestige, exchanging cultural and technology with its counterpart, dominating international markets, harnessing the state's sphere of influence, or even propagating ideology over others, a plethora of mechanisms are used by states.

(3) Long-term Goals:

Targeting different objectives, middle and long-term goals are separated from each other. While the former refers to a policy towards one state or a particular situation, the latter is a leader's vision regarding the global system.

Apart from the order of magnitude, the national interest can be thoroughly divided into four levels according to their urgency (Nuechterlien, 1973, pp. 10-29)

- (1) Survival interests: Survival interests involve danger and unexpected incidents that can affect territorial integrity.
- (2) Vital interests: This kind of interest leaves more time, when compared to survival interests, for the policymaker to seek solutions with allies or negotiate with an opposing state.
- (3) Major interests: Major interests are also important, but they are not as serious as the aforementioned interests, as they do not threaten the well-being of the people. Consequently, states would rather adopt a soft style in dealing with problems by utilizing negotiation.
- (4) Peripheral interests: Even though the last type of interest is the least urgent, compared with other interests, peripheral interests remain important for states to preserve for their own good.

As national interest is usually mentioned as the rationale for states implementing their foreign policies with other states, the term is defined in a wide-ranging manner. Consequently, Morgenthau attempted to give a comprehensive meaning of the word by placing it in two-broad categories: the interest of one state and the interest of two states, or multi-state (Robinson, 1969, pp. 184-185).

In terms of one state's interest, it can be thoroughly defined into six categories:

- (1) Primary interests: All states shall treat primary interests as the first and foremost interest as they involve the existence of a state's political system, values, identities, and its autonomy.
- (2) Secondary interests: This kind of interest is considered to be an extension of primary interests. These include the protection of their civilians living overseas, and the protection of diplomatic immunity.
- (3) Permanent interests: They are the interests states are usually concerned with over a very long period of time. Nevertheless, these interests gradually change in order to be compatible with the new context, for example, England used to regard the freedom in navigation as its interest.
- (4) Variable interests: These kinds of interests refer to temporary interests. They can be adapted from primary or permanent interests of a particular state and can vary depending on the changing contexts, e.g., a new leader's policy, public opinion, political party, norms and political culture.
- (5) General interests: General interests are in various aspects, e.g., economic, trade, diplomatic relations, and international law.
- (6) Specific interests: Specific interests are an extension of general interests. For England, the preservation of the Benelux countries is equal to the remainder of Europe to maintain a balance of power.

In terms of multilateral interests, they can be broadly categorized according to the interplay between / among those interests:

- (1) Identical interests: Identical interests refer to the intersection of states' interests. They can be one of the aforementioned interests of a particular state. For example, both the U.S. and England agree on the preservation of the European balance of power.
- (2) Complementary interests: Complementary interests rely upon reciprocation. Based on the notion that all actors will gain from each other, interchanging interests among states contributes to further

cooperation. In other words, the collaboration of the states starts with common points in particular issues, then mutual gains operate on giving and taking to complement each other. To provide a clear-cut example, the positive relationship between England and Portugal was built on the mutual benefit of security. To England, Portugal became a strategic point in preserving its influence in the Atlantic Ocean and on the Iberian Peninsula. At the same time, Portugal used the influence of England to guarantee its autonomy from Spain.

- (3) **Conflicting interests:** Where there are contradicting national interests, it may lead to a conflict among states. Nothing endures but change, and the national interests are no exception. In other words, conflicting interests embrace unsteadiness as it can be changeable from time to time. The dynamics of change may stem from various reasons, for example, a changing policy from a new leader or a new situation. As such, states can completely change their reaction in response to a conflicting interest or a mutual interest. In essence, states can be more practical by changing their hostile stance towards a state with a contradictory interest and become a friend to that ex-enemy. Of course, this depends on the context and a new perception in defining the national interest.

1.2.5 The implementation on international strategies

There are various approaches and theories on the implementation of international strategies and the foreign policy of states. This research adopted the theory of classical realism to examine states' foreign policy in response to changes in the surrounding context, including efforts to survive, protecting interests, preserving influence over others, and maintaining the balance of power.

Classical realism maintains a pessimistic view of human nature as generally being self-interested. All humans live by relying on themselves as there is no government to govern them. Therefore, morality does not concern humans. Since ancient times, the nature of humans has not changed. Since humans have unlimited

needs and are selfish by nature, it is inevitable that conflicts between states will take place.

With evil, self-centeredness, and the thirst for power stemming from human nature, each state attempts to acquire more power. The behavior of states reflects human nature because it is governed by a leader, who is human. This makes the actions of states to be similar to human actions. According to Michael Spirtas, the evil leader will formulate an evil foreign policy to make war for power, and other interests (Collin, 2007, pp. 11-20). Selfish states, who live in the anarchic realm, attempt to acquire power to protect themselves from loss. Throughout the history of humankind there has been a struggle for power among states and that conflict, stemming from power seeking, will remain forever. As Han J. Morgenthau once said, “The struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience” (Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 1948, p. 17).

1.2.5.1 State level

In order to acquire desirable things, humans seek power to achieve their intentions. As one state is a multitude of self-interested humans, it is unavoidable that people within a state will manipulate their relations to achieve their fundamental needs, i.e., survival and protecting their interests. Power, therefore, becomes both the ends and means to achieving the desires of humans. The struggle of power can be divided into three stages:

- (1) The preservation of the possessed power
- (2) The maximization of power
- (3) The expression of the possessed power

Considering human nature is self-interested, domestic affairs of states is in line with common characteristics of humans. To live with each other peacefully, the self-interested being has to be governed by hegemony. Without the supreme entity, the society will be entirely in a state of confusion and disorder. In other words, the society will be in utter chaos as everyone is struggling for power.

According to Hobbes, the so-called “Leviathan”, the sovereign power, ensures the security of a society and should be granted absolute power for mutual safety. In this sense, Hobbes’ idea on Leviathan prioritizes ends rather than focusing on the means.

Concerning statecraft, Niccolo Machiavelli, a proponent of the realist approach, proposed that leaders should be careful about morality when governing the state. To him, each situation is temporary and changeable. Therefore, the only ethics that the state leader should uphold are ones that achieve, preserve, and acquire interests for the state.

1.3 Literature review and related studies

For the review on literature, the research found related work on U.S. - Thailand relations.

In *Militocracy, Military Coup and Thai Politics*, written by Professor Dr. Surachart Bamrungsuk, military coup d'états were studied through the lens of international affairs. Questioning democratization in particular countries, he notices that the existence of an authoritarian regime, the opponent of democracy, has a positive effect on relations with a superpower's foreign policy. According to his argument, the stance of superpower, considered as the external force, can be either supportive or averse to such a regime overtly or publicly. When America has a strategic national interest, ideology promotion can be put on hold. The most explicit example is the case of American's foreign policy during the Cold War, in which the U.S. could turn a blind eye to the democratization process or even join hand in hand with authoritarian regimes in South East Asia and La (Bamrungsuk, 2015) tin America in order to preserve its strategic alliances against the threat of communism.

"Reinvigorating the U.S.-Thailand Alliance", an article written by Walter Lohman, the Director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, and Robert Warsaw, discusses U.S.-Thai relations in the midst of China's intervention. Although the U.S. and Thailand have had a long history of being strategic partners, particularly during the Cold War, the almost 200-year-old bilateral relations has never guaranteed the steadiness of the relationship, especially when the relationship is balanced out by other major superpowers. Undeniably, China is a major factor in understanding the complex relationship between the U.S. and Thailand. Lohman claims that Thailand has been inclined to lean towards China when its relationship with the U.S. is shaken by political turmoil in Thailand. Unlike the U.S., China has clung to the

principle that it will never step into domestic affairs of another nation-state. After the 2006 coup was staged, the U.S. held back its military cooperation and monetary assistance to the Thai government for going against democratic values. Bending towards China is made evident by the multitude of Sino-Thai relations, including, arms trades, the successful free trade agreement between ASEAN and China, the number of Thai exchange students in China and so on. In the end, Lohman stresses the significance of the U.S. keeping a good relationship with Thailand if it needs to reengage its role in the region. He suggested that U.S. policy makers revitalized their good relationship with former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, the elected administration after the 2006 military coup was staged (Lohman, 2011).

The book entitled, *Shifting Ground between the U.S. and a Rising China*, demonstrates that the relationship of the U.S. and Thailand gradually declined after the Cold War ended (Zawacki, 2017, pp. 194-298). In his effort in conducting exclusive interviews with key people in Thailand and the U.S., the work provides an in-depth understanding of how Thailand's elite manage to deal with the two major superpowers. He argues that the setbacks in bilateral relations stemmed from crashes of ideological interests. The explanation is based on the tracing of Thailand's foreign policy, which has shifted from the U.S., the former alliance, to China, the newly emerged power in both regional and global influence. Differences in political-economy models comes after China's influence. He claims that the critical factor spoiling relations is the incomplete instituted neoliberalism principal in Thailand, owing to Thailand's elites, who have played a significant role in defining and implementing the country's foreign policy. They would instead disregard democracy and human rights and instead follow the Chinese model and combine the authoritarian style of administration with a capitalist economy. Moreover, the U.S. traditional strategy of supporting undemocratic regimes, which grants massive U.S. military and economic assistance to create an alliance, in this case with Thailand, was abolished once the ideology conflict erupted. In essence, transitions in Thai politics have a profound impact on the direction of Thailand's foreign policy towards the United States and China.

A further study, "The U.S. Strategy Towards the Southeast Asia Region", conducted by Associate Professor Dr. Prapat Thepchatree reveals three major strategies the U.S. utilizes towards the region: maintaining their regional hegemonic role, hedging

or containing China's influence, and strategizing the War on Terror. The U.S. master plan affects the regional architecture, so Prapat proposes that Thailand devise a strategy in accordance to the U.S. strategy in two dimensions: bilateral and multilateral. Bilaterally, Thailand's interest should be affixed with the U.S., which would extend their close relationship and lead to a variety of collaborations in security, and the economy. Multilaterally, Thailand can bring in the U.S. to balance the influence of China in ASEAN since the influence of the latter is growing rapidly. Nevertheless, Prapat reiterates that Thailand should be careful in balancing the relationship with two superpowers. Therefore, Thailand's position towards them should try to preserve neutrality.

“The U.S. Foreign Policy Towards East Asia and Pacific Region Under the President Obama Administration: a Final Report” is a well-crafted piece of work focusing on U.S. foreign policy towards Asia. It provides an in-depth understanding about the superpower's strategy towards Asia. As Asia's significance is increasing in many varying aspects, from economics to security. To unveil the grand strategy that President Obama adopted towards this region is the objective of this study. According to the study, the Obama administration got involved in this region to pursue three major goals: (1) preserving its hegemonic status in the region (2) contain China's influence, and (3) centralize the U.S. role as the major regional architect. President Obama extended the methods to pursue such goals by diversifying bilateral and multilateral relations. While the U.S. continues its “Hub and Spokes” strategy by maintaining good relations with its five traditional allies in Asia: the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, and Australia; at the same time, the U.S. has attempted to promote its role multilaterally to amplify its interests. There is an abundance of evidence showing that the U.S. eagerly pushes forward its role in multilateral frameworks, such as joining the meeting of ASEAN+6 or the East Asia Summit (EAS), persuading APEC member countries to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is expected to be the largest free trade area if successfully ratified by those members. All those attempts is not only to counter balance China's influence after the long U.S. absence in regional affairs, but to create a new space where the U.S. can fully exercise its power in the sphere and even exclude China, in the case of the TPP. Regarding the relationship with Thailand, Dr. Prapat forecasts that the relations between the two countries will become more

estranged. As the master plan aims to get involved in ASEAN affairs, Thailand will be less important to the U.S. because it has suffered from political turmoil that continues to plague its potential in ASEAN. Therefore, the U.S. will pay more attention to Thailand's neighboring countries, such as Indonesia or Vietnam instead (Thepchatree, 2013).

Dr. Surachart Bamrungsuk's master thesis on "United States Foreign Policy and Thai Military Rule 1947 – 1977" is a study on the existence of military rule in Thailand, ranging from the arrival of Pleak Phibulsongkram to General Kriengsak Chamanan, and its direct impact on U.S. foreign policy. Considering the context of the Cold War in the region, U.S. decision makers were aware of the threat from Chinese-led communism, which gradually annexed Thailand's neighboring countries, e.g., Laos, and Vietnam, to join its bloc. Concerning strategic importance, the U.S. foreign policy seemed to be hypocritical in terms of democratic values it upheld. Namely, the U.S. government reconciled with military regimes to preserve its alliance in the region and ignored democratization and human right abuses in Thailand, especially by the time the Sarit regime was in charge. In sum, this work explains the rise and fall of Thai authoritarian regimes being a result of U.S. foreign policy towards Thailand very well. Although the U.S. is not the sole catalyst keeping Thailand under military control, it is undeniable that Thailand suffered under military regimes for almost 30 years because the U.S., directly and indirectly legitimized the military regimes through assistance, e.g., military exercises and arms trades (Bamrungsuk, 1988).

1.4 Conceptual framework


This study examines literature, related studies, academic papers, as well as documentation related to U.S.-Thailand security relations. It also adopts the concepts of national security, national interest, the implementation of international strategies, as well as classical realism to analysis U.S.-Thailand military security relations. The impact of the 2014 Thailand military coup on bilateral relations will be explored to understand the adaptation of U.S. strategies when engaging with Thailand through security cooperation and obstacles stemming from the U.S. law barring any aid and assistance to coup countries will be analyzed. Maintaining the security arrangement

with Thailand enables the U.S. to engage in regional affairs. To balance the influence of China, it is crucial for the U.S. to preserve its strategic interests through the maintenance of good cooperation with Thailand. Discontinuity from the arrangement with its longstanding ally could affect the balance of power regionally and at the global level.

Furthermore, the research adopted the theory of classical realism to analyze the limitations of the U.S. in fully applying penalties on the military junta government of Thailand through banning security arrangements with the country, in order to explain the stance of the U.S. towards Thailand following the 2014 coup. Amidst competition between the two superpowers in Asia, the U.S. struggled to survive and maintain its national interest in this region.

Figure 1

The Conceptual Framework of the Study



1.5 Scope of the study

The research investigates the impact of the 2014 Thai military coup on U.S.-Thailand security cooperation. Therefore, the scope of the study focuses on the security cooperation of the two countries from when the coup was staged and until the 2019 election, which was a period of ineligibility for Thailand to have a security

arrangement with the U.S. Amidst the tension in U.S.- Thailand relations, Sino-Thailand security cooperation after the 2014 Thailand coup will also be investigated

1.6 Research questions

- 1) How did the 2014 Thai coup affect U.S.-Thailand security cooperation?
- 2) After the 2014 coup was staged, what are some of the limitations in U.S.-Thailand security cooperation?
- 3) To what extent was the U.S. impacted by the 2014 Thailand military coup and what effects came from its security cooperation with Thailand?

1.7 Hypothesis

The strategic importance of Thailand contributes to the continuity in maintaining firm security cooperation with Thailand, despite the 2014 military coup.

1.8 Methodology

To answer the research questions in this study accurately, the study will use a qualitative method based on descriptive analysis and documentary research, significant sources of data of the study will be collected from two kinds of sources:

- 1) Primary sources: Major primary sources are derived from the statements from the U.S. Department of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, speeches, press releases, news, and Thailand's military budgetary reports.
- 2) Secondary sources: All other necessary information is derived from secondary sources, e.g., electronic journals, books, theses, dissertations, interviewing articles, academic articles that are relevant to the military cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand, such as, the report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which is also applied as a source for this study.

1.9 Presentation

- 1) Chapter 1: Introduction and significance of the issue, review of the literature and scope of the study, conceptual Framework, hypothesis, objective of the study, and methodology
- 2) Chapter 2: U.S.-Thailand Security Cooperation
- 3) Chapter 3: U.S.-Thailand Security Cooperation after the 2014 Thailand military coup
- 4) Chapter 4: Chinese Factors
- 5) Chapter 5: Rebalancing between the two countries: the Trump Administration
- 6) Chapter 6: Conclusion

CHAPTER 2

U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY COOPERATION

Understanding the background of the U.S.-Thailand security cooperation will bring about more understanding on how the relationship of the two countries was built. In order to explore what and how the U.S. and Thailand cooperates on security arrangements, this chapter attempts to investigate the security and strategic interests rooted in activities of the U.S.- Thailand security cooperation. The chapter covers the period of the U.S.-Thailand security relations before the 2014 Thailand military coup.

2.1 Security cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand

This section elaborates on how the long-standing security cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand has developed and progressed from time to time. Considering their relations, it is found that the security cooperation of the two countries is profound and resilient, despite encountering various challenges.

Tracing back five decades of security relations between the two countries, the alliance of the U.S. and Thailand has been built on mutual interests involving security issues (Meelarp, 2016, p. 6). Recognized as a “phi nong or older-younger brother relationship”, their relations are based on a patron-client pattern, which was established by Thailand’s massive dependence on superpowers, like the U.S. (Muecke, 1988, p. 62). Military cooperation has been flourishing, despite the repeated coups in Thailand. In other words, the shared bond in U.S. and Thailand’s relations lies in their military ties.

During the cold war era the imminent threat to the U.S. posed by the spreading of Communism throughout the region, including China; its eastern neighbors; Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR); and an internal insurgency, Thailand became a key ally and a partner of the U.S. in maintaining its strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Under the 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué, Thailand formally became an ally to the U.S. (Chanlett et al., 2007, p. 8). Thailand received massive support from the U.S., including financial and military

assistance. In exchange for tremendous help provided by the U.S., Thailand provided troops and hosted the army-base facilities that could facilitate the U.S. military operation in Indochina, including an air-base at Pattaya and a deep-water port at Sattahip (Stern, 2009, p. 1). With the high stakes of U.S. interest in the region, Thailand obtained defense support, including military training and arms transfers from its ally.

During the end of cold war period, transnational threats, including trafficking, narcotics, and trans-organized crime, became focal issues bringing the U.S. and Thailand together for further security cooperation. In the 2000s, both countries were strengthening their security cooperation in order to fight against terrorism. The terrorist attack on September 11th brought firm cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand to combat terrorist security threats in the region.

During the President George W. Bush administration, the security cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand developed into further steps. In 2003, Thailand was officially designated a significant non-NATO ally that could enhance security cooperation with the U.S. in combating global terrorism and transnational organized crime (Chanlett et al., 2007, p. 14). The special status of Thailand was to fulfill that U.S. foreign policy goal. In order to facilitate combating terrorism and transnational crime, the Thaksin administration facilitated the operations in Iraq by allowing U.S. troops access to Thai military facilities, including ports and airfields (Meelarp, 2016, p. 29). As a non-NATO ally country, Thailand enjoyed its privileges and received foreign aid and military assistance from the U.S. Such aid and assistance from the U.S., included, special offers for arms transfers and purchases of weaponry.

The U.S. enjoyed the privilege using Thai military facilities, including airfields and ports, during both war and peace time, and use Thailand as a gateway to Asia. Their relationship became even closer after the signing of the 2012 Joint Vision Statement for Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance (Berteau et al., 2014). Realigned by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the concept of the U.S. military operation in Southeast Asia as “places, not bases” tightened the strategic cooperation with Thailand (Chanlett et al., 2007, p. 8).

2.2 Security arrangements before the Thailand 2014 military coup

This section examines the deep-rooted relationship of the U.S.-Thailand security cooperation before the 2014 Thai military coup. Through four main pillars of their security arrangements, represented by Cobra Gold, the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), the Foreign Military Sales program (FMS), and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).

2.2.1. Cobra Gold

The so-called military training “Cobra Gold” is considered as the largest multilateral exercise in the Asia-Pacific region. Apart from the U.S. and Thailand, there are many parties who participate in this annually held training, including U.S. allied nations; including Japan, South Korea, and U.S. military partner countries; including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and other observers.

In the beginning, Cobra Gold was just a bilateral naval exercise operation between U.S. Marines and Royal Thai Marines under the 1965 bilateral U.S.-Thailand naval exercise Operation TEAMWORK, which aimed at demonstrating the readiness of military forces, as well as ensuring the security cooperation among allies against their common enemy, Vietnam. In 1982, the cooperation, under the framework of Operation TEAMWORK, strengthened. Later on, the operation became an annual exercise. Several naval exercises were combined in the operation, and it was later recognized as Cobra Gold. Apart from the U.S. Marines and Royal Thai Marines, the first Cobra Gold invited two additional forces, the Royal Thai Air Force and U.S. Navy to participate in the exercise as well.

Although there was no longer an imminent threat from the Cold War in the 1990s, the training continued and members and observers expanded. Following the coup in 1991, the U.S. decided to suspend the military exercises in response to deposing the elected government. However, the penalty from the U.S. was not long-lasting. In the following year, the suspension of the exercise was called off by the U.S. State Department. This time, the military exercise resumed with the full participation of the U.S. side. In 1993, the defense cooperation of the two countries strengthened further when the logistics agreement between the two countries was concluded. As a result of

this agreement, the U.S. was able to utilize the airfields and port facilities of Thailand. (Chambers, 2004, pp. 461-462)

In 1994, there was an expansion in terms of the observer countries, which extended to Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia. In the late 1990s, the bilateral exercise between the U.S. and Thailand continued to grow in terms of the number of participants. The participation of Singapore in the year 2000 made it the third party in Cobra Gold. In 2004, there were two new nations, the Philippines and Mongolia, participating in the military exercise. During the 2000s, Cobra Gold's mission became wider in scope. The mission of the military exercise became more relevant to the challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. In response to vulnerabilities stemming from the 2004 Tsunami, Cobra Gold later included a multinational interagency mission and workshop, along with staff concerning humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations.

HADR continued to be the main focus of the 2005 Cobra Gold. Apart from reframing the scope, there was also an expansion in terms of participation of stakeholders as well. Namely, the military exercise expanded to non-military stakeholders, including nongovernmental, and private organizations from the participating countries. Additionally, there was an extension to new observing countries to the exercise, including China, Pakistan, Cambodia, Israel, and The United Arab Emirates (Chanlett et al., 2007, pp. 8-16). Evolving from a bilateral exercise between the U.S. and Thailand, Cobra Gold has become one of the largest military exercises, one which has substantial diplomatic and security significance.

Before the 2006 coup was staged, Cobra Gold expanded continuously in terms of the numbers of observers and participant states. Although there was serious concern about human rights violations from Thailand's war on drugs during the years 2003 to 2005, Cobra Gold's activity appeared to continue smoothly. (Thailand's 'war on drugs', 2008). Apart from Cobra Gold, 40 military exercises are jointly held between the U.S. and Thailand annually (Chanlett et al., 2007). During the Cobra Gold 2006, Washington sent approximately 7,800 servicemen to participate in the military exercise. The observing nations, including Singapore, Japan, and Indonesia also attended the Cobra Gold 2006. (Chanlett et al., 2007, p. 11). It was a great chance to provide opportunities for expanding security cooperation with prospective participants and

observers. Considering the fact that the 2006 military coup d'état had no significant implications on obstructing the strong military cooperation between the two countries, little change in the bilateral and multilateral exercise with Thailand occurred. In the year following the coup, both countries continued to have 40 joint military exercises, including Cobra Gold in May 2007. Although it was scaled down in the number of U.S. troops participating in multilateral exercise, the reduction stemmed from other reasons, not by the democratic setback in Thailand. In other words, the operational commitments of the U.S. in Iraq was found to be the reason for scaling down the U.S. troop numbers (Meelarp, 2016, p. 41). Since the security and diplomatic interests of the U.S. is dependent on this multilateral military training, the Cobra Gold and military relations with Thailand was far too important for the U.S. to call it off following the 2014 Thai coup. Cobra Gold promotes good cooperation and communication among the U.S., Thailand, and other partners in response to the emerging challenges of the region. For example, preparation for humanitarian operations under HADR, which is one of Cobra Gold's missions, was possible and fortunately led to an alleviation of the extremely severe damage stemming from Cyclone Nargis in 2008. (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 2011). By that time, Thailand under the former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej had played an active role in persuading the Burmese junta to accept assistance from international organizations and militaries.

According to Alexander A. Arvizu, an American diplomat serving as the deputy chief of missions in the U.S. Embassy in Thailand when the 2006 coup was staged, "Cobra Gold has been the most visible symbol of United States and Thai military cooperation." (Fayloga, 2007). Although the U.S. has threatened to put the military exercise on hold, Cobra Gold has never been called off in spite of the deterioration of Thailand's democracy since its first introduced in 1982. With no interruption for Cobra Gold, the annually held military exercise has entirely proved its significance towards bilateral and multilateral military security cooperation for all stakeholders, including the U.S., Thailand, other participating states, and observers. With its capacity in uniting new participating states, and attracting more observing states to join the military exercise, Cobra Gold has become the world's largest incorporated military exercise (Chanlett et al., 2007, pp. 8-14). In 2013, Thailand

played an active role in inviting the Burmese Armed Forces officers to join in the military exercise. In the following year, the Burmese military was introduced to their internationally respected military counterparts and proved it can meet international standards, in particular, in respect to human rights and planning and operations (“National Security,” 2014). From this sense, the bilateral exercise has shifted to multilateral cooperation, which advances U.S.-Thailand relations and provides strategic interests for both countries. Also, the military exercise serves as a platform for all stakeholders, including the armed forces of the U.S., Thailand, and participating and observing countries.

By 2014, more than 13,000 servicemen of seven participating nations, including Thailand, the U.S., Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea, attended the military exercise (“China and Vietnam,” 2014). China became an Observer Plus and attended in the non-combat part of the military exercise (Chanlett et al., 2007, p. 8). Additionally, there were 11 official observer nations participating in the 2014 Cobra Gold, including China, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, South Africa, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Russia, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom (Slavin, 2014). According to Gregory Poling, the director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and a fellow with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Cobra Gold is a strategic mechanism to establish trust, promote coordination with partners, and seek new collaboration in response to security challenges, including HADR, military medicine, and search and rescue (Poling, 2014). In 2011, the significance of the annual military exercise was reaffirmed by Ambassador Kristie Kenney. According to the US Ambassador to Thailand, Cobra Gold is regarded as an opportunity that ultimately strengthens the partnership of the two countries and is a driving force in steering security and humanitarian cooperation for this region (Kenney, 2011). Ambassador Kenney also stressed on the significance of maintaining Thailand as a close ally to the U.S. In this sense, Cobra Gold, the principal multilateral military exercise, becomes a tool for U.S. regional diplomacy.

2.2.2 International military education and training program (IMET)

With a low budget, but earning high profit made the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) become one of the most efficient programs which invests in human capital. In executing the IMET program, there are two authorities performing different roles. While the U.S. Secretary of State considers eligible countries to participate in the IMET program, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for the execution of the program (Parameswaran, 2015a). Since 1976, the IMET program has transplanted American culture into young-talented foreign leaders. During participation in the IMET program, students have a great opportunity to build a good relationship with U.S. military and foreign officers. Additionally, the professional military training program allows these foreign future leaders to network and build up mutual trust. Every year the U.S. Congress provides appropriated funds to the guest countries for the Military Education and Training Program. Thailand is one of the nations to be awarded the IMET grant. The establishment of the IMET program for Thailand can be traced back to 1952, the year in which the first Thai student started participating in the program. (Taw, 1994). Before Thailand's 2006 coup was staged, Thailand received IMET funding with a total amount of approximately \$2.5 million per year (Chanlett et al, 2007, p. 11). This made the country the largest beneficiary of the program's funding. After the completion of training, Thai IMET alumni went back to their home country and utilize the U.S. doctrine from preparing the training manual to professionalize their military. Later, Thai IMET alumni are later appointed advisors of the U.S.-Thailand security cooperation. Since the first launch of IMET, thousands of Thai military officers have attended the program. In general, Thai IMET alumni officers serve in the army for 30 years of their career and assume top-ranking positions in Thailand. In a study conducted by the RAND Corporation, an American nonprofit global policy think tank, five percent of the total Royal Thai armed forces has attended the IMET program. (Taw, 1994, pp. 23-26). The findings of the study suggested that most of the Royal Thai officers participating in the training program get better opportunities in their military career. They have been able to hold key positions in the Thai army, including training and human development, policy development, and command. Due to the overthrow of the democratic government in 2006, the U.S.

suspended granting IMET funding to Thailand. However, the U.S. sophisticatedly sought another way to allocate the funding to Thailand through the program. In fact, the IMET funding is classified as one of the military assistances that has to be suspended owing to the toppling of a democratic government. Indeed, the diplomatic viewpoint is rather important when considering the stance of the U.S. when cutting the IMET funding due to the 2006 coup. Despite the U.S. cutting the program's funding provided to Thailand, it allowed Thailand to subsidize its own fund and participate in the program. The U.S. flexibly allowed Thailand to participate in IMET through other sources of funding, such as self-funding, and finding other U.S. appropriations. Although there was an announcement of the U.S. State Department for the suspension of the IMET program, the U.S. allowed Thailand to send military officers to participate in the program (Chanlett et al., 2007, p. 7). The flexibility of the U.S. was evident by its approval for those Royal Thai Military officers who obtained funding before the coup to continue their training. The self-funding provided by Thailand was an alternative way for the country to send new students to participate in the training program (Meelarp, 2016, p. 44). In practice, the admission of the Thai students by other military institutions was also flexible as it was prohibited to provide any assistance to a coup county, for instance, students who passed the qualification of the Naval Postgraduate School were admitted. All IMET funding granted to the county was resumed as soon as there was a certification that Thailand had got back on the democratic track in 2008. Each year the appropriation of IMET funding is done in order to allocate funds for the following fiscal year (FY), covering from October 1 until September 30 of a given year. The IMET funding has become one of the mechanisms of the U.S. to strengthen security cooperation with Thailand.

2.2.3 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a program under the responsibility of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is under the control of the United States Department of Defense (DoD). The program supports the U.S. and its counterpart in executing government-to-government sales and purchases of U.S. made weapons and security equipment, obtain security services, and military training. Granting the fund to a particular country is under the responsibility of the Secretary of

State and the execution of the program is under the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.

Under the program, the U.S. also assists its counterpart in terms of providing low-interest rate grants and loans in order to purchase U.S. weapons, services, and training through a funding support program entitled “Foreign Military Financing (FMF)” (“Foreign Military Financing,” n.d.). Apart from the FMF financing grant, the program also allows the counterpart country to purchase U.S. military devices, service, and training through self-funding (“Foreign Military Financing,” n.d.).

Under the authorization of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the FMS program becomes one of the mechanisms of the U.S. foreign policy in promoting security interests with a particular country. To proceed a further step on security cooperation with a foreign government, the AECA imposes that the approval of the U.S. president is necessary as he/she must acknowledge the opportunity to promote the security interest as well as maintain stability (Chanlett-Avery, 2007). In aligning with the direction of AECA, there is a provision in the FMS program prohibiting the sales of defense articles and services to countries that have carried out a coup. According to Chapter 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Program General Information, no assistance shall be furnished to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by a military coup or decree (Section 7008, P.L. 111-8)” (“C4 - Foreign Military,” n.d.). The accessibility of both programs allows Thailand to be able to modernize its military with U.S. made weapons. Offering more opportunities for foreign governments with lower budgets to obtain U.S. weapons, and services, the FMS program also has another track called “the excess defense article (EDA) programs”, which allows defense trade and arms transfer. In order to requests and facilitate the grant and arms transfer, the programs, including FMS, FMF, and EDA are monitored by the DSCA with coordination with the DOD, which facilitates approval for the recipient states (“Excess Defense Articles,” n.d.). Under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the EDA program is allowed to be operated under the FMS program under the AECA. Under this program, the counterpart countries will obtain support as a grant or at a reduced cost based depending on the conditions of the equipment. The military weapons can vary in a range of conditions, from brand new ones to used ones. Receiving naval ships is an example of a country in securing the support under the EDA program

(Chanlett et al., 2007). Considering the U.S.-Thailand security-cooperation, the country is eligible to access all programs and U.S. support. With the FMS program, the support has enabled Thailand to enhance its military capability, including military weapons, services, and training. The elevation of Thailand's status to be a major non-NATO ally in 2003 allows Thailand access to greater support of the U.S. military aid and assistance, including purchasing U.S. made weapons. According to U.S. law, military sales and services must be suspended due to the 2006 coup. As a result, the total amount of 29 million dollars for the security aid and assistance provided to Thailand, including the FMF funding, was suspended.

2.3.4 International Law Enforcement Academy Bangkok (law enforcement cooperation)


The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) is one of the mechanisms for the U.S. in protecting its national interest, as well as promote emerging democracies. In 1995, the first ILEA was established in Budapest. In the following year, a recommendation was made by the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok for the establishment of ILEA as a mechanism in boosting the security cooperation in Asia ("Welcome to ILEA," n.d.). In coping with the regional security challenges effectively, the United States and Thailand concluded a bilateral agreement two years after the recommendation was initiated. The partnership included training for combating many kinds of transnational threats, such as drug trafficking, and terrorism. As the security academy is the largest academy that covers Southeast Asia and China, the establishment of ILEA in Bangkok marked the strategic engagement of the U.S. in security challenges in Asia. According to the State Department, "The ILEA's mission is to buttress democratic governance through the rule of law; enhance the functioning of free markets through improved legislation and law enforcement; and increase social, political, and economic stability by combating narcotics trafficking and crime." The ILEA Bangkok acquired training support from the U.S. and partner countries which maximizes security cooperation as well as promote the adoption of international law enforcement standards. For the organization structure of ILEA in Bangkok, the blueprint was collectively designed by both the agency officials from the U.S. and Thailand. Both the U.S. and Thailand are responsible for the provision of the instructors and the logistic support. In

other words, the security related agencies of both countries would send their representatives to participate in this program. For instance, those that represent the U.S. are from related security agencies, including the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), etc. (Meelarp, 2016, p. 48). In the same practice, the representatives from Thailand are also sent by those security-related agencies, including the Royal Thai Police and the Thai Office of the Narcotics Control Board (Chanlett et al., 2007, pp. 9-10). In particular, the U.S. agency entitled "Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)" under the Department of Justice, whose mission is to combat drug trafficking and distribution within the states, is the major agency responsible for program support for the ILEA in Bangkok. Concerning the executive positions, many key positions, including the executive director, deputy executive director, and the chiefs of each subsection in ILEA Bangkok are in Thais. The source of ILEA Bangkok financing appears to be the U.S. Department of State, which is the major contributor of the program's training through the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE). The funding supports Thailand's ability to conduct counternarcotic operations, facilitate crop substitution and demand reduction efforts and enhance regional and multilateral counternarcotic cooperation (US Congress House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program, 2004).

To finance the specialized courses, the contributions of the U.S. can vary according to the requirement of its governmental agencies, as well as the need of the foreign governments ("International Law Enforcement," n.d.). The designed training courses in the academy are mostly a combination between the compromised requirements of participating countries, and the U.S. interests. In order to participate in the ILEA training courses, the nomination from the U.S. Embassy of those states expressing their intention to participate in the academy is a must, as it is proof of the eligibility of the states. For instance, one of the conditions notifies that any state with a record of human rights violations must be prohibited from participating in the academy. The ILEA academy in Bangkok reflects strong cooperation among nations. With the contributions of various nations, there were many multinational staff performing their roles as trainers in the academy, including Japan, Holland, Australia, and Hong Kong.

As the focal point is security cooperation through the ILEA in Bangkok, it is undoubtedly true that the U.S. could maintain its influence in the region.

Following Thailand's 2006 coup, ILEA Bangkok continued. With mutual concerns of regional threats, as well as imbalances in regional power and evident threats to national security, mutual interests contributed to the cooperation of the two countries through the law enforcement, which is considered as one of the most effective ways to cope with those concerns. With regard to its training course on law enforcement, the ILEA Bangkok allows Southeast Asia nations to be able to cope with transnational threats through the international security cooperation. Since ILEA was considered as an important mechanism in promoting the U.S. interest in the region, the 2006 military coup had no impact on the security arrangement with Thailand.



CHAPTER 3

U.S.-THAILAND SECURITY ARRANGEMENT AFTER THE 2014 MILITARY COUP

Following the 2014 Thailand military coup, there were many negative reactions in response to the overthrowing of the democratic government. Starting with the prompt denouncement made by the Secretary of State John Kerry. That was followed by the proclamation to withhold military aid and assistance to Thailand, e.g., the cancellation of the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), the annually held bilateral Naval exercise between the U.S. and Thailand, and the bilateral Army exercise entitled Hanuman Guardian. In addition to those suspensions, there was a rumor of the possibility of canceling Cobra Gold 2015. Although Thailand has strategic importance for the U.S., the U.S. law bars any aid and assistance to a coup country. With such challenges, the Obama administration sought ways to compromise between the two different requirements in order to continually grant the security arrangement with Thailand. Therefore, the necessity in prolonging the security cooperation with Thailand during the Obama administration became an object of this study, which needs to be investigated.

In essence, this chapter investigates U.S.-Thailand security cooperation in 2014, which was during the Obama administration and followed the 2014 Thai military coup. Through the four main pillars of the U.S.-Thailand security cooperation, including Cobra Gold, IMET, FMS, and FMF, this chapter examines the aftermath of the coup in relation to the defense cooperation between the two countries.

3.1 Obama administration: Rebalancing to Asia

Readjusting his predecessor's foreign policy, President Obama attempted to recover the positive image and influence of the U.S. in the Asia Pacific region. In his policy towards the Southeast Asia region, the so-called "Pivot to Asia", illustrates Obama's ambition to rebalance Asia. Given that a high priority was placed on the Southeast Asia region, the Pivot to Asia figured prominently in the U.S. foreign policy agenda that focused on U.S. involvement in the region; returning after a long absence.

The U.S. attempts to expand economic activities, including trade and investment, partnership, granting development assistance, and deepening diplomatic activity with Southeast Asian nations (Nguyen, 2016). In a nutshell, Obama's foreign policy direction in returning to Asia was proceeded under the 3D approach consisting of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development. In accordance with the 2015 National Security Strategy, the first D, Diplomacy would be one of the major means in engaging and forging partnerships. Defense was the next element, concerning how the perception of U.S. national security intimidation would be a deterrence. The last component in the Obama foreign policy was Development, which is clearly a significant factor in improving better living conditions of almost one-third of the world's population (Nafees, 2010). Before the Obama administration, the past administrations of the U.S. relatively neglected Southeast Asia, with other regions, such as Europe or Middle East drawing the focus. In the year of 2008, when Barack Obama was elected as the president of the U.S., his administration prioritized Southeast Asian nations by strengthening cooperation in bilateral and multilateral institutions (Sutter et al., 2013).

In terms of the foreign policy of democratic promotion, the Obama administration promoted democracy aligned with its major foreign policy direction. Namely, the policy focused on the engagement and forging of partnerships. As President Obama inherited an unfavorable legacy from his predecessor due to the outrageous behavior of the Bush administration in invading Iraq and Afghanistan in the name of democracy, the prestige of the U.S., as a global leader in promoting democracy and human rights had declined significantly. Lacking faith in democratic leaders would contribute to a wide range of global democratic recessions.

The very first step that the Obama administration endeavored was to recalibrate the democratic promotion through U.S. foreign policy. The administration employed the softer rhetoric by focusing on universal rights and principles, rather than the imposition of American-style democracy with increasing diplomatic engagement with those countries viewed as opponents of the U.S., such as Iran and Russia (Carothers, 2012). Furthermore, the President and his foreign policy team started to express publicity and vigorously more often about democratic and human rights promotion, as well as engagement in pro-democracy diplomacy with regard to

democratic breakdowns or breakthroughs in many countries; including Honduras, South Sudan, Belarus and Côte d'Ivoire.

Despite the attempt to recalibrate the U.S. democratic promotion, it is hard to avoid the fact that the priority is always given to U.S. interests, rather than to ideology. This accounts for the asymmetrical actions related to why some countries, where the U.S. national interests are at stake, such as the Persian Gulf countries, get a free pass, while less strategically important relationships with Central Asian and African autocrats, are held accountable by the U.S. liberal ideology.

While the Chinese influence has been growing significantly in the region, Obama's strategic policy aimed to penetrate into the Chinese sphere of influence. With an increasing number of economic and development projects in Southeast Asia, Beijing's strategic influence in the region has been steadily growing. Undoubtedly, China and the United States have conflicting interests in their quest for a zone of influence. In this sense, Washington attempts to penetrate into Beijing's sphere of influence. Moreover, many of Southeast Asian countries have been heavily relying on China economically and politically.

The penetration by the U.S. was built up through developing partnerships with individual Southeast Asian countries. Overall, the relations of the U.S. and ASEAN countries were in a positive condition under the Obama administration. Obama's rebalancing Asia was well-accepted by most of the ASEAN countries. Particularly, when the disputes between China and some ASEAN nations escalated, the window of opportunity was open for the U.S. As the U.S. could be able to engage and develop their further relationships with those states (Freise, 2012). In general, the key players in ASEAN had positive feedback in relation to the Asian pivot strategy of the U.S. More or less, these ASEAN countries were either publicly or privately content with the U.S.' higher involvement in the region to counterbalance Chinese influence. Some ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand expressed their standpoint vaguely concerning whether or not they would lean on the side of the United States or China. While, the Philippines and Singapore were overtly supporters of the U.S. presence in this region (Sutter et al., 2013, p. 13).

In terms of military assistance, the Obama administration had continued to provide military assistance and training programs to the key regional players, including

Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. Those key training programs consists of the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), the International Military Education Training (IMET) program, Peacekeeping Funds and the Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Program (Jeonghoon, 2011). In fact, these military assistance programs existed before the Obama administration assumed office. President Obama just maintained the aid and assistance programs. Later in the year of 2009, the president authorized increasing the amount of military aid and assistance provided to these three ASEAN countries.

At the bilateral level, the U.S. effort in building up good relations was very welcomed by ASEAN countries. For Thailand, the security cooperation was viewed as the strongest point in which the U.S.-Thailand relationship was built on (Lohman, 2011). Thailand had been receiving vast military assistance from the U.S. through various programs, including the IMET, FMF and Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Altogether there were also 40 programs reported to be conducted annually as joint military exercises under the security cooperation of these two countries. Those include Cobra Gold, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and Cope Tiger (air forces) etc. Furthermore, the U.S. and Thailand also worked closely on strengthening their security cooperation on non-traditional threats through the founding of the U.S.-Thai Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (CTIC) and International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).

Despite their long-standing ties with Thailand, the U.S. has faced hindrances in its relationship with Thailand, particularly when China has become closer with Thailand economically and militarily. The most remarkable case expressing the difficulties in the U.S.-Thailand relations was the reluctance of the Thai government in responding to the U.S. request in using Utapao airport as a humanitarian assistance and disaster response base, as well as for a NASA climate study. For Indonesia, the U.S. allocated more funds to the FMF program from US\$15.7 million in FY2009 to US\$22 million in FY2011. In the case of the Philippines, the budget allocated for the military programs including, FMF, IMET and Peacekeeping programs were from US\$34 million in FY2009 to US\$40 million in FY2010 (Jeonghoon, 2011, pp. 164-176).

3.2 The security arrangement after the 2014 coup during the Obama administration

3.2.1 Cobra Gold

In 2008, the security arrangement with Thailand was reinstated to pre-coup levels for IMET and FMF. The engagement of Washington was expressed through the enhancement of military exercises and law enforcement cooperation. In 2012, the U.S. and Thailand ensured their close cooperation in maintaining regional security and prosperity through the jointly signed vision statement for a Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance.

Although the number of the American troops attending Cobra Gold after the 2014 coup had declined, the number of participant and observer nations had been significantly increasing each year. There was an expansion in observer nations, from 18 in 2014 to 24 and 27 in 2015 and 2016 respectively (Nanuam, 2016). Although publicly expressing disapproval of Thailand's recent coup, by continuing Cobra Gold it conveyed a meaningful message from Washington to Thailand in that security cooperation with the country was unchanged. According to the U.S. chargé d'affaires, W. Patrick Murphy, it highlighted the unchangeable stance of the U.S.' commitment to Asia through its ties to Thailand. The U.S. would like to reaffirm its bilateral relations with Thailand, as a close friend and ally for almost two centuries. He also added that any bilateral relationship should not surpass the continuity of the Cobra Gold as the multilateral military exercise promoted security cooperation in the region. In 2016, the statement of the Ambassador Glyn Davies reiterated the importance of Cobra Gold as it symbolized America's steadiness and long-standing engagement to the Southeast Asia region. Such engagement with the region, including with Thailand, remained robust and long-lasting as it could surpass any impermanent challenges that arise in their relationship (Nanuam, 2016). Built on a solid foundation, Ambassador Davies positively envisioned that the U.S.-Thailand bilateral relations could return easily as soon as Thailand returned to a sustainable democracy. In expressing disapproval to the coup, the Obama administration reduced its presence. However, the reaction of this administration was rather soft concerning the application of pressure, which could have been stronger. The Obama administration could have entirely called off or considered changing the venue of Cobra Gold. Considering the U.S.' action of continuing Cobra

Gold in Thailand, indicates that Washington prioritizes security interests over the preservation of democratic ideology. In other words, Washington was concerned more about sustaining continual cooperation with Bangkok, its longstanding ally, than rejecting security cooperation with the military junta government.

Table 3.1

Approximate Number of the U.S. Servicemen during the Obama Administration

Year	Approximate Number of the U.S. Servicemen	Remark
2006	4,300	N/A
2007	3,600	N/A
2008	6,075	N/A
2009	7,000	Light Year
2010	6,000	Heavy Year
2010	6,000	Heavy Year
2010	6,000	Heavy Year
2010	6,000	Heavy Year
2011	5,900	N/A
2012	8,948	Heavy Year
2013	8,983	N/A
2014	4,556	N/A
2015*	4,556	Heavy Year in Light Year
2016	3,600	N/A
2017	3,600	N/A

3.2.2 International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

From FY2008 to FY2014, Thailand was annually allocated IMET funding by the U.S. Congress worth approximately \$1.4 million. Following the request for an increase in IMET funding for Thailand by the U.S. Department of State, the funding was expanded to \$2.1 million in 2015. Regarding the FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, Thailand was one of the top priority recipients of IMET funding (FY2015 Congressional Budget Justification, 2014, p. 117).

The actual expenditures of FY2015 and FY2016 indicated effects from the 2014 coup for Thailand as the recipient of IMET funding. Although the budget request for the FY2015 and FY2016, which amounted to \$2.2 million, was made to the U.S. congress prior to the military coup to cope with emerging threats stemming from the terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the requested budget was visibly affected by the military coup, considering the actual expenditure decreased to \$1.3 million and \$0.7 million, respectively (“Budget Amendment Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Fiscal Year 2015,” ed., 2014). Additionally, the requested and actual budget of FY2017 was entirely suspended following the 2014 Thai military coup. Despite the budgetary suspension, the U.S. flexibly allowed Thai officers, who already executed their participation prior to the coup, to continue their training. However, the new students’ expenses were covered by Thailand’s self-funding in order to attend the IMET program. For instance, the Naval Postgraduate School had two tracks of Thai graduate students in 2015. In this batch, there were two Thai students who received a grant from IMET funding and the others were sponsored by the Thai government self-funding (Meelarp, 2016, p. 69). In both FY2016 and FY2017, the Department of State withheld the requested IMET funding for Bangkok. With regard to the treatment of the IMET funding case, it was found that the reaction of the U.S. following the toppling of the democratic government of Thailand was similar to previous actions in response to the 2006 military coup.

Table 3.2*IMET Funding from FY 2008 – 2017*

in million USD

FY	Budget	IMET Funding
2008	Actual expense	2,369
	Requested expense	1,200
2009	Actual expense	0
	Requested expense	1,400
2010	Actual expense	1,202
	Requested expense	N/A
2011	Actual expense	1,459
	Requested expense	N/A
2012	Actual expense	1,318
	Requested expense	N/A
2013	Actual expense	1,568
	Requested expense	N/A
2014	Actual expense	1,400
	Requested expense	N/A
2015	Actual expense	1,319
	Requested expense	2,100
2016	Actual expense	713
	Requested expense	2200
2017	Actual expense	0
	Requested expense	0

Note. Adapted from “Congressional Budget Justification,” by Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 2008 -2017.

3.2.3 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

After Thailand's 2014 military coup, the country lost its eligibility status to receive arms transfers from the U.S. The eligibility status, together with, certain items would be regained only if the democratic situation in the country fully met the U.S.' requirements ("C4 - Foreign Military," n.d.). Strictly prohibited by the law, these provisions automatically functioned as a mechanism in pressuring the military junta government of Thailand to bring back democracy to the country at the earliest. Such prohibition entirely affected U.S. arms transfers to Thailand under the FMS program. Following the 2014 coup, the U.S. employed an arms transfer ban as a penalty on the military government of Thailand in order to force them to have a democratic transition. For this reason, the arms transfer through the FMS program was employed as an instrument forcing democratic change in Thailand's political landscape. Although the democratic government was toppled, it appeared that continuity for Thailand in accessing arms sales from the U.S. military was not affected by such circumstances. After the suspension of FMF, due to Thailand's 2006 coup, the fund was then continued in 2008. From FY2008 to FY2014, the country was annually granted \$1.3 million in funding to leverage the capacity of its military forces. Such funding was utilized as a tool by the U.S. to engage with Asia.

Concerning the U.S. rebalancing endeavor, Thailand is still a crucial player in the scheme. Since there was a renewal of the FMF granted to Thailand, the country could once again purchase American-made security devices, and services with the support of U.S. loans.

Table 3.3*Foreign Military Financing for Thailand during the Obama Administration*

in million USD

FY	Budget	Amount of FMF spending
2008	Requested budget	500
	Actual amount	1,485
2009	Requested budget	800
2009	Actual amount	0
2010	Actual amount	423
2011	Actual amount	1,600
2012	Actual amount	1,600
2013	Actual amount	1,568
2014	Requested budget	1,000
	Actual amount	1,187
2015	Requested budget	900
	Actual amount	0
2015	Estimated budget	0
2016	Requested budget	0
	Actual budget	0
2017	Requested budget	0
	Actual budget	0

The Congressional Budget Justification figures suggests that after the renewal of the military assistance from FY2008 to FY2015, Thailand had been allocated approximately \$1.4 million per fiscal year in military assistance from the U.S. Concerning the decreased amount requested for FY2014 and FY2015, one would notice that the decreasing amount had nothing to do with Thailand's 2014 coup. This is because the request was made prior to the coup. Although Thailand's access to the FMF because of the topple of their democratic government, accessibility to FMS and EDA continued for Thailand, as the country was able to self-fund. To make such a requirement more transparent, the interagency vetting process was founded by the U.S. Embassy. This process allows the U.S. Embassy to go against the interpretation of the U.S. policy. With the new procedure of the interagency, the U.S. Embassy was able to suspend the sales of small arms as well as any kinds of equipment utilized to abuse the general public. For instance, the U.S. canceled the Royal Thai Army request to procure access to high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) because of the overthrow of the democratic government in 2014 (Meelarp, 2016, p. 71).

It appeared as if the cutting of the FMF for Thailand was executed according to the law. However, as some weapons or equipment could be utilized in harmful purposes, the legality remains vague, as during the Obama administration, the junta government of Thailand bought weapons and acquired services through FMS funding worth a total amount of \$12 million. (See appendix A- FMS funding during the Obama administration). Examples of some of the transactions include Black Hawk helicopter purchases and RGM-84L Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles. Overall, it is clear there was discretion for the U.S. officials in considering the permission or restrictions for the weapons sales to Thailand.

3.2.4 International Law Enforcement Academy Bangkok (ILEA)

According to the actual budget of the Congressional Budget Justification from FY2007 to FY2014, approximately \$1.6 million had been granted to Thailand in fiscal year. There was no disruption for the execution of the ILEA Bangkok. Considering the continuity for the allocation for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement after the military coups in 2006 and 2014, it appears that the overthrow of the democratic governments did not have a negative impact on cooperation (Chanlett-

Avery, 2007, p. 8). There was no interruption in security cooperation under ILEA Bangkok. The bilateral security cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand, through the academy, still functions as a significant mechanism to promote regional cooperation in combating transnational threats. The capture of Victor Bout in 2008, an international arms dealer, was one of the tangible results of the bilateral law enforcement endeavor (Chanlett-Avery, 2007, p. 9). Additionally, advances in Thailand's law enforcement, aligning it with international standards and improving its respect for human rights, was recognized by the U.S. Embassy's FY2013 Mission Strategic and Resource Plan ("FY2013 Program and Budget," 2016). Since cross-border crime is considered a top-priority issue for the Southeast Asia region, ILEA Bangkok has become a crucial mechanism in promoting international security cooperation in combating the threats. Nowadays, crimes have become more trans-border operations. In coping with transnational crimes effectively, it is necessary for the states to cooperate and manage these security-related issues through international cooperation. Facing mutual threats, all stakeholders, including the U.S., Thailand, and related countries in Southeast Asia have sought ways to strengthen their cooperation on law enforcement to cope with transnational crimes. ILEA Bangkok has become a means to achieve such ends through security training and promoting bilateral and multilateral partnerships in combating transnational threats; including drugs, trafficking, terrorism. Considering the range of the U.S.-Thailand security cooperation, together with the cooperative stance of Thailand, it is understandable why the U.S. keeps supporting the ILEA fund for Thailand, despite the military coup in 2014.

3.3 Diplomatic relations during the Obama administration


After the 2014 coup, there was a prompt disapproving reaction expressed by the Obama administration for the undemocratic action. The condemnation was made by Secretary of State John Kerry, who called for an instant return to democracy. In the year following the coup, the stance of the Obama administration towards Thailand's 2014 military coup was evidently reflected through the remarks of the envoy, Daniel R. Russel, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs. In his speech, he ensured the neutrality of the U.S. government towards Thailand's domestic politics.

Nevertheless, the progression of democracy in the country was viewed as important for promoting the long-term stability in domestic politics which in turn, would support the U.S. interest as well. With stable domestic politics, the U.S., together with its ally would be able to focus more on their mutual interests in regional issues.

The firm message sent by the U.S. by maintaining its cooperation with Thailand nudged Thailand's democratic development and was represented by the visit of Mr. Scot Marciel, the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. The overthrow of the elected government resulted in the suspension of \$1.3 million of military assistance according to the FAA, which prohibits any security arrangements for coup countries. Other cooperation between the two countries still continued. All in all, the pressure from the Obama administration was rather mild. Although there was a delay in nominating a replacement for the Ambassador to Thailand, Kristie Kenney, which was linked to the disapproval of Thailand's 2014 coup, it was later acknowledged that a year-long interim period in nominating the new ambassador was common case. According to a report by Secretary State Kerry, approximately 25 percent of 169 nations had unoccupied ambassador positions at U.S. embassies. Additionally, the verification process in appointing new ambassadors was heavily scrutinized during the Obama administration (Rogin, 2011). In 2015, there was the nomination for the U.S. Ambassador, Glyn T. Davies in April and approved by the Senate. He assumed his office by September that year. His stance obviously represented the direction of the U.S. foreign policy towards the junta government of Thailand in that it disapproved of the military coup. However, as a highly experienced and expert in Asian affairs, Ambassador Davies represented a positive sign in revitalizing U.S.-Thailand relations (Crispin, 2015).

To reconcile the harsh reaction of suspending security arrangements, the U.S. attempted to express its good faith as a long-standing ally of Thailand through different means, including, the courtesy visit of Ambassador Davies to the Grand Palace to pay homage and pay respect to the Thai monarch. As such, the first mission of the newly appointed ambassador was to signify the intention of the Obama administration by sending a message to Thailand that the U.S. still valued its relationship, despite the disapproval of the military junta of Thailand. The maintenance of security cooperation between the two countries was affirmed verbally through a speech made by

Ambassador Davies at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand in 2016. In his speech, he reassured the strengthening of security cooperation between the U.S. and Thailand through shifting the mission of Cobra Gold to focus on HADR cooperation, despite the suspension of military assistance according to the U.S. law. Moreover, the attendance of Ambassador Davies at Cobra Gold in 2015 and the 2016 multilateral military exercise was another evidence signifying that the U.S. was focusing on Thailand. Considering the constructive stance of the Obama administration in maintaining its diplomatic relations with Thailand, it appeared that the administration was attempting to balance its ideological interests with other interests, including economic and security interests, when handling its relations with the junta government of Thailand.



CHAPTER 4

CHINESE FACTOR

After the end of Cold War, hostility between the U.S. and China gradually became more intense. According to Ian Bremmer, the hostility between the two countries may possibly develop into a confrontation worse than the Cold War (Bremmer, 2010).

In accordance with Bremmer's argument, the friction between the U.S. and China stemmed from their incompatible relations. For example, the tension between the U.S. and China rose and developed into a trade and currency war in 2010. The U.S. accused China for intentionally crashing America's economic recovery through increasing the value of its currency. Moreover, the inability or unwillingness to protect intellectual property of foreign countries was also one of the main reasons the U.S. blamed China

Apart from economic conflicts, security issues were another source of escalation and tension between the two countries. Both countries adopted different approaches in terms of sanctions on Iran's nuclear program. Additionally, Washington carefully watched over the power transition in North Korea, a country having special ties with Beijing. The interference by the U.S. in the dispute between China and Japan over the ownership of the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands was another flash point in the Sino-U.S. relationship. In terms of disagreements between the two powers in the Southeast Asia region, the U.S. was uncomfortable about the close ties between Chinese leaders and military leaders in Myanmar. Moreover, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea strongly affected security and regional peace. Namely, China's assertiveness was regarded as a threat to the U.S.' right to freely navigate the disputed areas.

The rising of China in terms of political and economic power, entirely poses an imminent threat to the U.S. According to the observations of John Mearsheimer (2005),

A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun claims that the emerging power of the new challenger, China, was apparent as an imminent threat to the U.S. in maintaining its status quo as the world's sole superpower. In other words, the rising of Beijing in terms of economic, and military power unavoidably caused a shift in the global order, which Washington has strived to sustain ever since the end of the cold war period.

Amidst the competition between the U.S. and China, it is obvious that Southeast Asia has become one of the battlefields of the two countries. Since both rivaling countries have employed different methods and strategies to retain their influence over countries in the region, it is highly possible that Beijing could take advantage of its competency to establish its power and become the regional hegemon while competing with Washington (Bert, 2003, p. 83). In fact, the rising of China has extended its influence on its neighboring countries, including Thailand, which used to be dominated by U.S. interests (Vogelmann, 2008, p. 2).

Since the competition of the two rivalries has become more intense, the maintenance of the relationship with Thailand has become more important for both the U.S. and China. Both countries recognize that Thailand is a strategically important country for achieving their strategies in the competitive power game of predominance in geopolitics. From the viewpoint of the U.S., Thailand is a large trade and investment partner and provides strategic military bases for the U.S. military to facilitate its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, Thailand is base for almost 50 U.S. government agencies, with regional operations implementing a range of programs, including infectious disease research, healthcare provisions, and law enforcement training. At the same time, China recognizes the strategic importance of Thailand as part of its eastern and southern rim initiative. Thailand is recognized as one of the members of the rising mainland Southeast Asia bloc dubbed 'CLMT' (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand). According to Thitinan Pongsudhirak, the CLMT countries, including Thailand, are strategically central to what is fast becoming a great game of sorts in mainland Southeast Asia in competing with the cultivation of the U.S. treaty allies and strategic partnerships (Pongsudhirak, 2015, p. 74).

Amidst the competition between the U.S. and China, Thailand has been well-aware of its position in-between the two rival countries. Therefore, it has attempted to maintain a good balance between the two countries by adopting a

pragmatic and flexible policy approach, known as “bending with the wind” to protect its interests and secure its safety. This approach allows Thailand to justify its close ties with multiple powers without being overly concerned about losing trust with, or benefits from, any of those powers (Busbarat, 2016, p. 237). In other words, hedging against such an outcome is a general policy practice of Southeast Asia countries, including Thailand (Ba, 2005). With such a practice, Thailand has flexibly and pragmatically maintained its interactions by continuing to engage with Beijing in regional affairs, while at the same time, maintaining its involvement with the U.S. in counterweighting the influence of China.

However, there has been a tendency for Thailand to possibly lose its position as an unaligned ally to the U.S. In other words, Thailand could become more inclined to side with China. In accordance with the article entitled “An Unaligned Alliance: Thailand-U.S. Relations in the Early 21st Century,” Thitinan pointed out that the relative decline of the Thai-U.S. bilateral relations in the early 21st century is a major concern. The structural changes in the region and the shift in the international system after the end of the Cold War were important determinants causing the decline of the ties between the U.S. and Thailand. According to Thitinan, after the end of the Cold War Thailand sought its new foreign policy direction, economic development, as the main engine in solidifying their relations.

When comparing Sino-Thailand relations with U.S.-Thailand relations, it appears that the latter has been relatively distant since the end of Cold War. The closeness of the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Thailand has been proven throughout their history. Despite claiming to be a close ally to Thailand, however, the U.S. has failed to always provide support whenever the country was in need. For instance, the U.S. was not particularly helpful during the bust of Thailand’s economy in 1997, a crisis known as “Tom Yum Kung” crisis, which was caused by the mismanagement of the financial sectors rooted in corruption and cronyism, first in the banking sector and later in the nonbank financial institutions, and compounded by a currency crisis from deteriorating macroeconomic imbalances, contributed to the Asian economic crisis (Pongsudhirak, 2016, p. 67). In solving the financial crisis, the central bank of Thailand switched the system in managing the foreign currency from the basket of foreign currencies to floating the baht currency in January 1998. Since adopting the

floating Baht policy was a disaster for Thai companies with foreign currency debt, Thailand attempted to seek foreign assistance for a bailout. Thailand failed to obtain help from Japan, and the U.S., respectively. In the end, there was no direct support provided from the U.S. However, Thailand did get assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), supported by the U.S. Treasury, to the tune of US\$14.5 billion (Pongsudhirak, 2016, p. 68).

Thailand was disappointed by the U.S. action. When compared to Washington's action in assisting Mexico in a similar crisis, Bangkok felt a sense of betrayal and alienation. The ignorance of the U.S. contributed to the development of the regionalization effort in cooperating on financial issues in Asia, leading to the increasing role of Beijing towards the regional architecture and an improved relationship with Thailand. Thailand truly appreciated Beijing's action for contributing US\$1 billion to Bangkok's IMF rescue fund, and not devaluing its own currency (Busbarat, 2016, p. 246).

Additionally, China, together with Japan and South Korea, joined ASEAN as ASEAN+3 to establish a currency swap mechanism under the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000. Considering the contributions of Beijing, Bangkok started to acknowledge Beijing as a "true friend" who never left when the country was faced with a crisis.

Apart from the disappointment of Thailand from its expectations in gaining support from the U.S., Thailand's foreign policy became more closely attached to China. In particular, Thailand's diplomacy during the Thaksin period made the Sino-Thailand relations flourish. The intention of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to promote Asian economic cooperation contributed to the establishment of the forum entitled Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD). In his view, the ACD could potentially become a complimentary mechanism to promote the existing dialogues and initiatives in Asia. In order to promote mutual interests, the ACD was aimed to be a synergetic platform that could combine all existing mechanisms, including bilateral, multilateral, sub-regional, and regional strategic partnerships. Increasing interdependence through regional integration in Asia, which could counterbalance the uncertainty in economic and political issues in the region. Participation of Beijing in the forum could magnify the attractiveness for other countries to join the ACD as well. Through the proactive stance of the former Prime Minister Thaksin, China was

approached in both bilateral and regional mechanisms, and Thaksin was later successful in persuading Beijing to host the 3rd ACD Summit in June 2004 (Busbarat, 2016, p. 246). Afterwards, Bangkok and Beijing successfully concluded a free trade agreement in June 2003 on Accelerated Tariff Elimination under the Early Harvest Program of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China (“ASEAN – China,” n.d.).

In contrast, the U.S.-Thailand relations appeared to have become relatively estranged, when compared with Sino-Thailand relations. Basically, the domestic affairs of Thailand were recognized as the main reason accounting for the deteriorated bilateral relationship of the U.S. and Thailand (Blaxland & Raymond, 2017; Busbarat, 2016; Pongsudhirak, 2016, 2015; Chachavalpongpun, 2011). Namely, the military coup d’état staged in 2006, which not only brought an end to Thaksin’s regime, it also weakened the ties between Washington and Bangkok. In the viewpoint of the anti-Thaksin group, the U.S. was accused of being bias in supporting the ousted Prime Minister and of intervening in Thailand’s domestic politics (Kate, 2011). Moreover, the removal of Thaksin from power also resulted in the suspension of the U.S.-Thailand negotiations on the conclusion of their Free Trade agreement. The aborted bilateral free trade agreement was replaced by the multilateral free trade attempt called the “Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)” . Under the Obama administration, TPP was part of his Asian pivot scheme. This negotiation was strategically important for the U.S. in counterweighting the influence of China as it involves key regional trading partners in the Asia Pacific region, except China. In achieving its ambitious, the U.S. definitely expected its partner country, Thailand, to join the negotiaion. However, the past acheivements on the regional economic cooperation, including CAFTA, the ASEAN-Japan FTA, the ASEAN-Korea FTA, the East Asia FTA (or ASEAN+3 FTA), and the Chiang Mai Initiative, gradually led to more regional autonomy away from American involvement. The significance of the economic arrangement of ASEAN, not only affected Thailand’s decision to join the TPP, but also empowered Beijing to geostrategically influence the region (Busbarat, 2016, p. 250). Competing in the power game, China responded by initiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the multilateral free trade negotiation, which excluded the U.S. Although there was concern on losing benefits from not joining the TPP, attending RCEP could be more consistent with

Thailand's interest. Namely, supporting the centrality of regional arrangements appears to be the shared goal of Bangkok and Beijing. In this sense, the inevitable closeness of Thailand and Beijing contributed to the concern of Washington.

As aforementioned the prolonged polarized politics of Thailand determines the direction of Thailand's foreign policy towards the U.S. and China. The 2014 Thailand military coup also affected how Thailand carried out its pragmatic foreign policy approach. Namely, the Sino-Thailand relationship became closer. Beijing managed to deal with the situation more diplomatically. China tried to keep its distance from stepping into Thailand's internal affairs. The junta government of Thailand truly appreciated Beijing's non-intervention approach. Evident by the visit of Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan to Thailand in February 2015. He was praised by his Thai counterpart for representing a country that "will not intervene in Thailand's politics but will give political support and help maintain relationships at all levels (Pongsudhirak, 2016).

Without making any critiques on the military as violating human rights, the pragmatic approach of China towards the 2014 Thailand military coup contributed to the dense and deep relations between the two countries. By the time the U.S. banned military assistance and aid due to the military coup, Thailand and China were able to increase their military cooperation in a range of ways. The exchange on defense cooperation included supplying arms to Thailand with three diesel-electric submarines for US\$1.03 billion (the biggest defense deal in the Kingdom's history) and 48 main battle tanks (Storey, 2019). In addition, there was an increase in terms of the scope and frequency of Thai-China military exercises, for example, the annual basis exercise of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) with the Chinese army, navy and air force. In response to the suspension of IMET funding, China offered attendance at courses for RTARF officers and cadets at PLA-affiliated military educational institutions.

Moreover, the upgrading of the Chinese defense attaché to Thailand from a one-star to a two-star general, its highest-ranked military attaché in Southeast Asia, was seen as signifying the close ties between China and Thailand after the 2014 Thailand military coup (Storey, 2019).

In contrast to the interventionist approach of the U.S., the strong critiques, together with many negative measures, including the prompt condemnation of

Thailand's 22 May 2014 coup, and the suspension of the U.S.-Thailand security arrangements, roused the sensitivity relating to its relationship with Thailand. According to the study of John Blaxland and Greg Raymond, entitled "Tipping the Balance in Southeast Asia? Thailand, the United States and China", it was found that the U.S. is perceived as a threat that could possibly interfere in Thailand's domestic politics (Blaxland & Raymond, 2017, p. 10)

The relatively unfavorable relationship with the U.S. had contributed to the inclination of Thailand towards China. As a result, Thailand was unable to maintain its pragmatism policy in balancing between the two powers as it usually did. Despite the refusal of Thailand's shifting policy to rely on China instead of western powers, it is remarkable that the pressure from the U.S. side affected the decision of the Thai government to buy weapons, especially by the time that the military junta took office. In 2017, Thailand concluded a deal to buy submarines from China. The decision of the Cabinet for its approval of the Royal Thai Army's request to buy 34 ZBL-09 VN-1 armored personnel carriers from China for 2.3 billion baht symbolized the shifting on Thailand's foreign policy bending towards China.

Therefore, the decline of the U.S.-Thailand relations could be reflected from the diversification of the arms sales to the country after the 2014 military coup. In response to the ban on military equipment, Thailand had sought contractors from other superpowers, including China and Ukraine. As a consequence of the 2014 coup, there was a change in arms suppliers to Thailand. Of all the total sales by countries from 2014 -2017, the U.S. is third place in supplying arms to Thailand, while Ukraine and China have become the major arms suppliers to Thailand, replacing the U.S.

Table 4.1*Total Arms Sales to Thailand by Countries from 2014 -2017*

in million USD

Countries	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total Sales by countries
Ukraine	45	47	79	85	256
China	8	N/A	77	129	214
United States	32	27	46	27	132
Italy	6	10	46	23	85
Germany (FRG)	1	27	45	8	81
France	4	30	15		49
Sweden	8	13	13	4	38
Switzerland				26	26
United Kingdom			10	10	20
Russia		14			14
Spain			12		12
Israel	3	5			8
Canada			2		2
Total amount	107	173	345	312	

Note: Adapted from “SIPRI arms transfers database,” by researcher, 2020.

CHAPTER 5

REBALANCING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

As a result of the estranged U.S.- Thailand relations, the Sino-Thailand relationship has flourished since 2014 military coup. The Trump administration has been shifting its stance towards the junta government of Thailand. Aiming at preserving its strategic interest in the region, the revitalization of their relationship with the junta government became an urgent issue of the administration. Therefore, the strategy of the Trump administration in reviving its relationship with its old ally is central to this chapter. In essence, this chapter investigates the security cooperation in during the Trump administration, through the four main pillars of the U.S.-Thailand security cooperation, including Cobra Gold, IMET, FMS, and FMF, together with its diplomatic relationship with the country.

5.1 Trump administration: Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy

With the rapidly growing influence of China, the U.S.' perpetual competitor, the necessity of the U.S. to maintain its security cooperation with regional partners is highly important. Especially when the direction of the Trump's foreign policy mainly concentrates on the security dimension, including combating terrorism, strengthening border defenses, immigration controls, and increasing the U.S. military capability. Therefore, the so-called "America first" approach regarding the interest of the country as a top priority is applied to every dimension of the Trump administration from trade to diplomacy (Montanaro, 2017). The changing of the U.S. administration brought about variations in the foreign policy formulation and implementation. In this sense, it is unsurprisingly that the transitional period from the Obama administration to the Trump administration contributed to new ways of conducting U.S. foreign policy (Brânda, 2018). In comparison with Obama's foreign policy, which was more collaborative, it appears that President Donald Trump vigorously attempts to transform the U.S. into an isolationist country. Unlike the former President Obama, President Trump is less likely to adopt a compromising approach when dealing with the relationship with rogue states. The foreign policy of the Trump administration focuses

more on the protection of the state's interest and sovereignty. With the difference style in conducting foreign policy, the degree in compromising with democratic values globally is entirely lessened. During the Trump administration, it is obvious that the role of the U.S. as the democratic promotor has been dramatically decreased (Carothers & Brown, 2018). In other words, democracy hardly becomes an impactful value influencing Trump's foreign policy. Many actions of the Trump administration reflect the ignorance toward democratic promotion in his foreign policy, including admiring autocratic leaders and criticizing democratic allies of the U.S.

Like his predecessor's administration, the Trump administration has set the priority for its foreign policy to be the Asia-Pacific region due to the substantial importance of trade, security, investment and so on. In counterbalancing the influence of China, the so-called Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy has been launched under the Trump administration as the foreign policy towards Asia. In the strategy, this region is envisioned as an accessible region for all stakeholders, a rational region in which disputes are settled peacefully, and an economically "open" region that includes "fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, transparent agreement between nations, and improved connectivity (Scott, 2018). In other words, the Trump's FOIP policy is the by-product of the increasingly growing influence of China. Additionally, it allows the U.S. to pursue its goal to reach out at the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as thrust back against Beijing's assertiveness in the South China Sea (Storey & Malcolm, 2018).

To engage in region affairs, the security cooperation and military assistance is built on the rebalancing of the U.S. engagement with ASEAN countries. The Trump administration has also maintained the same strategy as the Obama administration, which is to build on the partnership with ASEAN countries through providing military assistance and training programs. For example, the escalating conflict between Southeast Asia countries with China over the South China Sea, has become a maritime security hotspot for the U.S. presence in the region. The new initiative of the U.S.-ASEAN joint maritime drills conducted near the disputed South China Sea reflects the nexus of the interest of both the U.S. and ASEAN countries in balancing the assertiveness of China in the region (Zsombor, 2019). Regarding the U.S. relationship with Thailand, it is obvious that the previous tension stemming from the latest coup is

no a longer hindrance as their long-standing relationship has reconciled. Concerning the strategic importance of Thailand, the Trump administration has been streamlining its defense relations with Thailand through continually granting security arrangements to the country.

5.2 Security arrangements during the Trump administration

5.2.1 Cobra Gold

During the Trump administration, the security arrangement through Cobra Gold has improved in comparison under the Obama administration. Focusing on Cobra Gold 2018, which was the first Cobra Gold in which the Trump administration was in charge of, the evidence reflects the intentions of the administration is to improve its relationship with the military junta government of Thailand. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Glyn Davies, the military exercise is one of the strongest pillars of the Thai-U.S. relationship, a relationship that stretches back over two centuries of close friendship and cooperation between the two nations. In his speech made during the opening ceremony, he illustrated the strong intention of the Trump administration to revisit U.S.-Thailand relations. He also mentioned the number of the U.S. servicemen involved, which was an increase to 6,800, a figure doubling the troops sent the previous year. In comparison with the four drills of Cobra Gold under the Obama administration, which were scaled down to light years, the Trump administration resumed the exercise patterns to heavy years. This also supports the compromised stance of the Trump administration. All in all, Cobra Gold during the Trump administration remains strategically important for the U.S. security interests and as a multilateral military exercise in the Asia-Pacific region considering its number of participating countries and observing nations. Apart of the seven participating nations, including the U.S., Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan and Malaysia, in Cobra Gold 2018, there were almost 30 countries of combined participants or observer nations, including the regional powers, China and India. For the Cobra Gold 2019, there were approximately 4,500 U.S. personnel together with 29 nations. Considering the stance of the Trump administration towards the security arrangement through Cobra Gold, it is obvious that the security interest is prioritized for this

administration. Since Cobra Gold allows the administration to achieve its goal in engaging the Indo-Pacific region, the restoration of the security cooperation with Thailand is equivalent to an increase in the U.S. commitment to strengthen the region.

5.2.2 International Military Education and Training Program (IMET)

The 2014 coup affected Thailand's ability to receive IMET funding in three consecutive fiscal years. Considering the actual expenditures of FY2018 and FY2019, the reaction of the Trump administration towards the junta government of Thailand was aligned with that of the Obama administration.

5.2.3 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

Concerning the Congressional Budget Justifications of 2018, 2019, and 2020, there were no requested or actual expenses for Thailand under the FMS. This leads to the conclusion that under the Trump administration, Thailand was totally suspended from receiving allocated funds to upgrade its military capacity following the 2014 coup. Although the three congressional budgets reported the suspension of the loan accounts for Thailand, in practice, the U.S. continuously allowed Thailand to access the FMS program. This intention of the U.S. to maintain its strategic commitment to engagement in Asia has been expressed through other means. Despite the toppling of the democratic government, Thailand could access FMS during the Trump administration, just as it did under the Obama administration. According to the U.S. Embassy to Thailand, Thailand bought weapons from the United States through its self-funding of \$20 million. (See appendix B-FMS funding during the Obama administration). During the Trump administration, Thailand bought weapons and acquired service; including the F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft performance improvements; helicopter purchases, the Black Hawk; and RGM-84L Harpoon Block II Surface Launched Missiles. Considering the continuity in Thailand's access to the FMS program, this phenomenon reflects the intention of the U.S. to maintain interests in terms of preserving Thailand as its ally to rebalance Asia.

5.2.4 International Law Enforcement Academy Bangkok (ILEA)

According to the Congressional Budget Justification from FY2018, which was the first fiscal year of the Trump administration, approximately \$1.6 million was

actually budgeted for the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement and granted to Thailand to engage with the commitment of the U.S.' national agenda, in particular, on defending U.S. national security and asserting U.S. leadership and influence. In the case of U.S. – Thailand relations, continuingly granting the security-related assistance to partner countries could ensure that such assistance would enhance the capacity of the partner in coping with trans-border threats. With strengthening ties with the partner, the U.S. would be able to preserve its security interest in terms of preventing and combating a variety of transnational threats, including trafficking, terrorist groups, or extremists. The 2014 military coup had no impact in preventing Thailand from receiving the grants supporting the security academy during the Trump administration. With no disruption in the security cooperation under ILEA Bangkok, the U.S.-Thailand bilateral security cooperation remains one of the most significant mechanisms enhancing regional security cooperation in combating transnational threats. According to a joint statement between President Trump and Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, the important alliance between the U.S. and Thailand has been reaffirmed and mutual interests promoting peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, was set as a shared commitment of the alliance. During the discussion between the leaders, Thailand was acknowledged as a core piece of architecture in strengthening close partnerships between the U.S. and ASEAN. The ILEA Bangkok was mentioned as a significant mechanism in promoting regional security and in coping with regional and global security challenges; including terrorism, pandemics, and transnational trafficking in persons, drugs, and wildlife. Both sides agreed to work more closely on intelligence sharing and law enforcement training, and to make full use of the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok to forge networks and enhance coordination among law enforcement officials in the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, the improvement of Thailand's capacity in coping with transnational threats, its law enforcement in order to be consistent with international standards and respectful of human rights was acknowledged as one of the goals to be accomplished by the USAID Joint Strategic Plan FY2018-2022. Concerning the continuity in granting funds for ILEA Bangkok during the Trump administration, it appears that maintaining the bilateral security arrangement with Thailand increases the engagement of the U.S. with the Southeast

Asia region. For this reason, the security interest is also prioritized over the role of the U.S. in preserving ideology during the Trump administration.

During the Trump administration, Thailand has regained its status as a strategic ally. One indication of the restoration of their relations is the appeasement made through the U.S. special offer of selling 60 refurbished U.S. Army M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICV) under a 2.96-billion-baht package, which includes 23 vehicles free of charge to the junta government of Thailand. According to the deal, after delivery, Thailand will be the first country operating this military vehicle (Chongkittavorn, 2019).

Unlike the previous administration, the Trump administration obviously expressed its intention to revitalize its estranged relationship with Thailand in order to maintain its security interest with its old ally. Such attempts show the positive stance of the Trump administration towards its diplomatic relations with Thailand. It reaffirms that the U.S.-Thailand long-standing alliance, nearly two centuries long, will continue.

5.3 Diplomatic relations during the Trump administration

Considering the stance of the Trump administration, it appears that this administration has attempted to maintain diplomatic relations, in particular military-to-military relations, to compensate the earlier suspension of military assistance stemming from the ideological interest after the the junta government of Thailand gained power. The diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Thailand, under this administration, has been positive, in comparison with that of the previous administration. The first signal came from the visit of the U.S. Secretary State, Rex Wayne Tillerson, to Bangkok to have a meeting with Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai on August 8, 2017. This meeting was the first time a high-ranking U.S. representative visited Thailand after a long hiatus. In fact, it had been 5 years since the last visit of the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, to Bangkok with President Yingluck Shinnawat and President Obama in November 2012. Additionally, The Trump administration obviously expressed its intention to improve its relationship with Thailand in order to maintain its mutual interest with its old ally. With Thailand grieving the loss of its beloved King Bhumibol Adulyadej, it was an opportunity for the

U.S. to console its old friend, at the same time, to affirm the cooperation of the two countries. It was remarkable that many the U.S. military high-ranking officers visited Thailand during this time. During this period, the military-to-military relations between the two countries improved, as it was a good time for the two countries to discuss the maintainability of mutual interests. The visit of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., Commander of U.S. Pacific Command in February 2017 signified the strengthening of ties of the U.S.-Thailand military relations, in particular, joining Cobra Gold 2017, which was opened by U.S. Ambassador, Glyn Davies, and Thailand's counterpart, Chief of Defense Forces, General Surapong Suwana-adth. Admiral Harry's visit was completed with a meeting with Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Prawit Wongsuwan to discuss more about the U.S.-Thailand security-related concerns, including regional issues, and recent developments in Thailand (Sifton, 2017). Apart from his mission to pay tribute to His Majesty, the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the second visit of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in August 2017 was a chance to discuss and reaffirm bilateral relations and the engagement of the U.S. with Minister of Foreign Affairs Don Pramudwinai and Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha (U.S. Embassy Bangkok, 2017). Additionally, Secretary of Defense James Mattis led the U.S. Presidential Delegation to attend the Royal Cremation Ceremony for the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej in October 2017 (History of the U.S. and Thailand, 2020). The U.S.-Thailand bilateral relationship was progressing. In October 2017, there was the official working visit of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha to the United States. During the meeting, both leaders agreed on mutual benefits for their security defense cooperation in coping with regional issues. The military-to-military relations between the two countries have been continued in order to ensure that the security interest of the U.S., through its ally, would be secured (Raksaseri, 2017). The visit to Thailand of Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford to meet with Thailand's chief of defense, Gen. Tarnchaiyan Srisuwan, Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan and Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha was one of the most prominent indications of the security goal. In his speech, he pointed out the significance of advancing the military-to military relations with Thailand and that it is important to maintain relations with Thailand because they have outstanding visibility in the maritime domain in a critical part of the world. He also added that the strength of the

U.S. globally and particularly in the Pacific depends on the network of allies and partners, including Thailand (Garamone, 2018). Another symbolic action highlighting the two centuries of U.S.-Thailand friendship was made through the offering of public health collaboration. The offering was made by Ambassador Davies. The donation, made on behalf of the U.S. Government, through the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was of 50,000 rabies vaccines to support Thailand as it has addressed an increase in human and animal rabies cases since the beginning of 2018 (“History of the U.S.,” n.d.). In 2018, the year marking the 200 years of friendship of the U.S.-Thailand relations, one big event entitled the *Great and Good Friends*, the open-to-public exhibition displayed official gifts exchanged between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Thailand over the past 200 years, was arranged in March 2018 to signify the longstanding relations of the two countries (Great and Good Friends, n.d.). This event signified an attempt of both countries to normalize their relations after the 2014 coup. There was a positive reaction from the Thai side. In fact, His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn presided over the grand opening ceremony of the exhibition, alongside Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, privy councilors, and members of the Cabinet (Great and Good Friends, 2018). Later, her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri, together with, a group of Chulajomklao Royal Military cadets also visited the exhibition (“History of the U.S.,” 2020).

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Considering the impact of the 2014 Thai military coup on U.S.-Thailand relations, the bilateral security cooperation was one of the indications showing the estranged relations of the two countries. Given that the fundamental principles of the U.S. law are rooted in the ideology of liberalism, it becomes the compulsory determinant role of the U.S. as the world's democracy promoter and human rights protector. Prohibiting any security aid or assistance to a coup country is mandated by U.S. law, therefore, the overthrowing of the democratic government in Thailand had inevitably contributed to the disruption of security cooperation between the two nations. It was unavoidable for the U.S. to employ various measures as penalties, including the strong condemnation made by the Secretary of State, John Kerry, and the putting-on hold of U.S. military aid and assistance to the junta government of Thailand.

However, the suspension of security arrangements with Thailand, which was one of the strongest pillars strengthening its ties with the country, became counterproductive to America's Asian involvement policy, particularly by the time that the rising Chinese influence gradually increased regionally and globally. Following the 2014 military coup, the security arrangement between the two countries later became a major instrument in forcing the military junta to restore democracy to the country. The strategic importance of Thailand faced a major obstacle for the U.S., the suspension of the security assistance based on the coup. The U.S. needed to counterbalance the influence of China and keep close with key regional players, such as Thailand. Thailand is one of the U.S.' most important partners for supporting its engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, hence, cutting military aid and assistance to the ally would be counterproductive to the U.S. foreign policy in the region. Moreover, the discontinuity of defense cooperation could accelerate the development of Sino-Thailand relations. Not to mention, the geographical closeness of Thailand and China in relation to regional economic integration. With no interference in domestic affairs from Beijing, and the more welcoming stance of Beijing towards the junta government of Thailand overall, Thailand lost its balanced position in-between the two superpowers. In other words,

Thailand's foreign policy under the military junta government is explicitly inclined towards China.

Since continuing with security arrangements with the military government of Thailand offered more advantages for the U.S. in terms of getting involved in regional affairs, this study investigated the strategies implemented by two U.S. administrations, the Obama administration and the Trump administration. Even though the military junta overthrew the democratically elected government and seized power, both U.S. administrations attempted to balance their disapproval of Thailand's 2014 coup with the maintenance of security arrangements with the country. Despite being prohibited by U.S. law, which barred providing any defense aid and assistance to any coup countries, the stances of the Obama and Trump administration were pragmatic and stayed consistent with the U.S. foreign policy of engaging with the region. Since both administrations chose engagement, it was a strong indication of commitment to Thailand, its old ally, which counterbalanced the rising Chinese influence. To maintain the U.S. strategic interest, the Obama administration attempted to compromise between ideological and security interests. Therefore, only one threat to call off the Cobra Gold in 2015 was issued, which was the year following the coup. In other words, such stipulations made by the U.S. only occurred once during the Obama administration. In terms of ceasing to supply U.S. weapons to Thailand, after the coup, it appeared as if the U.S. entirely cut off assistance through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, as well as cutting assistance for military training under the IMET program. However, despite the junta government of Thailand not having restored democracy, the Obama administration continued to hold the annually held military exercise, Cobra Gold. At the same time, the flexibility of the administration continued to grant security arrangements, including FMS and IMET for the country to participate through its own self-funding. Although the administration attempted to reaffirm the good relationship of the two countries, the previous negative stance of the Obama administration was responded to by a firm message from the junta government of Thailand that they could potentially lose the balance of power and Thailand may be inclined to bend towards to China, the perpetual competitor of the U.S. In fact, Thailand had been procuring arms from China and inviting China to be an observer in the 2015 Cobra Gold. Having observed the failure of the Obama administration in approaching

the junta government of Thailand, the Trump administration adopted a more friendly stance. In terms of security assistance, the administration actually adopted the same strategy as the previous administration. It had to abide by the U.S. law by cutting defense aid and assistance, however, it also sought ways to continue granting assistance to the junta government of Thailand, including Cobra Gold, IMET, and FMS to Thailand. On the diplomatic relations front, the administration wanted a change. Although the democratic situation in Thailand had not progressed, the Trump administration explicitly expressed its attention to normalize its relationship with the military government. There was an official invitation from the White House. The actions of President Trump signified good intentions to improve relations once again between the old allies. Also, there were many visits of high-ranking officials, especially military officers during the Trump administration, which signifies an effort to revitalize the relationship with the General Prayut administration.

In essence, the compromising stance of the U.S. towards the junta government of Thailand reflects general characteristics of international relations. Living within the anarchic realm, all sovereign states seek a guarantee of safety and protection of its interest through the acquisition of power. Since China is now rising as a regional and global power, the U.S. requires Thailand to be a close ally in order to maintain the status quo and power balance in the region. With the geological importance of Thailand, the U.S. put less priority on its ideology promotion interest and thus less pressure on the junta government of Thailand in order to maintain security arrangements. It allows the U.S. to protect its long-term goal, decreasing the influence of the rising of China and increasing opportunities for the U.S. to engage in regional affairs. In this sense, the role of the U.S. as the democracy promoter is questioned, particularly when security interests restrict the capability of the U.S. to employ security arrangements as a major instrument to pressure autocratic governments to restore democracy. Considering the limitations of the U.S. using military assistance as a tool to pressure Thailand's military government, it signifies the hypocritical practices of both the Obama and Trump administrations, who only partly discontinued the security arrangements with the autocratic government of Thailand.

REFERENCES

- Acharya, A. (2002). *Regional institutions and security order: Norms, identity and prospects for peaceful change*. Stanford University Press.
- Aiello, S. (2013, July 29). *Reforming the FAA section 508*. JURIST.
<https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2013/07/steven-aiello-legislation-reform>
- ASEAN - *China Free Trade Agreement*. (n.d.). Thai FTA. http://www.thaifita.com/english/eng_ascn.html
- Ba, A. D. (2005). Southeast Asia and China. In E. Goh (Ed.), *Between and between: Southeast Asian strategic relations with the United States and China* (pp. 93-108). Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
- Bamrungsuk, S. (1988). *United States foreign policy and Thai military rule, 1947-1977*. Duangkamol.
- Bamrungsuk, S. (2015). *เสนานิธิปไตย: รัฐประหารกับการเมืองไทย* [Militocracy, military coup and Thai politics]. Matichon.
- Baron, K. (2009). *Cobra Gold 2009: Building trust high on the agenda*. Star and Stripes.
<https://www.stripes.com/news/cobra-gold-2009-building-trust-high-on-the-agenda-1.88012>
- Bert, W. (2003). *The United States, China and Southeast Asian security: A changing of the guard?* Palgrave Macmillan.
- Berteau, D. J., Green, M. J., & Cooper, Z. (2014). *Assessing the Asia-Pacific rebalance*. Center for Strategic & International Studies.
- Blaxland, J., & Raymond, G. (2017). *Tipping the balance in Southeast Asia?: Thailand, the United States and China* [Centre of Gravity series paper #37]. Center for Strategic & International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/171102_Blaxland_TippingBalanceSoutheastAsia_Web.pdf

- Brânda, O.-E. (2018). Changes in the American foreign policy: From Obama to Trump. *International Conference Knowledge-Based Organization*, 24(2), 160 – 164. <https://doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2018-0083>
- Bremmer, I. (2010, March 22). China vs America: Fight of the century. *Prospect*. <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/>
- “Budget Amendment Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Fiscal Year 2015,” ed. (2014). Retrieved December 8, 2019, from U.S. Secretary of State: www.state.gov/s/d/rm/c61875.htm.
- Busbarat, P. (2016). Bamboo swirling in the wind: Thailand’s foreign policy imbalance between China and the United States. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 38(2), 233-257.
- Butterfield, H. (1951). *History and human relations*. Collins.
- C4 - Foreign Military Sales Program general information. (n.d.). Defense Security Cooperation Agency. <https://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-4>
- Carothers, T. (2012). *Democracy policy under Obama : Revitalization or retreat?* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_under_obama.pdf
- Carothers, T., & Brown, F. (2018, October 1). *Can U.S. democracy policy survive Trump?* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/01/can-u.s.-democracy-policy-survive-trump-pub-77381>
- Chachavalpongpun, P. (2011). Competing diplomacies: Thailand amidst Sino-American rivalry. *Southeast Asia Affairs*, 306-320. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41418650>
- Chanlett, C.-A., Doven, B., & Mackey, W. (2007). *Thailand: Background and U.S. relations* [CRS Report No. RL32593]. Congressional Research Service. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf>
- Chambers, P. (2004). U.S.-Thai relations after 9/11: A new era in cooperation? *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 26(3), 461-462.
- China and Vietnam “official observers” at Cobra Gold 2014 in Thailand. (2014, February 6). CTN News. <https://www.chiangraitimes.com/thailand-national-news/news->

asia-thailand/china-and-vietnam-official-observers-at-cobra-gold-2014-in-thailand/

Chongkittavorn, K. (2019, July 16). Thai-US relations in the Indo-Pacific era. *Bangkok Post*.
<https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1713236/thai-us-relations-in-the-indo-pacific-era>

Collin, E. (2007). Realism. In M. Griffiths (Ed.), *International relations theory for the twenty-first century* (pp. 11-20). Routledge.

Crawford, J. (2012, March 27). U.S. suspends aid to Mali in wake of coup . CNN.
<https://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/mali-us-aid-suspended/index.html?no-st=9999999999>

Crispin, S. W. (2015, September 26). *New ambassador holds key to US-Thailand relation*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/new-ambassador-holds-key-to-us-thailand-relations/>

Dunne, T., & Schmidt, B. C. (2011). Realism. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owen(Eds.), *The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations* (5th ed., pp. 93-96). USA: Oxford university press.

Excess Defense Articles (EDA). (n.d.). Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
<https://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-eda>

Fayloga, M. (2007, May 8). *Pacific partners come together for Cobra Gold 2007*. U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. <https://www.marforpac.marines.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=21&ModuleId=50781&Article=530183>

Fisher, M. (2013, July 4). *The Washington Post*. Retrieved March 2, 2019, from Law says the U.S. is required to cut aid after coups. Will it? The Washington Post.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/03/law-says-the-u-s-is-required-to-cut-aid-after-coups-will-it/?noredirect=on>

Foreign Military Financing (FMF). (n.d.). Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
<https://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-financing-fmf>

Frankel, J. (1979). *International relations in a changing world*. Oxford University Press.

- Freise, C. (2012). *By invitation, mostly: The international politics of the U.S. military presence, China, and the South China Sea* [Monograph]. RSIS Working Paper.
- FY2013 program and budget guide: East Asia and the Pacific.* (2016). U.S. Department of State. www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/fy2013/206685.htm #Thailand
- FY 2015 Congressional budget justification.* (2014, March 4). U.S. Department of States. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ebs/2015/index.htm>
- Garamone, J. (2018, February 6). *Dunford re-energizing military-to-military relations with Thailand.* U.S. Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1433430/dunford-re-energizing-military-to-military-relations-with-thailand/>
- Great and Good Friends. (2018, March 21). *Great and Good Friends Opening Day.* <https://www.greatandgoodfriends.com/news/2018/3/21/great-and-good-friends-opening-day>
- Great and Good Friends. (n.d.). *200 Years of U.S. – Thai Friendship.* <https://www.greatandgoodfriends.com/>
- Herz, J. (1951). *Political realism and political idealism: A study in theories and realities.* University of Chicago Press.
- History of the U.S. and Thailand.* (n.d.). U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Thailand. https://th.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/?_ga=2.62675564.1594491071.1581811784-1422780387.1579420960
- House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, 2004.* US Government Printing Office.
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2011, May 3). *Myanmar: Cyclone Nargis 2008 facts and figures.* <https://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/news-stories/asia-pacific/myanmar/myanmar-cyclone-nargis-2008-facts-and-figures/>
- International Law Enforcement Academy Bangkok (ILEA) Activities.* (n.d.). U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Thailand. <https://th.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulate/bangkok/us-agencies/international-law-enforcement-academy-bangkok-ilea/>

- Jeonghoon, H. (2011). The need for more smart power: Strategic implications of US military assistance to Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand for US foreign policy. *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 11, 164-176.
- Jervis, R. (1976). *Perception and misperception in international politics*. Princeton University Press.
- Kate, D. T. (2011, December 16). *Thai royalists say U.S. envoy should 'get out' over King law*. Bloomberg. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-16/thai-royalists-to-protest-against-u-s-un-criticism-of-king-insult-law>
- Kenney, K. (2011). *Ambassador's remarks: Cobra Gold 2011 closing ceremony*. US Embassy Bangkok. <http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/news/press/2011/nrot012.html>.
- Lerche, C. O. & Said, A. A. (1972). *Concept of international politics* (2nd ed.). Prentic-Hall of India.
- Lohman, W. (2011, September 28). Reinventing the U.S.–Thailand alliance. *Backgrounder*, 2609. <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/reinventing-the-us-thailand-alliance>
- Mearsheimer, J. (2005, November 18). The rise of China will not be peaceful at all. *The Australian*.
- Meelarp, D. (2016). *Sideliing democracy?: explaining the United States' response to Thailand's 2006 and 2014 coup de etat* [Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School]. Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archeive.
- Montanaro, D. (2017, January 20). *Trump foreign policy doctrine – in 3 points*. npr. <https://www.npr.org/2017/01/20/510837911/the-trump-foreign-policy-doctrine-in-3-points>
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. A.A. Knopf.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1973). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. Scientific Book Agency.
- Muecke, M. (1988). Trends toward the democratization of Thai society. In A. Ramsay, A. Ramsay & W. Mungkandi (Eds.), *Thailand-U.S. relations: changing political, strategic, and economic factors* (pp. 62 - 70). Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkely.

- Nafees, A. (2010, September 17). *The 3D's of foreign affairs*. Harvard Political Review.
<http://harvardpolitics.com/arusa/the-3ds-of-foreign-affairs/>
- Nanuam, W. (2016, February 9). Cobra Gold begins with US call for elected Thai govt.
Bangkok Post. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/857496/cobra-gold-begins-with-us-call-for-elected-thai-govt>
- National security and foreign policy priorities in the FY 2015 international affairs budget*.
 (2014) (presiding by Senator Menendez). US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040814_Transcript_National%20Security%20and%20Foreign%20Policy%20Priorities%20in%20the%20FY15%20International%20Affairs%20Budget.pdf
- Nguyen, H. (2016). The Obama administration and Southeast Asia: Dynamics of a new engagement. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, 29(1/2), 39-56.
- Nuechterlien, D. E. (1973). *United States national interest in a changing world*. University of Kentucky Press.
- Parameswaran, P. (2015a). Confirmed: U.S. will hold 2016 Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand. Retrieved from www.thediplomat.com/2015/06/us-moves-ahead-with-2016-cobragold-military-exercises
- Parameswaran, P. (2015b). *A surge in Southeast Asian transnational crime?* The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/a-surge-in-southeast-asian-transnational-crime/>
- Poling, B. (2014). *The case for holding Cobra Gold 2015 in Thailand*. Center for Strategic & International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/case-holding-cobra-gold-2015-thailand>
- Pongsudhirak, T. (2015). Thailand's foreign policy in a regional great game. In N. Kitchen (Ed.), *The new geopolitics of Southeast Asia* [IDEAS Special Reports] (pp. 74-79). The London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Pongsudhirak, T. (2016). An unaligned alliance: Thailand-U.S. relations in the early 21st century. *Asian Politics and Policy*, 8(1), 63-74.
- Raksaseri, K. (2017, October 16). Trump 'reached out' to Prayut at White House meet.
Bangkok Post. <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/1343047/trump-reached-out-to-prayut-at-white-house-meet>

- Robinson, T. W. (1969). National interests. In N. J. Rosenau (Ed.), *International politics and foreign policy: A reader in research and theory* (pp. 184-185). The Free Press.
- Rogin, J. (2011, December 7). Several U.S. embassies could start 2012 with no ambassador. *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/07/several-u-s-embassies-could-start-2012-with-no-ambassador/>
- Rosenau, J. N. (1968). National interest. In D. L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (pp.34 -40). The McMillan Company & The Free Press.
- Scott, D. (2018). The Indo-Pacific in US strategy: Responding to power shifts. *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 3(2), 19-43.
- Sifton, J. (2017, October 2). *Another week, another autocratic leader visiting Trump's Washington*. Quartz. <https://qz.com/1091575/thai-prime-minister-gen-prayut-chan-ocha-is-another-autocratic-leader-visiting-trumps-white-house/>
- Slavin, E. (2014, October 10). *US, Thai officials planning Cobra Gold exercise despite May coup*. Stars and Stripes. <https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/thailand/us-thai-officials-planning-cobra-gold-exercise-despite-may-coup-1.307643>
- Sondermann, F. A. (1977). The concept of national interest. *Orbis*, 21(1), 121-138.
- Stern, L. (2009). *Diverging roads 21st-century U.S.-Thai defense relations* [Strategic Forum, no. 241]. Defense Technical Information Center.
- Storey, I. (2019, May 27). Thailand's military relations with China: Moving from strength to strength. *Perspective*. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2019_43.pdf
- Storey, I., & Malcolm, C. (2018). The Trump administration and Southeast Asia: America's Asia policy crystalizes. *ISEAS Perspective*, 77, 1-8.
- Sucharitkul, S. (2014, June 2). *To John Kerry: America needs a better understanding of Thailand*. The Nation. <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/opinion/aec/30235269>.
- Sutter, R., Brown, M., Timothy, A., Mochizuki, M., & Ollapally, D. (2013). *Balancing acts: The U.S. rebalance and Asia-Pacific stability*. Sigur Center for Asian Studies. https://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf

- Taw, J. M. (1994). *Thailand and the Philippines: Case studies in U.S. IMET training and its role in internal defense and development*. Rand Cooperation.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR159.html
- Thailand's 'war on drugs': International harm reduction association and human right watch briefing*. (2008, March 12). Human Right Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs>
- Thepchatree, P. (2013). นโยบายต่างประเทศของสหรัฐฯ ต่อภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ ในสมัยรัฐบาล Barack Obama [U.S. Foreign Policy towards East Asia during the Barack Obama Administration]. Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University.
- US Congress House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs. (2004). *Foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations for 2005: Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations*.
- U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). *Human rights and democracy*.
<https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/human-rights-and-democracy/>
- U.S. Department of State. (2016). *FY2013 program and budget buide: East Asia and the Pacific*. www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/fy2013/206685.htm#Thailand
- U.S. Embassy Bangkok. (2014. May 14). *Coup in Thailand. Press statement by John Kerry, Secretary of State*. Washington, DC. May 22, 2014. I am disappointed by... [Status update]. Facebook.
<https://www.facebook.com/usembassybkk/posts/753137701374041>
- U.S. Embassy Bangkok. (2017). *Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Thailand*.
https://th.usembassy.gov/secretary-state-rex-tillerson-visits-thailand/?_ga=2.96894559.1594491071.1581811784-1422780387.1579420960
- Vogelmann, J. (2008). The ascent of China as a new superpower and the relationship with the hegemonic United States: Rough power politics or peaceful economic cooperation [unpublished master's thesis]. Universität Stuttgart.
- Welcome to ILEA Bangkok*. (n.d.). International Law Enforcement Academy of Bangkok.
<https://bangkok.ilea.state.gov/>
- Why the U.S. doesn't call Egypt military's ouster of Morsi a coup*. (2013, July 4). Thomson Reuters. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/why-the-u-s-doesn-t-call-egypt-military-s-ouster-of-morsi-a-coup-1.1347857>

Zawacki, B. (2017). *Thailand shifting ground between the US and a rising china*. Zed Books.

Zsombor, P. (2019, August 28). *New US-ASEAN naval drills a 'balancing act' with Beijing*.

Voice of America. <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/new-us-asean-naval-drills-balancing-act-beijing>



APPENDICES



APPENDIX A

FMS Funding during the Obama Administration

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Aug. 14, 2014	Airforce	ATAP Inc.,* Eastaboga, Alabama (FA8517-14-D-0009); Advanced Technology Systems Company,* McLean, Virginia (FA8517-14- D-0010); Boneal Inc.,* Means, Kentucky (FA8517- 14-D-0011); Charleston Logistics LLC.,* Charleston, South Carolina (FA8517-14-D-0012); and Tec-Masters Inc.,* Huntsville, Alabama (FA8517- 14-D-0013)	Third Party Logistics (3PL) Follow-on Service Acquisition	\$185,545	The Air Force Sustainment Center Contracting Directorate/PZAAC, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia,
Sept. 30, 2014	ARMY	Raytheon Company Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona	Tube Launched Optically Tracked Wireless Guided missiles	N/A	Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal (Missile),

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
					Redstone Arsenal, Alabama,
Nov. 3, 2014	AIR FORCE	L3 Communications Corp., Systems Field Support, Madison, Mississippi,	the option for C-12 contractor logistics support	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
Dec. 19, 2014	Navy	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri,	follow-on integrated logistics support/engineering services for Harpoon /SLAM-ER Missile System and Harpoon Launch Systems	\$165,516	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland
Dec. 22, 2014	AIR FORCE	Raytheon Company Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona	Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) production which includes AMRAAM system includes the missile, captive air training missile, common munitions bit/reprogramming equipment, and non-developmental item airborne instrumentation unit.	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Feb. 13, 2015	AIR FORCE	United Technologies Corp. doing business as Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, Connecticut,	Remanufacture of FI00-PW-I 00/200/220/220E/229 engine modules	100%	Air Force Space Command, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
Apr. 3, 2015	ARMY	Airbus Defense & Space Inc., Herndon, Virginia	UH-72A helicopter support, hardware, and services for the Royal Thai Army.	\$9,360,135	Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
May. 28, 2015	NAVY	ViaSat Inc., Carlsbad, California	the production, development and sustainment of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) terminals,he production, development and sustainment of the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) terminals.	N/A	The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, California,
May. 28, 2015	NAVY	Engility Corp., Chantilly, Virginia	Systems integration and software development, platform simulation,	\$239,399	The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			integration and laboratory engineering, and software engineering		Patuxent River, Maryland,
Jun. 3, 2015	AIR FORCE	United Technologies Corp., doing business as Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, Connecticut,	Remanufacture of FI00-PW-I 00/200/220/220E/229 engine modules.	100 percent foreign military sales	Air Force Space Command, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma,
Jun. 16, 2015	NAVY	Data Link Solutions LLC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa,	the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) terminals. The MIDS JTRS terminal is a four-channel software defined radio that delivers existing Link 16 with concurrent multi-netting-4 and tactical air navigation functionality, as well as three channels for future growth, including JTRS advanced networking waveforms such as tactical targeting network technology, multifunction advanced	N/A	The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, San Diego, California,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			data link, intra-flight data link and other advanced networking waveforms.the Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) terminals. The MIDS JTRS terminal is a four-channel software defined radio that delivers existing Link 16 with concurrent multi-netting-4 and tactical air navigation functionality, as well as three channels for future growth, including JTRS advanced networking waveforms such as tactical targeting network technology, multifunction advanced data link, intra-flight data link and other advanced networking waveforms.the Multifunctional		

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			Information Distribution System (MIDS) Joint Tactical Radio Systems (JTRS) terminals. The MIDS JTRS terminal is a four-channel software defined radio that delivers existing Link 16 with concurrent multi-netting-4 and tactical air navigation functionality, as well as three channels for future growth, including JTRS advanced networking waveforms such as tactical targeting network technology, multifunction advanced data link, intra-flight data link and other advanced networking waveforms.		
Aug. 24, 2015	ARMY	CAS Inc., Huntsville, Alabama,	labor hours and travel supporting the Utility Helicopter Project Office.	N/A	Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama,
Sept. 15, 2015	NAVY	Leidos Inc., Reston, Virginia,	raining and assistance consisting of preparation, shipment, and	\$137531	Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center Norfolk,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			management of Navy repairable assets to the Technical Assistance for Repairable Processing services in support of the Naval Supply Systems Command weapon systems Support.		Contracting Department, Philadelphia Office, Pennsylvania,
Oct. 20, 2015	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communications Corp., Systems Field Support, Madison, Mississippi,	C-12 contractor logistics support. Contractor will provide maintenance, repair and support functions.	N/A	Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma,
Nov. 30, 2015	NAVY	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri	integrated logistics support/engineering services in support of the Harpoon/Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response missile system and Harpoon launch systems	\$186,382	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland,
Mar. 31, 2016	Navy	BAE Systems, Land & Armaments LP, Minneapolis, Minnesota,	MK 41 vertical launching system canister production requirements.	\$1,146,782	The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
May. 26, 2016	AIR FORCE	Abacus Technology Corp., Chevy Chase, Maryland,	Engineering and technology acquisition support services	N/A	Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts
Jun. 21, 2016	AIR FORCE	BTAS, Beavercreek, Ohio	Advisory and assistance services knowledge-based, non-engineering support to Hanscom Air Force Base and its geographically separated units	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hanscom Air Force Base
Aug. 25, 2016	Navy	Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Portsmouth, Rhode Island,	the procurement of MK 54 lightweight torpedo common parts kits; MK 54 Mod 0 lightweight torpedo kits; and MK 54 exercise fuel tanks, spares, production support material, engineering support, and hardware repair support	\$754,475	The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia,
Aug. 30, 2016	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communications Corp. -Systems Field Support, Madison, Mississippi	exercise the option on previously awarded contract FA8106-11-D-0002 for C-12 contractor logistics support.	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Aug. 31, 2016	AIR FORCE	Abacus Technology Corp., Chevy Chase, Maryland,	Disciplined systems and specialty engineering; technical and information assurance services; and support using established government, contractor, and industry processes.	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts
Sept. 1, 2016	Navy	Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Annapolis, Maryland	to exercise option year three for the production of MK54 Mod 0 lightweight torpedo (LWT) array kits, factory test equipment, production support material, and related engineering and hardware repair services for upgrade of Navy LWTs.	\$327,863	Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia,
Sept. 29, 2016	Army	CAS Inc., Huntsville, Alabama,	labor hours and travel for the Utility Helicopter project office.	N/A	Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Nov. 4, 2016	Navy	Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona	Evolved Seasparrow Missiles Block I production requirements.	Below than 1 percent	The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia,
Dec. 8, 2016	AIR FORCE	Leidos Inc., Reston, Virginia,	indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for Joint	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			Mission Planning System (JMPS) engineering integration		Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts
Dec. 21, 2016	Navy	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri	production Lot 90 Harpoon weapon systems, components, and spares	\$846,769	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland,
Sept. 20, 2017	Navy	Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Portsmouth, Rhode Island,	Option year one for the procurement of Mk 54 lightweight torpedo common parts kits; Mk 54 Mod 0 lightweight torpedo kits; and Mk 54 exercise fuel tanks, spares, production support material and related engineering and hardware repair services for the torpedo kits.	\$175,665	The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia,
Sept. 28, 2017	ARMY	Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona	Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wireless-guided missiles	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Nov. 15, 2017	ARMY	Iron Mountain Solutions,* Madison, Alabama	Technical support for the Utility Helicopter Project Office	N/A	Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Dec. 15, 2017	Navy	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri	procurement of Harpoon/SLAM-ER missile system and Harpoon launch systems follow-on integrated logistics and engineering services support.	\$228,085	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland,
Apr. 13, 2018	ARMY	Speegle Construction Inc.,* Niceville, Florida	the construction of a foreign military sales facility at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida	N/A	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Alabama
Apr. 17, 2018	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communication, Vertex Aerospace, Madison, Mississippi	Logistics support of the Air Force C-12 fleet	N/A	Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma,
May. 14, 2018	ARMY	Quantitech Inc., Huntsville, Alabama	Support services for the Utility Helicopter Project Office	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Aug. 30, 2018	Navy	NAVMAR Applied Sciences Corp.,* Warminster, Pennsylvania,	The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase III effort that continues intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensor development, testing, and evaluation under SBIR topic	\$1,338,967	The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Lakehurst

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			numbers N92-170 and AF-083-0006 in support of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Fleet Innovative Team.		
Sept. 18, 2018	NAVY	Data Link Solutions LLC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa,	increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN), spares CLIN, systems engineering and integration, and travel/other direct cost CLINs of the referenced contract.	N/A	The Space and Naval Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
Sept. 26, 2018	ARMY	Raytheon Co., Fort Wayne, Indiana,	procure ARC-231 hardware	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
Sept. 27, 2018	ARMY	Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Stratford, Connecticut	the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Oct. 1, 2018	AIR FORCE	COLSA Corp., Huntsville, Alabama	Technical and Management Advisory Services Command, control, communications, computer, intelligence,	N/A	Air Force Test Center, Eglin AFB, Florida

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)/cyber support.		
Nov. 8, 2018	ARMY	IronMountain Solutions Inc.,* Huntsville, Alabama	Support services for non-AMRDEC technical support for the Utility Helicopter Project Office	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Nov. 14, 2018	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC, Madison, Mississippi,	Logistic support of the Air Force C-12 fleet	N/A	Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma,
Dec. 19, 2018	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC, Madison, Mississippi,	Logistic support of the Air Force C-12 fleet.	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma,
Jan. 25, 2019	NAVY	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri	Engineering, training, integrated logistics support, installation/checkout of developed systems and support services for Harpoon Ship Command Launch Control Set, Encapsulated Harpoon Command and Launch Systems, and Advanced Harpoon Weapon Control	N/A	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
			System, Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response, and Harpoon missiles.		
May. 9, 2019	ARMY	IronMountain Solutions Inc.,* Huntsville, Alabama	Technical support services	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama,
Jun. 4, 2019	AIR FORCE	Universal Propulsion Co. Inc., Fairfield, California	the Modernized ACES II Electronic Sequencert	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah,
Jul. 17, 2019	NAVY	Data Link Solutions LLC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa,	Increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN), spares CLIN, and systems engineering and integration CLIN of the referenced contract	N/A	Naval Information Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
July 17, 2019	NAVY	ViaSat Inc., Carlsbad, California,	Increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN) of the referenced contract	N/A	Naval Information Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
July 19, 2019	AIR FORCE	United Technologies Corp., doing business as Pratt & Whitney Military Engines, East Hartford, Connecticut	Engine module remanufacture	N/A	The Air Force Sustainment Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Sept. 10, 2019	NAVY	ViaSat Inc., of Carlsbad, California	Increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN), and the systems engineering and integration CLIN of the referenced contract	N/A	Naval Information Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
Sept. 20, 2019	AIR FORCE	COLSA Corp., Huntsville, Alabama	Technical and management advisory services command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance/cyber support.	N/A	The Air Force Test Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida
Sept. 26, 2019	AIR FORCE	United Technologies Corp., Hartford, Connecticut	Contractor engineering and technical services in support of the F100-PW-100/220/220E/229 engines for the F-15 and F-16 aircraft.	N/A	The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Sept. 30, 2019	AIR FORCE	L3 Technologies Inc., Arlington, Texas,	An F-16 A/B Block 15 simulator	\$17,374,120	The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

APPENDIX B

FMS Funding during the Trump Administration

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Feb. 13, 2017	Navy	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri	The procurement of spares in support of Harpoon and Stand-Off Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) for the Navy	\$20,394	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland,
May. 16, 2017	Army	Quantitech,* Huntsville, Alabama	Programmatic support services for the Utility Helicopter Project Office.	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Jun. 1, 2017	AIR FORCE	Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, Orlando, Florida,	Sniper advanced targeting pod (ATP) and low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) navigation pod sustainment.	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia,
Aug. 28, 2017	AIR FORCE	Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Fort Worth, Texas	Engineering and technical services in support of the F-16 aircraft requirements	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Sept. 12, 2017	AIR FORCE	Odyssey Systems Consulting Group Ltd., Wakefield, Massachusetts	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Sept. 19, 2017	Navy	Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Annapolis, Maryland	Option year four for the production of MK54 Mod 0 lightweight torpedo (LWT) array kits, production support material, and related engineering and hardware repair services for upgrade of Navy LWTs	\$930,442	The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia,
Sept. 20, 2017	Navy	Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, Portsmouth, Rhode Island,	Option year one for the procurement of Mk 54 lightweight torpedo common parts kits; Mk 54 Mod 0 lightweight torpedo kits; and Mk 54 exercise fuel tanks, spares, production support material and related engineering and hardware repair services for the torpedo kits.	\$175,665	The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia,
Sept. 28, 2017	ARMY	Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, Arizona	Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wireless-guided missiles	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Nov. 15, 2017	ARMY	Iron Mountain Solutions,* Madison, Alabama	Technical support for the Utility Helicopter Project Office	N/A	Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Dec. 15, 2017	Navy	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri	procurement of Harpoon/SLAM-ER missile system and Harpoon launch systems follow-on integrated logistics and engineering services support.	\$228,085	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Apr. 13, 2018	ARMY	Speegle Construction Inc.,* Niceville, Florida	the construction of a foreign military sales facility at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida	N/A	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Alabama
Apr. 17, 2018	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communication, Vertex Aerospace, Madison, Mississippi	Logistics support of the Air Force C-12 fleet	N/A	Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma,
May. 14, 2018	ARMY	Quantitech Inc., Huntsville, Alabama	Support services for the Utility Helicopter Project Office	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Aug. 30, 2018	Navy	NAVMAR Applied Sciences Corp.,* Warminster, Pennsylvania,	The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Phase III effort that continues intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensor development, testing, and evaluation under SBIR topic numbers N92-170 and AF-083-0006 in support of the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Fleet Innovative Team.	\$1,338,967	The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Lakehurst

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Sept. 18, 2018	NAVY	Data Link Solutions LLC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa,	increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN), spares CLIN, systems engineering and integration, and travel/other direct cost CLINs of the referenced contract.	N/A	The Space and Naval Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
Sept. 26, 2018	ARMY	Raytheon Co., Fort Wayne, Indiana,	procure ARC-231 hardware	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
Sept. 27, 2018	ARMY	Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Stratford, Connecticut	the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
Oct. 1, 2018	AIR FORCE	COLSA Corp., Huntsville, Alabama	Technical and Management Advisory Services Command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)/cyber support.	N/A	Air Force Test Center, Eglin AFB, Florida
Nov. 8, 2018	ARMY	IronMountain Solutions Inc.,* Huntsville, Alabama	Support services for non-AMRDEC technical support for the Utility Helicopter Project Office	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Nov. 14, 2018	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC, Madison, Mississippi,	Logistic support of the Air Force C-12 fleet	N/A	Air Force Lifecycle Management Center, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma,
Dec. 19, 2018	AIR FORCE	L-3 Communications Vertex Aerospace LLC, Madison, Mississippi,	Logistic support of the Air Force C-12 fleet.	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma,
Jan. 25, 2019	NAVY	The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri	Engineering, training, integrated logistics support, installation/checkout of developed systems and support services for Harpoon Ship Command Launch Control Set, Encapsulated Harpoon Command and Launch Systems, and Advanced Harpoon Weapon Control System, Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response, and Harpoon missiles.	N/A	The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland,
May. 9, 2019	ARMY	IronMountain Solutions Inc.,* Huntsville, Alabama	Technical support services	N/A	U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama,
Jun. 4, 2019	AIR FORCE	Universal Propulsion Co. Inc., Fairfield, California	the Modernized ACES II Electronic Sequencert	N/A	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah,

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Jul. 17, 2019	NAVY	Data Link Solutions LLC, Cedar Rapids, Iowa,	Increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN), spares CLIN, and systems engineering and integration CLIN of the referenced contract	N/A	Naval Information Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
July 17, 2019	NAVY	ViaSat Inc., Carlsbad, California,	Increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN) of the referenced contract	N/A	Naval Information Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
July 19, 2019	AIR FORCE	United Technologies Corp., doing business as Pratt & Whitney Military Engines, East Hartford, Connecticut	Engine module remanufacture	N/A	The Air Force Sustainment Center, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
Sept. 10, 2019	NAVY	ViaSat Inc., of Carlsbad, California	Increase the ceiling of the existing production contract line item number (CLIN), and the systems engineering and integration CLIN of the referenced contract	N/A	Naval Information Warfare System Command, San Diego, California
Sept. 20, 2019	AIR FORCE	COLSA Corp., Huntsville, Alabama	Technical and management advisory services command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance/cyber support.	N/A	The Air Force Test Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

Contract for	Type	Contractor	Item	Amount of FMS	Contracting Activity
Sept. 26, 2019	AIR FORCE	United Technologies Corp., Hartford, Connecticut	Contractor engineering and technical services in support of the F100-PW-100/220/220E/229 engines for the F-15 and F-16 aircraft.	N/A	The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
Sept. 30, 2019	AIR FORCE	L3 Technologies Inc., Arlington, Texas,	An F-16 A/B Block 15 simulator	\$17,374,120	The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

BIOGRAPHY

Name	Ms. Sarunphak Kittivorapoom
Date of Birth	March 3,1990
Educational Attainment	2012: Bachelor of Political Science (Politics and Government) 2020: Master of Arts in International Relations
Work Position	Senior Program Officer JICA project for ASEAN University Network/Southeast Asia Engineering Education Development Network (AUN/SEED-Net)
Work Experiences	Senior Program Officer JICA project for ASEAN University Network/Southeast Asia Engineering Education Development Network (AUN/SEED-Net) Technical Support Officer, Ship Owner department, Prima Marine Public Co.,Ltd. Secretary & Coordinator Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) Project Analyst and Program Coordinator Secretariat to the Department, International Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Administration Officer

Gateway City Co., Ltd. and Gateway Estate
Co., Ltd.

