



**INDONESIA: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ITS
INFLUENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE**

BY

MISS PANPAKA SINGKEEWAN

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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RELATIONS
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2020
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THESIS

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MS. PANPAKA SINGKEEWAN


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was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Political Science in Politics and International Relations


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
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Thesis Title	INDONESIA: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ITS INFLUENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
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Degree	Master of Political Science
Major Field/Faculty/University	Politics and International Relations Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University
Thesis Advisor	Asst. Prof. Sunida Aroonpipat, Ph.D.
Academic Year	2020

ABSTRACT

The rise of China and its expansion of power through its grand strategy of Belt and Road Initiative, have influenced a number of countries in the region. This influence could potentially cause some uncertainty in terms of the security and unity of ASEAN. However, despite the uncertainty posed by China either in the South China Sea or bilateral disputes, many ASEAN countries seem to be attracted by their BRI and investment, Indonesia was one such country. There are many studies regarding the topic of how Indonesia responds to or initiates foreign policy to such a situation through the IR theory perspectives.

The IR theories are useful for understanding the action of the states that interact with each other. The IR theories provide a sort of explanation in terms of how the external environment influences Indonesia's foreign policy.

Nonetheless, in the field of foreign policymaking processes, it is better to rely on the Domestic Politics approach and neorealism for an explanation of Indonesia's relation with China in terms of the balance of power and economic cooperation and to fill in the gap between the intellectual and practical realms.

This thesis employed the Domestic politics approach and explanation from Vinsensio Dugis in his article "Domestic Political Structure and Public Influence on

Foreign Policy, A Basic Model". Within this process, there are four factors including the political system, leadership and foreign policy, political fractions, and the Chinese factor.

This thesis founded that the process of foreign policy change is a result of the domestic politics that change whenever there is a new leader that comes into power. Especially, when a newly elected president takes control, it always brings about change in the government actor; however, despite this, the political systems dominated by political elites and military still persist. The new government comes with new interests that results in a new foreign policy direction and goals as they may not have been satisfied with the previous government's performance and the difference in terms of how they defined the term "national interest". Moreover, the Chinese factor also played a different role in the SBY and Jokowi governments which resulted in great foreign policy shifts as well.

Combining both domestic politics is the major key contributor to the foreign policymaking of Indonesia. The political structure where the political elites still possess control created a huge impact on the foreign policymaking of the country. As the structure persisted as a top-down process, therefore, both the former presidents SBY and President Jokowi seem to be restricted by the political structure where they have to seek support and rely on those who hold elite power.

As a result, after analyzing all the factors, they lead to a change in the foreign policy of Indonesia that shifted from outward-looking to be more nationalistic and domestic-oriented.

Keywords: Indonesia, foreign policymaking, domestic politics, SBY, Jokowi, Global Maritime Fulcrum and Belt and Road Initiative, and the South China Sea conflict

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Throughout the process of writing this thesis, since the very beginning of the proposal development, I have received a great amount of support and assistance.

Most significantly, I would first like to thank my supervisor, Professor Sunida Aroonpipat, whose expertise was invaluable in helping me formulate the research question and methodology. The professor's perceptive comments and feedback pushed me to sharpen my thinking and brought my work to a higher standard.

I would like to acknowledge all my classmates, namely Natchaya, Kasina, Wannawat and Phanuphat, all of whom have supported me through difficult times and their supportive suggestions also contributed to my thesis.

I also would like to thank my parents and my brother for their wise guidance of how to live life happily and my best friends Sarita, Wiracha and Panramon for their sympathetic ears. They have always been there for me and I could not have completed this thesis without the support of these people.

In addition, I would like to thank BTS (방탄소년단) for such comforting music that encourages me to love myself throughout very tough periods. And Daniel Kang for all the enjoyable moments. And thank you to myself for not giving up.

Miss Panpaka Singkeewan

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations	Terms
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CoC	Code of Conduct
DPR	The House of People's Representatives
DoC	Declaration of Conduct
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GMF	Global Maritime Fulcrum
IORA-RC	Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation
IUU	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing
Jokowi	President Joko Widodo
KPK	Corruption Eradication Commission
PPP	The United Development Party
TNI	Indonesian National Armed Forces
UNI	The United Nations
SBY	President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter consists of five parts: the first part provides an overview of the issues and the significance of this study. Moreover, there is a recap of the literature review and IR theories that tend to explain the behavior of the state rather than explain how the foreign policy is conducted.

Second is the research question that led the way in how this research will be studied. Third, the objective and the scope of the study that pointed out the goal that this study wanted to find out. Followed by part four which discusses the methodology used in this study and the last part is the structure of this thesis.

1.1 Statement of problem and significances

The rise of China in both the economic and political aspects has posed a variety of challenges for Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region as a whole. China's expansion of its influence in the form of investment somehow manifests in its willingness to cooperate and comply with ASEAN multi-cooperation principles.

Indonesia was selected as a case study because of its growing power in terms of economic, geopolitical and population situations. Importantly, it has a leading role in ASEAN, so if China can influence Indonesia, then this may have significant implications for the whole Southeast Asian region and might impact the unity of ASEAN.

However, when China came into the region, it compelled the ASEAN countries to establish a policy to deal with this major power. Indonesia was significantly affected by China's expansion in the region. Because of this, the foreign policy of Indonesia towards China has been greatly varied, due to their domestic politics.

A number of literatures delicately studies China's belt and road initiative and the Southeast Asian region, that literature tends to introduce us to what China's BRI is about and China's actions in the South China Sea. Moreover, the literature provided some opportunities and challenges. Yet, they also talk about how the

responses of ASEAN countries towards that particular issue differed due to the political issues in each country.

To study the foreign policymaking of a country, there are many alternative ways to look at depending on which theoretical frameworks we wish to employ.

Regarding this issue, there are several studies that explain the actions of Indonesia's foreign policy toward China's Belt and Road initiative and the South China Sea conflict. Most of them were constructed through the IR theories perspectives, both mainstream IR and the English School.

However, the researcher sees that by employing IR theory to explain the shift and the establishment of foreign policy in Indonesia, there still remains a wide gap in IR theory such as in realism, the theory tends to emphasize an external aspect that influences a country to act or respond in a way to protect their national security and interests. At the same time, constructivism pointed out that the emergence of foreign policy originally resulted from a set of norms held by a country.

They explain that, while liberalism emphasized cooperation and democratic principle, Indonesia utilized the liberalist aspect through the international forum and negotiations which prominently in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY era. But the theory might not be able to explain the new emergence of the Global Maritime Fulcrum of President Joko Widodo in which the policy is inward-looking and prioritizes national interest rather than international affairs.

The English school also provides the concept of international society being formed by a group of sovereign states that share common values and interests. Thus, they are willing to construct a certain set of rules to govern and interact with the members of the community.

These IR theories contribute to the understanding of the foreign policy actions of a country. However, the study of foreign policy is not limited to any particular IR theories but a relevant subject for all. The foreign policies, according to Hussain, are designed by the head of government with the aim of achieving complex domestic and international agendas. Moreover, it usually involves a series of steps in which domestic politics plays an important role.

Therefore, the researcher prefers to utilize the Domestic Politics approach as a framework for this study. With the aim of investigating how the foreign policy of

Indonesia is conducted, this thesis illustrates the importance of how the domestic political structure consists of a deep-rooted traditional structure of the government including the area of foreign policymaking. Moreover, this thesis could be an alternative way, apart from the IR theory, to study how a particular country conducts its foreign policy.

Certainly, the way foreign policy is conducted and delivered varies due to the context of domestic politics; as can be in the case of Indonesia where the military has played a prominent role in Indonesian politics ever since the Declaration of Independence from the Dutch. Although the country was democratized, the military remains in the eminent position in the government. Even the president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is regarded as the first directly elected president, holds the background of military general.

Moreover, in the current era of Joko Widodo's presidency, he seems to lean towards nationalism and to some extent was said to be an authoritarian turn. Thus, the domestic political structure of Indonesia remains a largely top-down structure. Consistent in its relations is the legacy of the declaration of independence in which Indonesia emphasized an "Independent and Active" foreign policy doctrine, this been part of modern Indonesian heritage and shaped the ideology of the country as well as its position in the world. Drawing from this point, this ideology was prevalent in the SBY era in which "Independent and Active" was used as the foundation for almost every policy.

This thesis, therefore, highlights the Domestic politics factors, particularly the government figures, as well as the Chinese factor which is an important part in the establishment of foreign policy. The foreign policy in of itself showcases the linkage between domestic politics and external factors. The foreign policy is a product of the interaction of environment factors, both internal and external (Northedge,1968). In this point, this thesis utilizes an explanation of neorealism to explain Indonesia and China relations, as it argues that foreign policy is perceived to accommodate the role of domestic and external determinants in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy (UKEssays, 2018). The relations of the two countries are quite complex due to the overlapping issues in Natuna Island and the South China Sea that pose a threat of uncertainty to the country. On the other hand, despite this uncertainty, their relations in

terms of economics seem to be growing and that's a result of the strategic partnership agreement in the SBY era, for example.

This thesis aims to make a distinction between SBY and Jokowi in terms of foreign policymaking by looking into the consistency of Indonesia's relations in which this thesis will take into consideration the factor of political structure/system that touches upon the deep-rooted structure and ideology of Independent and active doctrine. This is related to and influences the second factor which is leadership, in the way that the political shape and scope of the foreign policy was proposed by the president. Moreover, it also consisted of two factors that have a crucial role in the foreign policymaking of Indonesia: the factor of political groups, and the Chinese factor.

1.2 Research question

There has been an uncertain predicament going on in the region especially the South China Sea conflict and overlapping territory disputes between Indonesia and China. In spite of this, Indonesia, under both SBY and Jokowi presidencies, still maintains good relations with China.

However, besides the fact that there are limited studies on Indonesia's foreign policy decision making by using the domestic politics approach, the researcher decided to employ the domestic politics model of Vinsensio Dugis "*Domestic Political Structure and Public Influence on Foreign Policy, A Basic Model*"

Then conducting the research question that would lead to what this thesis aims to find out, the question is:

How does domestic politics determine Indonesia's foreign policy decision making to join the Belt and Road Initiative despite the South China Sea conflict?

1.3 Objective and scope of study

This thesis aims to contribute to the study of foreign policy decision making for those who are interested in Indonesia and wish to see how domestic politics plays a

significant role for Indonesia in making a decision regarding this particular situation that they have to balance between security and economic interests.

As well as this, this study can supplement what International Relations theories may have overlooked. The scope of this thesis will cover the early years of the Presidency of Joko Widodo and will touch upon some of the significant policies of the former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to make it clear how foreign policy has remained the same or changed and how domestic politics play their role in this.

In terms of domestic politics factors, this thesis will consider the government actors involved in foreign policymaking revolving around this particular issue.

1.4 Methodology

This thesis will use a qualitative approach combined with the descriptive and analytical method. The reason why the researcher uses a qualitative approach is that the study into how domestic politics affect or influence foreign policy requires in-depth study. Moreover, qualitative research intends to understand the phenomenon of what is experienced by research subjects such as behavior, perception, motivation, and action. The descriptive research method is to describe a depiction of the environmental situation around the time of the study.

This thesis aims to analyze the basis of Indonesian foreign policy through the perspective of the Domestic politics approach and focuses on how Indonesia conducted their foreign policy regarding participating with China's Belt and Road Initiative despite the South China Sea conflict.

1.4.1 Data collection

In data collection, this thesis is based on an online database and online library research as well as primary and secondary sources that would be gathered from existing literature, official government reports, declarations, books, academic research and article, news, and electronic websites.

1.4.2 Data analysis

The data would be analyzed through the Domestic Politics approach. However, due to the limitations of the article that studied this topic and the usage of Domestic Politics in their analysis, the researcher, therefore, adopts the model from the article of Vinsensio Dugis “*Domestic Political Structure and Public Influence on Foreign Policy, A Basic Model*”

1.5 Structure of study

Chapter 1: presents the background of the issue, a statement of the problems linked with the research question, objective, and scope of the study, methodology in which there are data collection methods and data analysis to give an introduction of which theoretical framework will be used in this study.

Chapter 2: the literature review, for this thesis covering a brief discussion of China’s importance in the region. The literature will be divided into four sections. The first section is Indonesia’s response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The second is the review of the theoretical framework both the International Relations theory. And thirdly, the findings of the literature and lastly the Domestic Politics approach will also be discussed.

Chapter 3: This chapter provides in-depth details of each aspect of domestic politics that influence foreign policymaking under the SBY presidency and ends with the conclusion in the analytical aspect.

Chapter 4: This Chapter provides in-depth details of domestic politics factors that have changed when a new president came into power, however, this means that the political system remains the same but the actors within the government have change. Moreover, this chapter provides analysis in terms of the change in foreign policy from SBY and Jokowi.

Chapter 5: The conclusion of this study and the implications for future studies.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims to provide details of related literature as well as identify the importance of domestic politics as a method to this study of Indonesia's foreign policymaking. The chapter will be divided into four parts.

Firstly, it will be a discussion on Indonesia's response to China's BRI which includes three sections, namely Indonesia's perception toward China's BRI, the challenges and opportunities, and Indonesia's maritime policy and the BRI.

Secondly, the related literature that studies this topic through IR theories including Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and the English school.

Thirdly, it will be the findings of the literature review which identifies what IR theories may have overlooked in the field of foreign policymaking.

Lastly, the discussion about the theoretical framework of Domestic Politics in which the researcher has synthesized the model to suit what this thesis is trying to explain

2.1 Indonesia's response to China's Belt and Road Initiative

This part will be divided into three subsections including Indonesia's perception toward China's BRI, the challenges and opportunities, and Indonesia's Maritime policy.

First, Indonesia's perception toward China's Belt and Road Initiative which includes two related works, namely "China's BRI: an Indonesian perspective" a research paper by Evi Fitriani, and "Perception and readiness of Indonesia towards the BRI" by Yose Rizal Damuri, Vidhyandika Perkasa, Raymond Atje and Fajar Hirawan, these works illustrated that Indonesia is still concerned about China's investment and true purposes in the South China Sea and want China to declare good intentions and commit to finding win-win solutions.

Nevertheless, Indonesia still remains concerned about both economic and political aspects as well as the domestic politics, which some have argued that from the standpoint of identity and domestic politics, that it would be better if the current government policies took Muslim's interests into consideration instead. They believe that the current government is being driven by 'foreign' interests, at the expense of both national and Muslim interests.

According to Wirajuda, the democratic transition in the country has changed the way policies are made, as the foreign policy decision-making process is now open to more anticipated actors, apart from the top-level foreign policy actors, it usually includes the parliament and interest groups (Mearsheimer & Walt 2007; Risse-Kappen, 1995).

Wirajuda further argued that the Indonesian parliament or the DPR and bureaucracies are more likely to be able to influence the decision-making process. Moreover, they are also prominent foreign policy observers and have been influential in shaping Indonesia's foreign policy agenda.

Secondly, challenges and opportunities: there are two related articles, namely "Review of The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative: Indonesia-China Cooperation and Future Opportunities for Indonesia's Port cities development" by Hermaputi Roosmayri, Gong Jiajia, and Hua Chen.

Another work "Indonesia and China's Belt and Road initiatives: Perspectives, Issues and Prospects" by Siwage Dharma Begera and Leo Suryadinata, argues that in Indonesia, which is keen to accelerate its infrastructure development, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is seen as an opportunity to tap into China's huge financial resources and technological capabilities. What appears to hamper progress are four key issues: the perception of China's economic domination, the ethnic Chinese issue, the Natuna issue, and the issue of mainland Chinese workers.

Third, this group of literature discusses Indonesia's Maritime policy and the BRI. It consists of several articles, namely "China's Maritime Silk Road and Indonesia's Maritime Nexus Policies: Towards policy convergence?" a paper by Meidi Kosandi, and another media release "Belt and Road Initiatives to Further Bolster Indonesia and China Economic Cooperation".

These two articles state that under the Jokowi administration, the development of the maritime sector is among the top priorities of Indonesian national development. With the vision to promote Indonesia as the “global maritime nexus”, the Nawacita proposes maritime development through three strategic policies: maritime infrastructure development, building capabilities in the maritime industry to support national maritime development and connectivity, and increasing maritime cooperation and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, according to Meidi Kosandi’s work, he stated that there are two things uncertain for Indonesia. First, the strategic relations that have been the core of Indonesian foreign relations might be undermined by the future maritime regime under China’s leadership. Successful implementation of the maritime policy may strengthen Chinese leadership among the cooperating parties of the Maritime Silk Road. Indonesia’s ties with ASEAN and the U.S. may change under any future regime.

Second, Indonesia’s capability to respond and contribute to the regional dispute settlements may also change under the new maritime regime. If the policy fails to induce South China Sea claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines into peaceful economic cooperation and drive the two claimants to assemble together to balance China with other powers, Indonesia’s role and contribution in maintaining the new regional order may be undermined.

2.2 IR theories: The study of Indonesia behavior towards China

In this section, the researcher will discuss the literature that studies this topic through the lens of IR theories including Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and the English School.

2.2.1 Realism

First, most Realism literature has examined Indonesia’s behavior towards the South China Sea conflict by shedding light on the importance of national and international security as well as the concept of the ‘balance of power’ which is the main aspect for realist scholars in considering Southeast Asia security.

According to a realist scholar named Misalucha (2014), who was mentioned in the thesis of Febrianti Tentyana S Tarno, the balance of power in this region by the major powers (namely China, the U.S. , and Japan) played an essential role in peacebuilding and peace settlements. Moreover, the study mentioned that the relations between the powers and the need to maintain international security indicated a win-lose relation.

From this aspect, her findings indicated that, from the realism point of view, one state sees another one as a threat, however, in reality, Indonesia has not perceived China as a major threat since its democratization even though there are some existing maritime issues between them. Indonesia could feel insecure by Chinese action in the Natuna Islands such as the interruption by illegal Chinese fishing activity, but it prefers to see it in another light.

Indonesia's foreign policy official viewpoint states that it is not necessary to feel threatened by China over territorial issues and that no official action was required to counterbalance against China. Therefore, realism theory is unable to explain the key factors of Indonesia's behavior toward China or the issue of the South China Sea dispute.

On the other hand, Ramadhani (2015) studies Indonesia's vision regarding the South China Sea dispute by utilizing a neorealism approach and argues that power and security competition among superpowers leads to security dilemmas in the international environment. She also focuses on the state of superpower influence, mainly the United States' attempts to rebalance Asia.

However, while she noted that Indonesia is keen to promote economic cooperation and mutual benefits, there is no further study on this issue (Ramadhnai, 2016). In summary, both the realism and neorealism approaches emphasized palpable material, for instance, military power and arms to express the power domination and threats to opposition states. However, in the case of Indonesia, their approach is based on the notion of a "Free and Active" foreign policy, to ensure their tradition of non-alignment.

2.2.2 Liberalism

Second, according to the thesis of Febrianti Tentyana S Tarno, she mentioned the work of Djalal who stressed the openness of the cooperation among ASEAN countries and other states outside the region (Djalal, 2001, p. 97-103). Djalal's basic principle concentrates on the importance of interstate cooperation rather than seeing each other as a potential threat. In terms of conflict resolution, in particular regarding the South China Sea dispute, he argues that countries in the region should support the coordination of and adherence to international law, especially the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention which is open to negotiation among states in the dispute.

Moreover, the author also mentions a diplomat who has investigated Indonesia's foreign policy towards the South China Sea dispute, named Aplianta (2015), who has described the escalating role of Indonesia in maintaining peace and security as Indonesia playing a key role as a mediator between China and ASEAN countries. Both Djalal's (2001) and Aplianta's (2015) studies found that Indonesia prefers peaceful stability in the region by perceiving less domination and threats by superpowers.

Also, Indonesia acts as a middleman by contributing to the Code of Conduct (CoC) and Declaration of Conduct (DoC) and in 2011, Indonesia eagerly cooperated with ASEAN member states and China in implementing the DoC and later continued to establish the CoC before the meeting in Beijing (Aplianta, 2015).

2.2.3 Constructivism

Third, the Constructivism perspective emphasizes the existence and preservation of national identity and values in which the historical issues of Indonesia also play a role in determining the outward behavior of the country. Sukma (1995), an expert on Indonesian foreign policy, highlights the "free and active" doctrine as a reflection of Indonesian historical, cultural, and political experiences which primarily illustrate the national and foreign policy.

According to Ruggie and Wendt, they stated that not only leaders or heads of state play a role in determining the policy but also that the nature of norms, values, culture, and identity are key factors in determining the domestic and foreign policy of a country. Moreover, Indonesian foreign policy analysts have argued that Indonesia's

identity as a Muslim majority state influences the formulation of both its domestic and foreign policy.

Therefore, according to Al-Anshori (2016) and Anwar (2010), they declare that religion, which is an impalpable aspect, succeeds in shaping Indonesia's approaches and reactions toward both regional and global issues.

In Anwar's study of Foreign Policy, Islam, and Democracy in Indonesia, she mentioned that, according to Yudhoyono, "Indonesia's free and active foreign policy should have a constructive approach to prevent the country from tapping into military alliances and being characterized by connectivity which would compel Indonesia to have a healthy engagement with the outside world" (Anwar, 2010b). In this sense, it is important to understand Indonesia's foreign policy toward international issues as a national reflection and image of the Muslim-majority state.

Moreover, in Febrianti Tentyana S Tarno's study of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) Performances To Deal With Tension in South China Sea Disputes: A Constructivist Analysis of Indonesia's Strategic Culture, under constructivism, she uses the strategic culture in explaining international security by examining the nation's idea, identity, and behavior toward external dispute. She mentioned that the Strategic Culture is useful to examine the constructed idea of Indonesia's neutrality in the realization of the "Maritime State" identity. In her findings, she laid out that the mediating role of neutrality of Indonesia came from the old foreign policy doctrine of "Free and Active" which the image and identity are carried by the current policy of "GMF" promoted by President Jokowi, in maintaining peace and security in maritime and border issues. In terms of the South China Sea conflict, it is argued that Indonesia's emphasis on GMF is very strong because the country needs to secure its maritime resources and power to reclaim the idea and identity of a maritime state.

Additionally, in the article of Fuadi Pitsuwan "Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the International Politics of the Islamic World" he stated that, unlike realism and liberalism, which tend to give priority to temporal factors such as power and materials, social constructivism opens the room for the impact of norms, beliefs, ideas, culture as well as perceptions in which to influence the interests and identities of the state and also determine its foreign policy.

Thus, to conclude, the mediating role Indonesia has been playing in either regional issues or global issues, is a constructed idea and identity which was cultivated from the culture and traditions in its foreign affairs and this mediating role was believed to be a continuation of Indonesia's traditions and culture which aims to preserve the peace and keep Indonesia active in maintaining global security and stability.

2.2.4 The English School

In terms of the English School, this theory is utilized in an article by Obsatar Sinaga and Verdinand Robertua titled "Indonesia in the South China Sea Dispute: Humble Hard Power". They employed this concept from Adam Nieves Johnson who invented the concept of humble hard power in his book "A Bilateral Analysis of the South China Sea Dispute: China, the Philippines, and the Scarborough Shoal" in which he stated that humble-hard power is a new form of hard power without intimidating others (Johnson, 2012,)

Moreover, Johnson argues that this concept is neither militarily threatening nor is it peacefully diplomatic, and employing this kind of power can achieve goals without inviting international condemnation. Johnson's humble hard power focuses on nonmilitary means which can be economic aid, technological improvement, or in the case of the South China Sea conflict, victory in the international legal dispute.

This article argues that mainstream International Relations theories such as Realism and Liberalism are not adequate in explaining the theoretical consequences of humble-hard power. The authors, therefore, looked to the English School theory, which has been revived by Barry Buzan (2014), to be able to understand contemporary international issues such as the South China Sea dispute.

In this, Barry Buzan combined the classic debate of pluralism and solidarism with the need for new conceptual construction through primary and secondary institutions. Linda Quayle (2013) has used the English School to investigate the International Relations of Southeast Asia with the focus being on state and non-state interaction. The authors of this article agree with Miles Kahler (2013) that, to counterbalance the risk of conflict, it needs three institutions, namely democracy,

economic interdependence, and international organizations, which Kahler has applied into the context of Asia's emerging powers including Indonesia.

Moreover, the authors suggested that for Indonesia to utilize the humble-hard power approach, it should capitalize on the tribunal ruling that rejected China's claim of the nine-dash line so that Indonesia could file a case against China. However, Indonesia's role in the South China Sea has confused scholars due to its neutrality and the free and active policy of pursuing peaceful solutions among states in the dispute.

Nonetheless, according to Kahler (2013), three circumstances in this region prevent a war, these being democratization, increasing economic interdependence, and emergence of international institutions. In the case of Indonesia, their foreign policy in the South China Sea conflict reflects the importance of democracy, economic interdependence, and international institutions. Indonesia plays the role of mediator and openly discuss possible solutions to the South China Sea with the claimant states as well as other related public stakeholders.

In terms of economic interdependence, there is evidence that China and other states involved in the dispute are important trade partners for Indonesia. In this sense, Indonesia has prioritized economic cooperation with its diplomatic agenda with China and other claimant states for restraint regarding the increasing tensions in the South China Sea. Furthermore, Indonesia is very enthusiastic about promoting the capacity and capability of ASEAN institutions in dealing with and managing regional problems especially in the South China Sea.

2.3 Summary and existing gaps

The literature provides some interesting points related to the topic of this study. Most of the literature implies the foreign policymaking process was conducted as a result of to the domestic politics of the particular time and surrounding external environment.

In terms of Indonesia's response to China's BRI, the literature reflects some of the domestic concerns over the issue of the South China Sea and China's intentions towards this region. This can be implied that Indonesia is, to some extent, afraid of

falling into the debt trap that other states such as Cambodia and Laos have become entangled in.

Moreover, the democratization of Indonesia has had a substantial impact on the way foreign policies are made, and it opens more avenues for several actors to participate in, which in turn reflect the desires of domestic politics in the sense that there could be an internal conflict between the actors who make or initiate the policy.

The second and third sections discuss the challenges and opportunities as well as the maritime policy of Indonesia. In my view, Indonesia could obtain enormous economic benefits from cooperating with China's BRI and at the same time achieve President Jokowi's vision of infrastructure development. On the other hand, in terms of the political aspect, especially the national security, those holding nationalist sentiment in Indonesia might not be impressed seeing China's influence in the maritime territory may want to ensure Indonesia's sovereignty over their own waters.

Therefore, President Jokowi's main policy of Global Maritime Fulcrum should give a clear explanation of how the country will conduct this policy toward China and other countries along the Pacific and Indian oceans at the same time respond to domestic desires and balance among his government in which there are both agree and disagree with this policy.

In terms of IR theories, it was very useful and interesting to understand the ins and outs of the foreign policy of a particular country, especially Indonesia as well. However, there are some aspects in domestic politics that IR theories have somewhat touched upon but not fully explained the whole process of how those domestic elements are crucial to the foreign policymaking of Indonesia.

In reviewing IR theories, it can be concluded that the realist proponents that are introduced in realism are highly applicable by means of their explanatory power which is a vital element of the state's international relations. Therefore, in this sense, realist theory is considered to be able to provide only a reliable and plausible source of policy options. However, realism doesn't provide any space for elaborating on other social aspects of discourse that happen in the contemporary world.

Moreover, according to the realist argument, the most important points in foreign policy analysis are the external aspects. It portrays the significance of the state

as the main actor in the international system, in which they are considered as rational unitary actors.

For liberalism, claims over peace and stability in the region, however, are inadequate in explaining the existence of Indonesia's new maritime doctrine of President Jokowi. The current president is trying to turn back the national reputation to be that of a 'maritime state' (Chen, 2014). Therefore, in the sense that Indonesia is trying to shift its geo-strategic focus onto the Indo-Pacific, it implies that it wants to maintain its 'middle power' status and reconstruct the sea lanes in its territory.

Nonetheless, the GMF policy which mainly aimed at extending their maritime regional leadership and the expansion of their maritime power is irrelevant to the liberalism theory. Therefore, the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy cannot be explained by neither realism nor liberalism.

Under the constructivism approach, it emphasizes the importance of having a set of norms and values that could prevent violence and conflict. However, foreign policy through the constructivism approach is often regarded as belonging to the realm of high politics and lacks roots in domestic aspects.

In terms of the English School, according to the arguments of I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, in his work "International Society: the social dimensions of Indonesia's foreign policy", the English School theoretical approach can help open up a new dimension to understanding the ideas and processes of diplomacy in Indonesia. Moreover, the English school argues that the example of Asian and African states as well as ASEAN explain the role of Indonesia in setting up multilateral diplomacy and emphasis beyond national interest.

In the researcher's view, IR theories have emphasized the international system or the external aspects in determining national interests, but in practice, national interests cannot be solely defined or determined by the international system because national interests can also reflect elements within the domestic political domain.

Therefore, in this matter, it links to the salience to fill in the gap that IR theories have overlooked which is the domestic aspect by focusing on the internal forces that drive the establishment of foreign policy in Indonesia. As a result, this thesis employs Domestic politics as a core framework to this study and identifies how each factor plays a role in the formation of foreign policy process.

Moreover, this thesis aims to investigate how foreign policy shifted from SBY to Jokowi by looking at the domestic political elements that have been prominently persistent. Despite Indonesia being a new democracy and becoming one of the largest democratic states in the world, the story behind its domestic elements still consists of some contradictions and influence from its traditional structure where the military remains predominant.


2.4 Domestic politics approach

This thesis adopted the Domestic Politics Model from *Vinsensio Dugis, a lecturer at the International Relations Department, Airlangga University. His article “Domestic Political Structure and Public Influence on Foreign Policy, A Basic Model”* revised the importance of a country's domestic political structure and the role of the public on foreign policy.

He drew the model of how the foreign policy was made and what factors should be taken into account.

Figure 2.1

The Model of Domestic Politics and Public Opinion Role on Foreign Policy



Note. Reprinted from “The Model of Domestic Politics and Public Opinion Role on Foreign Policy,” by V. Dugis, 2009. *Media Jurnal Global dan Strategis*, 3(2), p. 182.

In his article, he laid out the foundation to understanding how domestic politics and foreign policy are interrelated. According to Hermann (1990), foreign policy changes due to these three dimensions. Moreover, Goldmann's work (1988) provides some clear explanation for this issue as he argues for three dimensions that matter between a state's domestic politics and its foreign policy.

First, the matter of the degree of salience that points to the significance of the issue in the domestic power struggle happens when the transformation of the political system takes place, which could lead to various political changes including in the areas of foreign policy (Goldmann 1988).

Therefore, it is essential to consider the importance of the political system/structure of Indonesia which determines the scope and the power of leaders in foreign policy decision making.

According to studies by Clapham (1977) and Calvert (1986), they argued that the most significant actors in foreign policy decision-making in developing countries are their top policymakers. Therefore, to explain and identify foreign policy actors involved in the decision-making process, the domestic structure should be taken into consideration. Domestic structure, based on their studies, means the *changes in the political system* experienced by a state at a particular time which leads the state to change or alter its foreign policy.

As suggested by some scholars, one way of knowing the role of domestic structure or politics on foreign policy is by referring to studies on comparative foreign policy with some suggestions that different political systems have different bureaucratic systems through which decisions are formulated and implemented. Moreover, in most developed states, public policies tend to be prepared and operated through the existing bureaucratic procedures, with top policymakers in developing states mostly dominate these.

Second, the matter of the state's degree of institutionalization which means the extent to which the government of a state is committed to its foreign policy meaning that the struggle for domestic political power where foreign policy issues become a centerpiece. Competing political leaders and groups use foreign policy issues as a means to distinguish themselves from others.

Within this situation, the new incoming leader flanked by new supporting groups could lead to changes in foreign policy. In this sense, the researcher will look at the “Leadership” of the current president Jokowi, and his predecessor president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY in terms of foreign policy.

Third, the matter of the states' degree of support, refers to the extent to which various actors in domestic politics support or oppose the government's foreign policy. This occurs when the beliefs and attitudes of the majority of constituents drastically change, this could be used as a source for an explanation as to why the foreign policy has to be changed.

Foreign policy decision-makers are to build domestic political support for any of their proposed foreign policy initiatives to be implemented. Thus, foreign policy decisions become political results that reflect necessary political strategies to build agreement with the domestic structure to support the implementation of foreign policy.


Fourth, the Chinese factor also influences Indonesia's foreign policymaking as well. There are a number of scholars who argue that the foreign policy of a country is not solely determined by the domestic or internal factors, but is also influenced by the external environment which plays a significant role in foreign policy decision making.

Yet, in the case of Indonesia, where foreign policymaking is regarded as a top-down process, the political system tends to determine the direction of foreign policy and the actors that are involved in the decision-making process, mainly the top policymakers and political elites. Moreover, the Chinese factor was significant as it aligned with the president's vision and interest. However, the president himself could not solely create policy towards China that suited only his interests, as it was again restricted by the political groups that imposed themselves on the political system and structure.

From this aspect, the model that will be used in this thesis will be synthesized and modified into the following:

Figure 2.2

The Analytical Framework Synthesized by the Researcher



This model uses as a framework to analyze the foreign policymaking for a country that has a top-down structure where the traditional political system tends to persist. So, when considering the significance of Indonesia's domestic political structure such as the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of governance, the extent to which government is accountable and transparent or personalist, these help shape the domestic and international interplay of leaders and elites, resulting in domestic and foreign policies.

In other words, the role of leadership is crucial in the domain of foreign policy formulation, but it is argued that the domestic political structure is believed to constrain the power of the leader, in which the latter has to adhere to the existing system. This point also corresponds to the political system in which it somehow provides or constrains the direction of the foreign policy of the country.

The president needs to comply with the existing bureaucratic dominance, an example of this being the military-backed democracy in the SBY era, and the maintenance of military support in the Jokowi era. This is said to be deep rooted in Indonesia's political structure, in other words, it can be said that Indonesian domestic politics remains a hierarchical structure.

Moreover, the factor of political groups in which the researcher will analyze the political groups involved in Indonesia's foreign policymaking which includes the government coalition, opposition parties, and the oligarchical elites that play a role as push and pull aspects for the president to consider when formulating foreign policy and how they could constrain or allow the implementation of foreign policy that the leader proposes. These groups can also be called a political faction because within the government itself, there are factions that support the foreign policy of the president, while on the other hand there is also a group that tends to oppose the policies and pressure the government to adopt policies that are more favorable to them.

Lastly, the Chinese factor manifests itself through state-to-state relations which also constrain state behavior and challenge the leader's political legitimacy. China and the pressure they bring provide both opportunities and challenges for leaders to manage their political legitimacy and their effectiveness in dealing with particular issues.

However, from the model, the reason why the Chinese factor was deemed to be a part of domestic politics is that when it comes to the process of foreign policymaking, this factor is taken into consideration by the government figures of Indonesia. In other words, the president and other political elites will consider this factor when contemplating the issue of the South China Sea conflict and the economic benefits from the BRI which directly affect the economic development of Indonesia.

Moreover, by looking at the factor of China, it implicitly complies with neorealism which asserts that diplomacy, bargaining, and even waging war become strategic affairs of the country. In this case, China played a significant role in terms of its influence on Indonesia's foreign policymaking towards its rise and expansion through the BRI. The action of China in the South China Sea and the Natuna Island might create some uneasy feelings of uncertainty, but the leader will choose whether or not to join the BRI depending on how they perceive China as well as the current circumstances that impact the direction of foreign policy, in which Dupont points out that the balance of power between states and the dilemma of mutual security are the main concerns of the neorealist.

The notion of security dilemma has been particularly useful in explaining Indonesia's awareness towards its security and economic interests amid the uncertainty in international affairs structured by overlapping interests.

For instance, China's expansion of power through this region not only stems from its military capabilities but from its emergence as an economic power. According to Sunardi, the stronger the economy of a country is, the more power and leverage it has in shaping the dynamic of its strategic relations. Drawing from this point, it can be applied to this case in which China's growing economic power led to a change in the regional dynamic that has influenced both president SBY and Jokowi to perceive China as a necessary economic partner that could boost Indonesia's economic growth and development.

At the same time, it can be viewed from the balance of power perspective that China posed a change in regional dynamic and ASEAN states also shared many concerns over the South China Sea dispute. This aspect, therefore, posed a challenge for the governments of both President SBY and President Jokowi, as they have had to carefully pursue their foreign policy in response to these circumstances.

All in all, these four factors are prominent in the study of foreign policy, domestic politics can define the scope of the foreign policymaking process with the interactions with the external environment which refers to the situation that occurred during that particular time.

The original model would be beneficial to IR students who are interested in exploring the interplay between the domestic political structure and the public in which its possible impact on the government's foreign policy.

However, in the case of Indonesia's foreign policymaking, domestic politics play a vital role, especially the four factors mentioned earlier. On the other hand, there is limited information of public opinion influence in foreign policymaking about this issue and the available survey of public opinion was conducted by the quantitative method which illustrated the satisfaction of overall performance of leader and economic growth of the country.

To provide more reason for not taking the public opinion into account, Muhammad Hadiano Wirajuda argued in his thesis that the democratic political system usually allows public opinion to feature in the decision-making process although the

final outcomes may not always reflect that which the public truly desire. Political elites in democracies tend to listen to, but not necessarily follow, public opinion even in parliamentary democracies (Capling & Nossal, 2003; Saalfeld, 1997).

The political elites often ignore public opinion in times of crisis; in other words, the extent to which public opinion influences political leaders essentially depends on the personal judgment of the leaders concerned (Hilsman, 1971)

Furthermore, in practice, the importance of the link between the main foreign policy decision-makers in either the parliament or even public opinion is likely to be shaped by the type of issue and by the prior information held by each actor (Cunningham & Moore, 1997). Although there is an argument that in democracies, there is a considerable variation in the way that the government follows public pressure. In principle, the salience of pressure on the government is likely to be determined by the degree of centrality of the political system (Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 487-488).

Besides, Avery Poole examined the public opinion on how the democratic identity is perceived in Indonesia. He provided the example of a 2012 poll undertaken by the Lowy Institute which found that 'Indonesians overwhelmingly believe in core democratic values'; in another poll conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in 2010, the results showed that 75 percent of those surveyed believed that Indonesia is a democracy but only 4 percent agreed that voting gives them a chance to influence decision-making in Indonesia.

These polls suggest that the majority of the Indonesian public support the democratic project, but this does not mean that they support the promotion of democracy internationally. This implies that the public does not support the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy priority, but instead prefers Indonesia to have a role in specific political crises.

This research suggests that the projection of a democratic identity in foreign policy reflects a belief in democratic values and the worth of democracy as a political system. However, it does not tell us whether, or to what extent, public opinion influences the formulation of foreign policy.

As a further matter, Dirk Tomsa, argued in his article that public opinion polling goes hand in hand with the problems of responsiveness, representation and accountability. He further argued that the way to measure public opinion is

fundamentally misguided, as Pierre Bourdieu declared “public opinion does not exist”. From this matter, it is an illusion to believe that all respondents of public opinion surveys are knowledgeable enough to hold an informed opinion about the matters they are asked to comment on.

His article also suggested that policy decisions are often influenced more by lobbying from those such as business leaders and wealthy citizens than the opinions of the general public. As a result, many political actors, including most party leaders, remain skeptical about public opinion polling, therefore, public opinion polling remains relatively marginal to the political process.

In other words, according to Risse-Kappen, public opinion or public consensus was considered as a function of elite consensus and elite divisions trickle down to the mass public. It can be assumed that the public is easily manipulated by political leaders due to three reasons.

Firstly, the low significance of foreign and security policy issues when compared with economic policies. Secondly, the low degree of knowledge held about the issues involved and lastly, the volatility or liability of public opinion (Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 480-482).

Although, there are investigations from the local level regarding the issue of BRI, an example being the report by CSIS Indonesia which investigated three provinces, namely North Sulawesi, North Kalimantan, and North Sumatra. Each of these provinces have particular economic potential. In summary from the local view, these three provinces cannot plan and execute major projects on their own and require assistance from the central government.

This implies that the government has more power than the voices of the people. This is due to the lack of clear information on the BRI to the public and most of the decisions depend on the central government of the country.

CHAPTER 3

DOMESTIC POLITICS INFLUENCE IN SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHYONO'S FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's regime in terms of the foreign policy decision-making process. The interesting point of the SBY era is that his government was backed by the military and the political structure was influenced by the military and political elites, but his era was said to be one of stable democracy.

This chapter consists of five parts, namely Indonesia's political system: the SBY military-backed government. Second, leadership and foreign policy, this part will highlight the direction of his foreign policy that was shaped by the military's interests. Third, the political groups which will discuss the military and bureaucracy's involvement. Fourth, the Chinese factors and subsequently the conclusion.

3.1 Indonesia's political system: SBY military-backed government

According to the framework, it can be argued that the foreign policy and identifying actors involved in the decision-making process can be assumed from the changes of the political system experienced by a state. For instance, Indonesia's transformation from authoritarian rule to a democratic regime resulted in a drastic change to foreign policy and the process of decision-making.

The foreign policy was not solely made by the president himself but by a larger group of actors. The democratic principles gradually improved from time to time and were said to be consolidated in the tenure of SBY's presidency. But there was a strong political structure where the military remained dominant which lasted until the current period.

The military's presence plays a significant role in establishing the ideology that the army is the guardian of the nation and has been since the country gained independence from the Netherlands. Since then, Indonesia has a heritage that conveys the Independent and Active notion, as their foreign policy doctrine.

The political history of Indonesia reveals that the Indonesian National Armed Forces (the TNI) have held a strong political influence in Indonesia since the period of Guided Democracy. This influence derives from the fact that politically, Indonesia has been characterized by patrimonialism. Several existing pieces of literature reveal that the TNI developed its role as the guardian of the nation during the Indonesian struggle for sovereignty and reached the height of its power under Suharto.

The TNI's role during the Indonesia National Revolution against the Dutch had prominent consequences for the military power that exceeded meeting national defense objectives. Since the country declared independence, it has always adhered to the highest constitutional guidance of "Independent and Active" foreign policy doctrine along with the army domination.

The notion that the TNI was the savior of Indonesia thereby facilitated its claim that TNI personnel deserved a seat in the political sphere. Furthermore, in the New Order era, the TNI's influence grew substantially. The so-called 'dual function' doctrine gave the military national defense and political authority. From this aspect, Damien Kingsbury asserted in his work of Power Politics and the Indonesian Military that the military's insertion of itself into political life became an acknowledged political reality.

The fall of Suharto during the Reformasi however ended more than thirty years of military-backed rule and produced some successes in terms of introducing steps that limited the TNI's political and economic influence. The Reformasi brought about one of the biggest problems for the TNI which was a change in its image which became that of corruption and nepotism among the elite officers which led to a decline in both the quality and professionalism of the Armed Forces as well as the citizen's trust in the TNI as an institution.

Despite this, there was a little change in the 2000s during which the military maintained its territorial command structure which allowed the TNI to tap into economic resources at the grassroots level and defend its role as a significant player in local politics. A wide gap in 2004 showed that the TNI's Law mandated that the military divests from the business of military officials which meant that they still continue to maintain control of several corporations and enterprises in the country.

This implies that the fall of Suharto did not mean the removal from power of New Order TNI figures or their political companions, it thus allowed the TNI to retain their power with the protection from oversight and exemption from civil persecution regionally and nationally. Moreover, the role of the military not only helped to install Suharto's successor but they also achieved electoral success following the post-Reformasi loss of confidence in civilian political leadership, the climax of which was the two-term presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The TNI used the victory of SBY as evidence of its refurbished image.

As mentioned earlier, as Indonesia is characterized by patrimonialism, SBY is also the patron of its military groups. The presence of SBY as a representative of military groups in Indonesia implies that military groups still play an important role.

For example, military officers still hold prominent positions within the cabinet, military officers manage considerable economic resources and the military's presence in the provinces has been enhanced by strong patrimonial ties with local elites which allows them to manipulate local political processes.

Indonesia today is *a proto democracy*;¹ while employing processes that preserve its democratic image, the current political model in reality is fraught with weaknesses that encourage new forms of military participation. The Indonesian National Armed Forces' history shapes its perception and despite its withdrawal from politics, the officer corps retains a mindset that they are entitled to assume leadership if civilians cannot effectively protect the national interests.

The TNI commander General Wiranto's carefully worded statement during Armed Forces Day in 1998 stated that "the TNI would shift its role in politics and the national development process by not always being at the front of leadership, not to occupy but to influence, not in a direct way but indirectly, based on the willingness for political role sharing with other national groups in Indonesia". This is proof that the TNI still retained its substantial autonomy and that its influence in the SBY era is undeniable.

Importantly, the actions designed to influence government decisions originate entirely from the elites themselves without any need for mass participation or

¹ Proto-democracy is according to Sebastain (2007) a transitional model after the demise of the predecessor regime though moving towards a more democratic situation.

mobilization. It is clear from the political history of Indonesia since its independence and from the elements of its structure and cultural view that the most likely outcome over the last several decades is the maintenance of bureaucratic polity in which the military and oligarchy remained. Although Indonesia's policy direction may have been altered, political participation and power continues to be monopolized by the highest levels of the military and bureaucratic elites.

3.1.1 SBY democracy consolidation?

This section discusses the interlude of SBY in post-Suharto military politics. This aims to demonstrate his role in the developments of Indonesia's military politics after the fall of Suharto.

SBY as president achieved both political stability, by means of democratic consolidation, and economic growth. These successes were praised by the international community as Indonesia's recovery on the global stage as an emerging state. However, it was the stability in civil-military relations that was a key contributing factor to the progress in democracy.

SBY's military and political career in post-Suharto governments and his rise to the presidency reflect structural developments in the Indonesian military, as in the late New Order, SBY had managed to build a reformist image and also remain part of the political elite without relying on Suharto's anger. Although he played a significant role in convincing the military leadership under Wiranto that it had to let go of Suharto if it wanted to continue to play a role in post-New order politics. On the other hand, despite his rejection of the excesses of authoritarianism, he shared many of the traditional military sentiments against democratic practice and rules. For example, in the early Habibie tenure, he proposed limitations on the number of political parties and proposed regulations restricting their religious ideological orientation.

However, it is worth noting that Indonesia experienced democratization which resulted in the downplay of the military in the politics. Although the military has lost much of their formal political influence and they no longer act as the backbone of the incumbent regime, the military has still successfully defended its territorial power base, maintained its autonomy, and exploited the fragmentation of civilian politics to gain political concessions.

Although, in the 2000s the political structure begun to decentralize, the parliament was formally empowered to exercise control over the military who no longer held any such veto power. On the other hand, the core problem is that the military also shaped Indonesia's process of democratic transition since the fall of Suharto, and due to this, it is apparent that they will continue to play a significant role in Indonesia's politics.

As Indonesia was democratized, the country was called a new democratic state. The ideology of democracy did influence the way Indonesia presented itself on the international stage. Anwar also stated that SBY believed democracy was Indonesia's 'international identity' which shaped a certain attitude, including a more intense relationship with China despite some degree of wariness (Anwar 2010). SBY's intention was to make Indonesia be seen as an outward-looking country, eager to shape the regional and international order.

However, regardless SBY's image as a reformist, the political elite remained an important instrument for SBY to build support networks for his election campaign. And after his victory, SBY appointed several retired military officers to key government posts. Simultaneously, they had lived through the ups and downs of military transition from a pillar of authoritarian rule to a mediator and participant in democratic politics.

SBY with his visionary political regime and aspiration was influenced by democracy, but his experience with the pitfalls of Indonesia's political system instilled an extreme sense of caution in him. This caution became a hallmark of his presidency, in particular in his attitude to coalition building. From this aspect, he chose to create large 'rainbow coalition' cabinets that included not only former military officers and bureaucrats but also representatives from a large majority of the parties holding seats in parliament (DPR).

These factors have influenced and shaped his administration's policies in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas. During his regime, he persisted with the old idea of inclusive and grand coalition-building in the face of its manifest failure either to build cabinet solidarity or to maintain a base of support in the legislature, at the same time if the DPR had a greater capacity to develop its alternative policy

agenda, then SBY's administration may have had many more confrontations with the DPR than the relative few that did occur.

Furthermore, the oversized coalition brought about the problem of a fragmented and unrooted party system to the SBY government (Liddle 2005). Although he won a popular mandate, he still had to manage his way among the elites and strike compromises, as he had to consider various interests in order to build a support system.

3.2 Leadership and foreign policy: An outward-looking president

This section points out the impact of the political system on his foreign policy and the way he responded to the issue of the South China Sea conflict concerning the Independent and active foreign policy doctrine.

Moreover, this part will introduce SBY's well known foreign policy of "thousand friends and zero enemy". Third, the prioritization of ASEAN and lastly will be SBY's foreign policy towards the South China Sea conflict.

3.2.1 SBY's presidency and foreign policy

This section provides the analysis of SBY's foreign policy in which it was influenced by the existing domestic politics structure and the foreign policy doctrine of Independent and Active. This section aims to investigate how much and to what extent the foreign policy of SBY is in compliance with the political structure and independent and active doctrine.

The foreign policy changed or altered, but this did not solely come from the leader himself but was comprised of some factors such as the leader's background, the interests, and importantly the political structure which was believed to constrain the character of the leader. In other words, some studies on personality and character of the leader also coined that the personality and the background of the leader is reflected in his policy which holds true, but the leader himself has to accommodate the existing domestic political structure.

The political structure and the independent and active doctrine manifested the sense of nationalism in which the idea of this foreign policy notion reflected the perception of Indonesia when it was struggling with their freedom even after the

country declared its independence. Furthermore, the military-backed government of SBY itself implies that the foreign policy needs to concern national sovereignty and development.

So, when he first assumed the presidency in 2004, SBY's personality traits were well known in elite political circles. Since he was a senior military officer and then a minister, he had obtained a reputation for being highly intelligent and upright with a worldwide vision.

Since its democratization, the Indonesian political system has become more liberal and complies with democratic principle, but despite the authoritarian system being replaced, the political elite circle persisted.

Indonesia's status as a new democracy inspires the country to play a more international role. President SBY came into office with an ambitious reform agenda as he promised to accelerate economic growth, eliminate corruption and terrorism as well as strengthen democracy and human rights. From this aspect, he added the necessity for a constructive approach in the conduct of independent and active foreign policy.

Indonesia's independence and activism must be combined with a constructive mindset. This indicates an ability to turn an adversary into a friend, and a friend into a partner. This helps Indonesia to utilize the independent and active foreign policy to be a peacemaker, confidence builder, and a problem solver.

Although SBY portrayed his thinking as being driven by democratic and constructive principles, it was also heavily influenced by the traditional structure that prioritized political order much like in the Suharto era, this tradition shaped SBY's thinking on personal interactions and socio-political arrangements. Moreover, the concept of Independent and Active has encouraged the national leader to design a foreign policy that can make the country sustainable and secure.

The formulation of foreign policy under SBY was a combination of the concept of middle power diplomacy and the restriction of Indonesia's traditional ideology of "Independent and Active". This resulted in SBY's "thousand friends and zero enemy" policy. This term in of itself showcases that Indonesia had an expansive ideology and wanted to obtain its position in the world and Indonesia would not align with any power blocs.

3.2.1.1 Thousand friends and zero enemy

From the principle of the Independent and Active foreign policy doctrine, Indonesia has been afraid of being influenced by the major powers due to the experience from the historical legacy during colonization. Therefore, this foreign policy doctrine has been inherited down to the present day. SBY's thousand friends and zero enemy policy covered a number of aspects such as national security and economic interest and SBY tried to bring Democracy to the world which it adhered to Indonesia's traditional foreign policy.

SBY has emphasized what is called "democratic instinct" as shown in his 2010 speech at the sixth biennial assembly of the World of Democracy. SBY tried to promote democracy within the region through the international forum with the vision to secure national security and protection from military threats from neighboring states.

Moreover, he also believed that democracy is Indonesia's "international identity". This belief shaped a certain attitude and perception including a more intense relationship with China, despite some certain degree of wariness (Anwar, 2010).

This is reflected in SBY's famous slogan of "thousand friends and zero enemy" which manifested the so-called "omnidirectional diplomacy" to be the primary foreign policy direction under his administration. Moreover, SBY upholds the traditional "Independent and Active" foreign policy doctrine to foreground the stance that Indonesia will not take sides or align with any particular bloc.

He has worked to expand Indonesia's influence on the international stage through its active leadership within ASEAN and closer cooperation with India, Australia, and China. Moreover, SBY had been eager to share his experiences on democratic transition with the leaders of other nations such as Myanmar and Egypt. Moreover, Indonesia during this time held an annual Asia-Pacific forum on democracy designed to lend legitimacy to this political agenda.

In terms of economic perspective, SBY has manifested that Indonesia's agenda is not only for security but also prioritized economic development and see that Indonesia should play a proactive role in the international economic forum. For instance, he pushed Indonesia to play a greater role in international stages such as

G20 with the belief that joining a global scale of integration would improve Indonesia's image and reputation to the world.

Moreover, Indonesia has played many international roles such as those in United Nations peacekeeping operations and plays a leading and, at the same time, mediating role in ASEAN as in the case of the Cambodia-Thailand territorial dispute. Also, Indonesia under his presidency successfully took part in the ending of the 20-year separatist battle with the Free Aceh Movement insurgent (GAM) in which a peace agreement was signed in Helsinki in 2005. These kinds of actions were linked to his political ideology and how he aimed to utilize democratic means which were portrayed through his foreign policy and diplomacy.

3.2.1.2 Prioritization of ASEAN

As part of his aspiration for Indonesia to play a leading role in the region, SBY has prioritized ASEAN as its foreign policy cornerstone. Indonesia has long led ASEAN and in the SBY government, Indonesia played a role in pushing ASEAN as a whole towards democratic principles such as in the ASEAN Charter (2007) and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (2009), as well as hosting the Bali Democracy forum which invited both democracies and non-democracies to the forum.

In his speech SBY said that he placed great importance on the relationships with ASEAN and the United Nations, that in his view the two organizations should work together to strengthen ASEAN's capacity to globally assist in conflict resolutions and this intention was built on Indonesia's national commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. In addition to that, he said that it was important for Indonesia to exercise constructive leadership and maintain regional peace and stability which he believed would bring economic growth and prosperity.

3.2.1.3 SBY's foreign policy toward the South China Sea conflict

When it comes to the issue of the South China Sea conflict, SBY's political regime was highlighted as being crucially important for democratic principles along with his foreign minister who coined the term "dynamic equilibrium" in which Indonesia would seek to balance its diplomatic relations between the major powers and ASEAN countries.

From this point, he placed priority on ASEAN and multi-cooperation. When it comes to the issue of the South China Sea, he utilized methods that conformed to his policy slogan by employing Middle-power diplomacy which focused on the means that Indonesia acted as a confidence-builder and was entrusted in projecting a peaceful manner.

Rather than seeing China's assertive action as a threat, he saw this as an opportunity for Indonesia to advance its military capabilities. Since has China a growing military force, Indonesia launched the 'strategy of defense' with two main objectives: first, to protect national sovereignty, and second, to advance its military forces and use this channel to cooperate closely with China. We can see that the Strategy of Defense was launched to deal with China's actions in the South China Sea through a cooperative manner, but this strategy emphasized military cooperation such as the advancement of military technology for defense. As a consequence, Indonesia was able to manage this action effectively without attracting skepticism from both China and its neighboring countries.

This strategy of defense made a significant change to the strength of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the TNI's power was to maintain and protect the sovereignty of Indonesia and the national interest. According to the democratic principle, it explains that the concept of national interest can establish cooperation between countries to assist development, even in countries that are competing without a conflict.

Consequently, SBY prioritized the development of the defense system and security forces to safeguard Indonesia's territory. This defense development was done carefully based on defensive and not offensive means so that there was no suspicion from other countries, especially China, because Indonesia would like to maintain its sovereignty around the Natuna Islands and maintain good relations with China.

In addition, this defensive strategy of SBY was built on several factors, mainly political identity, national interest, and defense technology development. In terms of national interest, the president had done several cooperative agreements with China in various sectors such as economy, technology, and modern

defense technology to build Indonesian military power to achieve its maximum potential.

Therefore, in the South China Sea conflict where most ASEAN countries are involved, Indonesia acts as a mediator to safeguard peace in the geographical territory both between claimant states and Indonesian waters, Indonesia moreover utilized this opportunity to establish cooperation with China especially in strengthening its military fleet with the aim to show that Indonesia will not take action that could endanger China and to reduce the sense of suspicion from China. The cooperation between the two countries under SBY began to improve which led the Chinese government to believe in the good intentions of Indonesia (Arifin, 2014).

SBY's strategy of defense was very effective in establishing bilateral or multilateral relations, it was based on Indonesia's independent and active traditional foreign policy which meant that Indonesia does not have to stand against any particular country. His political identity also makes SBY demonstrate the consistency of "a thousand friends and zero enemy" and "middle power diplomacy".

Drawing from the point, Indonesia has prioritized ASEAN and tried to solve regional disputes through the multilateral mechanism and even stated that ASEAN was Indonesia's foreign policy cornerstone. It can be assumed from neorealism that the establishment of such an institution is an instrument of foreign policy, to promote norms and standards profitable for the creator. But the advantage of having international institutions is that, if it were not for this institution, we could never be sure what was going to happen. So, having them can help states to be more able to predict the behavior of one another.

All in all, Indonesia has acquired the leader status in ASEAN. It then utilized this regional integration as a mechanism to step further onto a global level. At the same time, the actions, such as the promotion of Democracy and the mediator role in many regional disputes, were done through the Independent and Active sentiment with the military presence in the Strategy of Defense that deals with national sovereignty.

Moreover, Indonesia, while playing an important role regionally, has asserted its economic interests as we can see from its response to Chinese's assertive actions that Indonesia did not try to oppose China but rather utilize the given

opportunity to advance its economic relations and military technological development. Although it was said to be a defensive manner, it was also one of the mechanisms of power accumulation that reflects the national security sentiment of the term Independent and Active.

3.3 Political groups: A controversy within coalition, a democracy stagnation?

In terms of political groups involved in foreign policymaking in SBY's administration, this political group or faction as it can be called, represented the role of several actors involved in the foreign policy formation and decision making in the SBY era. This part aims to highlight the impact of these political groups in the decision-making process. Following Indonesia's political structure, there is some bureaucratic dominance and military presence in the high position.

Moreover, the building of an oversized coalition by SBY was then led to the intra-coalition conflict regarding their interests both in political and economical aspects, for example, in terms of the imbalance in the of share of interests.

3.3.1 The involvement of military and bureaucracies

Since the authoritarian system has been to some extent replaced with a more democratic system, it was said that this period is the period of democratic consolidation. There are an increasing number of actors involved in policy decision-making. According to Yani, a lecturer at Padjadjaran University, this reveals that the center of decision making in Indonesia rests with the president along with the advice of the foreign minister, who is responsible for the implementation of such policy. Moreover, to the foreign minister, the president receives information and other outputs to policymaking from the commander in chief of the armed forces, especially in areas directly affecting the country's security.

The role and involvement of the armed forces in the formation of foreign policy is considered to be consistent with its defense function. For instance, the Strategy of Defense foreign policy in which the policy aims to secure national security while at the same time advance the military technological defense with China.

In terms of foreign economic relations, the economic ministers will play the most prominent part in considering the policy under a coordinating minister whom the president mainly relies on. At the same time, the role of the DPR, through its Committee I in charge of foreign and defense affairs, is limited in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The DPR's role, in general, is more important and effective through the legislation, but this is rarely employed in the area of foreign affairs.

Although, there are many actors involved in the decision-making process, there still remained a bureaucratic and military dominance of ministerial positions. Taking the defense system of the South China Sea conflict as an illustration, the Defense Minister's white paper stated that in order to solve the problems that are related to and affect the national defense, Indonesia must prioritize diplomacy supported by modern military force. On the other hand, the foreign policy of SBY in response to the South China Sea dispute is based on multilateral cooperation, but it implies the significance of the military to play a major role in the national defense.

In terms of decision-making, although the military or the TNI have withdrawn from day-to-day political activities, it is somewhat ironic that civilian political parties now seek support from the TNI and influential individual senior military officers. From this aspect, although there was a military reform effort during the SBY era, he could not overcome the military dominance in his administration and the policy formulation.

It is a paradox that even though SBY upheld the democratic principle and the democracy was stabilized, there are divergent controversies in his government. First, regarding the oversized coalition, he had to deal with different shared interests. Second, his military background gave rise to the presence of the military in the top positions in his government. Third, his over concern about international reputation led to the neglect of domestic issues which, until the last year of his presidency, he still could not manage to overcome these problems.

From these aspects, the problem posed to the SBY government is that he could not manage his government coalition effectively and there are some senior military officers, oligarchs and bureaucrats in the top positions. All these fundamental issues caused him to pursue the middle ground and neutralize policies that he

considered as moderating president, in which that his most important role was to moderate and mediate between conflict and clash of interest.

However, this shows the lack of bold action and a strong policy agenda, as president SBY refrained from advancing his ideas in any political debates but rather performed tasks that could save face from heavy criticism. Although he had a huge coalition that could protect him from any potential impeachment, it also made the process of decision making tremendously difficult (Sherlock, 2015).

In terms of the involvement of bureaucrats, SBY was not a predominant leader because bureaucratic dominance tended to prevail in his policymaking. Their influence can be indicated by their policy advocacy towards, for example, strategic cooperation with China, their active involvement in bilateral meetings with Chinese officials and business groups.

Moreover, the roles of bureaucrats related to the democratic arrangement in which SBY before making a decision, needed to engage with bureaucratic actors. On the other hand, his lack of foreign policy expertise and understanding of foreign trade and investment compelled him to seek policy recommendations and advice from bureaucrats, especially his ministers.

For example, he advocated that the nation's foreign policy Indonesian ministers of trade had been the leading actors in promoting stronger cooperation between Indonesia and China. And most of the policies, including the technical details and direction of said policies, were drafted and shaped by ministers and their senior officials instead of the president himself who initiated them.

In sum, during the tenure of SBY, the government navigated the country's democratic consolidation. The military still maintained a presence in Indonesian politics and to some extent the decision-making process, for example, the need for military support. However, for the military, what is important is not about something symbolic, such as retaining a fraction of political influence, but rather, it is the preserving privilege and vested interests.

This means economic interest through various forms of business activities was important in determining defense policies without civilian intervention. For instance, the Code of Conduct and the Strategy of Defense policy are deemed to be the TNI's policy which was evident during the SBY era. SBY was the first popularly

elected president, but he was an ex-military elite who was well aware of the business interests that the TNI generated from the traditional territorial command system.

3.4 The Chinese factor: A truly collaboration?

This section highlights the relations between Indonesia and China and how, or to what extent, China influences the foreign policy of Indonesia by utilizing the neorealism security dilemma and the balance of power in the analysis. Second, this section tries to distinguish the role of China in influencing the foreign policymaking of SBY.

According to Goldman (1988), states always adapt to the changing environment in which they are located. In the same way, Hill (2003) pointed out that foreign policy is formulated 'to mediate the impact of external influence on the domestic and to find ways of projecting a particular set of concerns in a very complex world'. In other words, foreign policy cannot be separated from the external context.

Nonetheless, there are a number of scholars who argue that the foreign policy of a country is not solely determined by the domestic or internal factors, but is also influenced by the external environment which plays a significant role in foreign policy decision making and the Southeast Asian region. Indonesia is one of the countries for whom that the external environment has, to some extent, influenced foreign policy.

3.4.1 Indonesia's relations with China

Indonesia's relationship with China has historically been unstable, and these ups and downs in their relations lasted until 2005 when president SBY signed a strategic partnership with China. However, as Rizal Sukma argued, in terms of bilateralism, Indonesia has become increasingly more comfortable dealing with China, as shown in the expansion of cooperation between the two since 1998 and especially since 2004. Nonetheless, in the context of the region, Indonesia's attitude and policy is still shaped to a degree by a feeling of uncertainty due to the long-term implications of the rise of China in the regional order.

Moreover, as geographically close and with large ethnic Chinese populations in their own countries, the Southeast Asian states want to ensure that China's inevitable rise is as peaceful as possible. China also realized this matter; thus, it has courted with a diplomatic 'charm offensive' giving development aid and increasing its role in multilateral forums. This also matches with the vision of SBY in which he wanted to promote multilateral cooperation and have Indonesia play more of a role on the regional and global stages.

SBY and his omnidirectional diplomacy emphasize the non-alignment perspective. This reflects a security dilemma from the neorealist aspect, as China's rise in its expansion of power led to the change in the regional dynamic ("An Analysis of Neorealist," 2018). Therefore, countries with less economic capability need to adjust their foreign policy to balance Chinese power and at the same time secure their national interest.

Most of the states in Southeast Asia are considered to be developing countries, therefore, they see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. But they do not fully trust in China's intention as well due to the ongoing incidents in the South China Sea. It has posed that Southeast Asian countries need to carefully proceed with their relations and foreign policy with China.

3.4.2 The role of China that affect SBY's foreign policy

China is one of the most developed countries in the fields of technology, economy, and military power. Moreover, the continuity of the military force built by China has provoked countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia to be concerned over China's intervention by using its military aggressiveness, particularly in the South China Sea.

China has some prominent characteristics that play roles and to some extent make Indonesia pursue the foreign policy of omnidirectional diplomacy. In this regard, concerning the South China Sea conflict, Indonesia's South China Sea policy under SBY focused on diplomacy where Indonesia acted as a confidence-builder and was entrusted in promoting peaceful means. This approach of Indonesia's foreign policy reflects on continuity rather than providing a fundamental change in Indonesia's overall manners of solving the issue.

Those prominent characteristics are, first, the growing power of China and the structural shifts in the regional power and the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement are key instruments in promoting regional integration which was China's idea.

Second, the Indonesian government was worried about trends of regional arms build-up to prevent any aggressive action from the major power. Thus, the main concern was that if a state decided to launch a policy of military modernization that went beyond security requirements, then the arms race could provoke tension and in turn, reduce the state's security and increase the possibility of war.

Third, maritime disputes have posed a significant challenge to Indonesia's regional security. The tensions between China and ASEAN claimants have complicated ASEAN-China relations and also weakened the unity of the association. Indonesia also rejects China's claims in the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, and this posed a concern for defense officials who have repeatedly expressed their concerns on the vulnerabilities of Indonesia's territorial sovereignty to China's intrusion.

All these characteristics of China have led to regional uncertainty. Under SBY, Indonesia chose to maintain the long-standing doctrine of 'independent and active' foreign policy. Whilst at the same time, emphasizing its aspiration for international peace and stability despite these concerns. In other words, Indonesia's government preferred a cooperative approach in international relations rather than a military solution to regional issues.

As a result, Indonesia came up with a hedging strategy to avoid any situation where they have to align with any particular major powers. As seen in the strategy of defense, Indonesian foreign policymakers were keen to create a so-called security community to reduce tension and avoid armed conflict in the region and at the same time protect its sovereignty without arousing any suspicion from any countries.

On the other hand, SBY based his vision on four pillars: prosperity, peace, justice, and democracy. Of these four pillars, he mostly emphasized prosperity which was closely related to economic cooperation with China and stability in the region.

For instance, in 2002 ASEAN and China agreed on a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; all parties involved committed to the norms such as non-use of force and respect for other's sovereignty. Moreover, China, the

Philippines and Vietnam also approved a trilateral exploitation zone in the disputed area (Schofield & Storey, 2009)

Although the Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and its historical claims in the nine-dash line have posed a major concern for Indonesia's sovereignty and security, SBY's administration managed to carefully launch the strategy of defense to balance the Chinese military.

At the same time, Indonesia utilized this momentum to develop and advance its military forces in the defensive sense and their relations through economic cooperation. This military development was done only to protect its own maritime and national sovereignty which was strongly related to its long-standing "Independent and Active" doctrine.

It can be said that most of his foreign policy towards China reflects the nature of his vision and belief in the comprehensive cooperation which lead to development. Moreover, the role of China and the foreign policy of Indonesia under SBY has manifested that Indonesia was willing to cooperate with China in terms of military and economic development.

According to neorealism, although China has created uncertainty in the region, its tremendous economic growth appealed to Indonesia's economic interest which resulted in the signing of the strategic partnership between the two countries. However, this cooperative manner was not free from suspicion. In terms of the security dilemma, China's action in the South China Sea and the ambiguous intentions of its expansion create the change in regional dynamic.

Despite the uncertain feeling within ASEAN countries including Indonesia, these states are aware that they cannot balance with China by themselves. Thus, from this aspect, Indonesia under SBY saw that to balance China's power, it needed to build diplomatic relations with other major powers which could be witnessed with the invitation of the United States to participate at the East Asia Summit and many other regional forums to protect the national security regarding the nine-dash line issue and to secure regional stability.

There is one senior member of foreign affairs who noted that Indonesia's decision to include India, Australia and New Zealand in the East Asia Summit reflected

their discontent at how China may act when it has all economic, political and military supremacy in the region and how long it would continue its claimed “peaceful rise”.

Simultaneously, President Barack Obama made a trip to visit Indonesia to sign a partnership cooperation with President SBY. The United States and Indonesia share a healthy bilateral relationship, as evidenced by both presidents officially launch “the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership”, in which the two leaders agreed to elevate bilateral relations by enhancing cooperation and upgrading strategic consultations on key bilateral, regional and global issues.

Following the official visit of President Obama, Indonesia’s former ambassador to Washington expressed his thoughts that Indonesia had been in the shadow of China and India in terms of development for too long, and that with the visit of President Obama, the country hoped that there would be more attention from the public in America towards Indonesia.

From the U.S. aspect, the rise of China has become a challenge and a struggle of the U.S. for security predominance over maritime trade. Therefore, the U.S. perceives China not only as a rising power but also as a potential rival. Consequently, as the U.S. expressed their cautiousness over the rise of China, this caused the Obama administration to take steps to rebuild its relations with Indonesia.

Since the rebuild of relations, it will have implications for the relationship between Indonesia and China. As a part of the Southeast Asian region, Indonesia is the largest country and will become a theatre of competition for influence between the U.S. and China. The competition for influence between the two countries will make the region not only more dynamic but also more vulnerable to possible conflict.

For this reason, Indonesia has to be alert and attempt to make any potential competition benefit Indonesia which could bring wealth and prosperity to the region. As a result, SBY was a visionary leader who put more preference for the U.S., Indonesia’s strategy towards Asia’s established and rising powers was to bring together both countries in multilateral institutions. In particular, the East Asia Summit, which aims to balance China’s rise, both in its ASEAN+6 and particularly since the addition of the U.S. and Russia in 2011. Although the East Asia Summit has been criticized for its ineffectiveness, it could at least provide opportunities to moderate competition between the U.S. and China.

3.5 Conclusion

Taking all these four factors into account, they provide us with a reliable reason that to conduct a particular foreign policy, we need to fundamentally consider these four factors.

These four factors manifested that by looking at how foreign policy is formulated; it needs to first consider the political system or the structure of that country and how it shapes the leadership and the direction of the foreign policy. For instance, in the case of SBY, the political system that is military-backed provides the deep-rooted tradition of the military playing an important role in foreign policymaking, as there was a need for military and bureaucratic support.

Moreover, Indonesia's long-standing traditional foreign policy doctrine of Independent and Active which was concerned about national sovereignty has shaped the way that President SBY initiated his "thousand friends and zero enemy" policy.

He pursued a foreign policy that portrayed the country as a Middle power and actively played an international role on many global stages such as G20, UN peacekeeping operation, and was a mediator in regional territorial disputes, for instance, the territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. And even regarding the issue of the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia under SBY utilized middle power diplomacy to deal with the situation peacefully.

Nonetheless, in terms of a political group, there was a bureaucratic and military dominance that held as much power as SBY that he had to comply with. We can see from his foreign policy which critically reflected a form of neutralization because he had to balance the share of interests within elite circles.

In terms of the Chinese factor, the historical relations and the rise of the economic power of China, it does matter in Indonesia's foreign policymaking. According to neorealism, the diplomacy between states is undertaken through a variety of means including economic cooperation, however, the state does cooperate with some suspicions.

As in this case, even though they have signed a strategic partnership with China, there remains a concern in Indonesia over China's action and their intentions in

the region. Therefore, SBY diversified Indonesia's relations with many major powers to avoid being dominated by one particular country.

Indonesia's relations with major powers, therefore, were conducted through the mechanism of strategic partnerships which are seen as instruments by which to forge multiple channels of communication to take advantage of China's growing economic power and encourage China to adhere to regional norms and institutions.

The perception that China is a threat has been supplanted by the perception of opportunities. After SBY came into power, China's growing economy and willingness to accept ASEAN and Indonesia's leadership in setting up institutions to manage great power interests in the region have improved the perception of China in Indonesia (Novotny, 2010).

It can be said that China mattered in Indonesia's foreign policy during SBY's terms, in the way that Indonesia viewed China as an opportunity to diversify its relations with other major powers apart from the U.S. and Japan, and not to depend on any one particular country. Moreover, SBY's aspiration was for Indonesia to play a greater role both in the region and world stages, the SBY government had hoped to show the world that China was willing to be cooperative and accept regional norms and institutions that Indonesia was a part of.

CHAPTER 4

THE INFLIENCES OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN JOKO WIDODO'S FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter consists of seven parts. The first talks about how the presence of the military still play a significant role in the political system of Indonesia and to what extent they contribute to the foreign policy direction of the president. Second, the prominent foreign policy of Jokowi, followed by the third part of political groups in which the clash of interests and ideology became an obstacle for GMF policy. Fourth, the role of China and Pro-China sentiment. Fifth is the conclusion of these domestic politics factors under Jokowi era.

The sixth part will be an analysis of the shift and continuity from SBY to Jokowi, in which the researcher has distinguished into four sub sections to see how each factor plays their role in each government and this chapter will end with the conclusion.

4.1 Indonesia's political system: A pitfall for non-elite president Jokowi

Today the predominant political structure is still persistent, the countervailing pressures within the national administrative and political hierarchies are very strong. The military represents both an integrating and a decentralizing force, for example, the local military unit defending local interests. The political structure of Indonesia is varied even in terms of the use of law, which varies among states' legal traditions. This is undoubtedly varying and depending on degrees of social, political and elite structure.

For the military in Indonesia, although there was an effort for reform, it remains business as usual, at least to a considerable extent. Evidence suggests that under Jokowi, the military has entrenched its authority across a number of arenas as an outcome of the president's declarations and actions. Therefore, this section aims to highlight the existing role of how the political structure influence the foreign policy direction of President Joko Widodo as military and oligarch elites tend to still hold authority to some extent.

The election of Jokowi in 2014 appeared to usher in a new era of civilian leadership. Being referred to as a civilian leader, this implies that his status was that of an outsider which could be interpreted that he had few allies in the parliament. Despite this, his first intention before coming into office was to build a small group of coalition and try to a project of new bureaucratic reform. However, he failed to overcome the structural constraints of Indonesia's politics. Therefore, he had to turn to army generals to regain the support of his power base that he lost during his first tumultuous year in office.

President Jokowi has two important priorities, these being infrastructure development and social security. Regarding these, the president has taken initiatives on these two issues, but the task of other sectors has largely been left to the minister in charge. This also extends to his relationship with the TNI as he has relied on the advice of his right-hand man in political affairs, for instance, Luhut Panjaitan who was a retired army lieutenant general. Moreover, the president also appointed a number of New Order figures, including officers prominent during the Suharto regime, to positions of power.

Two of the more consequential appointments were that of Gatot Nurmantyo, who was placed in charge of the military, and Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was appointed Minister of Defense, in order to secure the loyalty of the army. During the era of SBY, the TNI mobilized the logic of 'internationalism' that emphasized the need for engaging more actively in global affairs. But on the other hand, under Jokowi administration, Gatot has justified the logic of internationalism and emphasized the development of the contrasting logic of 'anti-globalization' which mobilized the right-wing nationalist narrative agitating the conspiracy of proxy war.

However, he provides the definition of proxy war as not a war in which Indonesia was being directly attacked by a foreign military, but indirectly via foreign powers that invisibly penetrate Indonesia, such as encourage social division, weaken national unity, undermine the national economy, and destabilize the country in order to deprive it of its rich national resources (Kompas, 2016). For example, the TNI's proxy war propaganda started to perpetuate a conspiracy theory.

As the infrastructure development promoted by Jokowi since 2014 began to attract foreign investment, especially the rise of investment from China, Jokowi's

intensive focus on infrastructure development and foreign investment for that purpose is reasonable and has been welcomed by the international community.

Yet, the investment from China is also noteworthy for its unique package with massive labor exports. This has provided an opportunity for the development of conspiracy theories with the spread of fake news in social media that the migrant workers from China were illegally living in various parts of Indonesia. As a result, it created a controversy within Indonesian society and political debate regarding Jokowi's foreign policy purpose.

The expansion of power and influence that the TNI has achieved during Jokowi's presidency is close to the levels it had during the Suharto era. The TNI's power has risen because its personnel have sensed that Jokowi's position as an outsider presents an important opportunity for Indonesia's military and political elite. Moreover, Jokowi himself appears to treat the military as an independent institution, as he has not shown any interest in reforming the military and in turn, has tried to ingratiate himself with members of military in order to avoid any potential confrontation from those who oppose him.

The military in Jokowi's government have imposed a nationalist position and at the same time, Jokowi's political ideology, in which he leans towards a domestic orientation, seems to reflect the interests of many Indonesian politicians including the political elites and policymakers. This nationalist ideology has recalled the New Order's emphasis on a pragmatic development program and the aspiration to modernize Indonesia.

According to Cribb (1993), he explained that under the New Order regime, 'modernity' was defined as stabilizing prices, repairing physical infrastructure and making agriculture more productive. From this perspective, it is notably similar to Jokowi's contemporary agenda in which he emphasizes that to deregulate was to modernize, not liberalize. Some observers stated that Jokowi's personality and leadership style are reminiscent to those of Suharto (Jakarta Globe, 2014).

Moreover, Baker suggested that Jokowi exemplified the New Order's illiberal middle class, and his development agenda goes beyond a simple personal attribution, but it is inborn to his class status. He further argued that Jokowi as a middle-class businessman rising to success in the late New Order years, forged an alliance with

the New Order establishment and learned an appreciation for services and standards but developed little interest in liberal democratic ideas.

From these perspectives of Jokowi's political identity, which have been shaped by the socio-political realities of Suharto and post-Suharto's regimes that deeply reflect the ideological and structural imperatives we could see in 2016, Jokowi began to absorb Indonesia's patronage-driven democracy, embracing the sense of economic nationalism. As suggested by Eve Warburton, Jokowi is likely to make rushed and often rash decisions without wide consultation, therefore, it is difficult to predict how he will manage increasingly complex challenges and how he will realize his ambitious infrastructure development goals.

4.2 Leadership and foreign policy: A man of the people

According to the framework, it refers that the leaders compete with each other by using foreign policy as a means to differentiate themselves from one another.

Therefore, this section will project the difference of foreign policy between the former president SBY and President Jokowi. SBY's military-backed government and internationalist sentiment drove him to pursue an outward-looking foreign policy. However, Jokowi has introduced a new kind of foreign policy to Indonesia and the rest of developing world.

Apart from the political structure that imposed a nationalist sentiment and paved the way for foreign policy making, Jokowi also introduced a new form of populism and offered change within the framework of the democratic status quo and presented himself as highly inclusivist and refrained from anti-foreign support. It can be said that the president himself is a bundle of contradictions which can be seen from his three features of foreign policy, in which the purpose of his foreign policy tends to be more nationalistic and at the same time he also wants to maintain Indonesia's leadership status in ASEAN, but he does not tend to be willing to participate in such regional forums.

4.2.1 Jokowi's prominent foreign policy

Jokowi's foreign policy tends to lean more to the nationalist sense as posed by the military elite in his government. During his term, he has emphasized a hands-on style by introducing the concept of "Blusukan" which means to see local conditions around the city. This concept gave him a reputation for results-oriented management, and for working incrementally to improve governance.

At his inauguration in 2014, he called for a spirit of unity and hard work and promised to restore national pride as well as building a stronger maritime presence. Jokowi did not pursue an outward looking policy for the foreign powers and he did not portray Indonesia's democratic system as being in decay, nor present a neo-authoritarian alternative to the status quo.

Domestically, he manifests the image of a 'man of the people' and 'down-to-earth diplomacy'. From this aspect, he began his populist routine of 'blusukan' which meant he was willing to visit places such as markets or the rural areas and hear the people's concerns. Despite the fact that he himself has his own definition of his political regime, which it could be called technocratic and non-confrontational populism, he was trying to resume and renewal the framework of the existing democratic polity.

Regarding his predecessor and Indonesia's previous diplomacy approach of "thousand friends and zero enemy", he seemed to distance himself from this policy and the domestic needs. Therefore, Jokowi began to pursue an inward-looking foreign policy direction of "Pro-people diplomacy" and the "down-to-earth diplomacy". The establishment of Pro-people diplomacy, which is influenced by President Jokowi's life and characteristics, as well as his diplomacy has been said to be a counteraction to SBY's foreign policy.

There is an argument that because of his strong image as a person who was non-elitist, Jokowi has been widely seen as representing poor people, so that he has to portray himself as populist figure, which also influences the way he constructs policy. As part of Jokowi's direction of pro-people foreign policy approach, the Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi translated the new approach in 2015.

According to her statement, Indonesia will focus on three priorities including: maintaining Indonesia's sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesia citizens, and intensifying economic diplomacy (Indonesian Cabinet Secretariat, 2015).

4.2.2 Three prominent features of Jokowi's foreign policy

Jokowi was said to own three outstanding features of Indonesia's foreign policy which include: the global maritime fulcrum, and emergence of populist nationalism, and a newly description of Indonesia's foreign policy in self-interest logic (Hamilton-Hart & McRae, 2015).

4.2.2.1 Global maritime fulcrum

The prominent program under President Jokowi has turned to maritime development rather than land-based development as his predecessors had emphasized. The concerns over the maritime sector had risen in the period of SBY 's administration.

During SBY's presidency, the framework on maritime security was introduced as the national security framework and set the agenda projecting Indonesia as a major player in the Indo-Pacific marine region. SBY's former foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, emphasized the importance of Indonesia's role in the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, it was prompted by Indonesia's active involvement and election as the vice chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORA-RC) for the period 2013-2015. This was in line with SBY's foreign policy vision of increasing Indonesia's leadership at the regional and global level.

The essence of Indonesia's leadership at the regional and global levels was imminent with President Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). According to Rizal Sukma, one of the key advisors of foreign policy of President Jokowi, the idea of GMF was to transform Indonesia into the fulcrum of the two strategic oceans, the Pacific and Indian ocean.

However, it also had a slightly different maritime vision than that in SBY's period, as Jokowi's GMF doctrine is more encompassing. It aims for more than just increasing Indonesia's regional leadership. Indeed, Jokowi's maritime orientation is similar to the Chinese maritime concept, with a strong emphasis on building the new 21st century maritime Silk Road or, as it is now known, the Belt and Road Initiative.

Therefore, we can see a shift in maritime policy regarding the South China Sea conflict. SBY preferred mutual cooperation for mutual benefit, while Jokowi launched the GMF in order to secure national interest rather than pursuing multi-cooperation.

On the other hand, Jokowi did not begin this program just to focus on down-to-earth diplomacy or due to a lack of interest in geopolitical issues, there are some reasons for the shift in South China Sea policy.

First, under Jokowi, Indonesia has increased the importance of Chinese investment, this can be seen in the decision-making process relating to the most high-profile of these investments, in particular, a high-speed railway between Jakarta and Bandung which indicated that Chinese investors have benefited under Jokowi and this appears that his administration is closer to China.

Second, from these aspects as Jokowi did not view China as a threat and also priorities its importance in terms of investment, therefore, the President has proposed a program called Global Maritime Fulcrum which fulfills all of the desires of Indonesia's national interest and the role in international level.

In terms of national interest, Jokowi believe that national power should be based on domestic capabilities which means economic development and economic diplomacy should play a central role in Indonesia's foreign policy, favoring bilateralism rather than multilateralism. At the international level, the aims of GMF were to expand regional involvement to the Indo-Pacific regions and the Indian and Pacific Oceans because for Jokowi, Southeast Asia alone is very limiting for his vision of turning Indonesia into maritime power.

As the Global Maritime Fulcrum is his core program, it can be implied that the President aims, in terms of geopolitics, are to bound the Pacific and Indian Oceans to serve as highways for the movement of global trade as well as people-to-people exchange. Moreover, this region is also an engine for global economic growth.

Therefore, President Jokowi is trying to achieve his GMF program in order to retain the status of a middleman ship as said by Indonesia's former foreign minister Marty Natalegawa who described Indonesia as a 'regional power with global

interests and concerns' and it enjoys more cordial relations with all of its neighboring countries by playing the role of mediator and facilitator in regional conflicts.

However, Jokowi's signature policy regarding foreign affairs emphasizes domestic development but he has often struggled to explain Indonesia's position in the South China Sea conflict and also his opinion on diplomacy was a far less prominent feature of his public remark on maritime affairs. For example, although the president once said that the GMF and BRI programs highly complementary to each other, he still employs the 'dynamic equilibrium' to balance between the major powers of the United States and China and to avoid being dominated by China like Cambodia and Laos.

4.2.2.2 The nationalist sense foreign policy

From the above aspect, there emerged the *nationalist elements* that included both a pronounced sensitivity to the respect shown to the president in international forums and a series of populist gestures that appear as mostly intended to convince a domestic audience that Jokowi's government is exercising leadership as to achieve foreign policy outcomes.

For example, more substantively, Jokowi's administration's policies on the executions of narcotics traffickers and sinking illegal fishing vessels are clear illustrations of populist gestures. His government executed more than ten prisoners in 2015 and these actions have become a foreign policy issue under his tenure because the majority of people on death row in this case are foreigners.

4.2.2.3 Self-interest foreign policy: Domestic-oriented foreign policy

President Jokowi emphasized in a statement that Indonesia's diplomacy would prioritize issues directly related to the interests of the state and the Indonesian people. In 2015, according to Indonesia's deputy foreign minister, the president called on all Indonesian diplomatic missions to assure that Indonesia and its relations with other countries must bring benefits to the Indonesian population.

In contrast to SBY who placed relatively few limits on Indonesia's international involvement, the heart of Jokowi's vision of Indonesia's place in its development as a nation is his vision of Indonesia as an archipelagic state whose identity and prosperity are tied to its insular waters as well as his conviction that

Indonesia's dignity depends upon the state's ability to defend itself from diverse attempts to try to weaken the country both domestically and internationally.

During Jokowi's first term, he strictly followed this approach, however, he was not a strictly left or right wing populist like in other countries, he was rather inclusive and did not neglect international affairs and still wanted Indonesia to maintain its status on the global stage. But his foreign affairs were somehow differing from SBY who placed emphasis on summit diplomacy, Jokowi, on the other hand, prioritized the summits that would serve his domestic agenda.

For example, he did not appear at some ASEAN Asummits but rather visited countries such as Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh in 2018 to demonstrate the direction of Indonesia's foreign policy under his administration. In contrast, SBY's Indonesia was more active and keener to shape regional institutions and norms through an intellectual-leadership role, while Jokowi and his foreign minister Retno Marsudi place more emphasis on a so-called modest geo-strategic goal as Retno seeks to implement and highlight the president's vision of down-to-earth diplomacy.

4.3 Political groups: The clash of ideology and interest between two factions regarding the GMF policy

It is important to note that, although he seeks support from the military and political elites and this GMF foreign policy program seems to reflect nationalist sentiment, in terms of the foreign policy making process the military and many senior ministers tend to oppose Jokowi's ideas.

So, this section will point out the political groups that are the fragmented within Jokowi's government coalition, in which they are important actors that can indicate the success and failure of the implementation of foreign policy. Their clash of interest and ideology revolves on how they view the pros and cons of GMF, which implies that this program is likely to be delayed or unimplemented.

Drawing from Jokowi's foreign policy of GMF, this part will be divided into two section that consist of two main interest groups. As argued by Benjamin Nathan in his summarized paper "Domestic Forces behind Indonesia's Paradoxical

Maritime Policy”, maritime policy under President Jokowi has gone into two directions at once.

Therefore, the researcher will categorize them into two different groups within Jokowi’s government coalition which consists of the group that are concerned about national sovereignty, the researcher will call them as a *nationalist group* and another group possesses a *non-confrontational* stance arguing that Indonesia and China have no territorial dispute and any regional tension should be solved by peaceful means with emphasis on mutual interests.

According to the framework of Domestic politics, Goldmann argues that the interest groups in the matter of state’s degree of support refers to the extent to which various actors in domestic politics support or oppose the government’s foreign policy. Foreign policy decision makers are supposed to build domestic political support in order for any of their proposed foreign policy initiatives to be implemented. Thus, foreign policy decisions become political results reflecting necessary political strategies to build agreements within the domestic structure in order to support the implementation of foreign policy.

4.3.1 Non-confrontational group or a group that support the GMF foreign policy with the prioritization of economic aspect

This section aims to introduce the group of people that play a role as support and push forward the implementation of the GMF. They consist of several ministerial sectors and key foreign policy advisors that facilitate the promotion of this foreign policy program. They also point out the opportunity for Indonesia to cooperate with China through GMF which will not only bring about tremendous economic benefits but also the expansion of Indonesia’s maritime power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Indonesia aims to cooperate with China’s Belt and Road initiative in order to push its own Global Maritime Fulcrum policy to realization and the issue of South China Sea conflict has been a concerning issue for Indonesia’s policy makers. There are many controversial happenings within the policy process and there are many stakeholders involved.

Importantly, after the democratization in the country, the foreign policy was no longer solely in the hands of the leader, the increasing role the foreign ministry play

is significant in this issue. The foreign ministry believes in maintaining a “non-claimant” status in which the country will not acknowledge in any way that a disputed maritime boundary with China exists.

Some of the members of Jokowi’s government have gotten to the point where they deny that there has been any conflict at all. For example, Arif Havas Oegroseno, the Deputy Minister for Maritime Sovereignty, insisted that Chinese fishing boats appearing in Indonesia’s waters was merely a “so-called incident”. Therefore, Indonesia has no overlapping claim with China or any other maritime neighbor.

Moreover, in addition to the message of Havas, Cabinet Secretary Pramono Anung reiterated that “hostilities were resolved and such events which raise regional tensions should be dealt with by peaceful means and move toward mutual respect without involving parties outside the region”.

In addition, the former foreign minister Marty Natalegawa also repeated the longstanding official policy of denying that Indonesia and China have any territorial disputes and even cited Indonesian efforts to attract Chinese investment to the Natuna area.

However, President Jokowi has been said to have little interest in foreign affairs, therefore, his foreign policy regarding this issue relies mainly on his advisers. One of Jokowi’s closest advisors on national security matters is the retired General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, commonly known as Luhut. He is the country’s Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment and is considered to be the most prominent person enabling Indonesia’s growing ties with China which enables him to achieve greater influence over foreign policy.

Moreover, he facilitated several Indonesian representative missions to China and he offered 28 infrastructure projects to China during the BRI II Summit in 2019 which were signed later on. Moreover, he then established and led the Global Maritime Fulcrum Task Force, which is designed to oversee the implementation of BRI projects by involving various ministries and relevant stakeholders.

Although there was growing widespread anti-Chinese sentiment and an ongoing perception that the current government was too inclined towards China, Luhut tried to justify Indonesia’s close ties with China by arguing that stronger China-Indonesia relations can help Indonesia’s economic growth. In the aspect of maritime

territorial issues, Luhut affirmed that China has no intention of conflict with Indonesia and he asserted that the South China Sea issue should not be escalated and instead blamed Indonesia's limited capacity and number of ships in the area.

Another close adviser of President Jokowi is Rizal Sukma who played a leading role in crafting the foreign policy sections of Jokowi's Visi-Misi statement. Sukma is well-known to foreign diplomats and think-tankers in world capitals, and in his academic work which focused on Indonesia's relations with an emerging China, Sukma argued that the country should openly advocate for its interests and ideals despite fears of a backlash in the region.

Nonetheless, both Luhut and Sukma are broadly supportive of the "independent and active" policy, but they tilt more towards cooperation with other states and seek to continue SBY's broadly conciliatory and cooperative approach to Indonesia's relationships with its neighbors and the great powers.

In addition, there are a number of senior diplomats in the Foreign Ministry that Jokowi has chosen to include in his coalition, namely Arif Havas Oegroseno who was mentioned earlier, Desra Percaya, and Retno P. Marsudi. Retno has impressed Jokowi with her commitment to so-called "diplomacy down to earth" which reflects Jokowi's background of interest and to some extent helps the president convey his own policy interests.

4.3.2 Nationalist group whose concern over Indonesia's sovereignty

On the other hand, while there are supporters, there will always be opposition. This group is critically concerned over the national security and country's maritime sovereignty as they are afraid that Indonesia might fall into the debt-trap diplomacy and sphere of influence posed by China.

This group consists of the defense ministry and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) who, in contrast to the foreign ministry, seem to have little faith in what the foreign ministry have described "institutionalist" or "legalistic" logic in dealing with China's behavior, they are concerned with the increasing number of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing incidents within Indonesia's EEZ around the Natuna Islands in which there is an overlapping area between Indonesia and

China. This has led to some disagreements between Jokowi's party and the opposition party that obstruct the implementation of the GMF program.

Despite President Jokowi's persistent focus on infrastructure development, the largest obstacle that his GMF program continues to face is the complex maritime security governance. There is no clear barrier for maritime authorities' agency, of which Indonesia currently has 13 different agencies that are stakeholders in maritime security. This includes, for example, the TNI, the Police, and the Civil Service Investigators of ten different ministries. These ten agencies have not been integrated under the same direction which in turn could be due to miscommunication and lack of coordination.

Moreover, regarding the issue of illegal fishing and Chinese's assertiveness, Susi Pudjiastuti, a former Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Minister, escalated a hardline approach for example, escalating the bureaucratic infighting, detonating of foreign vessels caught and the conviction of IUU fishermen. Susi frequently verbally clashes with the coordinating minister for maritime affairs, Luhut, Jokowi's closest adviser in the government.

In terms of the opposition, the party lead by Prabowo, before he and Jokowi agreed to unite in recent year, he had pushed the military line regarding the dispute, because of his nationalistic character and little interest in democratic principles, Prabowo's coalition has already begun to pressure Jokowi on domestic issues in the legislature where a coalition of parties that support his candidacy have a significant number of seats.

From this point, the nationalists in Indonesia legislature, in particular among the coalition parties that supported Prabowo, may also push Jokowi towards less conciliatory and cooperative policies. Indonesia's legislative body consists of several commissions which each take care of different purposes, defense and foreign affairs is to be under the responsibility of Commission I.

As a further matter, although in the earlier group mentioned there are senior diplomats that support Jokowi's policy, there are some senior diplomats in the foreign ministry as well as leaders in the PDI-P, Jokowi's own political party, that are more inclined to nationalist rhetoric intended to put neighboring countries in their place. At the same time, they favor a foreign policy that emphasizes Indonesia's independence

from the great powers concerning a more constructive diplomacy and security cooperation.

In fact, Jokowi's hesitant statement on the matter committed him to ensuring the integrity of Indonesia's maritime sovereignty and to securing marine resources in the EEZ, while also committing to dampening maritime rivalries among the great powers and to have peaceful settlements of disputes.

This indecisive position struggles to integrate both the TNI and the foreign ministry's approaches to the issues or in other words, it is signaling less tolerance for Chinese encroachment in the Indonesian EEZ but at the same time seeking to remain as an honest broker in broader disputes. In addition, the group of elite nationalists blames foreigners as the perpetrators of all domestic problems (Aspinall, 2015).

Therefore, from this aspect, Indonesia's overall complications revolving around its maritime policy and interests stem from a diffusion of leadership structure in which President Jokowi's policies cannot flow smoothly down the chain of command. The president's strategic initiatives, such as turning the country towards a policy of "Global Maritime Axis", often clash with the independent aims of his ministers and the defense establishment.

According to Evan Laksmana, he stated that overlapping departmental jurisdictions and lack of shared priorities between Indonesia's foreign ministry and defense leaders have put more difficulty on Jokowi's ability to pursue a coherent and solid South China Sea policy. Furthermore, the landscape of Indonesia's internal politics since the fall of Suharto is one in which the presidents have struggled to control the direct institutions like the military as well as one of the major obstacles for any presidents such as the old oligarch elites. Although Jokowi at first did not want to build a big coalition like his predecessor SBY, he eventually went ahead with a strategy of accommodation which brought about substantial political risk.

Therefore, as a result, he had to expand his coalition to form a large majority in the parliament but at the same time he struck deal with oligarchs and powerful partisans in strategic posts by giving them control over states' resources and authority over profitable industries. Additionally, Mietzner further argued that the oligarchs in Jokowi's own coalition have tried to steer him and his administration, however, it is

worth noting that Jokowi was not the oligarch's choice, rather he was considered as a populist outsider which confronted the oligarchs with an unforeseen situation.

4.4 An attractive role of China

Indonesia's political elite have always been ambivalent about China. This ambivalence has been shaped by China's geographical proximity and the historical and controversial role of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in the economic life of the country.

However, regarding the traditional foreign policy doctrine of Indonesia, Independent and Active, Jokowi perceived it differently from SBY. Jokowi said, "*For me 'free and active' is making friends with countries that can provide us with benefits,*" he said. "*What's the point of making friends if we are always on the losing end?*" (Bland, 2020)

Moreover, in Jokowi's case, he himself appears uninterested in foreign affairs and has appeared to seek closer ties with China mainly to further his economic development agenda.

4.4.1 Pro-China sentiment

According to neorealism, Indonesia as a sovereign state must also have its national interests at stake, despite its commitment to contribute to peace and security formation in both regional and international affairs. However, following the announcement of a new priority in foreign policy which emphasize the importance of maritime vision through the Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia is expected to play a more contributive role in the formation of regional security through this vision.

But there remains the dilemma as to how Indonesia might pursue its national interests while maintaining its neutral position as a non-claimant state despite the interest concerned in the Natuna Island. Moreover, security dilemma defines Indonesia's anxiousness to concern on their security from being dominated by other states. Thus, it is formulated into Indonesia's focus on maritime power.

The clearest indicator to this is the Jokowi's strategic vision of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum. Rizal Sukma, Jokowi's key foreign policy advisor, describes the ideal as transforming Indonesia into the fulcrum of two oceans namely the Pacific

and Indian Oceans. Despite the security dilemma, because of the domestic reality of poor infrastructure development in the country, Indonesia requires substantial foreign investment. Simultaneously, China's economic power has grown and it launched Belt and Road Initiative with the aim of providing loans for countries with less developed infrastructure.

Therefore, Jokowi viewed China as the most significant country for providing investment to Indonesia for the infrastructure development. However, during his presidency, there are many incidents that have occurred in the South China Sea and in the Natuna Islands of Indonesia that have posed challenges for Jokowi's government.

The most challenging issue is the Natuna Islands issue which is very complex and important to Indonesia because the islands are abundant with natural resources such as oil and gas and it also important in terms of geopolitical strategy for Indonesia. However, the Natuna Islands was partially claimed in the Nine-dash line by China. Moreover, in early 2016, there were three incidents that took place in this area involving Indonesia and China.

These incidents have created a wariness in the relationship of both countries but not led to any serious matters. Following the incident, China warned Indonesia not to further complicate the situation. In response to this matter, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, said that Indonesia would not negotiate over violations of its sovereignty and jurisdiction in its EEZ, but would seek to maintain good relations with China.

However, this led to contradictions of Jokowi's foreign policy when that Indonesia's Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, began taking a hardline against illegal fishing activity in Indonesia waters and adopted the strategy of sinking seized foreign fishing boats.

Moreover, this was in stark contrast to SBY's diplomatic means in an effort to establish ASEAN centrality as well as encourage major powers' engagement in the regional security structure. In practice, Indonesia's leadership role in ASEAN has always been hindered by its domestic weaknesses. Although Indonesia is accepted as the natural leader of ASEAN, its leadership role is often ignored by the other members (Liow, 2018).

In the Jokowi government, the approach based on ASEAN was abandoned and replaced by a nationalist and expansive strategic regional vision. Jokowi aspired to have Indonesia be the center of all maritime activities in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. Therefore, he further developed a geoeconomics and geopolitical power as the Global Maritime Fulcrum. The goal is to attract Chinese investors to fund infrastructure development in the country.

Also, Jokowi considers the significance of China's Belt and Road Initiative to Indonesia's regional political structure. Therefore, despite the fact that there have been many assertive actions by China around its sovereignty, Indonesia under Jokowi is moving closer to China.

On the other hand, regardless of these incidents, under Jokowi, Indonesia and China are drawn ever closer to each other. Jokowi's vision of making Indonesia a maritime power through GMF, would require a lot of funding of infrastructure development, and China seems to be major contributor to such projects.

A good illustration of this can be seen with China constructing the high-speed railway between Jakarta and Bandung. Trade and foreign investment from China have increased, in particular after Jokowi visited China in 2015 and president Xi Jinping included Indonesia in his "Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)" which resulted in Jokowi being invited to Beijing's inaugural Belt and Road Summit in 2017.

Although there is much opposition to Jokowi's preference for China, Indonesia and China have repeatedly stated at the government-to-government level that there is no territorial dispute in Indonesia-China relations.

Moreover, unless there are economic benefits for Indonesia, Jokowi's disinterest in foreign affairs would encourage competing interpretations among political elite on how to respond to China's action and behavior. In addition, Jokowi's fractured political elite do not indicate a good direction for conducting foreign policy that corresponds with Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign policy doctrine.

President Jokowi and the former Governor of Jakarta, who was known as Ahok, are perceived as being broadly "Pro-China". That is why Jokowi himself tends to value Chinese investment in the country despite the fact that there are numerous territorial disputes between the two countries. The situation is further complicated by the perceptions of less-than-efficient joint business. China needs Indonesia to help

realize some of its BRI objectives, while Indonesia favors China for its funding to assist its maritime power dream.

This factor however has led to heavy criticism by his opponents. The opposition party recognized that the country is becoming uncomfortably close to China and could lead to asymmetrical economic benefits and sovereignty. The opposing party believe that Jokowi's government needs to ensure that it does not sell the country to foreigners, especially China.

Therefore, the Natuna Islands issue is likely to remain a long-lasting issue between Indonesia and China, in which the central concern is the dispute over illegal fishing and a number of nationalist concerns regarding Indonesia's territorial integrity. It is unlikely to bother the bilateral relationship as economics are likely to continue to be deemed to be of more importance than politics in the relations of the two countries, at least by the Jokowi administration.

In 2016, under President Jokowi, the comprehensive partnership was elevated to that of a strategic partnership which can imply a strong relationship between the two countries. President Donald Trump's political ascent has also created additional feelings of unease for Indonesia, as can be seen in the case of Trump's statement regarding the Muslim world and his policies toward Israel and Palestine, both of which have damaged Indonesia's views of the U.S.

In Asia, Trump administration's articulation of great power competition with China and its setback from its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy have produced anxiety and uncertainty for Indonesia regarding the role it might be expected to play in the Trump's administration approach to the region.

From this aspect, Indonesian strategists have been ambivalent about the United States' attempts to rebalance to Asia. Moreover, according to Evelyn Goh, there are some key foreign policy figures who also worry that over-reliance on the U.S. security umbrella has emboldened some ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea dispute which may lead to greater instability.

It is apparent that we can see Indonesia's relations with the U.S. under Trump's administration have been considerably marginalized. Indonesia, to some extent, needs the U.S. to balance the power of China but in terms of the national interest

and foreign policy program of Jokowi, he has tilted towards China for investment in infrastructure development.

As evidenced by their first bilateral high-level economic meeting where China agreed to cooperate with Indonesia in infrastructure development, Indonesia has undoubtedly joined China's initiative to set up the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. While economic cooperation with the U.S. is still significant, it could be argued that the Indonesian economy and U.S.-Indonesia economic relations are underperforming relative to their potential. Although Indonesia has enormous market potential, the obstacles to greater economic cooperation with the U.S. are varied, partly due to Indonesia's protectionist policies.

4.5 Summary

To conclude all the factors in Jokowi administration, what is different between SBY and Jokowi is that Jokowi does not possess a distinguished military or political elite background and when he first came into power he did not want to build an oversized coalition like that of SBY. Despite this, the existing political structure maintains the predominance of military and other political figures from New Order remain powerful. As a result, it is inevitable that he has turned to the military for their support of his power in the parliament and in pursuing policies.

The military presence in the Jokowi era is strong, this can be seen in his right-hand advisor being Luhut Panjaitan, a retired military general, and the appointment of New Order figures, such as that of Gatot Nurmantyo as commander of the TNI. The military during his tenure have turned out to behave differently from that of the SBY era. The TNI hold nationalist sentiment and one reason for this perception is, during SBY's presidency, right-wing nationalist groups were not impressed by Indonesia being more active in foreign affairs that overlooked the domestic issues.

Moreover, during Jokowi's tenure, there has been an emergence of economic nationalism because many foreign investors in Indonesia are excessively self-interested and the government needs to ensure that the country gets its fair share in every deal. But this new wave of protectionism is unlikely to benefit Indonesian citizens as those mostly likely to reap the rewards are oligarchs with interests in national

resources extraction. Not coincidentally, among these oligarchs are many elite politicians whose companies profit from the state's restrictions on competition in the market.

Apart from oligarch interests, Jokowi himself remains disinterested in foreign affairs and prioritizes domestic development which has led to a foreign policy that reflects a hands-on style and also reflects the purposes of those political elites. Jokowi's unique characteristics of foreign policy are said to be a mixture of technocratic populism, and he was also said to be a turn towards authoritarian nationalism.

Firstly, he won the election with a sense of elite populism, but it is a lighter version that he carried out in the framework of the existing democratic polity. In this sense, he upholds the image of a "man of the people" which can be seen in his "pro-poor diplomacy" in which he works closely with the people, even those in rural areas.

Moreover, his technocratic populism also differed from other populist leaders in other countries as Jokowi was rather inclusive and in the sense of democracy, he is again making his regime unique by not use a anti-foreign aspect in his administration even though he was populist, he saw that engaging with foreign countries provide Indonesia a great opportunity for national development especially China.

Second, Jokowi, to some extent, was contradictory to the democratic polity that he claimed, he was said to be an authoritarian turn and a lean towards a sense of nationalist as his political regime reflects the national interest and development and a downplay in international affairs unlike SBY who prioritized and was concerned about the international reputation and tried to push Indonesia towards playing a greater role in both regional and international affairs. Moreover, Jokowi has acted in an illiberal or anti-democratic manner with his narrow political sensitivities and short-term thinking which have led to ad-hoc decision making.

In terms of his prominent policies, the pro-poor diplomacy and his down-to-earth diplomacy are a reflection of technocratic populism that, in contrary to SBY, Jokowi brought a reputation for humility and the can-do approach of an entrepreneur to the presidency with a focus on both domestic workers and Indonesian overseas workers and placed the domestic politics and economic development ahead of other national interests.

Jokowi's own foreign policy, also, reflects the neorealism aspect which tends to emphasize sovereignty and national dignity but at the same time Indonesia also has to weigh between the security and economic interests. In the case of Jokowi, it posed a contradiction as he seems to bend to China's investment but some of his actions in response to China seem to be more nationalistic.

For instance, during his first term, Jokowi had a policy of sinking illegal fishing boats and the government took an aggressive decision on behalf of the dignity and honor of the country in order to protect the natural resources (Parameswaran, 2015)

Moreover, Indonesia also reacted immediately after Chinese fishing boats entered into the area of Natuna Islands, Jokowi's actions led to a cabinet meeting and sent a signal to the Chinese government not to intervene in Indonesia sovereignty.

In contrast to these hard-line defensive actions regarding China, the concept of his down-to-earth diplomacy and his political vision compel the country to play less of a leadership role in regional efforts to have consensus on the broader disputes but focused on protecting its own interests around the Natuna Islands.

From this action, Jokowi has taken a narrow and short-term view of risks in the relationship with China and instead highlight the role of China as the most significant investor in his initiative of a national infrastructure development program.

This was controversial during Jokowi's first term of presidency as he told ministers to defend and protect Indonesia's sovereignty but at the same time seek to maintain friendly relations with China for investment to achieve his desire of domestic infrastructure development.

Even concerning the incident between the Philippines and China that would affect Indonesia's maritime rights and interests around the Natuna Islands, the actions of Jokowi were not organized to oppose China's position on broader disputes within ASEAN; in this case, Malaysian and Singaporean diplomats played a leading role in the efforts to draft a consensus while Indonesian diplomats kept a low profile in this affair.

From this matter, from his foreign policy action regarding the South China Sea conflict and the launching of Global Maritime Fulcrum, his political regime shape his foreign policy and actions regarding the South China Sea issue and his GMF program. Jokowi's GMF or wider maritime policy has led to controversy between two

political groups which involved two groups namely the nationalists and non-confrontationists.

On the nationalist side, there are a variety of actors that have been mentioned in the previous chapter such as the TNI, some senior diplomats and some fishing ministers, as well as Prabowo of the opposition party who took the nationalists' side.

They are mostly concerned about the sovereignty of the country and are suspicious over China's expansion of power in the South China Sea, and they believe the Belt and Road Initiative is somehow another channel for China to gradually increase its influence in the country in which the actions of Jokowi allowing Chinese investment and Chinese laborers to flood in the country that would threaten the stability of Indonesia in its own "independent and active" foreign policy.

On the other hand, the non-confrontational group of supporters see that GMF will bring benefits to the country despite there being overlapping territory between Indonesia and China and the South China Sea conflict where there are six ASEAN countries involved. This group view that Indonesia can utilize peaceful means to forge for a consensus and find common resolutions without being under the control of Chinese influence. But this controversy between the ideologies of the two groups has led to ineffective foreign policy making in Indonesia under Jokowi which has resulted the full GMF plan being yet to be delivered.

Under Jokowi, Indonesia and its relations with China and other major powers have been driven by either economic, political, or sociocultural factors based on the government's policy priority.

Due to Jokowi's characteristics of technocratic populism and domestic orientation, he prioritized the national interest as his core vision and initiated policies that accompanied with his plan. However, as Jokowi was said to lack foreign affairs experience and to possess a narrow vision in international stage compared to his predecessor, he realized the importance of China for his vision of improving Indonesia maritime infrastructure. The Jokowi administration further intensified the interaction between the two leaders in the statement that Indonesia's GMF was willing to work complimentary to China's BRI.

Under Jokowi, China become more involved in Indonesia by sending vice-premiers to meet with the Indonesian Coordinating Minister of Economic Affairs and Coordinating Minister of Human Development and Culture in their respective dialogues. This has encouraged the pro-China sentiment of Jokowi himself showed during his first term of president as Chinese infrastructure investment in Indonesia, which is a core interest of the Jokowi administration, had increased from US\$600 million in 2015 to US\$1.96 billion in 2017.

Although there are uncertain incidents that occurred many times around the area of Indonesia's EEZ in the Natuana Islands, Jokowi managed to overcome these events and prioritized the relationship with China. It is apparent that Jokowi's foreign policy that favored more Chinese investment and, despite the nationalist sentiment that was one of the elements his political regime, he has managed to put economic interests and his maritime policy of GMF above all territorial disputes.


4.6 The shift in foreign policy from SBY to Jokowi era

It can be assumed that changes of political system may lead a state to alter its foreign policy. In some cases, it could lead to foreign policy restructuring, whereby the pattern of the state's external relations is experiencing a dramatically alteration (Holsti ,1982).

From this point, the foreign policy change that relates to the changing political system is also called as foreign policy redirection. On the other hand, the foreign policy can be changed when the existing actors change their course in foreign policy. Therefore, the nature of the change tends to be more self-driven (Hermann, 1990,)

Figure 4.1

The Analytical Framework Synthesized by the Researcher



According to the model, this part will investigate how the structure of domestic politics affected the change in foreign policy of Indonesia from SBY's government to Jokowi's government.

4.6.1 The role of political structure: Military and its influence in foreign policy

First, although foreign policies are designed by the leader or the president with the aim of dealing with domestic and international agendas, one significant factor that could shape the foreign policy direction is the *political system*. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the decision-making process is defined by the political system where the leader is operated, and the power lies in the coalition.

Indonesian foreign policy is affected by domestic events and actors. As Indonesia's foreign policy reflects the beliefs and actions of policymakers within bureaucratic institutions who are influenced by the society and international system in which they operate and in other various ways. This interaction then results in the politics of continuity and change in foreign policy.

In other words, the concept of change and continuity tend to reflect changes that take place in the structure, belief, politics of society and the state within a dynamic

system and international context. Moreover, in terms of continuity, it refers to broad patterns in foreign policy that tend to persist over time.

Drawing from this point, the political structure of Indonesia, where the military and other political elites are still predominant, does not seem to change as there is no evidence regarding successful military reform. In the governments of both SBY and Jokowi, the military maintained a presence in the top positions and from this aspect, they played a major role in defining the foreign policy direction that the presidents had to comply with to some extent.

However, the difference between SBY and Jokowi is the foreign policy direction that was altered due to the change in the bureaucratic and military interests. It is important to note that the military has been involved in Indonesia politics since its independence. Therefore, the foreign policy doctrine has always manifested a sense of nationalism. Moreover, from the fear of being colonized, Indonesia has initiated the Independent and Active doctrine as central to the foreign policy of the country and this has been inherited right until the present day.

The domestic politics of Indonesia are quite complex. The democratization and political stability of the SBY era was attributed to his personal military background and strong network within the TNI which gave him the authority to appoint his former classmate and aides-de-camp to a senior TNI position.

Although the military tended to have a more diminished political role, there still persisted the installation of the ideology of nationalism as emphasized in the Independent and Active and since the country became world's third largest democratic nation, President SBY and his military coalition wanted to improve Indonesia's international reputation. Therefore, they applied a so-called internationalist ideology to the long-standing foreign policy doctrine of Indonesia which was a key factor to the contribution of foreign policy direction of SBY's administration.

In terms of the foreign policy making process, the military elites had influence, as mentioned earlier when discussing SBY's personal military background and the persistency of military in the politics. Consequently, SBY, who was considered to be a moderate president who always avoided any controversy, became subordinate under the military predomination and as a result, he only played a supporting role in the decision-making process as opposed to a leading one.

For example, in terms of foreign policy formation and decision-making, in the post-New Order era the number of foreign policy actors has increased, as has their significance. The decision-making in the field of foreign affairs also rests with the president on the advice of the foreign minister, who is responsible for implementation of such policy.

In addition to the foreign minister, it is the commander in chief of the armed forces that provides information and other inputs to policy making, especially in areas that directly affect the country's security. In other words, the role and involvement of the armed forces in the formation of foreign policy is considered consistent with its defense function.

On the other hand, under President Joko Widodo, the direction of foreign policy was altered due to a change in the team of foreign affairs advisers who had quite a different perception of foreign policy direction compared to SBY's. As he has neither a military nor an elite background, Jokowi relied at first on a small group of close friends and advisers. However, as there was a need to grow his coalition for the support of his power in the parliament, he included long-time political supporters with expertise such as an experienced vice president and military leaders.

Jokowi appointed his right-hand adviser, Luhut Panjaitan who was a retired military general, and other retired generals such as Wiranto, Moeldoko, and Agum Gumelar. These men not only helped Jokowi manage the TNI, but also ensured that Jokowi did not create policies that were detrimental to the TNI's interests.

Moreover, they believe that Jokowi should not spend political capital on military reform policies when economic development and infrastructure were his core policies. Nonetheless, during his era, the military manages its own affairs and push the boundaries of civil-military relations. His prominent commander Gatot was publicly outspoken on a wide range of issues ranging from criticizing the government's approach to the South China Sea, to the promotion of anti-globalization which he believed destroyed Indonesia's value.

Nevertheless, Jokowi's closest advisers, particularly Luhut and Sukma, are pragmatic in their approach and have little time for nationalist demagoguery in diplomatic and security issues as they will seek to continue SBY's broadly conciliatory

and cooperative approach to Indonesia's relationships with its neighbors and the great powers.

However, the involvement of military leaders encourages the nationalist rhetoric of put neighboring countries in their place and emphasizes independence from great power influence. This nationalists in Indonesia's legislature may also push Jokowi towards less conciliatory policies, as they did when they succeeded in pushing SBY towards a more non-aligned stance.

4.6.2 Leadership and foreign policy

Second, in terms of leadership and the foreign policy. This subsection aims to the differentiate the foreign policy outcomes of the two presidents. The political system structurally shaped the foreign policy direction by terminology such as internationalism and nationalism that adhere to their view and interests, which varied due to changes in the people involved in foreign policy making in each government. Moreover, the leader's worldview and their interests also impact their foreign policy.

4.6.2.1 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono: The means to his foreign policy formulation

Indonesia's foreign policy under SBY was characterized by outward-looking internationalism that was asserted by important foreign policy figures such as the foreign minister and other political elites. SBY and his team believed that the independent and active engagement in multilateralism was the most constructive method of fulfilling Indonesia's national interests.

During his presidency, Indonesia viewed international politics as a foreign policy cornerstone to elevate the image of Indonesia as a new democratic and moderate country. His characteristics and motivations came from his eagerness to be known for his involvement in international affairs.

SBY believed that international status would encourage domestic capacity. Therefore, he based his foreign policy on so-called omnidirectional diplomacy and multilateralism which not only fulfills national interests, such as national unity and stability, but also includes broader ambitions, such as the realization of peace at regional and global levels. He further put forward his idea to make the country's democracy and its economy more modern and stable as well as develop civilization.

Fortunately, during SBY's government, China had yet to launch the Belt and Road initiative, so there were fewer complex relations in foreign policy. However, when dealing with the South China Sea conflict, SBY utilized middle power diplomacy to project both domestic and regional agenda. The domestic agenda was the Strategy of Defense which concerns Indonesia's sovereignty and Chinese actions in the disputed areas, but it was only in the defensive means and showed good will to neighboring states.

Moreover, in terms of regional agenda, Indonesia proposed a Code of Conduct on the framework for security cooperation through forums such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN regional forum. SBY came into power with long-standing interests and substantial experience in foreign affairs. Therefore, it can be assumed that he employed his preference for multi-cooperation in these international forums as an instrument of his foreign policy. Over his two terms in office, he sought to elevate Indonesia's standing on the world stage and improve Indonesia's relations with foreign countries. He advocated a policy of "thousand friends and zero enemy" and an "all directional foreign policy".

4.6.2.2 Joko Widodo: A different perspective of foreign policy direction

On the other hand, the omnidirectional foreign policy of SBY was altered and replaced by Jokowi's more nationalist minded foreign policy. Jokowi's foreign policy approach was inward looking and reflective of narrow nationalism. These markers stand directly opposed to SBY's foreign policy approach, which favored outward looking internationalism.

As Jokowi himself shows little interest in international affairs and has placed more emphasis on domestic and national development agenda, he has focused on down-to-earth diplomacy that would be useful to the people. Jokowi is trying to change the pattern of foreign policy and believes that the welfare of society or domestic development will determine the position of Indonesia in global affairs.

Moreover, another reason for the shift in Indonesia's foreign policy is that Jokowi has expressed his irritation at the multilateral institutions' failures to deliver solutions to confront the global economy. Moreover, Jokowi seemed to end

SBY's 'thousand friends and zero enemy', as he claimed that he would prioritize relationships that hold significant benefits for Indonesia (Qin, 2015).

From this aspect, with the military's influence in paving nationalism sentiment in his administration, he then formulated his key policy of pro-people diplomacy and in terms of foreign policy he has proposed the Global Maritime Fulcrum to maintain and enhance country's power and sovereignty that complies with the national infrastructure development.

To realize his GMF foreign policy, China was the main actor that played a role in this initiation. At the time when China launched the BRI, Jokowi's developmentalist agenda focused on attracting infrastructure investment. Moreover, in Jokowi's early years, Indonesia struggled to attract private foreign direct investment for major infrastructure projects. Therefore, to fill this investment gap, Jokowi has since looked to China, whose rapid development he admires, and sees Chinese President Xi Jinping as a fellow results-oriented leader.

However, this GMF program was contradictory in the way of its formation. Although it was proposed on the basis of nationalism, in practice, the TNI and many other ministers are not impressed with this policy and many do not agree with it. This aspect will be discussed in the sub consequent topic of the role of political groups.

4.6.3 The role of Political Groups: A push and pull mechanism

The political groups emerged from the actors in the political system that contains many people with different interests and visions. This political group factor plays a greater role in terms of the push and pull of foreign policy making. They are important to the extent that the tension amongst these groups could lead to the failure of foreign policy being implemented.

The political groups that were present in the SBY era were a result of military and bureaucratic domination. Despite democratization downplaying the role these political elites had, in practice, these political groups still persisted and sometimes constrained the president in the decision-making process.

Moreover, there were limitations in his policies due to the restricted pattern of Indonesia's strategic culture. It was controversial that SBY himself had a military

background and the old military elites were supporting him in return for top positions in government sectors. And although the democracy was stable, within his government there were internal clashes of interests due to the oversized coalition.

Moreover, in terms of the role of bureaucrats, it related to the democratically bureaucratic arrangement in which SBY, before making decisions, needed to engage with bureaucratic actors. According to Halperin, bureaucrat here refers to civilian officials and political appointees, as well as military officers. This implies that the role and function of bureaucrats are not limited to implementing but formulating policy, making decisions and giving advice.

For example, Mari Elka Pangestu and Gita Wirjawan, these bureaucratic ministers were strongly supportive of the closer partnership with China and also a number of ministers for economic affairs were actively involved in promoting strong economic cooperation with China.

From this aspect, the interests between these bureaucratic ministers and the military elite led to some controversies that SBY had to deal with by staying in the middle of everything and remaining neutral as he was called a “moderate president”. In addition, his over-concern about international reputation led to his notion of “thousand friends and zero enemy” which manifested his “omnidirectional diplomacy” which also reflected his leadership style in terms of befriending others and building a good reputation.

Although the president was the key actor in foreign policy making, he was considered to be a weak leader and was not predominant because bureaucratic dominance tended to prevail in SBY’s policymaking.

For Jokowi, according to his GMF foreign policy, one of his ministers said that the president was best understood as a ‘bundle of contradictions’. Moreover, it can be said that during Jokowi’s presidency there have been complex situations to clearly define what political stance he would like to lean on. However, with his infrastructure projects or any development projects, there was no proper analysis on the result of which infrastructure projects would increase growth and productivity the most. Rather, he just pushed forward projects depending on where he was visiting.

Due to this problem, there are apparently two factions of interest groups. A group of Nationalists expressed that although Indonesia was not directly involved,

Jokowi should push back against China's assertiveness in both the South China Sea and Natuna Islands by making a strong public statement in defense of international law and freedom of navigation. They also believe Indonesia should act as a mediating power in the region. Moreover, this group are concerned mostly over national sovereignty and security, as they believe if Jokowi lets Chinese investment have more influence in the country, it will affect almost all aspects of Indonesian society and the Independent and Active doctrine of the country.

While, on the other hand, a group of non-confrontational, insisted that Indonesia does not have a serious territorial dispute with China and that any dispute can be solved through peaceful means. They believe that by cooperating with China, Indonesia could gain enormous economic benefit that in turn could support Indonesia's reputation regionally and globally.

From this aspect, therefore, the GMF has not been able to be implemented since there were some constraints posed by the interest group mentioned earlier. So, it can be said that, although the president holds the highest power and was the one who designed the foreign policy, there are some other factors that can influence their foreign policy making process. Especially the support from his coalition and the parliament which included various actors such as the old oligarch elite and the military in the case of SBY.

For Jokowi, he has also faced similar constraints, moreover, since he launched the GMF, there has been the emergence of two groups that push and pull the implementation of his foreign policy.

4.6.4 The role of China in Indonesia foreign policy

The factor of China plays a different role regarding the foreign policy of the two presidents. The ambivalence in Indonesia-China relations has shown the deep-rooted sentiment the elite and the wider public have towards China. Thus, Indonesia sees that the multilateral engagement and bilateral partnerships with China and other major powers as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Therefore, the term "dynamic equilibrium" that SBY's government utilized implies a new label for the 'balance of power'.

The role of China during the SBY era created a debate topic among policymakers as China's action in the South China Sea and its expansion of power through infrastructure development might create uncertainty in the region. However, the economic benefits were more appealing to Indonesia's national interests, therefore, in the SBY era, Indonesia signed the strategic partnership with China.

However, this cooperation was not free from suspicion, so from this point neorealism is the best description for the relations between the two countries. Moreover, in terms of its influence on foreign policy, there were two ways that China was seen to affect the decision making of SBY.

First, Indonesia wanted to diversify its dependency on the great powers. In other words, China was targeted by Indonesia to balance out its economic dependence on the U.S. and Japan. Thus, under SBY's administration, his omnidirectional foreign policy has been an instrument to help facilitate Indonesia's need to diversify dependencies and engage them into accepting Indonesia's ideal vision of an inclusive international order.

Second, China's willingness to sign a Declaration on Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with ASEAN member states was a signal that it was willing to cooperate with ASEAN in managing potential conflicts in the region. This willingness shown by China was in accordance with the vision of SBY to bring peace and prosperity to the region and at the same time enhance Indonesia's leadership.

Despite these two key factors, Indonesia also diversified its relations with other major powers in order to balance the power of China. For example, the invitation of the U.S. to participate in regional forums such as EAS. Moreover, SBY prioritized ASEAN integration not only to balance with China, but also as a platform to promote Indonesia's leadership.

On the other hand, the Chinese factor during the Jokowi era tended to play more of a role in influencing foreign policy due to the different direction of foreign policy and the circumstances that happened in the region. The foreign policy of the U.S. towards this region has changed; this means that, while Obama saw the importance of strategic partnership and multi-cooperation with ASEAN region and sought a healthy relationship with President SBY, under the Trump administration, the U.S. has been gradually fading away from the region.

Simultaneously, Trump's administration and his policies have made Indonesia felt uneasy, an example of this is the U.S. policy towards Israel and Palestine which Indonesia, as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, did not agree with.

Moreover, the presence of the U.S in the region is clearly for the major power's competition with China. In addition, the decline of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy caused some ambivalence to Indonesia.

As a result, some of Indonesian's foreign policy figures see that the country should not rely so much on the U.S regarding its security because they are afraid that by relying on the U.S., this could cause other ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea conflict to act more aggressive which could lead to more uncertainty in the region.

Jokowi himself shows little interest in international affairs and puts more emphasis on domestic and national development agenda. He has chosen to focus on down-to-earth diplomacy that would be useful to the people. Jokowi is trying to change the pattern of foreign policy and believes that the welfare of society or the domestic development will determine the positioning of Indonesia in the global affairs.

He then formulated his key foreign policy which is known as Global Maritime Fulcrum to maintain and enhance country's power and sovereignty that complied with the national infrastructure development.

To realize his GMF foreign policy, Jokowi identified China as the main necessary actor to play a role in this initiation and when it launched its BRI, his developmentalist agenda begun to focus on attracting infrastructure investment. Moreover, in Jokowi's early years, Indonesia had struggled to attract private foreign direct investment for major infrastructure projects. Therefore, to fill this investment gap, Jokowi has increasingly looked to China in which he admires China's rapid development and sees Chinese President Xi Jinping as a fellow results-oriented leader.

So, it is no doubt that Jokowi tends to favor and lean towards China and embraced the term of 'Pro-China' sentiment. Despite the assertive action of China in the South China Sea and its illegal vessels in the Natuna Islands of Indonesia, Jokowi has tended to neglect such incidents in order to maintain a good relationship with China.

All in all, the role of the Chinese factor in Jokowi's foreign policy is a result of its growing economy matching with Indonesia's national interests and the goals of Jokowi's government. Indonesia under Jokowi and its relations with China and other major powers was driven by either economic, political, or sociocultural factors based on the government's policy priority.

Due to Jokowi's populist and domestic oriented characteristics, he prioritized the national interest as his core vision and initiated policies that accompanied his plan, although Jokowi was said to lack foreign affairs experience and narrow vision in international stage compared to his predecessor. Realizing the importance of China for his vision of improving Indonesia maritime infrastructure, President Jokowi further intensified the interactions between the two countries in the statement that Indonesia's GMF was willing to work complimentary with China's BRI.

4.7 Conclusion: The change in foreign policy

The change in domestic politics considerably affects the foreign policy making process of a country. The change in foreign policy direction in this issue results from domestic political factors that manifest. The most important factors in the shift of foreign policy direction is the political system which is defined by the actors involved and the foreign policy direction of the country.

The political system of Indonesia remains a top-down structure and does not signal any potential change. What has changed are the political figures when elections have taken place. However, these figures are mostly the old political elite and the military that have long been dominant in Indonesia's politics even after democratization.

Thus, the change in foreign policy can be assumed to be the result of changes in domestic power relations, this means the political elite or military presence that tended to prevail the president's power in the decision making. These political elites posed different views of foreign policy direction and how they wanted to portray the role of Indonesia in international affairs. The change in this aspect also brought about further change in domestic basis of political stability to economic development.

The military posed their ideology that varied due to their interests and the circumstances that occurred around that time. One circumstance that happened during SBY's presidency was that, when he began his first term, the Bush administration's war on terror was at its height and the Bali bombing resulted in Indonesia's foreign policy to shift concern to the security dimension and prevent the intervention of foreign politics and the military. That is why Indonesia under SBY launched the so-called 'thousand friends and zero enemy' policy to deal with this aspect and adhere to the ideology of internationalism that pushed Indonesia to play more of a role on the global stage with the aim of maintaining the country's independence and national interest.

In contrast to SBY, Jokowi defined 'national interest' differently from his predecessor and Indonesia's foreign policy has shifted from one based on the values of internationalism and democracy to one based on economics. This is a significant policy shift when compared to SBY's administration, in which Indonesia's strategy was to raise its international status by playing an active part in global governance.

Jokowi and his team, which included members of the military elite from the New Order era, were not satisfied with SBY's "thousand friends and zero enemy" policy because they believed that it sounded more like an excuse to take responsibility to advance domestic demands. From this aspect, it has also brought change to the national interest, as SBY prioritized economic cooperation mechanism, especially through ASEAN, and engaged in many international economic forums, whereas Jokowi's definition of national interest prioritizes domestic demand and infrastructure development.

Indonesia foreign policy is likely to remain independent but the more nationalist voices of the political elites have greater influence, especially in Jokowi's administration. His core foreign policy thus manifested that he is concerned mostly on national interests such as the Global Maritime Fulcrum.

Although the GMF is a large-scale foreign policy, it does not project a multi-cooperation sense, instead it tends to place more value on working with China's Belt and Road initiative and is oriented toward China's growing market in order to boost domestic infrastructure development. Despite tensions in the South China Sea escalating in the year that Jokowi came into power and the assertive action of China in

both the South China Sea and Natuna Islands, these incidents do not seem to be an obstacle for Jokowi maintaining a good relationship with China.

In terms of political groups, the prevalence of political elites that have persisted in Indonesia's political system has led to challenges in the foreign policy making process that come in the form of political groups or factions. The factions that emerged during the tenures of both SBY and Jokowi have presented a number of obstacles to foreign policy formulation and implementation.

In SBY's era, there were many actors involved in the foreign policy making process due to his oversized coalition. Therefore, he had to deal with the problem of a conflict of interests between the military and bureaucrats in the field of foreign policy.

Thus, the foreign policy in the SBY era tended to comply with both the ideology of independent and active and a strong support from the ministers of economic affairs in pursuing relations with China whilst at the same time he had to manage and avoid any controversies among the actors in his coalition.

While the change in government coalition has brought new interests and perspectives of foreign policy, Jokowi's coalition contains more nationalist voices as previously mentioned, therefore, his GMF policy has led to factions within the government, one of which remain skeptical about Indonesia's relations with China, several military figures continue to be suspicious of China intentions, and are likely to continue the protectionist direction in terms of economies. While the other group, which consists of foreign ministers, prioritize the potential economic gains from cooperating with China's BRI despite the conflict in the South China Sea which they believe could be solved through the enhancement of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

As a result, the GMF policy could not run smoothly as it struggled to deal with the factions within the political groups that hold conflicting views and interests regarding this issue of China's BRI and the South China sea conflict. This aspect was quite similar to that of the political groups that SBY encountered as his foreign policy needed to portray a neutral position in order to avoid any friction in the foreign policy making process.

The role of China here is also significant to the foreign policy decision making process. However, it was constrained by the political system of Indonesia due

to the persistency of the elites' cautiousness and wariness towards China's assertive actions. Therefore, the role of China seems to be that of an inspiration, rather than an direct influencer, for Indonesia to pursue more leadership role in the region, which was apparent in the SBY era. From this aspect, under the leadership of SBY, Indonesia was careful in pursuing its relations with China and at the same time diversifying its diplomatic relations with other major powers.

As the foreign policy goal of Indonesia changed, from political stability under SBY to economic development under Jokowi, consequently, so too did the role of China as, in the Jokowi era, they seemed to play a more significant role, as it was the most important contributor to Jokowi's national development agenda that created pro-China sentiment.

However, Indonesia-China relations thus can be explained through the neorealism perspective of security dilemma and the balance of power. As the political groups in each government have played an important role in the foreign policy making process. The security dilemma that China poses has created uncertainty in the region the impact on Indonesia's national security has been a major concern for the nationalist military elites as they are still suspicious about China's strategy in the region.


Consequently, Indonesia's foreign policymakers see that the country could cooperate with China for economic benefit but at the same time, China's expansion of power has created a sense of uncertainty, therefore, the country should proceed with a policy that can balance the power of China by diversifying its relations with other countries both within and outside the region. From this aspect, Indonesia could preserve its long-standing foreign policy doctrine of Independent and Active and its leadership status.

From all the prior aspects, there are a number of significant reasons for the shift in foreign policy from SBY to Jokowi, in many of which domestic political factors are the vital contributor to the foreign policy process and the changes to it.

First, the change in domestic power relations meant change in government actors when elections took place despite the persistence of political elites and military that seemed not to be altered. Second, when the new set of government figures came in, they brought with them new ideologies and interests, therefore, it changed the

overall foreign policy goal which for SBY was political stability and international role while for Jokowi it was economic development.

Third, the role of China that has changed as a result of the change in the foreign policy goal. Despite the Strategic partnership SBY signed with China, he simultaneously pursued relations with many other countries. In contrast to this, under Jokowi, China is the main contributor to his maritime vision and because of this, plays an increasingly more significant role in Indonesia's foreign policy. However, it is important to note that the Chinese factor has been hindered by the Indonesian political system where the political elites, including the military, remain a considerable obstacle for Jokowi in his attempts to lean more towards China.



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATION

This study has sought to answer this following question: How does domestic politics and external factors determine Indonesia's foreign policy decision making to join the Belt and Road Initiative despite the South China Sea conflict? This thesis investigated the four factors that influence Indonesia's foreign policy making towards China's BRI and the South China Sea conflict. This thesis focused on mainly government actors; therefore, the factors include the political regime, leadership and foreign policy, interest groups and the external factors namely China and the U.S.

To highlight these aspects, two cases were examined in order to see how the foreign policy making had changed when there was a transformation of leader: Indonesia's foreign policy making under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono; and the foreign policy making under President Joko Widodo. These case studies allow this thesis to demonstrate how domestic politics and external factors influence Indonesia's foreign policy and how some of these factors are also interrelated to each other. These two cases were selected in order to make a in-depth comparison to see the distinction in how each president went about trying to accomplish their foreign policy goals and how they are struggled with the constraints of domestic politics.

This study argues that domestic politics have impacted foreign policy in a mixed way. As Indonesia's democratic principle and the long-standing tradition of Independent and Active is one of the reasons that shaped and influenced foreign policy, some policy aspects have continued to be relevant. By all accounts, SBY's foreign policy goal and aspiration was to have Indonesia play a more active international role and emerge as a leader in the Southeast Asian region. On the other hand, under Jokowi, the independent and active doctrine tended to be downplayed, as the president prioritized domestic aspects rather than pursuing an active international role.

In order to understand the impact of these four factors, the Domestic Politics approach by Dugis was used. In his work, he employs the explanation of Goldmann in terms of the matter of domestic politics and foreign policy of a country.

Moreover, by utilizing the domestic politics approach, it could be able to fill the gap that IR theories have overlooked, for example, IR theories place importance on the external environment and regard it as high politics while lacking any analysis of domestic aspects. However, in defining the relations between Indonesia and China, this thesis utilizes the concept of security dilemma and the balance of power of neorealism which could be the most suitable for explaining their relations.

5.1 Main findings

The foreign policy was influenced by domestic politics, which is quite complex in of itself. For Indonesia, domestic politics play an important role in the foreign policy making process and also the shifts in the foreign policy.

Changes to the domestic politics have influenced the way decisions are made, they introduced new national priorities and influenced how these priorities are delivered or expressed. The uncertainties in the regional dynamic have also led to some readjustment to Indonesia's external relations. For example, the emergence of China as the major regional power has required Indonesia's attention, particularly that of Jokowi's administration.

In terms of the former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, he was the first directly elected president of the country and during his era it was said to be an era of democratic consolidation. However, the strong persistence of the political system of Indonesia since it gained independence has left the legacy of the military's presence and involvement in politics. After democratization, the military's role was downplayed in political affairs, but the inauguration of SBY seemed to revive their power.

In particular, the issue of foreign policy towards China and its expansion of BRI involved the aspects of national defense and security which meant it also had to involve the military aspect. During SBY's tenure, there were many actors involved in foreign policy making. One reason for this is that he possessed a military background and his indecisive manner led to decision making tending to be dominated by the military and bureaucratic elites. SBY relied on these people because these military figures and bureaucrats held power that SBY had to comply with.

Moreover, due to his oversized coalition that contained a variety of actors and interests, this somewhat forced him to pursue a rather neutral foreign policy or foreign policy that adhered to the old ideology of the TNI being the guardian of Indonesia.

In addition, the Chinese factor is crucial to this matter as, according to neorealism, China has created a sense of uncertainty in the region with its assertive actions, an example of which being those in the South China Sea. Therefore, using the term security dilemma and the balance of power could perhaps best explain this issue. This is because the regional dynamic has changed due to power competition between the U.S. and China. At the same time, China's economic growth has been a major challenge for Southeast Asian states to pursue their foreign policy.

Indonesia has pursued a good relationship with China in order to grow its economic development and, in the SBY era, China was viewed as an opportunity to diversify Indonesia's dependency so that it not longer had to depend on one particular country. From this point, it is reflected in SBY's much publicized slogan, "Thousand friends and zero enemy", that Indonesia will not align with any one country and will attempt to remain neutral in every situation possible.

On the other hand, a change in foreign policy took place when President Joko Widodo came into power. This transition brought about a change in the actors in the government which related to political groups as well. When Jokowi, who has neither an elite nor a military background, first came into power he was faced with a number of controversies within his party and in the parliament. Therefore, he had to seek support from the persistent power of military. As a result of this, he appointed a retired general to be his right hand and to serve as the coordinating minister for maritime affairs. Moreover, Jokowi also appointed several New Order figures to prominent positions within his government.

The presence of military figures has presented a new direction of nationalism for the president to pursue his foreign policy. Additionally, Jokowi himself, with little interest in foreign affairs, tends to lean more towards nationalism and to some extent toward authoritarianism. In this era, the military seem to play a significant role, firstly, by advancing a nationalist ideology, and secondly, the military have also effected limitations to Jokowi's GMF foreign policy.

With this nationalist sentiment, it brings a change to the foreign policy goal which is now much more domestic oriented when compared to that of SBY. The desire of the president and his team is to bring new interests and perspectives to the domain of foreign policy. As in SBY era, the goal of the president and his military supporters was to gain more international status and have Indonesia preserve its leadership role in ASEAN, that is why his foreign policy outcome is the well-known “thousand friends and zero enemy’ foreign policy, this was then utilized in many issues including the South China Sea conflict.

However, in the Jokowi era, the foreign policy direction shifted towards a more domestic orientation concerning the national development in regards to the issue of the rise of China and its grand strategy of the Belt and Road initiative, which has appealed to attract Jokowi’s interest. China was seen by Jokowi as an important investor who could help Indonesia with its national infrastructure development projects as, at the same time, the foreign policy of the U.S. has created an ambivalence to Indonesia’s foreign policy makers, as they tend to fade away from the region. Therefore, the role of China influenced Jokowi’s foreign policy as its growing economy matched with the vision of the Indonesian president so much that it has created a ‘pro-China’ sentiment in Jokowi.

However, the China factor was also restricted by certain Indonesian government actors, including the elites and the military that remain vigilant of China’s ambivalent intentions. Therefore, the relations between the two countries can be described by the neorealism concept of security dilemma regarding the uncertainty that China has created and the balance of power that has manifested in Indonesia’s foreign policy which remain Independent and Active.

Indeed, the GMF and pro-China sentiment has led to feelings of unease among some nationalists. As a result, it has created two divergent political groups that impair the progress of the GMF policy. One group stands on nationalist sentiment which means they are concerned about the national security and sovereignty of Indonesia. They are also afraid that Indonesia might lose its ASEAN leadership status if it excessively relies on China.

On the other hand, the other group favors gaining economic benefits regardless of the South China Sea conflict, insisting that Indonesia does not have any

serious dispute with China. Some also stated that by cooperating with China, Indonesia could gain tremendous economic benefits which could assist the capabilities of Indonesia in the international sphere.

These two groups were said to have clashed on ideology towards China's intentions in the investment sphere in the country, with one group being concerned over the sovereignty of Indonesia's waters, while the other group is supportive of the GMF policy and believe that Indonesia could benefit from cooperating with China.

Another problem is the failure to strike a durable balance between economic openness and protectionism. In other words, he was struggled to find the middle ground between economic nationalism and the need for foreign investment. The president has to deal effectively between charm offensives with foreign investors and domestic promises to wean Indonesia off imports and foreign companies.

5.2 Challenges and implications

While China presents huge potential economic opportunities, the domestic elites views it as a challenge for Indonesia. Despite Indonesia's underdeveloped economy, many of them fear that growing engagement with China might translate into dependency in the future.

Jokowi has instead favored a pro-China stance by actively pursuing Chinese investment to push through large infrastructure projects in the Indonesian archipelago. As evidenced, there is a great deal of criticism regarding the deals with Chinese firms which include excessive foreign interest, debt and a lack of local employment from the projects; despite this, Jokowi has said in return that 'Indonesia can't just export goods without building the necessary infrastructure' (Tan, 2019).

Nonetheless, there is still an inadequate level of information regarding to how the GMF foreign policy program will be carried out. Moreover, there are two sizable factions in regard to this program. These intra-factions resulted in terms of unrealisation of the policy and it is difficult to predict what it is going to happen with the GMF in the next four years of Jokowi's presidency.

All in all, the emergence of issues from the external environment presented a variety of challenges for both presidents to deal with different situations through their

foreign policy. However, although these external situations may have posed some challenges to the country, the domestic politics played a prominent role in the establishment of foreign policy based on how they view that particular situation. For instance, in the case of the South China Sea conflict, under SBY's administration, Indonesia was willing to act as a middleman and play a mediating role and prioritize the multi-cooperation aspect to deal with the problem. This kind of action was due to the domestic politics that have been discussed earlier.

In contrast to SBY, Jokowi came into power in 2014, just when the situation of South China Sea conflict was escalating, and he did not pursue the same role as SBY but rather proposed the GMF policy in which he hoped to secure Indonesia's sovereignty and at the same time benefit from the economic growth of China.

Moreover, it is important to note that during Jokowi's second term as president, his foreign policy has not gone through much change. Although there has been criticism for a lack of attention to foreign affairs, some observers argue that Jokowi is unlikely to change and become passionate by foreign affairs. He himself has emphasized and suggested that his foreign policy will stay relatively oriented towards domestic needs. In the first speech after his re-election in 2019, he attentively asserted his vision to develop domestic capacities, economy and governance. But in terms of foreign affairs, there has been the challenge that domestic agenda cannot be separated from international dynamics. The economic growth of the country is influenced partly by confidence in the regional stability, so his administration has to initiate economic growth that involves a fair share of international participation.

However, there are some changes in the vision he uses to frame foreign policy since 2014. For instance, Jokowi's vision for Indonesia's role in the world is no longer dictated by the 'Global Maritime Fulcrum' but now, he emphasizes Indonesia's capacity for technology and manufacturing. In his first term, he portrayed Indonesia's character as a maritime nation but in his 2019 campaign he emphasized Indonesia's Muslim Identity and his intent to improve relations with fellow Islamic countries. However, this kind of vision can be seen as part of his pragmatic effort to assembling domestic preferences with his pursuit of economic development.

Notwithstanding, the global and regional challenges that have occurred in Jokowi's second term have required the president to pay closer attention to foreign

policy. Those challenges include the maintaining ASEAN's unity among the push and pull of the great powers' competition in the region, in particular, in the South China Sea. From this point, Indonesia needs to balance and diversify its foreign policy and equal offers of involvement in geopolitical projects.



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