



**THE SELF-ADMINISTERED DIVISION OF WA:
AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE**

BY


MR KYI THAR

**AN INDEPENDENT STUDY SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2020
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INDEPENDENT STUDY

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ENTITLED

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RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE

was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Political Science in International Relations

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
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ABSTRACT

Myanmar came into existence as a nation-state after being independent of the British Empire on 4 January 1948. Myanmar is one of the ethnically diverse states in South East Asia. The resource-rich Myanmar has been in state-building, peacemaking process since it was born and developing a strategy to end the decade-long civil war between state army and ethnic armed groups in borderlands. This thesis explores how self-autonomy helps Myanmar reduce the impact of global exploitation (peace for economic production nationwide) then looking at how the state of Myanmar exploits the Wa autonomous region case as its state making policy.

Keywords: ceasefire capitalism, military state making in ethanics frontiers , ethnopolitical organisations

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
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations	Terms
AA	Araken Army
ABSDF	All Burma Students' Democratic Front
ALP	Arakan Liberation Party
BGF	Border Guard Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNF	Chin National Front
CPB	Communist Party of Burma
DKBA	Democratic Karen Benevolent Army
ECS	Economic Cooperation Strategy
KA	Karenni Army
KIA	Kachin Independence Army
KIO	Kachin Independent Organization
KMT	Kuomintang
KNLA-PC	Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council
KNO-B	Kuki National Organization-Burma
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KNU	Karen National Union
MNDAA	Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
MTA	Mong Tai Army
NAA-ESS	National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State
NMSP	New Mon State Party
NSCN-K	National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
PNLO	Pa-O National Liberation Organization
RCSS	Restoration Council of Shan State

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 History of Myanmar and its ethnic minorities

Since the emergence of nation-states there have been regional endeavours for autonomy brought about by differences in language, ethnic belonging or cultural norms. Nowhere are these endeavours more evident than in those countries that have not been built on a lengthy process of integration but rather on external imperialist forces that often drew country borders on a drawing board.

This Independent Study (IS) is focusing on one of those countries, which have been built on political negotiation and determination of peace process, rather than one historical precedence: Myanmar. Myanmar, used to be called Burma, is home to more than 100 different ethnic groups and has only existed since 4 January 1948, whereas its creation had been brought about by the British Empire. Since its creation, Myanmar has witnessed the emergence of numerous autonomous movements, one of which is the Wa region in northern Myanmar, bordering China, since the post-colonial period (Than, 1993). In this study, the focus will be on how the Wa as a minority succeeded in getting autonomy.

Wa people inhabit the highlands located between the Thanlwin River and Mekong river in the Northern Shan state of Myanmar (Kramer, 2007). According to Fiskesjö (2013), Wa people are recognized as an ethnic minority both in Myanmar and China. The self-governed territory of this indigenous is divided by international borders between Myanmar and China in the early 1960s. The Friendly Agreement on the question of the Burma-China Boundary and the Boundary treaty Between the People's Republic Of China and the Union of Burma (Myanmar) was signed in 1960 (Steinberg & Fan, 2012).

There is about one million Wa population living in China-Myanmar cross borderlands. The majority of them are on the Myanmar side. As Wa territories are highlands full of valleys and small rivers and remote from the mainland of Myanmar, they have had relied on their own agriculture and engaging in trade, especially exporting opium and mining minerals, with people in the surrounding areas since the 19th century. Wa protect themselves with arms (Fiskesjö, 2013). During the British occupation from 1824 to 1948 Wa people are

classified based on the colour of the skirts as red or barbarian Wa and Black or civilised (Tai Loi).

Wild Wa (Red Petticoats) resides in the Wa States in the East of Lashio between Burma (Myanmar) and China border. According to the British, barbarian Wa villages are not reached by the administration. During land preparation for agriculture, Wa offers human heads to gods (spirits). If head supplies are not available from strangers, the oldest member of the village has to be decapitated to offer his/her head to the Nats. Wa also purchases heads of persecuted prisoners from Keng Tung, a city in the Eastern Shan State. It is assumed that there are twenty-two human heads hunted in 1922.

Lau-wa, so-called by Chinese occupies the hills in the further North. These Wa are, fortunately, more civilised than the Wa of the Wa States. Being animist practitioners, the Wild Wa are perceived as the most under-civilized and unpleasant tribe by their next-door neighbours (Enrique 1918, 1981).

Wa language is commonly used among 300,000 Wa people in border counties on the Chinese side of the border and about 700,000 in Wa lands inside Myanmar. The linguistic structure of Wa is originated in the Mon-Khmer family (Fiskesjö, 2000). According to Milsom's study (2005, p. 65), Wa takes the three-quarters share of the population and there are minorities in the minority such as Lahu, Shan, Han Chinese, Akha, and Lisue, and others living together in the Wa territory.

Neihzial's account (1998) highlights that Wa has been determined to preserve their autonomy since the process of the new constitution in 1947. During the meeting with the Committee of Enquiry and representatives from Wa territories, During this inquiry, Wa delegates give their consent that they prefer to keep the status quo as a self-governed territory and being independent.

1.1.1 Panglong Agreement

As a result of the committee's inquiry in 1947, Burmese political leaders and representatives from ethnic minorities of highland areas ratify the founding accord of Burma, the Panglong Agreement. It has been controversial that the constitution drew out of the agreement is contradicting with what has been agreed upon at Panglong such as equal political rights of various ethnic nationalities in Burma are not fully entitled and there is not participation of representatives from all the ethnic groups, especially delegates from Wa community are left out (Milsom, 2005). In 1947, the Union of Burma is going to be as an independent state of

multi-ethnic-nationalities such as the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), Myanmar (Burman), and Shan, based on “the principle of equality” (Steinberg & Fan, 2012, p. 15).

However, in 1948 Buddhist Burmese are the majority and Buddhism influences the ideology and politics of what is called nowadays the Republic of Union of Myanmar (Sakhong, 2010). Myanmar is home to one hundred and thirty-five ethnic minorities as linguistically categorized by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/ State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). In 1962 Ne Win took power and in 1988 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took the power from Ne Win and his Burma Socialist Programme Party and SLORC rebranded its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 (Steinberg & Fan, 2012).

1.1.2 The Relationship between Wa and the state.

In the years 1950s after Myanmar became an independent state, the region of Wa was a war prom area. The region was too remote to reach the state system. Wa people and other minority were who resided in the hilly, mountainous borderland were recruited as warriors for the Communist Party Burma (CPB). CPB, which was relying on the support of Chinese Communist Party, found themselves a challenging time when China withdrew their aid in 1980s. Finally, CPB faced implosion and the leaders took refuge in China. At the demise of CPB, Wa founded the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and its military wing, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in 1989. Within the same year of Wa ethnic armed organization, Wa entered truce with Myanmar military-led government on 18 May in Hopang, the capital city, the Wa self-administered division. In this study, the truce achieved between Wa and Myanmar security forces in Hopang is regarded as Hopang agreement. Wa developed its traditional opium production and drug trafficking into to large scale production over the following years. As a result Wa was internationally regarded as drug lords and was targeted by anti-drug trafficking and opium ban policy domestically and internationally. Since truce, Wa entered Myanmar political area and established the state and non-state actor relations. Wa presented their organizational agenda based on ethnicity, territory and self-governance sharing similar political agenda as other ethnic armed forces in Myanmar. However, Wa affirmed that they would not disarm until their political demands were met, one of which was that their region to be recognized as Wa as one of the Myanmar's states.

Did 1989 truce not only opened up the relations between the state and non-state actor, UWSP/A, and it also reduced the isolation. However, its dependency on drug trafficking is becoming obstacle in the military state making in the borderland. Figure 1.1 illustrates the map of the regions of Myanmar controlled by the United Wa State Army.

What Myanmar has been facing today in its struggle for reconciliation since the birth of the Union of Burma: living up to the Panglong Agreement, which is a federal union. After Aung San has been assassinated, Myanmar's path Federalial union is detracted, which leads to the a 1961 Taungyi conference in Taungyi, the capital city of the eastern Shan state in 1961 to resume the federal system establiment effort . This vital movement in Myanmar political history is suppressed by General Ne Win coup d'etat on 2 March 1962 and the constitution amendment is ended (Sakhong, 2010). 1948 Constitution of Union of Burma failed to embrace the slogan of Panglong that “the Union Constitution automatically allocates political authority of the legislative, judiciary, and administrative powers to the Legislative Assembly of the National States. All member states of the Union could freely exercise the right of self-determination through the right of self-government within their respective National States” (Josef, 1981, p. 51).

Besides political violations from Panglong, another vital deviation from Aung San's vision of the state building in the constitutions amendment Act, 1961, which to make Buddhism as the religion of the state (The Constitution of Union of Burma, 1948). Such religious promulgation of Buddhism discriminates the communities of non-Buddhist and non-Barman ethnic minorities in the country (The Constitution of Union of Burma, 1948; Sakhong, 2010).

Burma has been under the occupation of two foreign powers, British and Japanese. British rule lasts from 1824 to 1948. Japanese has just occupied Burma for three years from 1942 to 1945. Although Burma gained independence from colonial imperials, the country suffers the impact of colonialism in many different ways. One of them is the military capacity divide between Barma people, one of the seven major ethnic groups of Myanmar and who spreads out in flatlands, and hill tribes or the ethnic or non-Barman people such as Chin, Shan, Kachin, Karen, Kaya, Rakhine, Mon. The late-national leader, Aung San, and his Burmese Independent Army (BIA) acquire military knowledge, skills, and weaponry from the Japanese, while the ethnic minority troops are trained by the British. Historical memories, atrocities, grievances caused by the majority (Barman military) to the minority (ethnic nationalities) have

presented until nowadays. As a result, what Myanmar sees is the emergence of militants or ethnic armies as illustrated in Figure 1.2 , Figure 1.3 (Linter, 2015)

Figure 1.1

The map shows the regions of Myanmar controlled by the United Wa State Army.




Note: From “Ethnic Militias in Myanmar form New Committee to Handle Talks with Government,” by RFA’s Myanmar Service, 2017, Radio Free Asia.

<https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/ethnic-militias-in-myanmar-form-new-committee-to-handle-talks-with-government-04192017162503.html>

Figure 1.2


Areas controlled by ceasefire groups



Note: From “Myanmar Militias” [Online image], by Fragile States, 2012,
<https://www.fragilestates.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Myanmar-Militias.gif>

Figure 1.3

Active Areas of Myanmar's Ethnic Armed Militants



Source: Burma News International, "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015"

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Note: From "Deciphering Myanmar's Peace Process: A Reference Guide 2015," by Burma News International, 2015, https://www.bnionline.net/sites/bnionline.net/files/publication_docs/dec-myan-peace-process-2015-eng_0.pdf, copyright 2015 by Burma News International.

1.1.3 The Wa as a militant group in the process of state-building of Myanmar

Wa lands are located in the mountainous terrain between two main rivers, Thanlwin (Salween) and the Mekong. Wa, culturally and traditionally, belongs to both Myanmar and China. Historically Wa in Myanmar and Wa in China are all together. In this study, Wa in Myanmar is a specific case study to understand the phenomena of an ethnic armed organization becoming a political player during Myanmar's process for state mechanism expansion in the frontier and for developing local and external investments (Bowman, 2007).

As Mao Zedong's armies escalated the oppression in the beginning in 1949, Chinese Nationalist¹ troops or Kuomintang (KMT), supporters of Sun Yat-sen, ran into Wa villages to build a springboard in such a remote jungle of Wa hills to invade Yunnan province of China. From this time forwards Wa territory has never been the same as before but full of war-related activities. When KMT realized that they could not achieve their primary objectives, after being defeated by both Burma and China forces, KMT decides to blend into local communities and establish opium trading routes in Northman Shan state (Kramer, 2007; Kaufman, 2001). In the mid-1980s, the KMT remnants receive supply from Tai Pei, presumably from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which has supported them since 1950s by the United States, in its pursuit of containing the spread of communism grew concerned about the communist influence in Southeast Asia during the height of domino theory. After the Cold War tension got started, it was the concern of the United States of America that Burma could be next to fall into communism.

However, joining hands with the People's Liberation Army, Burmese forces drove KMT out. Most retreat away to Burma's neighbor states such as Thailand and Laos and some make their way to Taiwan. As a result of this disperse of KMT in the Southeast Asia region, many of them started with illicit drug trafficking. Nowadays KMT communities can still be found in those countries. The KMT presence in Burma became an obstacle to combat the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and has a great impact on Burmese-American relations (Clymer, 2014).

When Shan rebellion brakes out in the 1960s, Wa also falls into insurgency movement. Military leader Ne Win ceases the office from U Nu-led administration and forms Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) and Burma is ruled by the one-state party. In the political history of Burma, the late 1950s and 1960s, 27-armed groups' emergence. Some are fighting against each other and others are against the Burmese Army. Communist Party of

Burma, founded in 1968, and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), founded in 1989, are such ethnic armed groups (Tucker, 2001). The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) is the first militia that attacks the Burma government in Rangoon. Burma was renamed Myanmar in 1989 so was Rangoon to Yangon.

However, in mainland Burma, General Ne Win implements a counter-insurgent strategy to eliminate the flow of the major supplies between the armed rebels and villages and communities on which the rebel relay on rations, information, money, and recruits. As a result, CPB has to pull its troops to the remote mountainous area of Wa territories (Smith, 1991). CPB introduced the Wa an organizational structure and internal conflicts among Wa groups become reconciled. Wa and along with other ethnic minorities are recruited to CPB and most of their lives are lost in the battles CPB fights against Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) and Burmese Army. On one hand, CPB starts collapsing when its major supporter China decides the reduction for supply to CPB during Deng Xiao Ping's administration in 1980-81. On the other hand, Wa realizes that their blood has been shed for CPB's interest and they do not see any future under CPB's Burmese leadership. Such feelings are shared among lower-rank Burmese too. In addition to that, the Chinese government is pulling their Red Guard volunteers back home for retirement. (Lintner, 1990) Finally, Was led by their leaders, Chao Ngi Lai, and Bao You Chang, make a historical move by taking over the headquarters of CPB in Panghsang, seizing weapons, and sending CPB Burmese leaders away to China. All CPB records are destroyed in this revolt. As a result, CPB disintegrated into four new armed groups. UWSP/UWSA is one of them. The other three are Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA/ Kokang Democratic Party) in KoKang region, The National Democratic Alliance Army near Golden Triangle, and the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) in the Eastern Kachin State along the Chinese Border. Chao and Bao brothers are ex-soldiers trained by the Chinese to fight against KMT before they join CPB. Wa army agrees to stop fighting with the government troops in May 1989 in the agreement established on “the bridge of Hopang” (Kramer 2007). When Wa are trying to take control of their own determination from the hands of CPB leaders, the civilian population in the mainland of Burma is struggling against the military dictatorship of Na Win and his way of socialism. Unfortunately, State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) chaired by another military executive, Saw Maung, seizes the power, after brutally suppressing the people demonstrating for the restoration of democracy in 1988. SLORC eradicates the 1974 constitution and took the place of BSPP. SLORC

schedules election for May 1990 . However, SLORC did not recognize the election outcomes and refused the transfer of the power to the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, which won the election (Tucker, 2001). In 2003, the regime adopted strategic planning with seven phases to achieve a multi-party democratic system. These seven steps begin with resuming the National Convention or a Convention to develop a new constitution, second, implementing gradually the requisite tasks for the founding of a democratic system. Third, drafting the constitution. Fourth, calling for a national referendum for acceptance. Fifth, if a popular agreement is achieved, then an election will be held to form national legislative bodies. Sixth, meeting of elected representatives for national legislative bodies and seventh, leaders, government, and authoritative bodies elected by the national legislative bodies (Taylor, 2004).

During this democratic regime transformation, Wa and five other ethnic groups (Naga, Danu, Pa Laung, Pa-O, Kokang) attained autonomy as self-governing territories according to the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008, article 56. Only the territory of Wa is described as a division due to its composition of six townships as two districts. The other five groups are just delineated as Self-Administered Zones because they are composed of two to three township receptively.

Wa Division is located next to the Chinese border and they are under significant influence by China. Momentary transaction in their area is in Chinese Renminbi. Mobile phone communication is through Chinese networks. Chinese is a more common language than Myanmar (Burmese) (Lintner, 2017). Not only Chinese yuan and mobile networks, but Wa's time zone is set to that of China. From Kramer's (2007) account, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the military wing of the United Wa State Party (UWSP), is the biggest ethnic armed organization (EAO) with 20,000 soldiers. The strength of the Wa military has grown and reached the top among EAOs as is illustrated in table 1. Yet, together with allies in Kokang (MNDAA) and Wa (UWSA), it is still resisting transforming its troop into Border Guard Forces (Stokke et al., 2018). It will be the 32nd anniversary in May 2021 that the Wa has made a truce with the Myanmar military. This verbal agreement established on the bridge of Hopang on May 18, 1989, halt the aggression between the two parties, and Wa was allowed to administer its territory (Krama, 2007). This accord granted Wa semi-autonomy to maintain their arms, conduct economic activities, and manage the Wa affair without the State's interference. Since 2008, the Wa status quo has been constitutionally recognized. This research aims to study why

states grant regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces in their domestic territory. In this chapter, the historical facts in the process on the way to regional autonomy of the WA are described.

Post-independent Myanmar has been through various changes in political arrangement, armed opposition, military dictatorship and national reconciliation attempts known as military state making in the literature studied Myanmar political affairs. Drafting new constitution and adopting it in 2008, conducting general election in 2010 to transfer the state administration to the elected party, releasing the leader of the opposition party, National League for Democracy, Daw Aung San Su Kyi, economic liberation and lifting restriction on media and communication, Myanmar military state making took several steps in the name of ‘reform’. However, Myanmar is applying a new approach, the National wide Ceasefire Agreement, NCA with country’s ethnic armed forces and transform them into the border guard troops under the Tatmadaw, the military of defense. Nevertheless. It is Myanmar’s constant struggle to extend state’s reach to ethnic commonly resided border region after the independence. Military state making in the border regions primarily depends on bringing the governance mechanism, establishing military bases, accommodating foreign and domestic investments in the resource extraction economy in the un-administered land such the area of Wa and the northern Kachin state. It is important to study how the military state making strategy intertwines with ceasefire based economic corporation and sharing political power as self-governing territory. Therefore, the study aims to understand such phenomena of state and non-state actor relations in the framework of military state making in Myanmar.

1.1.4 Research question

Why states grant regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces in their domestic territory? Focusing on one of those post-colonial countries, MYANMAR and the ethnic minority WA.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 The political economy of civil war and conflict transformation

Kevin Woods' (2011) studies show how political of civil war and conflict transformations were applied the process of state formation in the northern Myanmar territory in his commonly-cited article, *Ceasefire capitalism: military-private partnerships, resource concessions and military-state building in the Burma-China Borderlands*. The author summarizes that "The Burmese regime allocates land concessions in ceasefire zones as an explicit postwar military strategy to govern land and populations to produce regulated, legible, militarized territory. Tracing the relationship of the military–state formation, land control, and securitization, and primitive accumulation in the Burma–China borderlands uncovers the forces of what I am calling "ceasefire capitalism". (p. 747) Myanmar military states have been formulating various strategies and approaches to managing the armed resistance in national territories since the country regained its independence. Kevin's study indicates the evolution from the civil war to economic zones by agreements to stop the confrontation militarily, known as "ceasefire agreement". (p. 747) The author argues that Military-state established ceasefire truce with ethnic armed groups to achieve more power of governance on land, resources, and people in the mountainous border territories. The particular form of state presence was to build the complex economic network of military-backed investors and non-state armed group leaders, local and international companies, especially Chinese related investors, and to permit them and provide protection by deploying more military bases in the ethnic lands. Kevin coins this phenomenon as Militarizing the territories. Myanmar in its state-making process is seeking economic and political profit in the ceasefire zones by granting land concession in the form of enhancing state's sovereignty in its northern border state-building projects and "direct capital flows into resource-rich, non-state uplands as an act of creating effective national state and military authority, sovereignty and territory in practice. In this way, a military regime appropriates (trans-) national capital networks to form military–private partnerships to solidify de jure sovereignty into de facto territorial control" Thus, Myanmar's counterinsurgency approach has added another dimension as the resolution of the conflict over interests of armed opposition and state's military forces utilizing military confrontation to sharing power,

autonomy, and profit through a bilateral truce. Kevin describes such an approach with greater political and economic implications as ceasefire capitalism. In this process military associates, opposition elites, and external businesses could create a complex political and economic regions where the state's governance mechanism is eventually expended to promote domestic economic production and the state's monopoly of violence in the war-torn northern regions of Myanmar (Woods, 2011).

2.1.1 (Civil) war makes state to peace process makes state

The well-known American scholar, Mary P. Callahan (2005) details the role of the military in the political landscape of independent Myanmar and its state-building process in her book, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. The book gives a comprehensive account of Myanmar how it has been shaped in state-making process under the monolithic institution, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's Army, Navy, and Air Forces) administered by the Ministry of Defense. Her book is based on the research on the history of Tatmadaw that the author conducted during the height of political unrest in 1991 after receiving a research visa through a challenging application process. The thesis provides an essential perspective of Myanmar-in-making through the ideology and strategy of military statesmen. The modern Myanmar, which used to be known as Burma before 1989, comes into being as a state solely intervened in its natural course of process by the military government after taking coup d'état in 1962.

The military statesmen interpret the social unrest and tensions in Myanmar as threats and it can be resolved through violence or military means. In the words of the author, making enemies is that “warfare creates the conditions under which elites and social forces negotiate, create, revitalize, recognise, and rethink the patterns and practice of governance” (Callahan, 2005, p. 3). Callahan’s thesis is mainly focused on how warfare has been a consistent driving force of the post-colonial Myanmar history. *Making Enemies* is a term summarises the approach military-led Myanmar and how it deals with the political, social, and economic conditions with the perception of security concerns. The book lays out various chapters based on the events where the military responds by aggressions, the strategy of breaking the opposition ethnic groups to reduce their power of resistance, practice the notion of building military is to build the nation. *Making Enemies* is the particular concept that the military regime applies to portray the hero-image or the protector of the state, which is safeguarding the nation not fall

into the foreign powers, to defeat the insurgent movements who are perceived as disintegrators and regarding anyone who is against the military as state's enemy.

Their ideology influence Myanmar's state making and governance with the approach of how-to; how to defeat the enemies, what strategy works in the short-term and in the long-term, how to build an alliance and how to expend territory, and how to sustain the power and control, how to set and supply the defense budget. Such ideology guides its military operation to oppress the armed insurgency in the ethnic periphery lands to conquer and expand territory, which in turn allows improving the military might. Callahan provides an example of a US-funded KMT armed organization taking foot in Myanmar. Such external challenges made Tatmadaw transform and modernize, where the statesmen saw the need for financing and finally military enters managing the commercial affairs as the author argues. Eventually, the dominance of military over state affairs increases, and its consolidation of power and authority becomes the heart of state formation in independent Myanmar. As a result, studies about Myanmar politics takes the primary role of the military regime that plays in state-society and its international relations, the effect and consequence of this dynamic (Callahan, 2005).

2.1.2 Myanmar and its international relations

Myanmar has established diplomatic ties with the United States since 1947. In 1974, the US assisted Myanmar in its campaign on anti-opium operations. However, the US withdrew its economic aid to Myanmar in 1990 in response to the Myanmar military's aggressive oppression of democracy movements and putting the leader, Aung San Su Kyi, under house arrest. Three years after, the US increased its pressure by reducing diplomatic relations with Myanmar to the charge de'affairs level. The US president Bush executed two Executive orders to freezes assets of human rights abusing corrupted individuals in Myanmar ("Graphics: US-Myanmar Relations," 2010). US-Myanmar relations got frozen in the year 1990s. While other ASEAN members states extended their relations with Washington except for Myanmar. Such US policy change has an impact on Myanmar to process political and economic reforms in the longer term (Clapp, 2010). On one hand, US policy towards Myanmar is mainly based upon the spread of democratic values, promoting human rights, and eradication of drugs. On the other hand, Myanmar's engagement not only with the US but also other states and organizations such as China, Japan, and ASEAN with policy agenda of being part of the larger international community and building more diplomatic relations. The US sees Myanmar as strategically important in dealing with the Asian power, China. Although Myanmar does not include in the

main economic interest of the US in Asia, Myanmar generated up to \$470 million from exporting garment related product to the US market, before it was banned in 2003. In pursuing the policy interest, the US can project its influence on Myanmar by "diplomatic means, economic means, cultural through the use of media and military action".

Gourevitch (1978) argues that the behavior of domestic regime is shaped by two important external factors such as the influential power and dynamic of the world trade and political affairs. Therefore, the US constrains Myanmar to prevent the spread of communist force from China by bilateral pressure as well as pressure through the US's allies. It can also apply the same approach through the multilateral level in cooperation with the United Nations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), etc. (Singh, 2006).

However, the debates go on whether US sanctions towards Myanmar have made the country decline more to China or not and mutual benefit through bilateral relations is also a vital factor. In terms of such relations, the Myanmar military regime, which is not democratic, may face losing its power by improving its relations with the US (Limaye, 2010). Besides, Myanmar being under the influence of the US is facing another challenge in ASEAN, which is aiming to establish what is known as an economic co-operation hub. Myanmar being part of this community, Myanmar can benefit economically and politically (Than, 1991). Having been a member of ASEAN since July 1997, Myanmar has to develop a policy to save its reputation in the international community and to open up its market. Not only economic reforms, but Myanmar also takes up reforms in politics from the authoritarian type of regime to more democratic ones through elections. Therefore, Myanmar Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt laid out a plan what is known as the action plans for developing democratic system. Myanmar is not only trying to improve its economy through trading, but Myanmar is also trying to integrate into regional organizations like ASEAN and joining groups of Asia powers such as China, India, Japan, and Thailand to establish a certain level of resistance to the US (James, 2004).

To achieve such integration, Myanmar has to compromise its stance against domestic forces such as the ethnic armed groups as UWSA and manage to eradicate drug trafficking which imposes security threats to neighboring countries as well as the US. Myanmar can reduce the impact of the economic sanction of the US and European countries because it welcomes Chinese investments and loans. However, on the bright side, with Chinese backing, Myanmar manages to sustain its economy, on the dark side, Myanmar experiences its natural resources

being exploited and the risk of environmental disasters. Myanmar trade balance with China is not in its favor. The import is much higher than the export (Kudo, 2008). There is not much found in the existing literature concerning Wa's attainment of self-governing autonomy. Wa in this research refers to the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and its troops, United Wa State Army (UWSA). Myanmar frontier areas have been war-prone for over half of a century. Myanmar government has reinforced various strategies to tackle the rise of the insurgency. UWSA/P, among others, has been under constant pressure to transform into BGF, Border Guard Force, because of the implementation of a new constitution in the year 2010 (Meehan, 2011). Wa has chosen to be a case study in this research for several reasons. Wa has managed to maintain peaceful coexistence throughout Ne Win' regime, followed by a military coup until 2010. This has proven that Wa has the capability in diplomatic, military, and economic strategy to keep its territory secure, to feed its population, and to generate revenue through licit and illicit means such as drug trafficking and investment in business projects in Myanmar.

In conclusion, Wa made peace with the Myanmar government in exchange for self-governance and conducting economic activities independent from state control (Meehan, 2011).

Dukalskis (2015), in his comparative analysis, that UWSA/P is considered as a young ethnic group based on the year of establishment. The author argues that UWSA took a bilateral agreement with the Myanmar military because UWSA was fighting for the war of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the author argues that Wa perceives CPB more as a threat than it does towards the state, which in turn motivates Wa to receive the call for a truce. Even though Dukalskis' research gives an underlying reason of why some armed group took the ceasefire deal and others did not, he failed to explain how Wa had achieved its autonomy.

One month after the establishment of the United Wa State Army, Wa accepted the offer by the Myanmar military to stop shooting at each other. Within two decades since UWSA formation, Wa has grown in various aspects. Wa has developed a bureaucratic structure to manage internal and external affairs. UWSA is composed of 30,000 military personnel and 30,000 reserves ("United Wa State Party," n.d.). Some observers, experts, and media have recently portrayed that Wa has the strongest ethnic military in the country. Wa was rewarded for joining the combat operation to drive out Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA), which occupied the area along the Thai-Myanmar border in the Southern Shan State. Territorially, Wa extended to the southern part of Shan State after combating Khun Sa's MTA. This is another

reason that Wa is a relevant case study for this research. Wa is a particular insurgent group that has achieved this success in terms of territory gain, while MTA was shrink and lost its foothold. Thousands of Wa has moved to this new territory next to Thailand (Kramer, 2007).

Jonsson, Brennan, and O'Hara (2016) claim that it is as if it was a compromised deal that the Myanmar government grants peace accords to ethnic armed groups like UWSA in exchange for illicit economy such as drug trafficking and self-governing territory but their analysis does not cover the important factors such as the capability of Wa and their economic partner elites in Myanmar military, in China and Thailand as well as their economic interdependences. Since there are few works of literature written Wa's autonomy achievement, this research aims to contribute to the existing literature.

Thailand's perception and reaction to those domestic changes taking place in Myanmar play an important role in understanding Wa's achievement of autonomy. Thailand has seen all the insurgent groups along Thai-Myanmar borders as "buffer zone" and enjoyed the benefit from border trades legally and illegally throughout Myanmar's internal political struggles. As liberal theories argue, business elites in Thailand see more opportunities in Myanmar based on recent political shifts and they joined their hands with Myanmar interest groups and finally, they were able to ratify the Economic Cooperation Strategy(ECS) in November 2003, which facilitated economic zones in Thai-Myanmar borders (Meehan, 2011).

Geographically, Wa is located on two major fronts, Chinese borders, and Thai borders. Both states are major markets and weapon supply for Wa and its illicit drug supply. The elites from those three dimensions as well as Myanmar elites and including high-rank military officers have built economic networks for mutual gains. They have become a driving force to their states to behave in such a way that facilitates economic interests. "Ethnic Chinese syndicates based abroad" are controlling drug trafficking in Myanmar. They have a good connection with overseas entrepreneurs and associates from ethnic militia like UWSA (Kramer, 2017). As a result, as the liberal argues, the interconnectedness of individuals, groups more than state-state relations bring about peaceful coexistence and prosperity. This economic interdependence combining with Wa's capability let Wa achieve legitimacy or autonomy in Myanmar. Wa ambition is still marching up to a higher autonomy than sub-state autonomous division (Pwint, 2017).

This research will not cover such ongoing dynamic; rather focus on the domestic political shift in Myanmar in the years the early 2000s and around the time Wa was granted as

self-administered division. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) states in Article 56 (f) that six townships in Shan State such as Hopang, Mongma, Panwai, Nahpan, Metman, and Pangsang (Pankham), which forms two districts, are designated to Wa Self-Administered Division. Under this constitution, self-administered division or special regions like that of Wa can enjoy the autonomy to administer their internal and external affairs related to their territories (Taylor, 2009).

United Wa State Army (UWSA), since its establishment in the 1990s, has pursued political agenda as recognition of Wa area as a state, being part of Myanmar, where it can get direct access to administrative communication with the central government without going through Shan State government as of now. “The powerful United Wa State Party (UWSP) maintains authority over the area through residual provisions of its 1989 ceasefire agreement” (Jolliffe, 2015, p. vi). According to Jolliffe, such achievement falls into a category called “claims include ceasefire territories” (Jolliffe, 2015, p. vii).

UWSA is subject of interest in this study because its political agenda is different from other powerful ethnic armed groups like Karen National Union (KNU) driven by the spirit of protecting their own identity. UWSA is also different from Karenni armed organization because Karenni is fighting with nationalist incentives and for independence. Shan and Kachin are demanding federalism and decentralization of power. Despite various political opposition stance, the Myanmar government granted UWSA and those who joined ceasefires prior 1990s certain level of autonomy in their respective areas without being disarmed (Jolliffe, 2015). After UWSA defeated Khun Sa's Mong Thai Army (MTA), Myanmar let UWSA occupy Khun Sa' territory in South-Eastern Shan State bordering with Thailand in 1996 (Smith, 1999). As a result of the implementation of opium bans in 1999 and 2000, Wa leaders relocated over a quarter of Wa villagers from the Northern UWSA or Shan Special Region 2 of Myanmar to the newly granted land as UWSP's Southern Command Area next to the Thai-Myanmar border in 2001 (Kramer, 2007, 2009).

The prominent scholars who have analyzed the topic by applying various set of theoretical framework and presented their findings such as Kevin Woods emphasis on the governance of the state in its pursuit of military territory expansion and economic interest in the framework of state-making through peace process. Mary Callahan provides a deep case study on the role of the military in the political landscape of independent Myanmar and its state-building process in her book, "Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma". The

book gives a comprehensive account of Myanmar how it has been shaped in state-making process under the monolithic institution, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's Army, Navy, and Air Forces) administered by the Ministry of Defense. Her book is based on the research on the history of Tatmadaw that she conducted during the height of political unrest in 1991 after receiving a research visa through a challenging application process. Her thesis provides an essential perspective of Myanmar-in-making through the ideology and strategy of military statesmen.

The interesting contribution of the Independent Study (IS) is to offer a multi-level explanation--the relationship between a state and a non-state actor by applying the state's governance expansion strategy, the use of economic incentive and military might as state making tools and Myanmar's search for security in its international relations. The IS is an attempt to explain the perspective of Wa towards the state in its relation as a non-state actor, the perspective of the state in its military state making policy and how Myanmar tries to manage its domestic interests while maintaining its international relation agenda. By studying the multilevel interconnectedness and interpreting the phenomena with the Marxist lens, the IS is to respond to the research question of why states grants regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces in their domestic territory, focusing MYANMAR, state actor and the ethnic minority WA, non-state actor.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Theoretical framework

Ghai (2000) defines autonomy that it is "a device to allow ethnic or other groups the right to claim a distinct identity to exercise direct control over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers which cover common interests" (p. 8). The definition of autonomy in the context with Wa also means the decentralization of power from the state government to Wa's territory. These concepts of autonomy will be applied in this research because UWSP/UWSA has become a legitimate actor with self-determination to manage and govern the internal and external affairs of the Wa territory. This study seeks to answer the question of why states grant regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces in their domestic territory (Ghai, 2000).

To understand the shift of status quo of Wa, it should be worthwhile to look into what enables the relations between a political organization of Wa ethnic groups as a non-state actor and the Myanmar regime as the state actor. They both possess military capabilities. Yet, both parties have been able to avoid confrontation since the establishment of the United Wa State Army in the 1980s. This clearly states that they both take a defensive stance. Coexistence and peaceful means to solve conflicts seem more preferable than the use of force. UWSA conducted celebration to make three decades of cessation of hostilities in Pangsang, Shan state, on the 17th of April 2019 (Xuxin, 2019).

3.1.1 The Marxist approach; internal and external affairs

Karl Marx introduced the fundamental argument that the global capitalist system was one of inherent inequality wherein the powerful bourgeoisie exploits the working proletariat to further their power and influence. The fundamental core of the Marxist approach then includes various proponents. First of all, all Marxist theorists agree that Marxism can only be understood in totality; the approach can only be fully understood by combining perspectives from all areas, such as history, economics, politics, philosophy, sociology, etc. It is also important to recognize that economic development has been the driving force behind the conception of history. Therefore, all issues of politics and social institutions are reinforcement to the development of power and control in the field of economics (Marx, 1970). Additionally,

all Marxist theorists accept the fundamental role of class in their analysis (Marx, Engels, & Taylor, 1967).

Marx introduced the ideology that capitalism was entering a stage of global monopoly. In this system, the preeminent world powers, identified as the core, would exploit the rest of the world to establish hegemony. However, because this analysis is taken to the international scale, it acknowledged that the bourgeoisie of the core would exploit the peripheral states to benefit themselves as well as their own proletariat. This created an imbalance of interests between proletariats across the world; proletariats of the core no longer identified with proletariats of the periphery. This separation allows for the pacification of the core-periphery and prevents the possibility of unification of the proletariat for the subversion of the inherently unequal system (Arthur, 1992).

Additionally, Marxist theorists argued that eventually, the cost of manufactured goods would outpace the cost of raw materials, allowing industrialized core states to further profit off of the unindustrialized periphery (Prebisch, 1950).

Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory later expand this understanding of Marxist international relations but including a semi-periphery. States that existed in the semi-periphery would also be exploited by the core, but would, in turn, assist the core in the exploitation of the periphery. Their existence would also allow for the export of core labor, ensuring that the core would not have to deal with increasing pressure for better wage labor. Therefore, the semi-periphery further helps to solidify and stabilize the hegemony of the core over the remainder of the world (Wallerstein, 1979).

Antonio Gramsci wanted to improve Marxist ideology and eventually introduced what would later be known as Gramscianism. This new ideology recognized that the exploitation of others required not just coercion, but also consent. Marxism argued that coercion or the fear of coercion prevented the masses from engaging in revolution. However, Gramscianism argued that consent was also necessary. The hegemony that is established by the elite bourgeoisie of the core enables the socialization of the masses through their own sets of ideologies; the proletariat accepts this ideology as their own and inadvertently grants consent to the bourgeoisie to exploit them. Gramsci, therefore, argues that it is important to consider the political aspect of exploitation and its relation to the economic aspect of exploitation, not just the economic aspect (Hoare & Nowell-Smith, 2005).

Robert W. Cox (1981) adds to the Marxist ideology as well by taking into consideration the world order. He argues that ideologies and approaches are shaped by the values, socialization, and time of their creation. Therefore, realism and neorealism were developed to serve the purposes of those in power during that period – the developed states and their elite bourgeoisie. Cox thus utilizes critical theory, which seeks out and analyzes current structures of power and attempts to find pathways that will lead to the emancipation from said systems. Cox takes Gramsci's ideology regarding hegemony and utilizes it in the international realm; he identifies that hegemony is as important in the international realm as it is in the domestic realm. Therefore, the socialization of the international system into believing that capitalism benefits all will lead to near-universal consent for its use to exploit peripheral states. Therefore, the instability created by the global capitalistic system is destined to cause its collapse. However, there is no guarantee that the systems that seek to replace it will succeed (Cox,1983).

Modern critical theorists take the Marxist approach further by focusing on its application to international security, ethics, and society. They argued that with the advent of the commodification of social life, the proletariat begins to pose less and less of a threat. Their deep socialization into the system has prevented them from being able to imagine an emancipated system, let alone a pathway to achieving it. Critical theorists argue that the pathway to achieving emancipation, then, relies upon radically expanding accessibility to democracy; this requires the identification of all obstacles that prevent the full participation of the proletariat in their systems of governance and overcoming them to maximize participation. Furthermore, the radical involvement of the proletariat in their governance should be paired with the elimination of borders for the application of their ethics and morals. The proletariat of one state should be able to unhesitatingly apply their ethics and morals to those not of their state as well. This will slowly degrade the significance of state sovereignty and state borders, ultimately unifying the global proletariat community (Hobden & Jones, 2017).

New Marxists return to the original arguments of Marx himself, believing that a number of his concepts were either misunderstood or ignored altogether. They look at issues such as development; Marx originally argued for a linear development toward a socialist world. Capitalism would dominate the global market, the proletariat of developed worlds will rise and seize the means of production, and the establishment of a fundamentally more equal socialist society will take hold. However, this is not the case. Capitalism in developed countries

continues to become further entrenched in the ideologies of its masses. As capitalism spreads globally, its application remains unequal. States that enter the process of capitalization, later on, face several advantages and disadvantages. For example, they have access to technology that was not available to previous capitalistic states. Due to this access, they can capitalize faster, which results in an uneven and unstable capitalistic economy. The enforcement of the Eurocentric development of capitalism in non-European states helps to further disadvantage these states as it creates confusion and chaos in the domestic realm (Callinicos & Rosenberg, 2008).

Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theoretical approach will be applied in this case study of the self-administered division of Wa to explain Myanmar has decided to grant autonomy to Wa. The world-systems approach emphasizes the example of the core, semi-periphery, and periphery identified the economic exploitation of the less powerful in both the domestic and international realm. However, it also closely mirrors the political and economic exploitation of various international capitalist states in Myanmar. For example, the core can be identified to be the states in the Western sphere which are constraining Myanmar with the demands for reforms to gain more economic access to its resource-rich ethnic lands. The semi-periphery is inhabited by Asian states such as China, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, and Indian. While Western sanction has blocked Myanmar direct access to the core capitalist states, Myanmar inhabited in the periphery turns its supply to the semi-periphery with raw material and human labor. The exploitation of Myanmar's resources by the semi-periphery allows for their social, political, and economic success.

3.2 Hypothesis

The hypothesis for the research question is that Myanmar as a state has granted regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces to control all domestic production to become a domestic hegemon as well as to reduce the impact of global exploitations. Wa is the case study that presents the way Myanmar state coopts the capitals in the border areas. Besides, this Independent Study will offer a multi-level explanation of the relationship between a state and a non-state actor.

3.3 Methodology and research method

This research has applied the qualitative analysis to go in-depth studying of why Myanmar state has granted regional autonomy to Wa. In line with academic literature, this research use the documentary research method, relying on available and relevant sources of Burmese as well as international scholars. However, time, cost, and accessibility to information are limitations to primary sources, the secondary research has been performed by reviewing available work. Literature found through the University of Thammasat online library database resources such as JSTOR and ProQuest are one of the sources that have been explored. Besides, academic journal articles, online news media, and government publications are taken as another source. The documentary research method has served to understand the broad perspectives relevant to the state and non-state actor relation in the process of war makes states and peace process make states including the information, policies, books, and research papers. The method best suits the researcher due to several factors or limitations. One is the inaccessibility to the primary information. It is not possible to have direct access to top elites such as the leaders of Myanmar and the Wa government. It is difficult to research primary sources. Most documents are classified. Wa area is highly restricted to a stranger because of their illegal activities, gambling, and illicit drug trafficking. They exercise tight security to outlanders, especially to journalists and researchers. No one guarantees the safety of the researcher. The other factor is the cost. Traveling from Bangkok to the Wa and its surrounding area to collect field data can cost a lot more than the researcher afford without grant or scholarship. Considering these restrictions, the data collection method is chosen as mention above.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

4.1 State making in the borderlands

Kevin Woods (2011) conceptualizes “ceasefire capitalism” to highlight how military-led state government and ethnic contested zones cut deals to maximize the accumulation of wealth via resource extraction in the name of counterinsurgency development projects (p. 751). The author applies two case studies, hardwood production and exporting and Chinese funded rubber plantation project as part of drug eradication strategies to examine how this accumulation of capital via agreements to hold hostilities but build economic ties and power-sharing. He argues although it started with the state government granting a concession for timber production and rubber plantation to establish a governance system to control the resources, territory, and people in Kachin and Northern Shan State border areas, this process allows the state to create a patron-client relation with local authorities, stakeholders, military commanders, and Chinese entrepreneurs to monopolize the natural resource-rich ethnic territories and eventually all the permission and grants are centralized to Nay Pyi Taw, the administrative capital of Myanmar. Wood argues that ceasefire agreements in the 1990s not only opened up additional doors to conduct new business activities but Myanmar state's control over the ethnic borderlands increased. According to the author, ceasefire capitalism facilitated military territorialization, securitization, governing land and people, and monopolizing the transnational natural resource trade in the contested ethnic zones. His paper illustrates how Myanmar state institutions are trying to penetrate the ethnic borderlands by extending state authority to frontier through ceasefire deals to take control of all domestic production to become domestic hegemon to attain the end goal of reducing the impact of global exploitations (Woods, 2011). Wa region is one of the earlier ethnic armed group which held ceasefire after the demise of CPB and the region was constituted as a self-administered division in The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008). Therefore, the paper look into Wa as a case study to answer the research question of why states grant regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces in their domestic territory.

State making through a peace process in the ethnic resided periphery has always been obstructed by the armed resistance throughout Myanmar modern history. Stefano Ruzza,

(2015) the author of *There are two sides to every COIN: of economic and military means in Myanmar's comprehensive approach to illiberal peacebuilding*, presents his findings from a comparative study of three prominent ethnic armed resisting organisations located in three different states, Shan, Kachin, and Karen. The studies divide 1989 to 2015 as the three timelines from 1989 to examine Myanmar's strategy on balancing military and economic interests. 2010 sees the dramatic political changes in Myanmar with a general election, setting decades-long house-prisoner, the oppositions party leader, Aung San Su Kyi, new government formation by the elected Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), an old wine (State Peace and Development Council) put in the new bottle (USDP). Nevertheless, the year marks the transformation or untying of restriction as "democratic openings" (carrots) back on the political landscape. However, the decade-old civil war continues in the ethnic states is always an essential part of Myanmar policy formulation how to govern the historically un-administered periphery regions to consolidate it to the domestic production to reduce the impact of the international economic sanctions and to balance the relations with Asian powers while managing the social forces of democratic reform in the mainland (Ruzza, 2015). States experience a high level of instability during the process of democratic transition from authoritarianism, where power struggles, the nationalist movements, and insurgency rise at the various levels (Mansfield & Snyder 1995).

Myanmar, a state of prominent insurgency at the border regions has to reset its management mechanism to bring about reconciliation with such ethnic minorities which bears political implication domestically as well as internationally, especially how much the state will move forward with the reforms and how the international community will react to Myanmar in their relations. Ruzza highlights the underlying agenda of the military state making in the borderland armed non-state actors that "the use of force yet weighing it carefully to keep the country together, retain their grasp on power and not jeopardize their international agenda: their chances of success depending on how well they manage to tread this fine line" (Ruzza, 2015, p. 77, 78). It is critical to the military regime to balance when and how much they should apply military confrontation to achieve their state-making projects in the ethnic lands while they try to deal with the international pressures. The author's analysis emphasises on how state "counter, contain, re-absorb" armed resistance forces from the perspective of the government, which is slightly different but complements the Kaven Woods' analysis on the governance through granting political and economic concession the ceasefire zones of the northern

periphery. However, Ruzza draws the concept of Kevin Woods and Jake Sherman to examine the relations between state and non-state actor which he means “two sides of every coin, economic and military means in Myanmar’s comprehensive approach to illiberal peacebuilding. His approach adds a piece to the puzzle of Callahan, (civil) war makes states, as the peace process makes states through the mechanism of ceasefire capitalism. Although waging war is commonly assumed as a means to make a profit and grow power by conquering the inferior, Ruzza cites Sharman’s work and argues that economic interests can lead to reducing aggression. This mechanism of granting economic incentives has been applied in exchange for a ceasefire agreement with the non-state armed organisation during the SLORC ruling era while delaying the response to political grievances for the failure of granting the Pinglong’ rights to the ethnic nationalities. As a result of going to the pursuit of economic interest, the potential of conflict has significantly been reduced for a certain length of time (Ruzza, 2015).

Kevin Woods’ study and the concept of ceasefire-capitalism reinforce and reveal the end goals of state making through “military-private partnerships” in the resource-rich ceasefire zones in Myanmar border territories¹, next to the Chinese side of Yunnan province. Ceasefire-capitalism is conceptualized as an “interacted interplay between the military force, resource-rich peasant land, and (trans)national finance capital” that accommodates the reconstruction of a “political-economic and biophysical frontier landscape increasingly conducive to the military-state control” (Woods, 2011, p. 751).

Although in the late 19 century, the ceasefire deals are accepted by the armed ethnic resisting groups, their founding political motives are slightly different. On one hand, troops like Karen National Union (KNU) strongly demanding their national and political right to self-governing territory and federal power-sharing according to Pinlong agreement and on the other hand, the other troops, such as United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), show their motive to maintain the status quo as “un-administered by the central government” as they were in the colonial time, yet to manage their own affairs and receive support from the central government to further development of their areas and finally to be recognised as a separate state which will add up to one of the states in

¹ Myanmar territories bordering Yunnan province, China are Southeastern Kachin State (around Myitkyina and Bhamo), Northern Shan State (around Lashio and Kutkai), and Northeastern Shan State (Wa and Kokang areas)

Myanmar map (Kramer, 2007). Under the four cuts counterinsurgency measure and military confrontation for decades, some of the ethnic armed groups breaks up into sub-groups. Such disintegrated troops like Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and Kachin Independent Organization (KIO) joins hands with the Myanmar military as a ceasefire organisation to sustain their existence. The common texture in the ceasefire deals, written or verbal, is to enable the EAOs to conduct their self-financing activities licit or illicit without state interference yet maintain their arms. These scenarios serves the military borderland state-making projects in two dimensions. One is the chances of state and non-state actors alliance-building through ceasefire increases and the other is state's governing mechanism, economic production such logging, mining, drug substitution project, border trade, and establishment of military bases in the ceasefire zone are expended. These two dimensions indirectly bring containment and pressure effects on non-alliance troops (Oo & Min, 2007). As such, the strategy of ceasefire deals as an initial stepping stone that serves the way to the state-making project in the ethnic frontier.

The central question to this ceasefire deals in the ethnic populated periphery of Myanmar: why state grants self-administration autonomy to the ethnopolitical non-state actors in the case of Wa, Myanmar special region 2? Myanmar as a state has granted regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces to control all domestic production to become domestic hegemon as well as to reduce the impact of global exploitations. Wa is the case study that presents the way Myanmar state coopts the capitals in the border areas. Besides, this IS will offer a multi-level explanation of the relationship between a state and a non-state actor.

To explore this phenomenon, the following section will look into two other critical areas (1) what are the internal push for state-making (2) What are the international push for core-periphery relations to understand how they correlate with Myanmar granting self-governing deal to UWSA/P.

Myanmar is one of the states being targeted by international sanctions. It is necessary to understand the temporary pollical economy by examining the internal struggle in Myanmar and the external interests imposed in it by the neighboring rising economics such as China, India, Thailand, and the great powers such as the United States of America, Russia, European Union.

4.1.1 Internal push

January 1947 marked that Myanmar, (the country's name had been known as Burma before SLORC renamed it in 1987) signed Aung San-Calment Atlee Agreement on independence from the British empire. One year after Myanmar was established as a modern state under the 1947 constitution and entered into the international state system. Since the post-colonial period, Myanmar domestic politics has been shaped by two critical internal push, "national reconciliation and economic development" as detailed by two prominent Myanmar scholars, Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Maung Zani in the former and one Swedish scholar in the latter in part I of the book, Myanmar/Burma: Inside challenges, outside interests edited by Lex Rieffel (2010, p. 88).

Kyaw Yin Hlaing analyses three main actors in the nationwide peace process in Myanmar, the military which possesses the administrative power, the opposition political party, the National League For Democracy (NLD), and the representatives of the ethnic nationalities who are fighting for their share of the power. The author points out that these players are chasing their claims, which drive them into complex and prolong negotiations for national reconciliation. He also argues that "the military regime will have to give priority to solving the problems that create opposition rather than trying to extend and strengthen its grip on the country" (Rieffel, 2010, p. 4). In the later section, the research finding will present how the military regime has formulated its strategy and approach in order to seek profit by establishing ceasefire capitalism in the case of Wa special regional 2. The military constantly focuses its policy implementation and approach on growing its hegemony not only in the central areas but also in the remote hilly ethnic populated areas to bring legitimacy of the Union's territory and to monopolize the economy, which turns out the contrary of the Kyaw Yin Hlaing's recommendation. As it has been hypothesised that Myanmar grants self-administrative autonomy to the ethnopolitical forces to build its ceasefire capitalism in the stake making process in its periphery regions to control the domestic production, Maung Zarni's analysis on the national reconciliation of Myanmar reinforces the hypothesis of this independent study. His argument goes that the military regimes prioritize "the consolidation of its hegemony over the country" over compromising the difference to reconcile the grievances and political rights of the ethnic minorities (Rieffel, 2010, p. 4). As a result, the regime was criticized by the international community for prolonging the conflict in other words its war-makes-state policy.

Other observers highlights additional consideration factors that influence Myanmar's nationwide peace dialogues such as the 1990 election winner, National League for Democracy (NLD), and its continuous political movement, ethnic armed groups, and their self-interest orientated political agenda, the vested interest of China and Thailand. The author makes a significant point by bringing globalisation as another factor. In his view, the ruling elites "SPDC is a proxy for the foreign corporations that are exploiting Myanmar's natural resources" (Rieffel, 2010, p. 4).

Nevertheless, Myanmar policy prescription and implementation are around the line of de facto reconciliation in the form of ceasefire capitalism and control over domestic production nationwide including the ethnic frontier in the name of "economic development" (Rieffel, 2010, p. 8). To this end, the author argues that SLORC applies constitutional arrangements to "consolidate its rule over the country" and ceasefire negotiation with the ethnic armed organisations (Rieffel, 2010, p. 8). The latter seems to work better. Both Kyaw Yin Hlaing and Maung Zarni emphasize that state and non-state actors' relations more corporative at present days than they were in the post-independent era.

Besides, Maung Zani supports the notion that the international push, as he coins as "regressive globalisation or the negative form of globalization implies" the Myanmar domestic push for change by sustaining and prolonging the illicit economic activities of the oppressive military regime which seeks private benefits on the country's major export commodities and the construction of the road to reconciliation by the UN Security Council's resolution attempt has been turned down by the two veto powers, China and Russia, as providing a diplomatic shield to the military regime (Rieffel, 2010, p. 71). Moreover, the giant international corporations cut deal with the reign to have their share of license and permission to mineral exploration and production. He argues that the military regime, in the end, is to serve as a local proxy in the process at the expense of the "country's economic sovereignty" (Rieffel, 2010, p. 72).

4.1.2 The international push for core-periphery relations: Myanmar survival amid capitalist economic sanction and diplomatic pressure

While Western sanction has blocked Myanmar direct access to the core capitalist states, Myanmar inhabited in the periphery turns its supply to the semi-periphery with raw material and human labor by cooperating with the Asian states, the semi-periphery of the world

system, in the following sectors such as trade, exchange of knowledge, investments of China in development projects, and education.

The international community has laid persuasion and requirement on Myanmar to transform its military dictatorship into a democratic election, power transfer to civilian-led governance. Helen James writes, in her article, Myanmar's international relations strategy: the search for security, how Myanmar has shifted rapprochement with its Asian peers to improve its domestic political condition. It has been a central agenda in politics and economic for Myanmar to safeguard the Union from the disintegration of the midst of political unrest and armed separatism since regaining independence in 1948. By the time it is giving up Myanmar's interpretation of socialist ideology of self-dislocation and reintegrating into the world trade and opening the state external relations in the last 18th century, Myanmar is punished by the international economic sanctions due to the military regime's violations of human rights and an act of brutal oppression on the citizens. In search of security in Asia-Pacific, Myanmar holds a liberal and constructive stance to “economic development, political stability and social well-being” more than military might. However, Myanmar and its Southeast Asia peer maintain a "realist balance-of-power paradigm” towards powerful states so that the emergence of regional hegemon will be contained (James, 2004, p. 531). Six years after achieving a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Myanmar leaders introduce their seven-step reformative plan towards Myanmar version of democracy in the 9th ASEAN Summit at Bali. It appears Myanmar is trying to build its resilience capacity in economic and political dimensions. The announcement is made in coincidence with another round of sanctions imposed by the US for attacking NLD leader, Aung San Su Kyi, and her campaign in Depeyain, May 2003.

The concern among Asian peer grows due to consistent instability in Myanmar which can affect the ASEAN member states. However, Helen James impressively crafts the dilemma of dictator regime like Myanmar drawing example of such regime in Indonesia, Thailand Philippines history that it is “how to achieve regime legitimacy and state security through economic development which fosters the growth of pluralistic alternate centres of power which may eventually challenge the authoritarian centre for control of the political life of the country” (James, 2004, p. 532).

In response to minimise the risk of dilemma, Myanmar comes up with two strategic fronts. First, it is to seek diplomatic protection and backing from its border-trade partner states

and second to "build a longer-term strategy for state security through economic development". US military intervention in Iraq gives a signal to Myanmar what might be coming after economic sanctions. By means of two strategic fronts Myanmar is building political and economic ties with the Asian states. By the time US' the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act is implemented to ban importing products from Myanmar, exporting financial services to Myanmar, freezing assets of a certain financial institution and extending visa restriction on officials, in June, one month after Bali Summit, Myanmar has already been trading with the Asian partners and its policy continue to pursue to enhance its security through economic and political cooperation with the Asian peers. However, the trade surplus has never been in Myanmar's favour. Myanmar's import volume is always higher than its export.

When Western economic sanctions have prevented Myanmar to get access to the core economy of the world system, China increases its trade, funding, and investments in various sectors such as hydropower and mining and many others. As such, Myanmar reduces the impact of sanction for over 15 years. The sanction of the US president Bush administration put the textile factory workers unemployed and the US-based credit momentary transitions services are frozen. China fills the vacuum of international protection and funding needs of Myanmar. China, as a major supplier, also seeks benefits from firearm procurements out of the ethnic-based war economy in Myanmar. With Chinese funding, defense, and commerce strategically important infrastructure development projects emerge in Tilawa seaport and the six-lane expressway the commercial capital, Yangon, to the landlocked southern Yunnan province of China. However, Myanmar has allowed neither foreign military to have neither bases in its territory nor operation to attack other states. Thus, Myanmar preserves its sovereignty and has built reliance against Western sanctions since 1988 with Chinese diplomatic and investment support. China, somehow, is competing for its sphere of influence in the regions against the US "containment". It sees a greater strategic advantage in trading with Southeast Asian states, especially Myanmar to supply the energy needs of the growing industries in the Yunnan province and to open up maritime access through Tilawa deep-seaport. With this end goal, China conducts people-to-people relations via visits of state leaders and influential officials.

To counter the growing influence of China over Myanmar's economic and political life, Myanmar embraces and open up cooperation with another rising economic power, India. Through bilateral agreement, the relation draws closer in visa exemption for officials,

scholarship, other critical areas to counterbalancing against China such as diplomatic ties, border trade, drug control, information technology development, projects in hydropower and mineral exploration sectors. Unlike bilateral trade with China, the trade surplus with India is in Myanmar's favour. Moreover, Myanmar enjoys the counterweight through bilateral relation with India, the country regional economic cooperation and trade for being part of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) where ASEAN and India sign India Regional Trade and Investment Agreement (RTIA) after Bali Summit.

Among Southeast Asian states, it is worthwhile mentioning the significance of Thai-Myanmar relations. Despite having a close tie with the US, Thailand continues pursuing its engagement and 30 percent of export trade volume increases in late 2003 (James, 2004, p. 540). The two states have a common concern in terrorism aftermath of “September 11” (James, 2004, p. 538). They conduct counter-terrorism measures along the shared-border.

Although Myanmar has internationally been imaged as a Western sanction targeted state due to its abuse of human rights, undemocratic governance and failure of effective reconciliation, illicit drug trafficking, Myanmar seeks various interests and opportunities of the semi-periphery states of the world system such as China, India, and ASEAN. The "neo-colonial interest" or the need for cheap labours and raw materials of semi-periphery industrial growth welcome Myanmar in the position where the bottom role layer of the world system, periphery, should serve. Nevertheless, the Western sanctions are criticised as “counterproductive” (James, 2004, p. 548). However, Myanmar is surviving with its two-front approach economic and political strategy to reach the end of the goal of the regime legitimacy and state security. Shifting its strategy in the interest of balancing and counterbalancing to maintain economic development and national security as domestic and foreign policy agenda, Myanmar still has a fundamental issue to address, which is “human security” (James, 2004, p. 531). To achieve Myanmar's long-term prosperity and joining to the middle layer of the world system, Myanmar needs to comply with international standards of human rights, resolve ethnic unrest and political conflicts by continuing evolving in the democratic reforms (James, 2004).

Following Marx and Wallenstein from capitalist theory, the pre-eminent world powers, identified as the core, would exploit the rest of the world to establish hegemony. The bourgeoisie of the core would exploit the peripheral states to benefit themselves as well as their own proletariat such as offering cheap products made in the periphery is also a benefit for core proletariat. This created an imbalance of interests between proletariats across the world;

proletariats of the core no longer identified with proletariats of the periphery. (being able to buy cheap whatever you want, makes you feel rich, the original products were made by poor) The cost of manufactured goods would outpace the cost of raw materials, allowing industrialized core states to further profit off of the unindustrialized periphery. In the capitalist literature, the Core is the Western world, here primarily represented in the first place by United States of America. The periphery in this research indicated is Myanmar, including Wa. And the semi periphery is Asia, specially China.

The external forces of capitalism identified the economic exploitation of the less powerful in both the domestic and international realm. Myanmar as in the bottom spectrum of the capitalism, the developing world, faces the external and internal pushes of exploitation which is an unequal exchange. All the valuable raw material, labour and natural resources flow to the capitalist states with cheaper price, high-end finished products are imported with higher price. In the cycle of unequal trade, the developing country like Myanmar takes time to develop domestic productivity. However, it also closely mirrors the political and economic exploitation of various international capitalist states in Myanmar. The core can be identified to be the states in the Western sphere which are constraining Myanmar with the demands for reforms to gain more economic access to its resource-rich ethnic lands.

The findings from the previous studies illustrate how Myanmar state institutions are trying to penetrate the ethnic borderlands by extending state authority to frontier through ceasefire deals to take control of all domestic production to become domestic hegemon to attain the end goal of reducing the impact of global exploitations. The decade-old civil war continues in the ethnic states. It is always an essential part of Myanmar policy formulation how to govern the historically un-administered periphery regions to consolidate it to the domestic production to reduce the impact the international economic sanctions and to balance the relations with Asian powers while managing the social forces of democratic reform in the mainland. Therefore, Myanmar is constructing state-governance through granting political and economic concession the ceasefire zones of the northern periphery

It has been hypothesised to tackle the research question is that Myanmar as a state has granted regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces to control all domestic production to become a domestic hegemon as well as to reduce the impact of global exploitations. Wa is the case study that presents the way Myanmar state co-opts the capitals in

the border areas. Besides, this Independent Study will offer a multi-level explanation of the relationship between a state and a non-state actor.

4.2 Significant changes after truce

4.2.1 Political stance and ambition of Wa in 20th century

Wa reassured their political stance and satisfaction with the current hybrid autonomy as self-administered division. Wa presented their determination to seek the recognition of Wa as a separate state with similar status as other existing states in Myanmar compositions such as Shan, Mon, Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Kaya, Karen. At the 30th anniversary ceremony of the establishment of United Wa State Army (UWSA), the head of Wa leadership, Bao Youxiang mentioned in his speech on 17 April 2019 that Wa belongs to the territory of Myanmar and Wa is not fighting for the separation but for a greater autonomy as the level of an “ethnic state”.

In the framework of ceasefire capitalism and military-state making process, Myanmar has developed strategies to extend state’s reach to the administered regions such as Wa in the northern Shan state, next to the Yunnan provinces of Southern China. Preserving territorial integrity as a nation-state, Myanmar has established state and non-state actor relations with the arrangement of non-military confrontation with its ethnic armed organization such United Wa State Army in 1989.

Hopang agreement in the Wa region between state’s representatives and their counterpart from Wa conducted thirty years ago straightened the existence of Wa in Myanmar sovereignty and prevented the disintegration of the Union, which the prominent figure of the Wa communities restated that Wa is part of Myanmar (The Irrawaddy, 2019).

4.2.2 Closer but intense ties between state and Wa aftermath of regional autonomy truce

Granting regional autonomy facilitates the regional development in the ethnic governed territories of Myanmar, which are located in the peripheries of the Union. Self-management and financing to their own regions and holding military hostilities serves both parties, state and non-state actors with mutual benefits.

For Wa, they can remain armed as defensive mechanism and advance their self-financing activities via licit and illicit means enjoying the full capacity of self-administered region. For the state, achieving a truce with UWSA/P, one of the strongest ethnopolitical forces

in Shan State, Myanmar military could mobilise the resources to other opposing ethnic armed groups, especially in border peripheries with Thailand.

Formal communication and negotiation mechanism have been increasingly established between state and non-actor, UWSA/P after granting self-administration autonomy as illustrated in the table 1.2 in Appendix A. The Peace Monitor Website's records show that there are 19 times of such interactions in the forms of meetings, high officials visits to Wa regions, negotiations and Wa leaders' visit to the administrative capital city Nay Pyi Daw. Myanmar is cutting deal with ethnic armed groups in order for the state governance can penetrate its peripheries and expand the presence of defence bases and to increase state monopoly over the production in the military state making process in the borderlands. As the phenomenon under the study is the nature of process, the research findings demonstrate the correlation and after effects of granting autonomy to the Wa region.

After renewing the peace accord at the state level in 2011, the relations between state officials and their counterparts in Wa regions has become closer and corporation efforts are put in place in the area of regional development, tackling the drug trafficking and border stabilities. 3 exchanges of formal visits and discussion in 2011 in locations in the Shan states, 5 more in the following year, 2012 are conducted at the similar locations. After having 4 more times in 2013, the engagement of state and non-state actor relation has reached to the level of the Commander in chief and the president of the Union in 2014 at the administrative capital of Myanmar, Nay Pyi Taw as details in the table 1.3 of Appendix A.

UWSA/UWSP established at the demise of CPB in 1989 and entered truce with the Myanmar military regime has official name as the Wa Self-Administered Division in Myanmar constitution 2008 . The division is composed of six townships with eight arm posts, three posts in the china border front and five posts in the Thai border front serving as buffer zones in the international borders of Myanmar. UWSA also has seven liaison offices in the cities such as Lashio, Tang Yang, Keng Tung, Tachileik, Taung Gyi, Mandalay and Yangon (United Wa State Party, n.d.)

The agenda and discussions between state and Wa is based the fundamental themes such as "collaborations for region development, anti-narcotic campaigns and border stability", which was mentioned by former military general, ceasefire negotiator Khin Nyunt in his interview with Irrawaddy (The Irrawaddy, 2019).

4.2.3 Significant progress in opium eradication

Tom Kramer (2017) accounts shows how Myanmar-led by military uses Wa troops as a proxy to tackle Mong Tai Army (MTA) of the drug-lord, Khun Sa. Joint military operation of state and non-state actor has led to the victory over MTA's control area in Thai-Myanmar border, Southern Shan State. and to the surrender of Khun Sa in 1996.

UWSA has established its Southern Command bridge 171 in the place of MTA and Military-private partnership economic activities, border trade taxation and rent seeking flourish as a result (Kramer, 2017).

Regional autonomy deal with UWSA can not only reduce the conformational relations but promote corporation for mutual benefits in the area of territorial expansion, channeling the inflow of Wa's financial resources regions to mega domestic investments in infrastructure development, banking, transportation and hotel business.

In the following decade, in 1998, after withholding confrontation militarily, the influential and wealthy Wa leaders expend their investments in Myanmar economy with the money earned from illicit drug trafficking by founding Hong Pang Group enterprise (name changed to Thawda Win Co. Ltd in 2012). The Group serves UWSA/P to circulate drug-money through private and joint business corporations by operating in the sectors of infrastructure projects, mining, oil and gemstones production. Although some of the Wa leaders are targeted by the US Treasury Department as drug traffickers, it has been reported that their revenue has contributed to the development projects in Myanmar. Taung Gyi-Meiktila-Tachilek Highway can be observed as one of the mega projects that UWSA/P is involved. Wa seeks the opportunity to fill the gap in needs of domestic revenue in May Flower 1994, one of the biggest bank (licensed withdrawn in 2005) and Yangon Airways. Myanmar has provided protection to the Wa drug lords from the US wanted list for drug trafficking and money laundering charges (Aung Zaw, 2020; Sirven & Nénot, 2015).


Myanmar has granted regional autonomy to UWSA in exchange for having more control over domestic production and increase the hegemonic power of the state and deter the impact of global exploitations. Traditionally, Wa region's economy is based on cultivating poppy and trading illicit drugs. Such economy of drug trade has become a means of financing KMT, CBP and its successor, UWSA/P. Drug eradication is not only the regional problem for Wa but also a national concern for the state.

In 2001, Myanmar is reported as the producer of the highest opium in ton, which worth US\$244 million, valued at farm-gate price (United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 2002a). From 1996 to 2002, the production decreased half of 1760 tons as a result of drug eradication actions at the local and national level as well as the poor weather conditions. One contribution factor which has a positive effect on the drug control effort is related to the conquest of the state and UWSA joint-operation of Khun Sa and MTA in 1996. After granting regional autonomy, the states can facilitate UNDCP led crop substitution programme in the Special Region 4 and Special Region 2 of Shan state. US\$15.5 millions of foreign financial aid flows into Myanmar, especially to the Wa Alternative Development Programme in 1998 (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2002b)

Shan state has been a major contribution of opium production in Myanmar. Wa control areas are located in the North and South of the Shan state. UNODC survey findings in 2019 comparing to the data of 2018 conclude that the North, East and South of Shan State production declines by 7%, 8% and 17% respectively. although the production of opium hectares has decreased from 160,000 to 40,000, UNODC estimates that the income from illegal opium production represents 0.6 to 1.4 billion of US dollars in the country's economy in 2019. Figure 4.1 illustrate hectares of opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar from the year 1996 to 2019 (Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, 2019).

Figure 4.1

Comparison of opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar



Note: The data reprinted from “Myanmar Opium Survey 2019,” by Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control, 2019, UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, p. iii.

The reduction of opium cultivation, accommodating foreign aid to the Wa regions and contribution factor of drug income to the country's economy indicate the significant change emerged from the regional autonomy deal and state's grip on the production of Wa border lands in the framework of cease-fire capitalism in the military state making process.

4.2.4 Rubber as cash crop in Wa regions

Since 2000 onwards, rubber plantations have become one of the growing agribusiness in Kachin and Shan state. Such tracts of rubber have emerged in the northern and southern Shan state to supply the high demands in China. Both governments from Beijing and Nay Pyi Taw see the potential of rubber as a replacement for poppy cultivation. Wa regions have adapted drug free policy and planting rubber trees serves as a replaced cash crop. In 1993 UWSA implements the policy to promote growing rubber to finance their own troops as well as to support their central command. Their leader Pao Yon Chang set an example by planting 100,000 rubber trees at the absence of violence after Hopang agreement with Tamadaw. In 2008 UWSA Southern Command initiated rubber plantations on the lands of local indigenous people such as Lahu in Peinsa in Monghsat Township. Similar policy implementation is found in the Special region 4² but the lesson learned for the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) is that a good yield of rubber depends on the quality of seedlings (Pwint, 2019). Learning from the experience of the next-door neighbour, businessmen in UWSA region try to purchase quality rubber plants. This rubber business in Wa and NDAA regions provide a good example of military-private partnership at the border region because the rubber plantation projects are prospering as the joint-venture of Chinese funded business, military commands and local ethnic leaders in 2006. "Burma Army military officers and territory authorities with money are also scrambling to invest in rubber" (Lahu National Development Organization [LNDO], 2009, p. 8).

Not only rubber has entered into Wa and NDAA regions as a cash crop, but mining is also picking up to yield more production. "High-security mines" in Wa region invested by "Chinese, Thai, and Lao investors" and projects site are heavily guarded by UWSA because of lead, gold, silver and platinum deposit. "a percentage of their profits both to the UWSA and to

² NDAA emerged at the demise of Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the late 1980s and armed conflicts had persisted between NDAA and state's defence forces until both parties called for truce. NDAA was regarded as one of the early ethnic opposition troops, which entered the truce. The areas of the Shan state where the NDAA forces operated are territorialized as "Shan State Special Region 4", which is composed of Mong La, Nanban and Sele districts.

SPDC authorities”. Here again, it is seen that a tripartite profit-seeking, rent-seeking and mineral extraction activities have developed as a result of absence of violence after ceasefire-autonomy arrangements in 1989 (LNDO, 2009, p. 19).

4.2.5 Mining sector development

Tin deposit discovered in Wa region in 2013 hit the headline in the Financial Times. It has been reported that the discovery of such a valuable natural resource becomes possible as a result of the country's transition from military rule to civilian and its openness to external business at the absence of the potential armed conflicts. This Wa Tin mine serves as one of the major Tin supply to Chinese manufacturers and it is equivalent to the 1/10 of the world Tin production (Pwint, 2019). The Figure 4.2 is a good demonstration how the periphery Myanmar, especially from the US-backlisted Wa region, satisfies the Tin metal demand of the core state (USA) via the semi-periphery (China)

Figure 4.2

How US-backlisted Wa businessmen satisfies the tin metal demand of the core state (USA) via the semi-periphery (China)



Note: Reprinted from "Myanmar's Tin-mining Hub," by J. Wang & Y. Lee, n.d., Reuters Graphics. <http://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/rngs/MYANMAR-TIN/010030QG1KB/index.html>

Myanmar as a state has granted regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces to control all domestic production to become a domestic hegemon as well as to reduce the impact of global exploitations. Wa is the case study that presents the way Myanmar state coopts the capitals in the border areas.

Since the emergence of nation-states there have been regional endeavours for autonomy brought about by differences in language, ethnic belonging or cultural norms. Nowhere are these endeavours more evident than in those countries that have not been built on a lengthy process of integration but rather on external imperialist forces that often drew country borders on a drawing board.

Myanmar, used to be called Burma, is home to more than 100 different ethnic groups and only exists since 4 January 1948, whereas its creation had been brought about by the British Empire. Since its creation, Myanmar has witnessed the emergence of numerous autonomous movements, one of which is the Wa region in northern Myanmar, bordering China, since the post-colonial period.

4.3 Correlation between civil war, ceasefire and GDP (export/import)


4.3.1 Civil war and absence of violence in Wa regions , its implication on border trade and GDP

Civil wars such as Myanmar security forces against its ethnic armed organizations bring negative effect on the country's economy. As conflicts prolong in the various border regions, both parties mobilize their resources on military expenditures, otherwise they could have spent to the development sectors. Such potential and persistence of intrastate conflicts just like Myanmar experiences is a common scenario found in the states not only with poor economic performance and with the compositions of ethnic minorities, who do not share the development of the state. These group of state depends their income from production and exporting of raw materials. A country facing intensified armed oppositions from intrastate parties tends to spend higher budget on defense sectors and experience higher rate of health concerns. Three dimensions where states with internal conflicts can adopt to escape from the "conflict trap" (Collier et al., 2003, p. 4). One of the dimension is foreign aid, effective policy development, reduction of defense expenditure, better management on resource extraction. Second dimension is facilitating the non-state opposition groups intergrade into main society. Third and last dimension is effective and rapid restoration projects in the post-war regions

(Collier et al., 2003). Figure 4.3 illustrates military expenditure (% of GDP) Myanmar from the data source of the World Bank. The data recorded in the World Bank database indicates that a larger sum of the country GDP has allocated to the defense expenses in 1960s and the graphs goes downwards over time. Myanmar is one of the civil-war prone states in the world and Figure B.1 of Appendix B summarises civil war/conflicts across countries from 1946 to 2008 around the world.

Figure 4.3

Military expenditure (% of GDP), Myanmar, from 1961-2003



Note: Adapted data from “Military expenditure (% of GDP), by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in *Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, n.d. World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=MM&view=chart>

4.3.2 Border trading ports

After establishing shared-autonomy with the state, Myanmar-Wa continues further development at the regional level, which is in line with the national interests on the border trade of Myanmar and its trade partner, China, especially with the landlocked Yunnan province. Steinberg and Fan (2012) detail the bilateral trade improvement in licit and illicit exchange of commodities via trading post at the international borders.

Besides, reopening the Muse-Ruili trade port in Myanmar side as one of the major mess and national export and import zone, there are other significant 11 trade-ports are established, which include some in the Myanmar territories under the control of ethnic armed groups. One of such emerging trade zone is located in the Wa region, commercial city , Bangkang, Shan State Special Region No. 2 as illustrated in the Table C.1 of Appenidx C , Steinberg collected the data from Yunnan provincial post office. (2000-2009) 9 years statically analysis with US Dollars terms on the total amount generated via bilateral trade exchange indicates that over half of Myanmar's trades occurs through its international borders, of which three quarter of the total border trade is believed to be from Yunnan-Myanmar region (Steinberg, & Fan, 2012).

Bilateral export and import between China and Myanmar have escalated through land-ports of the two countries' borders in the northern Shan State of Myanmar and southern province of China, Yunnan after the military regime, SLORC, ceased the state administrative power in the last 1988. Relations with China plays vital role to the military regime in the areas of bilateral trade, politics, economics, aid and development projects plays a vital role. The nature of their bilateral relations fall into the Wallersteinian description of core-semipeiphery-periphery world system, where Myanmar contributes with raw materials in exchange from high-end finished products from China. The limitation of accountable data availability is a common challenge due to accessibility to formal statistical records from the both states and growing informal export/import without proper documentation (Myoe, 2007).

Nevertheless, the process of military state making in Myanmar at the ethnic concentrated frontiers see significant changes and developments where state is establishing various mechanism to enhance its reach , to co-opt the regional production to reach the outcome of increasing its hegemonic power and legitimacy, territorial expansion. In the Wa region in the northern Shan State of Myanmar, the set of data found in the literatures focus on contemporary Myanmar political economy and state-ethnic conflicts indicates that the Hombang bridge agreement 1989 between State (Military regime) and non-state actor (UWSA/P) serves post-conflict consequences in the mutual strategic goals, confidence building, economic cooperation. In such, their bilateral relation has evolved from regional to national level. Directing Wa's capital into domestic economy and international funds and aid to Wa regions are another added value to Myanmar. However, further research interest can be

recommended if the process has a liner in progress in the military state making in Myanmar border territories.

4.3.3 Civil war and its impact on Myanmar economic indicators

Since 1960 internal war in the form of civil armed conflicts has become a destructive factor to the developmental, stability and security health of nations around the world. Studies have been done on such dimension of war as to how civil war escalates and what the impacts on states. Conflicts resulted with over 1000 human life lost within one year is categorised as civil wars and 35 percent of countries in the international state system has experienced such civil wars or armed conflicted in their territories (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).

However, UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 1). Myanmar is one of the 165 geographic location where intrastate conflicts occurs from the year 1940 to 2008 data that collected by UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002) Figure B.2 of Appendix B shows the conflicts incidents with battle death over 25 took place across Myanmar territories.

Intrastate violence continuously persisted in the post-independent Myanmar pollical environment since 1949. The use of armed conflicts is commonly in the mainland as well as in the periphery areas. Myanmar military forces known as Tatmadaw becomes the main institution which hold state power and the use of violence. At the demise of CBP, the delegates of Tamadaw visited the Wa region in the north for Thailand and reached agreement to end military confrontation without disarming Wa troop but self-administration of the Wa afire without state’s interference. This truce brings new beginning to state and non-state actor relations. As a result, Wa can focus on its regional development while Myanmar security forces can mobilize their resources to other fronts. Although Wa has entered truce with state, Tamadaw contine managing armed oppositions in other ethnic territories continues. The Figure 1.8 of Appendix B shows the incidents of civil conflicts and location map resulting more than 25 battel death in the late 1980s and onwards.

4.3.4 Conflict over the southern Wa-region

After bilateral truce has been established, Myanmar arm forces uses UWSA as a proxy to take control of Mong Tai Army under the drug lord Khun Sa’s leadership in the

southern part of Shan state, next to Thai border. However, after defeating Khun Sa, the Tamadaw had an armed conflict with Wa while Wa refused to return to their northern region. The conflict is resolved with another truce and Wa maintains Khun Sa area and establishes Wa southern command. See Table B.1 and Figure B.5 in Appendix B. In 2012 a peace process agreement was signed between the government and UWSA. The agreement includes six points which the parties agree to, including adopting development plans for the Wa region. The full-text peace agreement is in the Figure D.1 of Appendix D.

4.4 Myanmar's role of periphery and its struggle to reduce dependency in the world system

Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory later expand this understanding of Marxist international relations but including a semi-periphery. States that existed in the semi-periphery would also be exploited by the core, but would, in turn, assist the core in the exploitation of the periphery. Their existence would also allow for the export of core labor, ensuring that the core would not have to deal with increasing pressure for better wage labor. Therefore, the semi-periphery further helps to solidify and stabilize the hegemony of the core over the remainder of the world (Wallerstein, 1979).

The world-systems approach emphasizes the example of the core, semi-periphery, and periphery identified the economic exploitation of the less powerful in both the domestic and international realm. However, it also closely mirrors the political and economic exploitation of various international capitalist states in Myanmar. For example, the core can be identified to be the states in the Western sphere which are constraining Myanmar with the demands for reforms to gain more economic access to its resource-rich ethnic lands. The semi-periphery is inhabited by Asian states such as China, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, and Indian. While Western sanction has blocked Myanmar direct access to the core capitalist states, Myanmar inhabited in the periphery turns its supply to the semi-periphery with raw material and human labor. The exploitation of Myanmar's resources by the semi-periphery allows for their social, political, and economic success.

4.4.1 Trade and dependency role in the world system

Myanmar is surrounded by the emerging economies in Asia and Southeast Asia. "The country is classified as a least developed country (LDC). Oil and natural gas dominate

Myanmar's exports. Its abundant natural resources, labour force, and proximity to Asia's dynamic economies have attracted foreign investment in the energy, garment, IT, food and beverages sectors". In the dimension of the international trade, Myanmar is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (International Trade Centre, 2014).

To understand where Myanmar is now from where it started in 1988-89, it is worthwhile to mention Myanmar's struggle to reduce dependency with economic recovery and promoting domestic production is well documented by Tin Maung Maung Than (2007) in his book: *State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Economy of Industrialization*. Than is an senior fallow from Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. In his book, he writes the economic and pollical life Myanmar with four set of time farm, colonial era, postcolonial, Ne Win's era and SPDC era. "The common threads that ran through the increasing interventionist role of the state in Myanmar from 1948 to 1988 had been the notions of self-reliance, the principle of state ownership of the means of production, and the ideals of planned economic development" (p. 394). The author argues that Myanmar failed its dream of industrialized state due to miscalculation ambition against capacity and it results with the bankruptcy of the state" (Than, 2007, p. XV).


1988 Military coup enters Myanmar political landscapes again and military state making is initiated with reforms as a new chapter in the old book. Since then, Military-led Myanmar has developed various development strategy domestically and internationally in the economic, politick and security fronts. Ceasefire deals, regional autonomy agreement with country's ethnic opposition groups like UWSA is one of the major strategic approach to open state and non-state actor relations, to penetrate state mechanism into such regions to boost the domestic production. Myanmar is trying to recover the domestic economy as well as to reduce its growing dependency on the external international environment. Myanmar is managing its trade surplus with the destination's states. However, its export depends on the extraction raw materials such as petroleum, gas, timer, gems and fisheries, which mainly contribute the growth of GDP. Myanmar export/import volume and destinations are shown in the Table E.1 of the Appendix E. The country GDP annual growth percentage hit -11.352 in the year 1989. It is a significant achievement that Myanmar has made from the establishment of ceasefire at the country's lowest point of GDP growth to the positive progress in thirty years. In this interpretation, Myanmar can reduce the dependency level to certain extend. Yet, three decades

of struggles, Myanmar GDP growth has reached 2.888 in the year 2019 (World Bank, n.d.-a). Myanmar annual GDP growth is illustrated in the Figure 4.4 However, Myanmar's struggle for reducing trade dependency on the states in the hybrid and upper blocks. From Global Competitiveness index, Myanmar is under world medium while its trading partners are above as illustrated in Figure E.1 of Appendix E (World Bank, n.d.-b).

The findings suggest that a new pattern of peripheral state as Myanmar does not engage constructively with the core power but only neighbouring semi-peripheral states like China. However, as strategic attempt of deterring the growing dominance of China, Myanmar has indevoured ceasefire negotiations to recapture its economic benefits, foreign aids in the open border areas, in its state-making process in the borderlands.

Figure 4.4

GDP Growth (Annual %) of Myanmar



Note: World Bank Data adapted from

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MM&view=chart>

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

The case study of Wa autonomous region in Myanmar shows that Myanmar is going through the international push for core-periphery relations on one hand and internal push for state-making especially in the area of state control of the distribution of resources, timber production, rubber plantation in Wa and Kachin regions. From the interpretation of Kevin Woods' conception, cease-fire capitalism backing by Marry Callahan's (civil) war makes states turn to peace process making states.

Why states grant regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces in their domestic territory?

The research has demonstrated that Myanmar as a state has granted regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces to control all domestic production to become a domestic hegemon as well as to resist/reduce global exploitations. Wa is the case study that presents the way Myanmar state co-opts the capitals in the border areas. Exploitation indicates extracting resources, labor, skills, and qualities for one's benefit economically and politically (Balibar, 2018). Such resources extraction has been taking place in the borderlands of Myanmar throughout history and Myanmar is applying ceasefire capitalism strategy in the hilly Wa as well as Kachin region, to get direct access to the land and resources and to be able to expand the reach of the state, expansion of territory and governance.

All Marxist theorists agree that Marxism can only be understood in totality; the approach can only be fully understood by combining perspectives from all areas, such as history, economics, politics, philosophy, sociology, etc. It is also important to recognize that economic development has been the driving force behind the conception of history. Therefore, all issues of politics and social institutions are reinforcement to the development of power and control in the field of economics (Marx, 1970).

Following Marx and Wallenstein in capitalist theory, the pre-eminent world powers, identified as the core, would exploit the rest of the world to establish hegemony. The bourgeoisie of the core would exploit the peripheral states to benefit themselves as well as their

own proletariat (offering cheap products made in the periphery is also a benefit for the core proletariat).

This created an imbalance of interests between proletariats across the world; proletariats of the core no longer identified with proletariats of the periphery (being able to buy cheap whatever you want, makes you feel rich, the original products were made by the poor). The cost of manufactured goods would outpace the cost of raw materials, allowing industrialized core states to further profit off of the unindustrialized periphery. In the capitalist literature, the Core is the Western world, here primarily represented in the first place by the United States of America. The periphery in this research indicated is Myanmar, including Wa. And the semi-periphery is Asia, especially China.

The external forces of capitalism identified the economic exploitation of the less powerful in both the domestic and international realm. Myanmar as in the bottom spectrum of capitalism, the developing world, faces the external and internal pushes of exploitation which is an equal exchange. All the valuable raw material, labour, and natural resources flow to the capitalist states at a cheaper price, high-end finish products are imported at a higher price. In the cycle of unequal trade, the developing country like Myanmar takes time to develop domestic productivity. However, it also closely mirrors the political and economic exploitation of various international capitalist states in Myanmar. For example, the core can be identified to be the states in the Western sphere which are constraining Myanmar with the demands for reforms to gain more economic access to its resource-rich ethnic lands. The semi-periphery is inhabited by Asian states such as China, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, and India.

The Wa could become an autonomy, because of their history and geographical situation in the difficult accessible highlands, their connection with China, the process of state-making in Burma, the Cold War, the fear of communism in the western world, Wa's own political situation because they had their own currency, religion, languages, and justice. They had their own resources, opium, and minerals. Their experiences with KMT and their heritage of weapons, what brought them to the biggest armed organization in Myanmar with more than 20,000 soldiers. A ceasefire was in the interest of Myanmar political leaders. The state was already unstable, democratic reforming, ethnic armed separatism, economic sanctions from the western world and Myanmar search for economic and political security by turning to the semi-periphery of Asia to stabilize the country and grow economic power. Wa similar to other ethnic armed organisation mentioned the Kavin Woods thesis is situated in the strategically important

Chinese-Myanmar border regions. China is investing in the border area to facilitate their own southern provinces and get access to the sea as their strategic interest. In the frontier state-building strategy, Myanmar constitutionalized the ceasefire zones in the Unions' territory such as Wa in a self-administered division, which enables state territory expansion projects and authority to officially involve in macro-economic cooperation with foreign and domestic companies in the sectors of the state's major export commodities like timber and mineral resources in the international trade market and land concessions. As state apparatus, governance, presence of military bases in Union frontier territories in the ceasefire zones, state's hegemonic power increases in the previously ungoverned borderland and abandon resources. Multibillion business investments such as logging and rubber plantation deals require the state's backing and regulation in this newly emerged ceasefire capitalist economies. The more territory of state's governance expands in ceasefire autonomous regions, the better state making process has become. As a result, Myanmar has moved one step closer to domestic hegemonic power to reduce the negative impact of global exploitations, illegal trade, drug trafficking, trafficking, and maximise the accommodation of international investment, which is then used as tools for counterinsurgency development projects. Wa is the case study that presents the way Myanmar state coopts the capitals in the border areas.

The Wa developed a strong army, townships with own Wa-administration and economic force by cultivating the mountains and developing trade with neighbor countries, was even able to extend their territory to the UWSP's Southern Command Area next to Thai-Myanmar border and last but not least got as an only ethnic minority the recognition of Wa Self-Administered Division by the central Myanmar government. Wa can enjoy the autonomy to administer their internal and external affairs related to their territories.

In Marxist capitalism, an elite bourgeoisie is exploiting the proletariat in their own interest. This all is happening on the national and international level, the core, the periphery, and semi-periphery.

Looking at the politics, economics, values, etc. on both levels the research findings explain that Myanmar grants self-administration autonomy to advance it is the strategy of ceasefire capitalism through monopolizing the economic developments in coronation with foreign investors in large scale logging and rubber plantation as part of state making in the strategic frontier regions. Regulating the land, rent, and capital by central governing bodies in the self-administered or autonomous ceasefire regions in Wa and Kachin, Myanmar state

institutions are trying to penetrate the ethnic borderlands by extending state authority to frontier through ceasefire deals to take control of all domestic production to become domestic hegemon to attain the end goal of reducing the impact of global exploitations. It demonstrates a phenomena the interplay between the interest of economic and military, just as (civil) war make states, so peace process makes states through the mechanism of ceasefire capitalism. As a result of going to the pursuit of economic interest, the potential of conflict has significantly been reduced for a certain length of time.

Kevin Woods' study and the concept of ceasefire-capitalism reinforce and reveal the end of goals of state making through "military-private partnerships" in the resource-rich ceasefire zones in Myanmar border territories, next to the Chinese side of Yunnan province (Woods, 2011, p. 749). Ceasefire-capitalism is conceptualized as an "interacted interplay between the military force, resource-rich peasant land, and (trans)national finance capital" that accommodates the reconstruction of a political-economic and biophysical frontier landscape increasingly conducive to the military-state control.

Granting UWSA regional autonomy to open state and non-state relations, Myanmar coops domestic production in the border regions. Over thirty years of the truces gives regional development and to some extent, progress in military state making process in the borderlands. Evidently Myanmar has used Wa as a proxy force to conquer ethnic armed opposition groups and expand territorialisation and implement drug eradication projects. Since 1989, State-led conflicts emerged 1,278 times. Of which 40 incidents are involved with Wa. As a result of Hopang truce, the two parties could reduce military confrontations and increase economic cooperation, regional drug substituted cash crop plantation by accommodating the foreign investors. The renewal of Wa region has incorporated in the domestic economy by allowing them to invest in infrastructure projects and banking.

The output of granting autonomy to Wa has contributed to the reduce of the impact of the global exploitation, especially reducing the dependency on the export by increasing gross domestic production (GDP) overtime. Having truce with one of the strongest ethnic armed groups helps Myanmar to locate its military resources to other opposition fronts. Position Myanmar at the periphery is to contribute the whole supply chain with its producing of natural resources. What Myanmar struggles here is balancing trade dependency on one major state (China). How would all of this relate to the reduce of the impact of global exploitation is that capitalist system is a system of exploitation. Two distinctions can be made. Exploitation as

taking advantage and harmful to the exploited and exploitation for the mutual benefit. Myanmar is in military state making in the borderlands, Wa region is one of them. The mechanism of state making is thorough ceasefire capitalism or accumulating capital and production after ending armed confrontations in exchanges for economic cooperation. The Junta strategizes to improve their share of the borderlands economy... (rent seeking and taxation) promote their legitimacy (granting permits, License, land use, transportation route), appropriating foreign and domestic investment via government agency.

Otherwise, the production of the borderlands would not be incorporated with the national wealth. In other words, the abandoned land, forest, rivers and minimal resources are being exploited for the private benefit of the capitalist in the borderlands in the sense of taking advantage of the exploited. The key of regional autonomy unlock these two-party deal to the national interest as three party relations. Since, the governance mechanism enters the bilateral relationship and it provides revenues to the state via military-private partnership. As a result the dynamics of borderlands exconomy transform to exploitation of resources for mutual benefits .

Drug eradication policy is an prominent example of this triangular beneficial explanation of the natural resources, although it has implications to the climate change and environmental impact. The latter is beyond the scope of this study. But it could be recommended as further research area.

China see drug trafficking from Myanmar is a growing concerns in their domestic arena and a threat to border stability. At the international front, China attempts to keep Myanmar under its sphere of influence through political and economic ties. China is one of the greatest consumers of latex (rubber products) and the demands is high.

Myanmar, China's bordering neighbor with mass areas of forest and lands, where poppy plantations are at rise. Forest provides coverage for the insurgents. Chinese government funds its companies under the policy of drug eradication and alternative to poppy. These companies as well as mineral productions come into the ethnic controlled areas to conduct business activities.

The government, local ethnic authorities and the foreign capitalist (Chinese, Thai, Korea, etc) form correlation for the mutual benefits from extraction of the natural resources. As the involvement of the government mechanism and presence through ceasefire capitalism,

it is also possible for the international aid agencies such the United Nation and foreign development projects to enter the remote areas with human rights and environmental abuses.

Thereby, the impact of the exploitation from globalization and international capitalist forces in the borderlands will be reduced in the process of the military state making while state's control over domestic production has increased by military state making in the border regions.

5. 2 Further research recommendations

Building upon findings of the independent study: a state has granted regional autonomy to ethnopolitical minority forces to control all domestic production to become a domestic hegemon as well as to reduce global exploitations has answered to the central question why states grants regional autonomy to ethnopolitical armed forces in their domestic territory, it is suggested future research to address unanswered aspects of research problem with a comparative study.

In addition, the phenomena of “achieving Myanmar's long-term prosperity and joining to the middle layer of the world system, Myanmar needs to comply with international standards of human rights, resolve ethnic unrest and political conflicts by continues evolving in the democratic reforms” can be regarded as a penitential area of research.

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APPENDIX



APPENDIX A

Meetings between state and UWSA

Table A.1

Meeting and visits between UWSA/P and State officials with three years from 2011 to 2014

#	Date	Location	Armed Group Rep	Govt Rep	Details
1	06/09/2011	Kengtung	Bao Youliang	Aung Thaung	New State level ceasefire agreement Other govt delegates: Thein Zaw
2	01/10/2011	Lashio	Xiao Ming Liang	Aung Thaung	Union level meeting The UWSP agreed not to secede from the Union. Discussions included: the reopening of education, health and liaison offices, reassignment of staff, drug eradication in cooperation with the government, implementing measures for border region development, arrangements made for economic-driven industries. Related agreements were signed.
3	26/12/2011	Pangsang	Xiao Ming Liang	Aung Thaung	Union Level 6 Point agreement Govt rep Aung Thaung urged the UWSP to take part in the upcoming by-elections expected to take place early next year.
4	09/05/2012	Pangsang	unknown	unknown	Regime officials visit Panghsang, Shan state for meeting with UWSA officials.
5	17/08/2012	Wiangkao and Pangsang	Xiao Ming Liang	Deputy Border Affairs minister Maj Gen Zaw Win	Official visits by Maj Gen Zaw Win to the Wa area: 16 August – Wiangkao, inspects Songpu hydropower plant 17 August – Panghsang, meets Xiao Minliang, Bao Youri, Zhao Zhongdang, Bao Youliang, Ai Lone, Zhao Guo-ang, U Aung Myint, Bo Laikham and others. Delivers K 30 million allowance and K 66 million for rice. Other UWSA delegates: Bao Youri, Zhao Zhongdang, Bao Youliang, Ai Lone, Zhao Guo-ang, U Aung Myint, Bo Laikham and others
6	06/10/2012	Kengtung	Xiao Ming Liang	Myanmar army chief vice-snr Gen. Min Aung Hlaing	Both sides agreed to cooperate in eradicating drugs.
7	16/11/2012	Pangsang	Xiao Ming Liang	Myanmar armed forces Northeastern Region commander Brig-Gen Aung Soe	Brig-Gen Aung Soe met with Vice-Chairman Xiao Mingliang for discussions. The brigadier-general also visited a facility of the UWSA's Hongbang Company.
8	04/12/2012	Pangsang	Xiao Ming Liang	Aung Min	Union level meeting The discussions centered on economic and development programmes.

#	Date	Location	Armed Group Rep	Govt Rep	Details
					UWSA officials were invited to Nay Pyi Taw to study Hluttaw sessions. The govt delegation presented cash assistance of over K 290 million for regional development, as well as layers and broilers. They also visited Mongmaw region and Mongmawkonmyintaung tea plantation. Other govt delegates included: Thein Zaw, U Soe Thein, President's Office Minister; Lt-Gen Thein Htay, Border Affairs Minister; Sao Aung Myat, Shan state Chief Minister; Col Aung Thu, Shan State Security and Border Affairs Minister; Maj-Gen Than Tun Oo, Commander, Triangle Region Command, Maj Gen Aung Soe the commander of Northeastern Region Command.
9	20/03/2013	Lashio, Shan State	Xiao Hsarm Khun	Aung Min	At the Shan-Kayah Trust-building for Peace Conference the Wa representative Xiao Hsarm Khun was informed by U Aung Min, UPWC Vice Chairman # 2, that the Wa call for a separate statehood could be decided only by the Union legislature.
10	12/07/2013	Kengtung	UWSA	UPWC	1) Follow the agreements that emerge from the discussion. 2) Maintain the already achieved mutual understandings, trust and fine tradition of peace and continue making cooperation for reaching eternal peace through constructive discussions. 3) Make transparent coordination as quickly as possible based on the constructive ways at a time when there emerge the military issues between Tatmadaw and UWSA. 4) Not to allow seceding "Wa" Special Region (2) from the State at any rate as "Wa" Special Region (2) is a integral part of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and to utilize the capabilities of "Wa" Special Region (2) for perpetuation of sovereignty and territory of the State. 5) Make mutual cooperation between the Union government and "Wa" Special Region (2) in development of the region and eradication of narcotic drugs.
11	03/09/2013	Kengtung	UWSA	UPWC/ Shwe Mann	(Informal)
12	04/10/2013	Pang Sang	Xao Ming Liang (vice-chairman)	U Thein Zaw (MP) and Lt. Gen Thein Htay (deputy minister of border affairs)	(Informal meeting) U Thein Zaw proposed 9 points in the meeting. In the proposed points, census issue, ID card issue, local development, permit government servants to work in Wa territory are included in discussion. U Thein Zaw also discussed with Xai Minliang about to attend the nationwide ceasefire signing ceremony.

#	Date	Location	Armed Group Rep	Govt Rep	Details
13	01/03/2014	Naypyitaw	Pao Yu Yi, Zhao Zhongdan, U Sam Lu (Khun Sam Lu) and Sao Khun Hseng	U Thein Sein	(Informal meeting) Leaders from UWSA, NDAA and SSPP met president Thein Sein after attending the census campaign in Naypyitaw.
14	03/03/2014	Naypyitaw	vice-chairman Pao Yu Yi, C-in-C Zhao Zhongdan	Thura U Shwe Mann	(Informal meeting) 3 Delegates from UWSA led by deputy chairman Pao Yu Yi and commander in chief Zhao Zhongdan met Thura U Shwe Mann in Naypyitaw when they visited union parliament.
15	06/04/2014	Northern Shan Head Quarter office	UWSA	Min Aung Hlaing (Commander in Chief)	(Informal meeting) Gen Min Aung Hlaing met UWSA for the first time in his term of Commander in Chief: state media reported on Sunday.
16	26/04/2014	Pan San	KNU leaders – Mutu saypoe, saw yawjarkhin, saw eyezatt, saw htoo2 lay, saw tarmulay	UWSA leader-deputy chairman ShaoMinLian, deputy general secretary-PaukYuYi, and officials	(Informal meeting) Leaders of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) say they are concerned that an escalation of fighting in Kachin State could reverse the ongoing peace process between the government and ethnic armed groups.
17	25/08/2014	Naypyitaw	NDAA-ESS, U San Pay (Vice chairman), UWSA – Shao Min Lian (Vice Chairman), SSPP/SSA Gen Khae Taine vice chairman	President Thein Sein	Informal meeting
18	25/08/2014	Naypyitaw	NDAA-ESS, U San Pay (Vice chairman), UWSA – Shao Min Lian (Vice Chairman)	Commander In Chief, Min Aung Hlaing	Informal meeting
19	26/08/2014	Naypyitaw	NDAA-ESS, U San Pay (Vice chairman), UWSA – Shao Min Lian (Vice Chairman), SSPP/SSA Gen Khur Tai vice chairman	Parliament Speaker Shwe Mann, Khin Aung Myint	Informal meeting

Note: Reprinted from Myanmar Peace Monitor, <https://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/1600>. Copyright © 2019 Myanmar Peace Monitor.

Table A.2*Development of State and Wa cooperation in the three main pillars from 2011 to 2014*

No.	Date	Collaborations for region development	Anti-narcotic campaigns	Border stability	Level of Engagement
1.	06/09/2011				New State level ceasefire agreement Other govt delegates: Thein Zaw
2.	01/10/2011	the reopening of education, health and liaison offices, reassignment of staff, arrangements made for economic-driven industries	drug eradication in cooperation with the government, implementing measures for border region development,		Union level meeting The UWSP agreed not to secede from the Union. Discussions included:. Related agreements were signed.
3.	26/12/2011				Union Level 6 Point agreement Govt rep Aung Thaung urged the UWSP to take part in the upcoming by-elections expected to take place early next year.
4.	09/05/2012				Regime officials visit Panghsang, Shan state for meeting with UWSA officials.
5.	17/08/2012	16 August – Wiangkao, inspects Songpu hydropower plant Delivers K 30 million allowance and K 66 million for rice.			Official visits by Maj Gen Zaw Win to the Wa area: 16 August – Wiangkao, inspects Songpu hydropower plant 17 August – Panghsang, meets Xiao Minliang, Bao Youri, Zhao Zhongdang, Bao Youliang, Ai Lone, Zhao Guo-ang, U Aung Myint, Bo Laikham and others. Other UWSA delegates: Bao Youri, Zhao Zhongdang, Bao Youliang, Ai Lone, Zhao Guo-ang, U Aung Myint, Bo Laikham and others
6.	06/10/2012		Both sides agreed to cooperate in eradicating drugs.		

No.	Date	Collaborations for region development	Anti-narcotic campaigns	Border stability	Level of Engagement
7	16/11/2012				Brig-Gen Aung Soe met with Vice-Chairman Xiao Mingliang for discussions. The brigadier-general also visited a facility of the UWSA's Hongbang Company.
8	04/12/2012	The discussions centered on economic and development programmes. The govt delegation presented cash assistance of over K 290 million for regional development, as well as layers and broilers.			Union level meeting UWSA officials were invited to Nay Pyi Taw to study Hluttaw sessions. They also visited Mongmaw region and Mongmawkonmyintaung tea plantation Other govt delegates included: Thein Zaw, U Soe Thein, President's Office Minister; Lt-Gen Thein Htay, Border Affairs Minister; Sao Aung Myat, Shan state Chief Minister; Col Aung Thu, Shan State Security and Border Affairs Minister; Maj-Gen Than Tun Oo, Commander, Triangle Region Command, Maj Gen Aung Soe the commander of Northeastern Region Command.
9	20/03/2013				At the Shan-Kayah Trust-building for Peace Conference the Wa representative Xiao Hsarm Khun was informed by U Aung Min, UPWC Vice Chairman # 2, that the Wa call for a separate statehood could be decided only by the Union legislature.
10	20/03/2013				1) Follow the agreements that emerge from the discussion. 2) Maintain the already achieved mutual understandings, trust and

No.	Date	Collaborations for region development	Anti-narcotic campaigns	Border stability	Level of Engagement
					fine tradition of peace and continue making cooperation for reaching eternal peace through constructive discussions. 3) Make transparent coordination as quickly as possible based on the constructive ways at a time when there emerge the military issues between Tatmadaw and UWSA. 4) Not to allow seceding “Wa” Special Region (2) from the State at any rate as “Wa” Special Region (2) is a integral part of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and to utilize the capabilities of “Wa” Special Region (2) for perpetuation of sovereignty and territory of the State. 5) Make mutual cooperation between the Union government and “Wa” Special Region (2) in development of the region and eradication of narcotic drugs.
11	03/09/2013				UWSA-UPWC/ShewMann (informal)
12	04/10/2013	U Thein Zaw proposed 9 points in the meeting. In the proposed points, census issue, ID card issue, local development, permit government servants to work in Wa territory are included in discussion. U Thein Zaw also discussed with Xai Minliang about to attend the nationwide			(Informal meeting)

No.	Date	Collaborations for region development	Anti-narcotic campaigns	Border stability	Level of Engagement
		ceasefire signing ceremony.			
13	01/03/2014				(Informal meeting) Leaders from UWSA, NDAA and SSPP met president Thein Sein after attending the census campaign in Naypyitaw.
14	03/03/2014				(Informal meeting) 3 Delegates from UWSA led by deputy chairman Pao Yu Yi and commander in chief Zhao Zhongdan met Thura U Shwe Mann in Naypyitaw when they visited union parliament.
15	06/04/2014				(Informal meeting) Gen Min Aung Hlaing met UWSA for the first time in his term of Commander in Chief: state media reported on Sunday.
16	26/04/2014			(Informal meeting) Leaders of the Karen National Union (KNU) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) say they are concerned that an escalation of fighting in Kachin State could reverse the ongoing peace process between the government and ethnic armed groups.	
17	25/08/2014				NDAA-ESS, U San Pay (Vice chairman), UWSA – Shao Min Lian (Vice

No.	Date	Collaborations for region development	Anti-narcotic campaigns	Border stability	Level of Engagement
					Chairman), SSPP/SSA Gen Khae Taine vice chairman President Thein Sein Informal meeting
18	25/08/2014				NDAA-ESS, U San Pay (Vice chairman), UWSA – Shao Min Lian (Vice Chairman) Commander In Chief, Min Aung Hlaing Informal meeting
19	26/08/2014				NDAA-ESS, U San Pay (Vice chairman), UWSA – Shao Min Lian (Vice Chairman), SSPP/SSA Gen Khur Tai vice chairman Parliament Speaker Shwe Mann, Khin Aung Myint Informal meeting


Note: The table is adopted from the Peach Monitor's table of meeting

APPENDIX B

Civil War

Figure B.1

The distribution of conflict types by year across countries, 1960-2009



Note: Graphic image downloaded from UCDP/PRIO armed conflict database
<https://www.prio.org/Data/Governance/MIRPSSIP/>

Figure B.2

Intrastate conflicts resulting over 25 battle deaths in Myanmar (1940-2008)




Note : UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009 in spreadsheet (Excel)) format
<https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/>

Table B. 1*Intrastate conflicts in Myanmar from 1989 to 2019*

Year	State-based conflicts incidents	All conflicts incidents	state_MTA_Wa_conflict incidents
1989	31	31	0
1990	19	19	0
1991	21	21	0
1992	31	31	0
1993	8	8	4
1994	39	39	18
1995	23	26	7
1996	24	28	1
1997	11	13	4
1998	8	18	0
1999	9	10	0
2000	16	23	0
2001	23	26	0
2002	42	42	0
2003	9	9	1
2004	18	18	1
2005	17	17	0
2006	29	29	0
2007	29	31	1
2008	14	14	0
2009	21	22	1
2010	33	33	0
2011	206	207	1
2012	50	60	0
2013	61	85	0
2014	29	35	0
2015	176	195	1
2016	41	57	0
2017	40	88	0
2018	66	70	0
2019	134	144	0
Total	1278	1449	40

Figure B.3

Incidents of civil conflicts and location map resulting more than 25 battle death in the late 1980s and onwards



Note: Number of battle death over year in Myanmar 1989-2019, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/144>

Figure B.4

Number of battle deaths from the Incidents of civil conflicts in the late 1980s and onwards

Number of Deaths




☒	Total Number of Deaths	18 260
☒	State-Based Violence	12 092
☒	Non-State Violence	0
☒	One-Sided Violence	6 168

Note: Number of battle death over year in Myanmar 1989-2019, <https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/144>

Figure B.5

Myanmar arm forces allied with UWSA defeating Mong Tai Army



Note: Adapted from State and UWSA/P armed conflicts over year (1989-2019)
<https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/422>

APPENDIX C

Border Trade Ports

Table C.1

China-Myanmar bilateral trading ports along the international borders

Name	Level*	Date opened**	Opposite Myanmar points and region
Ruili	National	1978	Muse, Muse township
Wanding	National	1952	Kyukok, Kyukok township
Houqiao	National	August 1991	Kambaiti, Kachin State Special Region No. 1
Qingshuihe (Mengding)	National	August 1991	Chinshwehaw Shan State Special Region No. 1
Daluo	National	August 1991	Mong La, Shan State Special Region No. 4
Menglian	Provincial	August 1991	Bangkang, Shan State Special Region No. 2
Nansan	Provincial	August 1991	Kokang Laukkai, Shan State Special Region No. 1
Cangyuan	Provincial	September 1996	Nandeng, Shan State Special Region No. 2
Yingjiang	Provincial	August 1991	Laza, Kachin State Special Region No. 1
Zhangfeng	Provincial	August 1991	Lwejel, Lwejel township
Pianma	Provincial	August 1991	Datianba, Kachin State Special Region 1.

Note: Steinberg, D. I., & Fan, H. (2012). *Modern China-Myanmar relations: Dilemmas of mutual dependence*. Nias Press, p. 214.

APPENDIX D

Figure D.1 Bilateral ceasefire agreement between UWSA and Myanmar government

UWSA Government 6-point Union-level Peace Agreement

26 December 2012

Union Level Peace-making Group led by U Aung Thaung and “Wa” Special Region (2) Peacemaking Group headed by Vice-Chairman U Shauk Min Lyan held second peace talks at the meeting hall of “Wa” Special Region in Pansang.

The two sides signed a six-point agreement:

- (1) Both sides have reached agreement to continue implementing agreements signed in Lashio on 1 October, 2011.
- (2) It is agreed to adopt short-term or long-term socio-economic development plans in light of bilateral consultations to enable the Union government to participate in tasks for improvement of living standard of the national people in “Wa” Special Region (2) and for regional development.
- (3) The Union government agrees to help increase opportunities for national races youths in “Wa” Special Region (2) to pursue education with the mindset to develop their insights, to equip them with vocational education and to realize human resources development.
- (4) The Union government agrees to adopt long-term plans for cooperation of local people in treatment, prevention and education processes of healthcare to national people in “Wa” Special Region (2), acquiring health knowledge.
- (5) It is agreed to continue negotiating matters related to enable representatives of people in townships of “Wa” Special Region (2) take seats in each Hluttaw of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to represent desires of the people in “Wa” Special Region (2).
- (6) “Wa” Special Region (2) is an important part of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. “Wa” Special Region (2) agrees to continue to hold talk to cooperate with defence forces of the State for security and defence of the State as one as it agrees not to disintegrate the State and secede from the State at all and


Note: Adapted from State and UWSA/P armed conflicts over year (1989-2019)
<https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/422>

APPENDIX E

Trade data

Figure E.1

Myanmar comparison with its trade partners by Global Competitiveness index



Note: Adapted from https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/gci?country=MMR&indicator=631&countries=VNM,IDN,THA,CHN,KOR,JPN&viz=line_chart&years=2007,2017&indicators=944&compareBy=region


Table E.1*Myanmar top export and import designations and volume in 2020*

Myanmar's exports 2020 by country	Myanmar's imports 2020 by country
Top export destinations of commodities from Myanmar in 2020:	Top trading partners (import sources) of Myanmar in 2020:
China with a share of 31% (5.37 billion US\$)	China with a share of 36% (6.52 billion US\$)
Thailand with a share of 17.7% (3 billion US\$)	Thailand with a share of 10.7% (1.92 billion US\$)
Japan with a share of 7.32% (1.24 billion US\$)	Japan with a share of 3.07% (551 million US\$)
USA with a share of 5.13% (868 million US\$)	USA with a share of 2.21% (397 million US\$)
Singapore with a share of 4.11% (696 million US\$)	Singapore with a share of 13.6% (2.45 billion US\$)
India with a share of 4.1% (695 million US\$)	India with a share of 3.79% (682 million US\$)
	Vietnam with a share of 3.27% (588 million US\$)
Germany with a share of 3.49% (591 million US\$)	
	Indonesia with a share of 5.96% (1.07 billion US\$)
Spain with a share of 3.11% (527 million US\$)	
	Malaysia with a share of 5.62% (1.01 billion US\$)
United Kingdom with a share of 2.88% (488 million US\$)	
Korea with a share of 2.58% (438 million US\$)	Korea with a share of 3.14% (564 million US\$)

Note: Adapted from “2002 – 2020 Annual International Trade Statistics by Country (HS02):

Myanmar,” by TrendEconomy, 2021, April 5,

https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2?commodity=TOTAL&reporter=Myanmar&trade_flow=Export,Import&partner=World&indicator=TV,YoY&time_period=2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010,2011,2012,2014,2015,2016,2017,2018,2019,2020

Figure E.2*Myanmar import data from 2010 to 2020*


The value of **merchandise exports** from Myanmar totalled **\$ 16.9 billion** in 2020. **Overall commodity exports** from Myanmar **decreased by 6.49%** compared to 2019. Merchandise exports decreased by \$ 1.17 billion (the value of merchandise exports from Myanmar amounted to \$18.1 billion in 2019)

Note: Adapted from “2002 – 2020 Annual International Trade Statistics by Country (HS02): Myanmar,” by TrendEconomy, 2021, April 5,

https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2?commodity=TOTAL&reporter=Myanmar&trade_flow=Export,Import&partner=World&indicator=TV,YoY&time_period=2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010,2011,2012,2014,2015,2016,2017,2018,2019,2020


Figure E.3

Myanmar product mix and sectorial specialization 2006 quarter 1 to 2019 Quarter 4



Note: Adopted from World Bank <https://mec.worldbank.org/buildersect>

The size of the bubbles (weight) is equal to a country's sector specialization. For example: China's largest export sector in 2006–2016 was Machinery, visualized with the largest circle. As worldwide imports of Machinery contracted over the period, both in prices and quantities, the corresponding bubble lies in the southwest quadrant of the chart. If you want to de-select a sector, just click on the corresponding heading in the legend. Sectors reflects Harmonized System (HS) Chapters, see the documentation in the download section for detail.

Figure E.4*Myanmar export data from 2010 to 2020*

The value of **merchandise exports** from Myanmar totalled **\$ 16.9 billion** in 2020. **Overall commodity exports** from Myanmar **decreased by 6.49%** compared to 2019. Merchandise exports decreased by \$ 1.17 billion (the value of merchandise exports from Myanmar amounted to \$18.1 billion in 2019)

Note: Adapted from “2002 – 2020 Annual International Trade Statistics by Country (HS02):

Myanmar,” by TrendEconomy, 2021, April 5,

https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2?commodity=TOTAL&reporter=Myanmar&trade_flow=Export,Import&partner=World&indicator=TV,YoY&time_period=2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,2009,2010,2011,2012,2014,2015,2016,2017,2018,2019,2020

Figure E.5*Myanamr export/import volume and commoditieis comparison***Myanmar's Top Exports in 2020:**

- 19.8% (\$3.36 billion): 2711 - Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons.
- 7.31% (\$1.23 billion): 6203 - Men's or boys' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear).
- 6.81% (\$1.15 billion): 0713 - Dried leguminous vegetables, shelled, whether or not skinned or split.
- 6.3% (\$1.06 billion): 6204 - Women's or girls' suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, dresses, skirts, divided skirts, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear).
- 5.46% (\$924 million): 7403 - Refined copper and copper alloys, unwrought.
- 4.56% (\$773 million): 1006 - Rice.
- 3.43% (\$581 million): 8431 - Parts suitable for use solely or principally with the machinery of headings 84.25 to 84.30.
- 3.17% (\$537 million): 6110 - Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar articles, knitted or crocheted.
- 2.26% (\$382 million): 1005 - Maize (corn).
- 2.17% (\$367 million): 0803 - Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried

Imports structure to Myanmar in 2020 represented by the following main commodity groups:

- 15.2% (2.74 billion US\$): 27 - Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes
- 10.8% (1.94 billion US\$): 85 - Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles
- 9.79% (1.76 billion US\$): 84 - Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof
- 6.62% (1.18 billion US\$): 87 - Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof
- 6.29% (1.13 billion US\$): 72 - Iron and steel
- 4.3% (773 million US\$): 39 - Plastics and articles thereof
- 4.15% (746 million US\$): 55 - Man-made staple fibers
- 3.94% (707 million US\$): 15 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes
- 3.6% (647 million US\$): 73 - Articles of iron or steel
- 3.29% (592 million US\$): 30 - Pharmaceutical products

BIOGRAPHY

Name	Mr Kyi Thar
Date of Birth	January 23, 1978
Educational Attainment	2004: Bachelor of Art (English), Yadanabon University, Mandalay , Myanmar
Work Position	Project Director Urban Refugee Programme, Bangkok, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Thailand
Work Experiences	Project Director Urban Refugee Programme, Bangkok, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Thailand, 2019 Senior Caseworker Urban Refugee Porgramme, Bangkok, Jesuit Refugee (JRS) Thailand, 2015 Community Liaison Officer Education for Migrant Children project, Ranong, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Thailand, 2013