



MORO CONFLICT: THE DISCURSIVE AUTONOMY

BY

MR. JIRAPAT SUWANDEE

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC YEAR 2021
COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY**

MORO CONFLICT: THE DISCURSIVE AUTONOMY

BY

MR. JIRAPAT SUWANDEE

**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

ACADEMIC YEAR 2021

COPYRIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THESIS

BY

MR. JIRAPAT SUWANDEE


ENTITLED

THE MORO CONFLICT: THE DISCURSIVE AUTONOMY

was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Political Science in International Relations


on July 9, 2022

Chairman




(Asst. Prof. Wasan Luangprapat, Ph.D.)

Member and Advisor



(Prof. Jaran Maluleem, Ph.D.)

Member



(Srawut Aree, Ph.D.)

Dean



(Asst. Prof. Tavida Kamolvej, Ph.D.)

Thesis Title	MORO CONFLICT: THE DISCURSIVE AUTONOMY
Author	Mr. Jirapat Suwandee
Degree	Master of Political Science
Major Field/Faculty/University	Politics and International relations Faculty of political science Thammasat University
Thesis Advisor	Professor Jaran Maluleem, Ph.D.
Academic Years	2021

ABSTRACT

This research focuses on the Moro ethnic conflict in the Philippines where the clashes lasted over hundreds of years, full of historical and foreign grievances, which may define the long-lasting conflict between the Moro political group and the Philippine authority. Although, the struggle of the Moro minority was commenced through violent, religious-implicated motivation, as well as the involvement of transnational influence that either support or shift the political agenda of the Moro movement. The discourses of the conflict over the method of operation and the struggle itself for achieving the desired independence also explain the different behavior and responses of both the minority and the government.

The research also break down and compare the different four Moro political group, the Moro National Liberation Front, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf, and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, through discursive analysis aimed to identify the distinct behavior of these groups operating under the same political goal, Bangsamoro (Moro nation) liberation, though the goal is the same, the implementation of tactic, organizational ideology, and the involvement of foreign support for the Moro groups are different. It is shown through the speeches, claims, and announcement of those mentioned groups while opening the room for victim, media, and academic's point of view to counterbalance the justification of political struggle of the Moro minority. Under this research, the finding also shows the different implementation of the groups' strategies, different implication of abstract ideologies, and different objective to bring other transnational movement into the Moro insurgency which in some cases, transnational movement changes the group's agenda, or the group intentionally changes the its agenda to attract more foreign involvement.

Keywords: Discourse, Moro insurgency, Jihadism



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor and the thesis committee, Asst. Prof. Dr. Wasan Luangprapat, Prof. Dr. Jaran Maluleem, and Dr. Srawut Aree that comment and criticize my work for further improvements and theoretical foundations.

Also, this research would not have been finished if without my family supports and encouragement as well as my advisor and other thesis committee who recommend many resourceful readings and academic works in the field of Moro insurgency and the Muslim perspective over the religious implication of Jihadism or Islam in politics.

Also, I would like to thank my classmates for motivation as well as for providing additional support on research findings and critical thinking on the Muslim conflict in different narrative on different countries to compare with the Moro case.

Mr. Jirapat Suwandee




TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	(1)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	(3)
LIST OF TABLES	(7)
LIST OF FIGURES	(7)
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	(8)
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Introduction and Brief Background	1
1.1.1 Timeframe	3
1.1.2 Definition of Terms	4
1.2 Research Overview	5
1.2.1 Research Question	5
1.2.2 Research Objective	5
1.2.3 Research Contribution	5
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE	6
2.1 Literature Review	6
2.1.1 Violence	6
2.1.2 Jihadism	8
2.1.3 Transnational Movement	10
2.2 Analytical Framework	11

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	13
3.1 Research Methodology	13
3.1.1 Research Method	13
3.2 Limitation and Opportunity	14
CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION	15
4.1 History and Perception of Moro movement	15
4.1.1 Violence: The Meaning for Struggle	15
4.1.1.1 The Moro National Liberation Front	16
4.1.1.2 Viewpoint of President Fidel Ramos	19
4.1.1.3 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front	20
4.1.1.4 Abu Sayyaf and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom	26
Fighter	
4.1.1.5 Selected Newspaper	31
4.1.2 Jihadism: Ties That Bind and Bite	35
4.1.2.1 Predecessor and the MNLF	42
4.1.2.2 The MILF's <i>Jihad</i>	47
4.1.2.3 Abu Sayyaf & BIFF Perception of <i>Jihad</i>	52
4.1.3 Transnational Movement within the Conflict	56
4.2 Critical Assessment of the Discursive Conflict	75
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	86
5.1 Summary	86
5.1.1 Reflection and Research Answer	90
5.2 For Future Research	92
REFERENCES	94

APPENDICES


APPENDIX A	Interview with Nur Misuari, Chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front	103
APPENDIX B	Speech of President Ramos at the signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front	107
APPENDIX C	MILF Leader to "Nida'ul Islam": "Perhaps the Moro struggle for freedom and self-determination is the longest and bloodiest in the entire history of mankind"	114
APPENDIX D	Speech of the Chairman of the MILF during the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, October 15, 2012	121
APPENDIX E	Abu Sabaya interview transcript	125
BIOGRAPHY		127

LIST OF TABLES

Tables	Page
5.1 The Comparison between All Selected Moro Movement in the Conflict	89

LIST OF FIGURES

Figures	Page
4.1 The Represented Ideas Which Drive the Moro Struggle from the MNLF and MILF	77
4.2 The Linkage between the Implication of <i>Jihad</i> as the Justification	81
4.3 The Relationship of Transnationalism in the Philippines from the Spaniard to the Post-Colonial Rule	84



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Symbols/Abbreviations	Terms
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BARMM	Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
GRP	Government of the Philippines
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organization
ISIS/IS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria / Islamic State
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD	Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference)
PNP	Philippine National Police
TJ	Tablighi Jamaat

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and Brief Background

Within the context of security in global international relations, domestic insurgencies seem to be relevant in many national governments influencing their security policies which, in the Twenty First century, one incident can relate to another event across the globe. The specific meaning of one thing could become another definition for the others. For example, the emerging aspiration of Islamic revolution in Iran should be ideological enough to conceptualize and materialize the Philippine Islamic uprising for autonomy in which its leader had been mold in Iran. The certain question can be How can we manage the Muslim insurgency? Or, what do they believe in Islamic revolution? Or, Which beliefs push them into a fight?

Within the southern Philippines, there are many established Muslim insurgent groups called the (Bangsa) Moro movement such as the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or the Abu Sayyaf Group. At the same time, those groups also build the newcomers or ‘emerging threats’ such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, or the Maute Group after the end of the Cold War. Despite their differences, they are all fighting to death for their ‘Independence’. The motivation for their causes, as they claimed, are the grievances of the Muslim minority in the Philippines (they are majority in southern Philippines) suffered through different time and in different administrations.

Furthermore, the security interaction between the Muslim insurgency or Muslim radical movement and the Philippine authority do not only produce the term ‘Second Front’ of the famous war on terrorism claimed by the United States government since the destruction of its twin towers, but also create the network of the local fighters with other foreign movement which I am interested in.

Rather than looking at the present Moro conflict through actors and agendas, some should also investigate the hidden message and relations behind those actors and their ultimate goal which, in this case, the Moro ‘Independence’

Therefore, some should not clarify the term Moro 'autonomy' in a linear or general definition, but they should proceed with the caution that the notion of 'autonomy' is changeable through space and time, in this case through different organization in various time. It might dissatisfy the structuralists, but that certain meaning might be not enough to explain the 'discourse' of the Moro 'autonomy' in their struggle, both violent and non-violent, for their ideal independence.

The History of this Moro struggle might have started since the Spanish colonial rule in the 1500s in which the colonists implemented an aggressive policy toward the natives. Then, the American took over the Spanish legacy and intensified the conflict through its repopulation project in the southern Philippines. Finally, the post-colonial Philippine government deepened this wound through the American legacy. The struggle of the Moros may seem to be 'uninterrupted' and against the oppressive and colonialist authority. However, by looking up closely, the sign of Moro struggle in the Spanish era was indeed not unified in which different part of the Mindanao reacted differently to the Spanish from friendly to hostile. The Sultans in Mindanao were waging clan wars or tribal war with each other when the Spanish landed. The ones who failed to establish a trade with the Spanish rulers led the resistance forces to push the colonizers back to the sea.

Although, the Moro resistance of the Spanish rulers was not unified due to their leader rivalries, during the American visit in the late 1880s, the new colonizer has promised the upcoming autonomous region for the Sultans in Mindanao and Sulu to separate the Moros from joining the Filipino-American civil war, though this promise never become true ending up as another Moro rebellion.

Nevertheless, the concept of unified resistance emerged in the late 1960s by introducing the MIM or Moro Independence Movement against the central government after the 'Jabidah Massacre' incident which the Philippine military infamously killed the Muslim special forces due to their disobediences to infiltrate in Sabah during territorial conflict between the Philippines and Malaysia. This event led to the very first Moro independent movement in 1968 through the Moro Independent Movement which later became the Moro National Liberation Front or the MNLF. The MIM had founded the sense of united resistance under a single organization

Despite the different clans and cultures, the Moro separatists created the term “Bangsa” Moro or Moro nation to unite the Moro people under the common religion: ‘Islam’. However, the interpretation of Islam might be incorrect to justify the violent struggle, which in some groups involved kidnapping and ransom of innocent civilian, for the Moro cause.

In order to have their autonomy, the Moros firstly believed in secessionist movements against the authority to establish their own autonomous region through various organizations such as the MNLF founded by Nur Misuari, or the MILF led by Sheikh Hashim Salamat.

Some would say the belief of independence gave the various meanings to the (Bangsa)Moro struggle in which went from rebellious armed struggles to peaceful negotiation in order to find their own autonomous region with or without the Philippine superior authority.

However, the initial idea of “Moro Independence”, which was claimed by the MNLF to establish the autonomous region, began to take another step when the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), formed by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), led by Ameril Umbra Kato, decide to join the transnational radicalistic organization so-called the ISIS in 2014 (Zahid, 2014).

Generally, in the case of the ASG, the very first attempt would be the alliance of the infamous Al-Qaeda organization in the 2000s which popularized the Abu Sayyaf fighters. The result of the involvement of those transnational radical movement was the siege of the Marawi city in 2016 in the southern Philippines commenced by the ISIS affiliates led by the Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF, and the native Maute group causing a destructive urban warfare with the Philippine national army.

1.1.1 Timeframe

This research covers the emergence and evolution of the Moro conflict in the Philippines since the late 1970s, specifically 1976, when the very first Moro movement established and carried on their struggle into many different Moro organizations representing the struggle for autonomy against the perceived threat of the Filipino, Christianity, and so on. The study would cover the peace development of the conflict since the late 1970s that related to the evolution of the context of the Moro

struggle which shaped and reshaped the discourse of perceived autonomy. The research observed the implication of 2016 siege of Marawi city that many representing and perceived representing Moro political groups participated alongside with the other transnational extremist organization. Though the main scope focuses over the development of the Moro context since the 1970s to 2016 incident and its aftermath, the study opens for further research over the implication of the Philippine constitutional reform which also involves the federalist peace agreement of the Moro autonomous region. This research only gives the possibility and assumption of such constitutional reform over the future of the Moro struggle in accordance with the research findings.

1968: The establishment of the first Moro independent organization happened this year.

1991: The first splinter group from the MILF group called Abu Sayyaf pursue its own agenda.

2014: The pledge of ISIS allegiance of the Abu Sayyaf, BIFF, and other local groups was manifested.

2016: The infamous siege of Marawi city was commenced by the ISIS affiliates.

1.1.2 Definition of terms

Moro- a Spanish term for native Muslims and other native tribes in the Philippines

Bangsamoro- a nationalistic term that means the Moro nation (often used by Moro Muslim nationalists)

Jihadism- an ideological term for radical Islamic movement (Firestone, 2012)

Insurgency- “asymmetrical power relations between weaker parties and the government involving violent or non-violent conflict” (Pratt, 2010)

Terrorism- “*politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence*” (Pratt, 2010)

Discourse- a linguistic term that refers to “*a series of representations and practices through which meaning are produced, identities constituted, social relations established ...*” (Campbell & Bleiker, 2013)

1.2 Research Overview

1.2.1 Research questions

To explain the struggle for autonomy, I have come up with two research questions. The first one is ‘How did the discourse of ‘autonomy’ shape the (Bangsa) Moro struggle?’ And the second one is ‘How did the discourse of ‘autonomy’ change after the 2016 siege of Marawi city?’

1.2.2 Research objective

Within this research, I would like to investigate the various meanings of Moro autonomy toward being independent that many Moro scholars and nationalists claimed during the past fifty years and to observe the effects and responses toward those meanings such as the emergence of the Bangsamoro term or the collective emotion on Muslim nationalism. I also want to identify the empirical implication of those meanings through the establishment or the breaking up of the organizations that pursue those kinds of meanings to have autonomy for grasping their discursive sense of independence. I would mainly focus on the struggle of the Moro against the Philippine government with a brief mention to their past conflict with the American or Spanish.

1.2.3 Research contribution

This research aims for the theoretical purpose as an alternative explanation for the autonomous ethnic movement in the southern Philippines from the 1968 to 2020 in order to cover the main perspective of the Moro discourses at the beginning of the struggle against the Philippine government. This research may be beneficial to future research based on an alternative approach despite the mainstream IR theories which may claim the materialist-oriented explanation to this happening such as military capacity or economic incentive.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Literature Review

First and foremost, I would like to introduce my literature reviews based on my research hypothesis which will categorize the review into three parts; *Violence*, *Jihadism*, and *Transnational movement*. To lay out this part, I categorize previous reviews into three components of my discourse of Independence.

2.1.1 Violence

“The historical narrative of Moro encounters with the Spanish and later the Americans ... choruses a distorted discourse of centuries of uninterrupted Moro struggle” I quote this statement from J.C. Liow in his work on *Southern Philippines: Reframing Moro Nationalism from (Bangsa) Moro to Bangsamoro* (Liow, 2016).

He argues that the concept of Moro or Bangsamoro is not ethnic but rather religious one which, in this case, is Islam. The word Moro is come from the Spanish term to call Muslim natives in Manila. Thus, the creation of Bangsamoro identity is from “the historical, social, and political aspects under the Bangsamoro nationalism (Liow, 2016).

From his work, I am convinced that Bangsamoro ethnicity is based on anything that is different from the Philippine culture.

The violent history of the Moro conflict is the result of ruthless colonialism since the 1500s namely the Spanish rule, then, the American colonial government, and finally, the post-colonial Philippine government.

When it comes to a struggle for an independent state, the first Moro movement was under the Moro Independence Movement in 1968 defending the ‘Bangsa’moro land. This struggle emerges from the transmigration policies which relocates people from other region into the southern Philippines which is mostly populated by the Muslim people.

He states the MNLF spokesman Asani that “Colonialism is the root cause of the Moro problem in the southern Philippines ... The present fighting in the area may be a fight against an established but repressive government” (Liow, 2016).

Even though the central government and the MNLF commonly agreed to settle their armed clashes, the 1976 Tripoli agreement, as an example, established the autonomous region under the Philippine sovereignty and also established the MILF to pursue its cause toward the independent state.

“Those people are not civilized.” said by General Hughes in W.R. Polk’s work on *Crusade and Jihad: The Thousand-Year War Between the Muslim World and the Global North* (Polk, 2018).

He emphasizes the role of anti-colonialist agenda that the Moro natives possessed during the Colonial period especially in the American rule which implemented the use of anti-guerilla warfare to end the native fighters. By announcing the ‘no surrender’ policy, the Moro fighters and civilian natives were ‘slaughtered’ by the colonist authority (Polk, 2018).

“Being uniformly brutalized, they began to react uniformly.” claimed by Polk.

The Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Second World War created this concept of uniformity. Thus, the Moro struggle started to go for a political aim which was the Moro nation state claimed by the MNLF.

Polk also mentions the atrocity named ‘genocide’ that Spaniards committed during their administration to secure their trade routes in the southern Philippines from the ‘Moro’ pirates. Therefore, the natives raised their hope as soon as the American came, however, the new colonists were driven by colonialism to expand their power which led to further Moro rebellious conflict.

Polk claims about an attempt to coexist with the Muslim through joint military infiltration to another state, but the Muslim special operators refused to obey the army resulting in the infamous ‘Jabidah’ massacre during President Marcos administration. The author also criticizes the 1976 peace talk that led to the MILF armed group splinted from the main MNLF organization and, later on, the breakaway of the Abu Sayyaf Group from the MNLF to pursue armed struggle against the Philippine government (Polk, 2018). “*Philippine Muslim armed resistance to Spanish*

encroachment was effective, but it was not a unified Islamic resistance” claimed by Yves Boquet in his book *The Philippine Archipelago* (Boquet, 2017).

The violent struggle during the Spanish era was not through the unified Moro fighters, but rather as through different clan-based fighters around the southern Philippines.

However, the attempt to ‘modernize’ the Philippines, the American governors perceived the Moro leaders as hostile and redefine the single word identity for the Moro to suit their colonial agendas which was the redeployment of native population pouring into the northern Luzon and Mindanao re-igniting the violence and Muslim rebellion (Boquet, 2017).

Hence, the concept of unity for Boquet is born since the American era which we can see it again during the very heat in the 1960s through the establishment of the Muslim separatist movement and the creation of the term ‘Bangsamoro’ as a nationalistic identity.

He, then again, emphasizes the Jabidah incident as the ignition of the Muslim insurgency across the Mindanao (Boquet, 2017).

2.1.2 Jihadism

Within this part, I would use the related reviews toward the introduction and the implication of Jihadism in the Moro conflict. “*The MIM, organized in 1968, was the first movement that demanded outright secession of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan regions. It insisted on defending the Bangsamoro homeland through jihad.*” stated by J. C. Liow in his book section; *Southern Philippines Reframing Moro Nationalism from (Bangsa) Moro to Bangsamoro* (Liow, 2016).

From this quote, I would say the discourse of independence was seen through Jihadism since the late 1960s which was the same time that the Jabidah incident occurred. However, by stating that ‘defending the Bangsamoro homeland’, it could mean the concept of Bangsamoro was almost simultaneously constructed alongside the violent clashes from Moro separatists.

However, Jihadism, as a radical Islamic movement, was seen as a variation that separated a certain group from another group. In this case, it was claimed

by the head of the MILF, Salamat Hashim in his speech “MNLF is more inclined to secularism, while MILF adopts the Islamic ideology and way of life” (Liow, 2016).

One of the sources of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front was done through the separation of ideas to pursue its ‘independence’ which was made to be different. The Islamic Jihadism was seen through Hashim’s eyes as a way or method that led to the Moro ‘Independence’.

Liow also mentions that the 1968 Massacre antagonized the ‘Muslim’ population which led to the insurgency in southern Mindanao (Liow, 2016).

“The Moros, however, felt they were asserting their right to self-determination as formerly sovereign people under the sultanates. The American Big Brother soon became a great Satan for the local Islamists.” stated by Liow in his book (Liow, 2016). From his argument, we would see the clear picture that the Moros have implanted themselves with the term ‘self-determination’ tracing back to the rule of sultanates before the Spanish era binding the concept with the term ‘Sovereign’ meaning the Moro conflict was fueled by the image of (Islamic) sultanates. Thus, we would prove the implication of his argument through the term ‘Jihad’ or Islamic radical movement within the MILF agenda.

Despite the different time of birth (Logan et al., 2020), the ASG and the BIFF share a similar goal as the ‘Islamic’ separatist organizations to seek an independent state for all ‘Moro’ people, even though, both groups are splinter groups from the core factions of the MNLF (for ASG) and the MILF (for BIFF).

Michael K. Logan and his colleagues claim that the leader transition of the organization may trigger the violence in southern Philippines through kidnapping, bombing, and armed clashes which the latter two are preferred by terrorist organizations (Logan et al., 2020).

“All Muslim radical groups in the Philippines, regardless of political persuasion and theological inclination, believe in the Bangsamoro struggle.” stated by R. C. Banlaoi in his book *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World* (Banlaoi, 2009a).

Despite the objective of (Bangsa)Moro independence, the Abu Sayyaf is struggling through the establishment of Islamic government, the notion of

Muslim equality, the implication of Quran which we cannot argue that the group operates without the radical Islamic ideology.

2.1.3 Transnational movement

“The expansion of transnational jihadist groups like IS and al-Qaida and their affiliates represents one of the most distinctive trends in organized violence.” stated by Erik Melander and his co-authors in their article, *Organized Violence, 1989-2015* (Melander et al., 2016).

In their work, the transnational jihadist is the new concept within the organized violence which includes all three concepts of violence; state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence (Melander et al., 2016).

They also use the ISIS and Al-Qaeda groups as the examples in this category which includes one key factor; there are no official signatories to any peace agreement between these two groups and any national states based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Melander et al., 2016).

Thus, I could use this claim with my case studies which there are yet any sign of possible peace negotiation between the Abu Sayyaf - BIFF and the Philippine government.

One specific issue about this transnational jihadist is that this category of organized violence is received a limited support from states (Melander et al, 2016). This could be possible when the transnational jihadist groups are classified as the terrorist organization, in other words, the radical or extremist Islamic movement.

“ISIS has encouraged supporters who could not go to Syria or Iraq to go to Mindanao and help the local groups,” stated by Dennis Quilala in his work on *Narratives and Counter-Narratives: Responding to Political Violence in the Philippines* (Quilala, 2018).

Within his work (Quilala, 2007), he argues that the collapse of the ISIS in Iraq and Syria would increase the numbers of foreign fighters in ASEAN countries which he uses the Marawi siege as an example that joint forces between local and foreign terrorists seize the city of Marawi which exposes the weakness of the Philippine military.

To summarize, I would say there are many academic works on the topic of Moro struggle or Moro insurgency, thus I could identify the gap in previous research. However, since it was introduced in my reviews, the definition of Independence remains unsettled which many academics are able to grasp this term, but the relations between the term Independence and the bigger picture of (Bangsa)Moro conflict still lack a comprehensive and cohesive explanation. Some reviews may mention the motivation of domestic violence and radical belief and ignoring the present movement of transnational presence, while other academics grasp the transnational concept, but do not investigate the domestic context which is shaped by the discourse of independence which my research would focus upon.

2.2 Analytical Framework

From my theoretical review, I found out that the notion of 'Discourse' in Poststructuralism would fit with my topic. As the name implies, Discourse can show the researcher a hidden message behind the specific term which its meaning varies based on how others perceive it to be. Thus, as the meaning depends on the others, social relations and practices from that discourse would change through times and agendas.

As knowledge is not neutral, the Poststructuralist sees the knowledge with biases depending on how individuals perceive through their belief. Basically, there is no single explanation on a specific term but rather depends on social relations or identities that are established or constituted.

Moreover, from my literature reviews that I would discuss below, I have spotted the patterns that many scholars and researchers use to describe the Moro conflict. The patterns include the violent causes create violent outcomes, or the unity of the Moro nation under Islam which I would use these concepts and combine them with my perspective of Poststructuralist discourse to structuralize my framework for more comprehensive and more critical explanation of the Moro conflict.

With my framework, I have identified the structure that the discourse of Independence can be seen through **Violence, Jihadism, and Transnational movement.**

In the '**Violence**' part, the meaning of Independence must be through armed struggle. Even though the violent actions within the Moro conflict can be intercepted by peaceful settlement, it cannot deny the fact that what follows the peaceful means is another violent incident either against the authority or among the movements.

For the '**Jihadism**' part, it remains strong that the concept of 'Jihadism' or radical Islamic movement lies within the discourse of Independence. As its name implies, the Moro 'Islamic' Liberation Front, which participates in the Moro conflict to gain its independent state, is a clear example of how the radical belief affects the insurgent movement in the Philippines. This **Jihadism** is not the word '**Jihad**' in traditional meaning, but rather the **Jihad** in political means to involve religion into political conflict.

For the '**Transnational movement**' part, it would be a huge mistake for not including this part in the analytical framework due to the fact that the Moro conflict is escalating into transnational radical movement from the context of the Abu Sayyaf group and the 'Bangsamoro' Islamic Freedom Fighters which they officially announce their allegiance to the ISIS organization which initially does not participate in the Moro 'Independence'. However, the siege of the city of Marawi in 2016 by the AFP or the Armed Forces of the Philippines to eliminate the 'ISIS' strongholds within the city can be an example that the line between domestic insurgencies and international terrorism is blurring. Since the conflict continues, the discourse of 'Independence' should include the presence of the transnational jihadist movement through the perception of Moro insurgencies.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Methodology

In order to answer my both questions, Qualitative methodology would suit my research as it can provide tools for diving into an in-depth knowledge and for fitting with specific case studies.

Since the methodology is a Qualitative category which I divide into two parts. The first part of my research will cover the historical study from 1972 onward through the origin of Moro independent struggle for Moro autonomy and their discourses. I would like to use the historical context respectively claimed by the MNLF and the MILF organization.

The second part of my research would be a historical study the transition of Moro autonomy for discursive autonomy through the announcement of the ISIS affiliates namely the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters which develops the indirect combat tactics and terror tactic to alternatively achieve the Moro 'autonomy'. This step would include the beginning of the Abu Sayyaf and the BIFF, as part of the splinter groups. Secondly, I would compare the studies from both first and second part of the research to see the development of the Moro struggle and its meaning.

3.1.1 Research method


As for Qualitative research, I have considered two instruments to be used in this investigation. The Primary method is the Discourse analysis through the meaning of Moro 'Independence' because this tool is suitable for my research objective and paves a safe way to study the insurgent groups that implement the terror tactics.

I would use this tool through governmental and separatist speeches and announcements that relate to the term Moro 'Independence' and through the local media comments which to see local responses to the governmental and separatist activities toward their own definition of the Moro 'autonomy'

The secondary method is through data collection and data analysis as the empirical evidence to support the discourse of independence. This tool will cover pre-existing secondary data such as books, and journal articles and also governmental or academic statistics from both independent research and other works from security institutions.

3.2 Limitation and Opportunity

By using these types of research methods, I am well-aware that this research might not suit for practical benefit which requires field study and up-to-date information from government officials and the groups' operators. It might be insufficient to provide knowledge for evaluating and analyzing parties' performances. However, by using Discourse analysis, my research would benefit the academic study and sociological research which my work can provide another perspective of the Moro conflict not as the practical study, but as the descriptive academic work which I can fill a gap in research field.



CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Historical and Perception of Moro Movement

4.1.1 Violence: The meaning for struggle

It is not to claim that the Moro struggle for autonomy equals linear violence in the sense that its fighters master their murdering skill by nature to achieve their goal. No, in this part I would suggest that the Moro struggle equals dynamic violence in the sense that its fighters use armed struggle not to scorch the Philippine government into ashes and reign the anarchic society that Moro people sit at the top. No, I think the Moro use armed struggle to send a message when conventional channels such as the negotiating table, international commission or alike cannot send the 'correct' message to the central government. I am not here to make a case for the non-discriminating use of force in Mindanao or Sulu, I am here to explain why the Moro fighters see the violence as a tool to achieve a political goal. A tool for their voice in future peace negotiation. Yes, the violence may seem unacceptable and futile, but it does produce some meaning or some importance when peace negotiation comes up.

For a brief illustration, the use of violence to achieve political goals do not occur only in the Philippines (or this paper, you may say). This kind of political tool is used by many guerilla forces such as the Cuban or Chinese communist fighters to topple down the repressive or capitalist government in which they see as the source of injustice in society. However, the use of this tactic tends not to harm civilians or minimize collateral damage. But for some secessionist groups, they may combine this tactic with the element of terror doctrine to visualize the just cause for a political goal that goes beyond or at least be more important than any cost of lives during the process. Ideologically fueled, those groups may rewrite civilian casualties as their martyrs to keep fighting for their desired goal.

Indeed, some would argue that violence is unacceptable particularly when combined with nondiscrimination upon civilians both local and foreign. It is true, I do agree only if the negotiation or the table is symmetrical, but as we see from the background that the Moro is the minority, resulted from the grand migration plan during

the US authority, which create the imbalance or asymmetrical board of chess that their moment leader know this advantage of fair deal resulting in the unconventional 'tactic' to inflict heavy losses, in term of assets and lives, over the opponent while maintaining and recruiting the 'true' Moro descendants. Therefore, it is not their guilt, but their scars to bear with.

4.1.1.1 The Moro national liberation front

Abroad, the Moro rebellion is posed as a religious war? Is this so? The revolutionary struggle in southern Philippines is basically a political struggle, primarily intended to bring about political, economic, social and cultural emancipation of our people from the strangle-hold of Philippine colonialism. The Bangsamoro revolution is designed to protect the sovereignty and integrity of our Islamic and indigenous culture and civilization, which is threatened by the cultural genocide... ” (Pedrosa, 2013) answered by Chairman Misuari in Interview with Nur Misuari, Chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front in 1978 (published in 2008)

The struggle of Bangsamoro within the eyes of the MNLF founder was revolutionary. Indeed, in this interview, chairman Misuari used the social class-based struggle in which the socialist moment or alike used to claim its cause when facing the central authority. The political struggle, even though he did not use the word 'violence', was through physical violence that inflicted grievances and casualties over the innocent, authorities, and group's fighters. Misuari also used other claims such as to protect the sovereignty and integrity of his Islamic and indigenous culture, the word indigenous means the lumads or non-Muslim tribes in southern Philippines. Within this cause of protecting sovereignty and cultural integrity, I think the just cause for Misuari's initial independence from internal colonialism was now not limited to the physical goal, but also the ideational objective, which was to preserve the local identities, Islamic or not. The meaning of fighting was to liberate the oppressed or exploited, regarding Misuari and his followers, through armed struggle against the colonial government of Philippines. Fortunately, but sadly, Misuari initially pursued the parliamentary means to establish the Bangsamoro republic, but it failed and led to

his second option, the armed struggle. Although his attempt to establish the independent 'Bangsamoro Republic' through the peace negotiation facilitated by OIC in the mid-1970s, the result was the implementation of the ARMM autonomous region of which the MNLF shall be the governor. The word 'independence' had changed to 'autonomy' which meant that chairman Misuari must be under the Government of the Philippines. From his answer on the Moro rebellion, Misuari had interpreted violence in terms of a political tool for the establishment of a state-like Bangsamoro.

Additionally, during Misuari's interview with Al Jazeera's Talk to Al Jazeera done by Filipino broadcaster Veronica Pedrosa in 2013 (Pedrosa, 2013), he revealed the importance of the MNLF's struggle for peace and prosperity of the Bangsamoro homeland, let alone its survival. He had admitted that the struggle for his homeland, the Bangsamoro or southern Philippines, involved violence. Furthermore, Misuari also appreciated the external support for his group's survival from neighboring Malaysia for arms and military training. However, he regretted the helping hand because of Malaysian agenda which Misuari claimed to support the MILF to submit Sabah to Malaysian. When the interviewer asked Mr. Misuari about the MNLF achievement and agenda for peace and freedom of Mindanao. The conversation revealed that

... we have been achieved something tremendous in our quest for peace in our homeland as well as, of course, in enhancing the freedom of our people (but you have to fight for it using violence, asked by Ms. Pedrosa) we had to fight for it and, in fact, we have lost hundreds of thousands of lives just to able to reach this point... (You say, Chairman Nur, that you are for peace, but you organized the Moro National Liberation Front to conduct an armed struggle for your cause of a Muslim homeland. You are ready to sacrifice lives, aren't you...)? Well, of course, until we can restore complete, permanent peace of homeland. It's impossible to stop this process... let us say we disarm ourselves. There is no guarantee... I just ordered them defend yourself (Pedrosa, 2013).

The sentence, there is no guarantee, from chairman Nur Misuari reaffirmed the necessity of armed protection when needed. Due to his experience during the Marcos administration, it is rational that the MNLF, personnel perceived with the threat of resource exploitation and anti-colonialism, believed that when they pushed for self-ruling and self-determination, the use of force is avoidable, but still available. The word defend yourself from chairman Misuari also strengthened his rationale over his armed struggle. For the MNLF, at least for its leader, the use of violence is a means to achieve the freedom of its homeland, Mindanao, however, the peace negotiation was internationally evidenced since the 1970s facilitated by the OIC or Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Conference in that period). Along with his answer, Misuari openly claimed that the differences between the MNLF and the MILF was that the latter receive both support and monetary fund from the Malaysian government (under PM Mahathir Mohammad)

... But, you know, we are facing what we call a colonial milieu. The Philippine government had imposed, treacherously imposed their colonial rule on us, on July 4th, 1946. What right do they have?... No people in the world has ever conquered our nation here. And I want to promise you, I will continue to the end of my life... How can you defeat a people, who have inherited nearly 500 years of war? Never has a single nation defeated us (VICE News, 2016) some part of chairman Nur Misuari with the VICE News reporter right before the 2016 presidential election.

As far as the time goes, the elder MNLF had reached a number of peace negotiations with many Philippine government both successful and wasteful. The organization had witnessed many kinds of central government from post-colonial rule to dictatorial administration which ignited the Moro rebellion by executing the Jabidah Massacre. However, within Misuari's perspective, the root cause of ongoing war and a yearning for peace and independent land is the perceived colonial rule of the Philippine government. The war of Moro independence, however, ceased by the implementation of the ARMM or Autonomous Region of Moro Muslim which Misuari chaired the governor himself. It should mean that the result of his struggle comes to an

end with this agreement. Nevertheless, the series of armed confrontation had been occasionally happened which is resulted in 2016 as Misuari's coexistence agreement when the common threat of the Abu Sayyaf and the 'presence' of the ISIS organization in which chairman Nur Misuari saw as the criminal group that cannot join his cause of Moro freedom.

Although Misuari openly shew the successful defense of Moro homeland through the 500 years of war including all previous western colonial masters to the post-colonial Philippine government claiming that the Moro is an unconquerable nation of the world, he suggested that it is different in a method of the use of violence that the MNLF and the criminal group, in a sense of Nur Misuari, these groups carried no visible cause of the liberation of the Moro people, at least in the Jolo islands where the interview had recorded. He also stated that the Abu Sayyaf had hidden (VICE News, 2016) their crimes behind ISIS in which the MNLF under Nur Misuari helped many foreign victims of kidnapping and ransom from the Abu Sayyaf fighters. For him, this is the difference between the MNLF and the criminal organization and foreign terrorist groups that have no presence in Misuari's realm.

4.1.1.2 Viewpoint of President Fidel Ramos

As for the counter argument from the Philippine government during the struggle of the Moro National Liberation Front which the speech of President Fidel Ramos during his Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996 (Ramos, 1996) proved an attempt to implement the 1976 Tripoli peace agreement. Even though this round of negotiation did not go effectively because the agreement emphasized over the political autonomy which the MILF, a MNLF splinter group, did not agree with and started to separately struggle for its Moro self-determination.

The 1996 agreement itself does not serve to contribute to this chapter. However, from his excellency speech, we can see the message which both Ramos and Misuari share and demand for the peaceful settlement of the Moro conflict. The problem, that chairman Nur Misuari demanded the full rights of self-determination and self-ruling over the southern Philippines, was initially dealt with violence during the Marcos administration, but ended, for the MNLF faction, with the negotiation table. From this point of view, I can strengthen the meaning of the violent struggle of the MNLF is not to destroy the Republic of the Philippines but rather to create the Moro

autonomous region where Misuari's Moros and other indigenous groups can serve no one but themselves. As President Fidel V. Ramos implied;

... By this agreement, however, we have resolved to deal decisively with those problems—to do battle against poverty and injustice—together, ... We have come to share this common vision because we have come to see and to accept—with pride and with affection—our common lot as Filipinos. It is not only the great island of Mindanao that all Filipinos share, but the entire Republic and our people's future. Whether we are Christian, Muslim or indigenous peoples, we face the same challenges and opportunities in the new century of growth.
(Ramos, 1996)

Within his speech, President Ramos also used the word *Brother Nur* to vitalize a peaceful attempt among both men since the late 1980s which led to the wide-scale cease-fire between the Filipino army and the MNLF armed personnel. By using the 'Brother' term, it implied a sense of brotherhood among different ethnicities and religion as well as it implied that the violent confrontation from the Moro conflict can be mediated and solved peacefully through political tools.

4.1.1.3 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Apart from the pioneering organization in the Moro conflict like the MNLF, the splinter groups named the Moro Islamic Liberation Front that also previously joined with Nur Misuari also participated in a forge of the Moro meaning for fighting, or I shall say violent struggle. It is evident that Salamat Hashim, later the founder of the MILF did not see the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli agreement through the ARMM autonomous region which actually cannot fully implement all of the sub-agreement within the Tripoli agreement. This led to the referendum boycott from the MNLF followers. Still, the Final Peace Agreement signed by Ramos and Misuari created a compromise of total independence in exchange for a 'special' zone of peace and development in Mindanao and its perimeter. Though, by 'altering' the just cause for Moro struggle, Sheikh Salamat Hashim disagreed with chairman Nur Misuari and began to pursue the liberation by his own means, but ironically and surprisingly, Salamat still shared the same picture of the Moro conflict with his brother MNLF.

What are the motives behind the Bangsamoro Muslims' uprising which started 30 years ago? The main reason behind the struggle of the Bangsamoro Muslims is the illegal usurpation of their legitimate rights for freedom and self-determination ... They were independent hundreds of years before the creation of the Philippines by Spain and the USA, her colonial masters ... It is worthwhile mentioning that the Philippines has inherited and developed a deep hatred against Islam and the Muslim people. After annexing the Bangsamoro homeland, a systematic design to liquidate Islam and to destroy Islamic identity of the Bangsamoro Muslims was launched ("MILF Leader", 1998)

As Salamat answered his interviewer recorded and published by Nida'ul Islam magazine in 1998, we could see the same root problem as if we heard to chairman Nur's interview namely the colonization, or the liquidation of the Bangsamoro identity. Furthermore, Salamat also emphasized the role of the BIAF or the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces which was the armed wing of the Moro Islamic front that, Salamat claimed, to be operating in a 'state of war' until the realization of the Bangsamoro issue.

Another interview of Crescent International with Salamat Hashim published in 1999 (Crescent International, 1999) also revealed different rationale of the MILF in order to use armed struggle to achieve its goal, the total independence of the Bangsamoro. Importantly, the group's speech should not be ignored, since this organization also pursued the same goal as the MNLF over the Bangsamoro autonomy. They shared the same goal which is to liberate the Moro and other indigenous groups through the establishment of their own Islamic state or, at some point, the Bangsamoro Republic. The MILF organization was led by Sheikh Salamat Hashim who split from the MNLF roughly after the Final Peace Agreement was executed in 1996.

Looking at the pattern of how the war in Mindanao is fought, it appears that the MILF has adopted a "fight-negotiate-fight-negotiate" kind of strategy. What is the reason for this?

It is simply following the teachings of Almighty Allah in the Glorious Qur'an and the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him ... "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts) of the enemies of Allah and your enemies...; But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is the One that heareth and knoweth (all things) ... Almighty Allah enjoins the Believers to be prepared for war and arm themselves with the best weapons they can acquire to strike terror in the hearts of their enemies. Furthermore, Almighty Allah commands the Believers to be ready to put all their resources into their cause. But while being strong to fight the enemy is mandatory, the Believers must also be ready for peace if the enemy inclines towards it ... at all times, whether in peace or war, we must be prepared for war and be armed with the best weapons we can afford. Moreover, we must put all of our resources to the cause, that is, making the Word of Almighty Allah supreme or making Haqq prevail over baatil. (Crescent International, 1999).

Explicitly, Salamat had openly stressed the importance of religious indication toward the use of violence and other political tools for his liberation strategy. He had used the Quran verses during his answering which signified the role of his literal interpretation from the teachings of the Quran. As we see from his answer, the fight and negotiation were commenced accordingly to the implication of the Quran, *we must be prepared for war and the Believers must also be ready for peace if the enemy inclines towards it* (Crescent International, 1999) shows that the violent struggle of the MILF was avoidable, or at least negotiable as well as, like his previous interviews, he mentioned about the colonial rulers as a root cause for the Moro issue which the MNLF tried to solve, but ended as a *compromise* that Salamat Hashim disagreed because the independence of Moro nation must not need compromise.

In the course of these centuries of conflict, we have seen the loss of our traditional Moro Sultanates. Expropriation of our sovereignty as a free Moro Nation and consequently our relegation into a state of captivity that eradicated our Bangsamoro identity and reduced our ancestral homeland into small parcels of gerrymandered territories called provinces ... This unjust condition that sustained this conflict in our generation made it inevitable for the Moro Liberation Movements to emerge ... The peace negotiations that took place first in 1976 in Tripoli, Libya... were all geared towards addressing historical and foreign grievances of the Bangsamoro people. But unfortunately, the negotiation came short of going further deep of the root cause of the Moro question ... Political palliatives and economic cosmetics under the rubric of counter-insurgency which were successively put in place to resolve the Moro question prove to be failed experiments in political autonomy... Under such dire circumstances peace negotiations were unable to alter let alone normalize the adversarial relationship between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine State and it was this adversarial relationship that continued to fund the armed sovereignty based conflict in our homeland and that construct the attainment of a just and enduring peace ... (Murad, 2012)

From the speech of chairman Al Haj Murad, the second chairman of the MILF during the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2012. During his passage, we can see the cause of the separation of the MILF from the former MNLF organization. Due to the failed ‘experiment’ of the peaceful settlement initiated by the Philippine government and chairman Nur Misuari which cannot prevent the total ceasefire over the Philippines while maintaining the full self-rule in Mindanao. From the words of chairman Al Haj Murad, political autonomy was not the way to liberate the oppressed Moro nation which must require the armed struggle for his homeland under the MILF.

Nonetheless, another passage from chairman Al Haj Murad, that I have brought below, still confirmed the similarity between the MNLF and the MILF that the liberation of the Bangsamoro must be achieved no matter how many lives the fight would claim or how long the struggle would last. Even when facing the transition of leadership from chairman Salamat to chairman Al Haj Murad, the agenda of the necessity of war and violence which the MILF. Despite the willingness to use force, the MILF, at least for chairman Al Haj Murad's view, also pursued the peaceful mean since its intention to use force was to achieve political means, but since the tide was turned into the peaceful negotiation, the MILF, like its brother MNLF, had proven to follow this method as well. The phrase *to end the reign of violence* (Murad, 2012) also proved the intention of the MILF group particularly after 2000s which the group, again, agreed to work together with the Filipino government and put violence as a tool for the past, even though there might be some reports of attacks or raid conspired with the MILF personnel.

...We, in the MILF Central Committee did not waiver and vacillate in pursuing it to the end despite the devastating three all-out wars in 2000, 2003, and 2008 waged by previous regimes in the MILF. This was the legacy of Sheik Salamat Hashim, the legacy of Sheik Salamat leadership ... inherited and continued to pursue with unclenching determination and with great personal sacrifice ... Today, it humbles me to say before you that we have stayed the course. Our perseverance has prevailed over those whose obsession is to perpetuate war and conflict ... after almost 16 years of hard negotiations, interfered with armed confrontations on the ground ... Today, we extend the hands of friendship and partnership to the President and the Filipino people ... to rebuild our homeland, institute justice and occupation, end the reign of violence ... with the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. (Murad, 2012)

Another brief interview that can contribute to the meaning of violence in the Moro struggle may be from the BIAF-MILF chief of staff, Sammy Al

Mansoor (DW News, 2019) in 2019. He was interviewed by the German public broadcast member, Sandra Petersmann and Hans Christian Ostermann during their visit in Mindanao reporting the current situation in Marawi city right after the victory of the Filipino combined armies and Moro rebels who fought with the so-called ISIS criminals that occupied the city for about 5 months. This does not only show the connotation of violence usage committed by the MILF that is necessary to protect and achieve the Bangsamoro independence, but also use it to counter a rising 'threat' from other terrorist groups, in this case ISIS affiliates in Mindanao. However, when speaking of terrorist groups, one may think about Al-Qaeda and its mujahideen fighters which in the Moro struggle history, there are some rumors, but constantly are rejected about a secret relationship between the MILF and Al-Qaeda.

Nevertheless, Mansoor agreed to join the Philippine army to siege and eliminate the ISIS-affiliated fighters in Marawi city in exchange for further autonomous power in Mindanao. Alongside his answers to the German NW News camera crew, he claimed that after the fight with ISIS, if the autonomous condition was not met, the tension of MILF would remain the same as well as his organization would neither disarm nor decommission the armed wing of the MILF. Therefore, the use of force by the MILF would not again mean to physically annihilate the 'colonial' ruler under kin of the Philippine Christian, but as a tool to negotiate with the Philippine government to accept its autonomy.

(asked by a news crew; What might happen if the autonomy project goes badly)

... our credibility to our people will become diminished then that's the time that ISIS will take advantage [of] this situation to convince all the followers of the MILF to join their group and that time the threat would become bigger ... (narrator said Mansoor would disarm and give up 30,000 fighters with full Muslim autonomy) ... if not then the status quo will remain, we will not decommission our forces and we will not also give up our firearms which we promised to the government (DW News, 2019)

4.1.1.4 Abu Sayyaf and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom

Fighter

Distinguishable from its ancestral groups, the Abu Sayyaf and the emerging Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters had developed and been influenced allegedly from external extremist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant which these groups had already withstood a long and heavy fighting from the counterterrorism executed mainly from the United States. For the Abu Sayyaf group, the military doctrine that was used in this group was different from the MNLF or MILF over the topic of hostile entities and ways to deal with it. For the elder groups, the adversaries were the colonial rulers in forms of the Philippine government's atrocities and failed territorial distribution over the Muslim ancestral region, Mindanao, and the way to settle this was through fighting-negotiation method which violence was used to bring weight over the negotiation. There was also the case that Nur Misuari himself helped the victims of the Abu Sayyaf to return to their families.

However, at least among the Abu Sayyaf executives, the hostility was engraved to the foreigners, military or not, the Abu Sayyaf Group was being infamous for its method of operation, a kidnapping and ransom and piracy, apart from regular bombing and guerilla warfare, to finance the group and remained being spotlighted from the international community. And if the deadline was met and no ransom was delivered, a decapitation would be executed toward hostages. With this kind of tactic, Abu Sayyaf was rather being defined as a terrorist group than as a Moro rebel group. However, it cannot be denied that the very first Abu Sayyaf group, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, was experienced the Muslim mujahedeen fighters in the Afghanistan war with the Soviet Union in which his return to Mindanao was to pursue the same goals from those Muslim Afghans.

However, after his death, the group began to 'remain' in his ideological legacy, but, at the same time, swayed the process outward the Moro rebellion and becoming 'a group of bandits' that young Muslims were inspired for its *bravery and being adultery: (spoken in his native language by 'Abu Khalid' a former Abu Sayyaf fighter and translated by the Al Jazeera narrators) ... no one were safe. Christians or Muslims as long as they wronged us, we decapitated them ...* (Al Jazeera English, 2007)

He also revealed that the group had started being splinter since last few years, the interview was held in 2007, and other fighters began to scare and leave the group like he did, while the interview continued, Abu Khalid also mentioned that he is on the run so as other fighters due to a military offensive toward his camp. The fact that he witnessed from being a part of the Abu Sayyaf was that Filipino police or army were less deadly compared to his own group, thus, by engaging in this interview, he would totally leave the group which may likely behead him as well.

Being different from the elder Moro group, some Filipino media, such as the Rappler, may think of Abu Sayyaf differently from the MNLF or MILF standpoints on using violence. The camera crew had openly asked the Abu Sayyaf fighters to interview their leader (CBC News: The National, 2016). However, the crew was tricked and held hostage for ransom. One of the crew, a female news reporter, had been given a chance to exchange her experience of the Abu Sayyaf encounter to the Canadian CBC News channel in 2016. She also shared her comment over the group's agenda upon her point of view which, I think, may hold some interesting points over the meaning of using violence over this group cause for 'Moro' nation. During her time with the CBC interviewer, she said her kidnappers' group was 'really has no cause' and, from her opinion, cannot find any ideological driven cause about the Abu Sayyaf fighters to pursue a kidnapping-ransom tactic unlike Nur's organization or Hashim's group. Even though being held captive and having no fighting potential, the news reporter asked one of her kidnappers to reveal his story, but from the answer she received, she did not think this group ideologically walked the same path shared with other already-established organizations.

... there were cruel, greedy young men with guns and nothing more ... (CBC News: The National, 2016) spoken by the CBC narrator from the Filipino crew's experience.

Simple but inclusive, from that sentence shared by kidnapped news reporter, we can see the violence, even Abu Sayyaf shared the same method of operation with the MNLF or MILF, was meant differently for Abu Sayyaf Group, at least it was reflected by this camera crew, that the use of violence through kidnapping-ransom and decapitating execution was done to *finance* the organization. Conversely,

the violence used by the MNLF or MILF was done to *defend* their people or their homeland.

On any U.S. assistance in the hostage crisis

We're raring to fight. We want to fight with the U.S... Tell them to reinforce their troops, if they want. Maybe they think we'll be frightened. Well, all I can say is it's up to the government. They think that they can beat us in a gun battle. They think we will bend. We would relish dying than surrendering to them. Remember." (Sabaya, 2001)

Answered by Abu Sabaya, the Abu Sayyaf spokesman with Radio Mindanao Network and translated by the CNN media in 2001, this passage of his revealed the extreme intention for fighting the United States, although he did not use a word 'the Western' or the 'Colonial oppressor' like Nur's or Hashim's speech. We also see the provocative and aggressive emotion of Abu Sabaya in which he would confront the Philippine authority through violence, gunfight, even without hesitation, combined with the use of kidnapping-and ransom tactic. The Abu Sayyaf Group, in Sabaya's view, can rely on these non-discriminations over who is a victim according to his further answers with the local radio stating that he and his fighters had captured roughly 30 hostages including fishermen which had no direct involvement toward the government or the US presence in the Philippines. Therefore, to push this furtherer, it means the Abu Sayyaf, at least in Tawi Tawi base, was consent over the use of violence to pursue its goal even though the victims might not involve in the justification to strive or rebel against the Filipino ruler.

Abu Sabaya also mentioned that the execution of the prisoners would be done regardless of time or place if the ransom would not be received. He said that he would help Gloria (President Gloria Arroyo) not care about the effort to extract the prisoners who would be executed eventually. It might mean that for Abu Sabaya the sacrificing of human lives is not necessary, but ordinary for Abu Sayyaf.

Another revelation of a former Abu Sayyaf victim, an Indonesian fisherman named Subandi who was kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf pirates and was rescued by the MNLF representative. His boat had been warned by the Malaysian patrols about the speedboats coming from the Philippine sea. During his

encounter with the pirates, they claimed to be the Philippine police, robbed him and his friends, and brought them to the Sulu islands through deep forest. Subandi visualized his dangerous situation at his captors' camp that whenever the army patrol of the Philippines came nearby, there would be a firefight usually after a nightfall and occurred several times per a month which the captors would order the relocation of their camp. Fortunately, the phone call was rung to confirm the status of the captives. The MNLF chairman Nur had arrived and rescued the hostages to a Sulu's governor. Apparently, Sabandi was from Indonesia who fished near the city of Sandakan in Sabah, thus like other cases, the Abu Sayyaf had undoubtedly chosen to use kidnapping-and-ransom tactics to sustain the group. However, from his interview, we could say, even if the Abu Sayyaf separated from the MILF, a former ally with MNLF, the conflict between this group and other Moro rebels was highlighted because the one who rescued the fishermen was the Nur's group who negotiated with the captors. Although the direct combat did not be mentioned during this interview, the ideational conflict does occur, at least in the just cause for the use of violence.

... My friend, who was driving the boat, was threatened. There were three hostages sent to their boat and there were armed men on board. ... We were told to enter this mangrove forest from the sea, ... Whenever the army came near [on patrol], there were gunshots. ... I still feel scared really often and I'm easily startled because when we were being held captive by Abu Sayyaf, there were always so many gunshots and the sounds of bombs. We were so afraid back then if they were going to kill or behead us?" (VICE, 2020) Spoken in Malaysian and was translated by the VICE media during Subandi's interview by Adi Renaldi, writer about terrorism for VICE. the interview was published in 2020.

Despite the Abu Sayyaf presence in the southern Philippines, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters also participated in this region. The BIFF, in short, had gained its debut during the 2016 ISIS-alleged assault over the Marawi city alongside the Abu Sayyaf, and the local Maute group which all pledged allegiance toward ISIS, the recent emerging Muslim radicals operating mainly in the Middle East

toward the establishment of its *Islamic* state in Syria, Iraq, and other Muslim-populated countries such as Indonesia, and the Philippines. Since its emergence as a splinter group, Kato may use the allegiance toward ISIS to increase his reputation as the same as the Abu Sayyaf allegiance with Al-Qaeda and, later, the ISIS group. It became an official announcement when the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi accepted both groups as the ISIS affiliates and pursued toward the ISIS-satellite Islamic state. In short, the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf, by allying with ISIS, had accepted to be under the ISIS flag while claiming their violent activities were done for the moro struggle.

The first BIFF leader, Ameril Umbra Kato, had separated himself and his loyal followers from the MILF which the former group accepted the peace negotiation with the Philippine government in 2008 that failed to implement Memorandum of Agreement – Ancestral Domain or MOA-AD agreement drafted to expand the administrative power of the Moro autonomous region of the MILF. During his stay in the MILF, Kato operated as the commander of an armed faction in the organization. However, when the memorandum was nullified by the Philippine national congress, Kato decided to leave the MILF and for his own armed struggle for his ‘Moro’ independence, but due to his separation from chairman Murad, Kato was caught the eyes of the national Filipino army and national police.

(spoken in native language and translated by Al Jazeera narrator) ... the government said we are criminals, committed arson, all lies ... what do we get from burning houses. We wouldn't get anything from that ... I am not at fault here. You see, it's like this. When they had a ceasefire, the government and the MILF, they did not include me. They put me aside, rejecting me. ... if we are blocked by anyone from achieving our purpose. There will be fighting. There will be war. (Al Jazeera English, 2011) said Umbra_Kato during his interview with the Al Jazeera in 2011.

Apart from the direct experience or first-person perspective of the meaning of violence in the Moro conflict, we have started from the MNLF as the very first well-known Moro separatist group that committed violence during its struggle toward Bangsamoro autonomy to the splinter separatist groups like Abu Sayyaf and the

BIFF armed groups which were branded as the terrorist and criminal organization. We have heard from both the head of the Moro separatist organization and their representative. However, we also do not neglect to look upon their consequences through the words of their opposition and victim, in the case of Abu Sayyaf. We may gather information toward the foundation of violence sector in the Moro self-ruling and determination. Nevertheless, I have gathered other sources of information from the local newspaper and some foreign newspapers which related to the struggle of the Moro nation from the early 1910s to the early 2000s.

4.1.1.5 Selected newspaper

Toledo Blade 16/04/1903: Moro Stronghold captured by Americans under Cpt. Pershing (Toledo Weekly Blade, 1903). This news column was about the armed conflict between the Moro insurgents and the American colonial rulers which had been helping the Moro rebels against the Spanish. The news focused on the siege of Moro-occupied Bacolod fort by American foot soldiers which they claimed to be shot at from the fort's direction. The attack delayed the peaceful submission of other sultan and datto (a term referred to indigenous leader)

The telegraph 25/04/1903: A Story By Chaffee: Throws light on character of the Moro of Mindanao-are willing to fight for us-if given a chance to kill off old enemies (Jewell, 1903). Although the fighting between the US and some Muslim-indigenous tribes, the US army lieutenant general Adna Chaffee who participated in the Spanish-American War in 1898 and, later, in the Philippine Insurrection started in 1901. He wanted the allied Moro for supply carriers for their offense toward the Spanish blockhouse which disappointed the Moro rebels.

Clinton Mirror 16/12/1911: Americans slain by Moros. Natives killed in progress of Campaign for suppression of Organized Brigandage in Mindanao (Eaton, 1911). A news article explained the armed confrontation in Lanao, Mindanao between the Moro rebels and the American troops as a result of the Moro's objection to disarming the entire Moro population in Mindanao and Jolo to the American authorities. The firefight ended with 42 Moro casualties.

Manila Standard 08/06/1994: MNLF joins war against Abu Sayyaf (Burgos, 1994). Jumped from the early 1910s, during the emergence of Nur's MNLF, the group had agreed to join the Philippine authority to stop the atrocities

committed by Abu Sayyaf because the MNLF was displeased by Abu Sayyaf's violent tactic. The MNLF implemented the use of checkpoints around Mindanao to prevent further reinforcement or supporters of Abu Sayyaf. Furthermore, the article quoted Rodolfo Biazon, government advisor on panel negotiator, speech "... *Abu Sayyaf is not ideological-based, it is not rebel movement but probably a big band of terrorists and bandits*"

Manila Standard 10/09/1994: Non-combatants to monitor truce in Mindanao. A news article was about the peace talks between the Philippine government and the MNLF that was done by Manuel Yan, presidential advisor on the peace process with the Moro insurgents. The talks were observed by 3 Indonesian officials to meet the OIC requirement of the 1976 Tripoli agreement due to the violation of ceasefire agreement from both sides and need another peace talk to negotiate the MNLF's goal that the autonomous region must include a total of 13 provinces in Mindanao. Yan also expected the MILF faction to agree with this round.

Manila Standard 15/12/1994: Cotabato firefight erupts anew (Macabalang, 1994). As we all know that the MNLF had accepted the peace agreement over the ARMM, the MILF faction did not agree to join this 'autonomous' region and began to resume the rebellion against the authority. The Philippine security officials had suspected that the MILF fighters were behind the armed ambush against the Philippine army in the city of Cotabato.

Manila Standard 22/10/1996: Exploratory gov't-MILF talks very urgent, says Palace exec (Maragay, 1996). By withstanding several attacks by the MILF armed branch, the government decided to resume peace talks with Salamat's group after it had witnessed the MILF 'lost command' assaulting in various parts of Mindanao as a preparation of the large-scale offensive in the future. The peace agreement was supposed to be a success between the government and the MILF. The MILF lost command was a term for the sub-faction of the main MILF that disagreed with any previous peace agreement.

Philippine Daily Inquirer 20/01/2000: A victory for the people (Diaz, 2000). This news article followed the assault of the Armed Forces of the Philippines over the second largest camp governed by the MILF local leader, Camp Bushra in Batig, Lanao de Sur. The army revealed that this camp was a base for

‘terroristic’ activities in neighboring areas. The army morale was high due to the full support of the government and majority of the Filipinos. The camp was overrun due to the lack of armed reinforcement which should have been sent by chairman Hashim. The ex-advisor of MILF explained that Camp Bushra was expendable to relocate the reinforcement to Camp Abubakar.

Philippine Daily Inquirer 18/04/2000: Now, Abu Sayyaf threatens to kill, kidnap Americans (Alipala-Inot, 2000). It is well-known fact that the Al-Qaeda is a flagship of the international radicalist movement and inspire many Muslim activist and many important militia figures, the head of the Abu Sayyaf Group was one of its followers. This news article stated the ASG’s attempt to threaten to kill all or kidnap the American citizens living in the Philippines if the United States did not release the mastermind of 1993 World Trade bombing plus another 2 Muslim extremists. The ASG spokesman, Abu Ahmad Salayuddin, spoke through the TV interview that his men would release 30 hostages, if Filipino President Estrada told the US President Bill Clinton to release those extremist prisoners.

Philippine Daily Inquirer 04/11/2000: New clashes’ toll: 10 MILF men, 3 soldiers (Fernandez, 2000). Even though Abu Sayyaf was infamously gaining popularity in the Philippine security threat, the MILF still was on its stage to pursue its independence with its method of operation to include armed conflict. The news article said there were firefights in Cotabato city again as a countermeasure to the army’s capture and hold of the MILF camps. The armed encounters were at Maguindanao which claimed 10 rebels’ lives and 3 soldiers’ souls. The army claimed that the rebels had captured and tortured before killing all 3 soldiers. The news also quoted one of the causes of never-ending violent conflict between the government and the MILF by quoting presidential advisor Manuel Yan; ... *the problem is that the MILF keeps on demanding so many things, but they don’t want to sit down and talk*’ Manuel Yan, presidential advisor (Estrada) to [the] peace process (Fernandez, 2000).

Philippine Daily Inquirer 04/10/2002: AFP, PNP chiefs: Abu Sayyaf did it (Alipala-Inot, 2002). Again, this news focused on the karaoke bombing done by the Abu Sayyaf fighters in Zamboanga city that killed the US personnel and injured many natives. Following the bombing, the US embassy

spokesperson condemned the terrorist act as a 'senseless' violence and would cooperate with the Philippine authorities to investigate and bring the attackers to justice.

Philippine Daily Inquirer 15/12/2002: Not with MILF (Cabreza, 2002). Even though the Philippines has given birth to many Moro rebel groups, it also gives birth to the NPA movement or the communist revolutionary group. The news article said the NPA had been blessed by the Christmas truce ceasefire agreement with the government. However, the MILF did not get that privilege because it might disrupt the ongoing peace process. Abu Sayyaf also did not receive the truce as well due to its brand as a terrorist group.

Philippine Daily Inquirer 14/02/2003: Fighting Escalates, 137 Moros rebs slain (Marfil, 2003). Although, in 2001, the government and the MILF had agreed upon the ceasefire agreement and peaceful implementation of the moro autonomous zone, both parties had *unconsciously* left the ceasefire agreement due to the conflict in an area of interest which both parties wanted for their own advantages. The abandonment of the ceasefire agreement led the Philippine armed forces to assault the Buliok complex, one of the largest MILF strongholds in North Cotabato.

Ocala Star-Banner 06/03/2003: Philippines rules out U.S. troops (Gomez, 2003). The news followed the Davao bombing by Abu Sayyaf that killed 21 victims including American missionary. The Philippine President Gloria Arroyo had ordered the US troops to remain as advisor and supplier for the Filipino security forces deployed in Jolo to counterattack Abu Sayyaf. The US officials claimed there was a link between Abu Sayyaf and Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda.

Philippine Daily Inquirer 05/04/2005: Peace Advisor ignores warning of US on MILF (Alipala-Inot, 2005). In Zamboanga, the Presidential Peace Advisor Teresita Deles had ignored the US military officials about the link between the MILF with Abu Sayyaf, which was accused as a terrorist group by the US officials, to maintain the temporary peace for a final peace act.

As we can see from my periodically selected newspaper, focused on the local media in the Philippines, violence has been pushed through various Filipino governments and through many separatist groups since the American-occupied era toward president Arroyo whose counterterrorism was intensified by the support of the United States. However, these collected newspapers would not serve as a main

source of analysis, but they should give the all-round situation upon which the group was spotlighted in its specific era and the way that group committed violence differentiated the meaning of necessity of violence. For example, the attack on the MILF camp was done by the authorities to suppress the terroristic acts claimed by the army, but the peace process toward this group, which was accused of using terrorist tactics, continued. Furthermore, with different governments, the status of terrorist groups was used differently. In the case of Arroyo's government, the MILF was once returned to its status as a Moro separatist or rebel group not as a terrorist group despite the same tactic that the MILF and other rebels used as other international extremists such as guerilla warfare and urban bombing. The changing status was done to preserve the peaceful settlement that may lead to the final peace agreement with the MILF rebels.

On the other hand, Abu Sayyaf group also was received the same importance, if not more than, as other Moro rebel groups, but the difference was that it was condemned as a terrorist or criminal group by the Filipino government and also was discriminated by other Moro group such as the MNLF due to its extreme violent behavior and non-discriminate violence act upon both military and civilian personnel. Even though Abu Sayyaf's target was always the American presence in the Philippines, one cannot argue that the collateral damage from Abu Sayyaf covered those innocent Filipinos and also neighboring populations through piracy as well. In the case of Nur's MNLF, he was also displeased by the act of Abu Sayyaf and even joined the security forces, his everlasting opposition when he was rejected to govern his autonomous region, to suppress a threat of Abu Sayyaf. When it came to the common threat, the MNLF's meaning of violence was not limited only to the 'colonial' rulers, but also the 'criminal' or 'terrorist' native group as well.

4.1.2 Jihadism: Ties that bind and bite

There are many academic or technical words for extremist or radicalist Muslims who attempt to restore a traditional or orthodox community of Islam such as Islamic fundamentalist, Islamic revivalist, or Salafi jihadist. The ideal Islamic community where Muslims become pure and distinguished from the rest of the world while preparing for the final judgement day when the final holy war would come against the infidel. This ideational framework is from the Salafi-Jihadist scholars who believe in the purity of Islam and the necessity of the 'struggle' against whatever may be seen

as the disbelievers or infidels which, in many cases of the Al-Qaeda or Wahhabi followers, refer to the United States presence from the Arabian peninsula to the northern Africa where Muslims are the major population.

For the case of the Moro struggle, we cannot deny that the majority support from the Moro separatist organization is from the Muslim population both within Mindanao and in foreign countries such as Malaysia, Libya, and Somalia. In order to achieve popular support to change or to campaign against something, one would seek not only the armed supremacy for physical subjugation but also ideological strength to withstand a moral degradation or cultural liquidation especially when the opposition controls the superior authority to decide almost any administrative or legislative act. In the case of the Philippines, the Moro-Muslim organization must deal with this legitimacy issue. Therefore, we would see the hidden presence of Jihadism in many Moro leaders' speeches. However, due to the ambiguous or vague definition of Jihadism, particularly as modern Jihadism, we have to combine the political view of Jihadism within the struggle of independence of the Bangsamoro nation. The struggle of legitimacy for the secessionist movement may require the ideational support, Jihadism, which some scholars have argued that this principle is quite troublesome for defining a specific meaning or for explaining a certain action. Thus, some Muslim extremist groups like Al-Qaeda often legitimize its violent action through the Quran verses related to an act of *Jihad*.

Although the teachings of Salafi-Jihadist principles varies through many influential scholars or other religious figures and may lead to radicalist approach to implement the discipline of Jihadism, but, within this study, I would focus mainly on 5 principles of Salafi-Jihadism (Maher, 2016) that are [defensive] *Jihad* (to struggle and endure), *Takfir* (declaring the outside the fold of Islam), *Al-wala' Wa-l-bara'* (to love and hate), *Tawhid* (omnipotence of God), and *Hakimiyya* (to establish authority). I would use a content of a book *Salafi-Jihadism The History of an Idea* by Shiraz Maher to describe and explain the implementation of Salafi-Jihadism on modern era and, hopefully, Moro Muslim rebellion in the Philippines. For further understanding, I would briefly explain each principle over Jihadism below.

Jihad, as one of the most controversial doctrine in the teaching of Islam, refers to the act of warship, to exert effort of the existence of Islam, however, for

the pure and untouched teaching of Salafi-Jihadist scholars such as Abdallah' Azzam or Al-Qaeda's elites would assume that to complete all requirement of the Jihad, prayer, pilgrimage, and fasting, ones must go through the 'virtue of combat' to fulfil their duties for Jihad. Though the Jihad implies those 3 principles, the 'defensive' Jihad, claimed as a defensive measure when the 'disbelievers' attack the Islamic community, is understood to withstand the disbelief and disobedience that Abu Qatada explained that 'Jihad can stem the corrosive tide of defiance while safeguarding Islamic principles. Defensive Jihad is necessary when an Islamic community is facing a 'threat', however, the means of operation is in debate whether the availability of Jihad must depend on the presence of Amir (legitimate ruler of Islamic community) or not.

Nevertheless, by witnessing the Afghanistan war between Soviet troops and 'Mujahideen' fighters, Jihad was used as a legitimate claim for rallying Muslim natives to stop a spreading Communism with or without Amir's presence, thus Jihad is varied depending on the perspective of scholars to raise or not to raise an appropriate implementation over this principle. However, Azzam argued ... *We must choose from two evils. Which is the greater evil: that Russia takes Afghanistan, turns it into a kafir (disbelief) country and forbids Qur'an and Islam for it, or Jihad with a nation with sins and errors*" (Maher, 2016).

Secondly, the *Takfir* principle means to declare another Muslim to be outside the fold of Islam (Maher, 2016). This pivotal teaching of Salafi-Jihadism emphasizes the legitimate excommunication among Muslim communities to protect the realm of Islam, according to Salafi-Jihadists. This principle is to accuse and to permit the intra-violence in the communities by declaring the heresy upon Muslim brothers, though this declaration is very crucial and critical which requires the declaring figure to consider various evidence and reason to legitimize its claim. By wrongly accusing one figure, a declaring figure would become a heretic. Nonetheless, normal citizens cannot and should not pronounce Takfir upon any person or their rulers, but it would be allowed only if their rulers are swaying from Islam and Sharia as well as anyone who is renounced by Takfir would be treated as rebellion and alien to the community.

Moreover, due to the decisive implication of Takfir, the modern Jihad start to use this doctrine to legitimize any collateral damages, Muslim civilian casualties, caused by Muslim militia groups. One example could be during the 2003

invasion of Iraq that Al-Qaeda operatives used Takfir to gain their constituencies for attacking Muslims who did not support the Al-Qaeda offensive against the United States occupation. Al-Qaeda's Takfir aimed to use terror tactics against the puppet Iraqi government established shortly after the occupation as well as the Saudi Arabia who supported the US armies during the invasion. In 2004, Al-Qaeda also attacked the governmental agencies in Saudi Arabian territory legitimized by its 'Takfir' to safeguard its 'Islamic state' even though a general Takfir prohibited such attack, as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one of Al-Qaeda's *Amir* in Iraq, argued that, ... *The US has started to hide in the background, pushing these supporters to the frontlines to replace it in fighting the mujahedeen ... the impending threat to the jihad are these al-rafida [rejectors] along the dregs of the Sunnis* (Maher, 2016).

Third principle is *Al-wala' wa-l-bara'* which generally means to love and disavow (Maher, 2016). This doctrine emphasizes on to love and be friendly or pledge loyalty to Islam and its community and to disassociate or distance itself or show its enmity toward non-Muslim or unbelievers. For Salafi-Jihadist, this doctrine is a zero-sum game. This principle originally focuses over the journey of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahab who ally with the Al-Saud family, the Saudi dynasty ruling Saudi state and support the first king on uniting Muslims and banish the Emirates. Wahab who experience the 'impurity' of Islam through his journey offered the ideological legitimacy over Saud family, in return for the Saud to allow Wahhabi's practice as religious conservatism with Saudi territory. The concept of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* as a tool to repel aggressors, also be used to repel the Ottoman offensive over Mekkah and Medina which the empire was perceived as a polytheist follower.

The second scholar, for this doctrine, is Hamad ibn 'Atiq who began to criticize the second Saud state which allied with the British forces while accusing the brother prince who joined with the Ottoman to support his claim over the Saudi throne. 'Atiq stated that anyone who allies with the polytheist also becomes a polytheist and anyone who joins a pagan would be a pagan as well. However, after the unification of Saudi Arabia was completed, *Al-wala' wa-l-bara'* became less important when Salafism grew strongly in Saudi state which *ulama*, or legitimate interpreter of Islam began to overwatch political stability and public ethics. The radical Salafis remain in the inner circles of the Saudi palace. Theoretically or abstractly, *Al-wala' wa-l-bara'*

acts as a distinguisher of Muslim against non-Muslim, the protector of the believers from staining themselves with the non-believers while building a social bond within Muslim communities by disassociating Muslims away from other non-Muslim communities.

Nevertheless, after the emergence of 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this doctrine was spotlighted again when Saudi government offered a helping hand for international forces to liberate Kuwait because this principle prohibits Saudi state to ally with 'non-Muslim' nations such as the United States, Britain, or Germany. Furthermore, some non-state actor like Al-Qaeda began to use *Al-wala' wa-l-bara'* to justify the 9/11 attack by individualizing (Maher, 2016) the doctrine that anyone is responsible to commit this principle to accuse any Muslim scholars or agencies associating with the 'West' and is authorized to use force against that Muslim traitors.

Fourthly, the principle of Tawhid, the omnipotence of God or the doctrine of monotheism, emphasizes the oneness of Lordship, Worship, and names which restricts any Muslim to embrace other deities before the one God, Allah. This principle, according to 'Abd al-Wahab, also associates the *Iman* (faith) into 2 parts; theoretical, and practical. Moreover, Tawhid emphasizes on the 'living' ideal of Islam, in other word, to relate belief and action. Muslims are expected to pray or worship their God and are obliged by the Law of God, Sharia. However, even this principle can be politicized by various Salafi activists such as Osama Bin Laden when he accused the kingdom of Saudi Arabia for committing the 'transgressing God's law in 1995 when Saudi government had supported the Yemeni communist government which, indeed, was a secularist government, but, at the same time, Saudi government backed the anti-Soviet movement in Afghanistan. It was condemned as a 'godless' political system that enjoyed an increased power in its dominion. To practice the omnipotence of God, ones cannot pray without realize the reality that something must be done to value the 'living' Islam not only in mind but also in eyes as well. Bin Laden also claimed his action on September 11, 2001 as an act (politically) according to Tawhid and Iman. He argued that, *Distancing oneself from a tyrant is not just an optional action," he said, "but rather it is one of the two pillars of tawhid, and Iman that cannot be established in the absence of either of them* (Maher, 2016).

He claimed that the only way to save the Muslim world living at the marginalized of the world order is to *renew* Tawhid through practical and through practice only that Al-Qaeda cannot be compromised which the doctrine of Tawhid would be violated by the Law of God. Muslim communities must be untied under the Islamic flag not by the *secularist* authority. One of the Al-Qaeda elites, Zawahiri criticized the reconciliation between Palestinian Hamas and Fatah as this talk was mediated by the Saudi Arabia and the United States which both groups were united around ‘the rope of secularism’ or ‘the rope of America’ (Maher, 2016).

In short, Tawhid is an emotional principle that Al-Qaeda had politicized to focus on the realization of the living Islam and oppose any *shirk* or polytheism. The Tawhid must be done through political implication to be physically established which faith alone can never accomplish.

Finally, the fifth principle is Hakimiyya, the doctrine for establishing authority or Islamic state. This teaching is implied by Salafi-jihadist scholar like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or Sayyid Qutb that Hakimiyya is necessary for Islamic reformist, revivalist, or social renewal, though there are no significant development or further theoretical framework that can visualize the ideal Islamic state. Even Al-Qaeda do not clarify the appearances or characteristics of governance within that Islamic state. Nonetheless, this principle is on discuss with many Muslim scholars even before the emergence of modern Salafi-Jihadism and try to explain and demonstrate Hakimiyya. One of the scholars like Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi suggested that, *...when we say hakimiyya, we mean to protect the right of Allah that we have been entrusted with against his enemies. That right is the right for legislation, judging, and executing the judgements* (Maher, 2016).

However, this doctrine is not originated in the Middle East or northern Africa, but rather in India. When facing the modernization around, in the 1950s, Daniel Lerner argued that Muslim communities must decide to choose between ‘Mecca’ and ‘Modernization’ that a flow of people demand for more multi-culture and transnational identities even in the *imagined* ummah (Islamic community). This tempting reality had made Islamic reformists, Al-Afghani and Wahab to rethink the principle of Hakimiyya which Muslim must face the political, cultural, and intellectual trap in this modernized world. Therefore, a reform must occur, not as a secular one but

rather a reform with Islam within an order of post-renaissance by accepting science and skepticism, but remain at distance with the secularism of the West. As Abul A'la Maududi, an Indian ulama argued that “Islam is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy,”. For Salafi-Jihadism, Muslim scholars argue that the secularism is a ‘divorce’ (Maher, 2016) of religion and politics which the spirituality is on decline.

Therefore, combining Hakimiyya with political implication, the doctrine is used through the perspective of Anti-colonialism that a ‘lost independence and sovereignty’ (Maher, 2016) must be restored and a social progress must be perfect. The principle is demonstrated by the Prophet Muhammad’s rule over Medina which he governed with social oriented, economy, public life, and rule of Jihad. Hakimiyya is used to combat the spreading ‘corruption’ and to challenge the ‘corrupted’ Muslim government such as Saudi government which support the United States.

To sum up, within this chapter; Jihadism, there is no need to distinguish on which Salafi-jihadist principles suit which Moro organizations or which doctrines can explain the meaning for fighting of which Moro rebel leaders. But, we have to see these principles as the components of the ‘Jihad’ in which many Salafi, Jihadist, and other Muslim radicalist movement tend to claim for their causes of (armed) struggle or to challenge the modern global order that Muslim communities, such as in Mindanao, are perceived for being exploited, oppressed, and colonized by the ‘West’, not to blame as a particular country like the Great Britain or France. All of the Salafi-Jihadist doctrines mentioned above have to be reviewed and analyzed as a unit, Jihadism that is used to legitimize various kinds of events from debates to bombing some embassies. As we have learnt, these principles are abstractly neutral as verses in the holy book, but ways to implement them matter our attention especially when there are connection between the ideational teachings and physical rebellion in a country that is even not located within the Middle East or northern Africa where the principles are translated and implied with other aspects to practice Jihadism not just endlessly pray for the Jihad to come. As we are seen by many speeches of important Salafi-Jihadist figures, the establishment of their ‘perceived’ religious state must come by both hand and mind as well as with the rightful governance and remain vigilant with the secularist (the West), though, in some radicalist groups, Jihadism is for authorizing any unwanted casualties when guns are shot (Maher, 2016).

The Moro resistance is indeed the rebellion against the established modern-state authority in the archipelago of the Philippines, though ones who hold that power are different from time to time and even the Muslim in the Philippines once ruled over these islands. However, when the time of change had come with or without a consent of the natives, Muslim or not, the 'modern' moro, which I use this term to describe the Moro struggle since the independence of the Philippines from the United States subjugation, had created its identity through a meaning of glorious nation who ruled over the majority of Mindanao and be oppressed by many foreign colonizers as we would see from chairman Nur's speeches with many international media. To be clear, solid anti-colonialism does not practically produce any kind of Jihadism to authorize any Muslim rebellion, but, vice versa, the politicized implications of (Salafi) Jihadism are the instruments to motivate the anti-colonialist movement in many Muslim-led resistances.

4.1.2.1 Predecessor and the MNLF

First and foremost, there must have an origin point that Islam had come into the Philippines which some author (Asani, 1982) may argue that Islam came to the Philippines through the caravans, and Muslim missionaries from Arab world where the Islamic symbol was originated. One of the "seven brothers" had met the indigenous tribes and clans of the Philippines such as barangay principality ruled by local datus (rulers), though, right after landing on this island's shore, one of the seven brothers had established the sultanate authority in Sulu archipelago implemented the Sharia law influenced by the Malay Muslim communities and Hindu societies. The natives, by worshipping animism, and being Pegan, see Islam as a strange practice of a strange Islam.

Due to the *perceived* different identity, Abu Bakr, one of the seven missionaries, had further implemented Arab principle over the ruling of Sulu sultanates and the integration had begun through the *Makhdum* or master that claimed to have the same bloodline as the Sumatran sultanate while holding the local support through tribal marriage. The same thing happened in Jolo, Tawi-Tawi, and Mindanao that Muslim leader claimed to genetically relate with the first sultan, Abu Bakr, one of the seven Arabs. However, it was not enough for Islam to spread to the northern part of the Philippines, Islam in Mindanao and Sulu had spread through the local rulers by

introducing the superior 'civilized' culture and governance according to Islam teaching by prioritizing a way of life, Islamic heritage and patriotism of Muslim brotherhood. Therefore, when the Spaniards arrived at their shore, the resistance, especially in Mindanao, Basilan, and Sulu, would occur to 'defend' Islam against the Christianization (Asani, 1985) which the Spaniards used the 'convenient' way to make the Muslim natives, referred as the Moro, obedient to the Spanish King, conventional violence. As Francisco de Sande, a current Spanish governor of Manila ordered,

You shall try to ascertain who are the preachers of the sect of Mohamad, and shall seize and bring them before me and you shall burn or destroy the house where that accursed doctrine has been preached, and you shall order that it be not rebuilt. (Asani, 1985)

Even stated above, the colonization done by the Spanish was not enough to bring the term *Jihad* to the Moro leaders, in spite of the foreign invaders in their homeland. It was until the Spanish successfully ruled over the Moro and the Philippines which their missionaries started to Christianize the local communities through church and Christian school that, during the early governance, those facilities was limited only to the *Filipino* or genetically-born Spaniards in the Philippines as same as *creole* in Latin America. However, the privileges of those *Filipinos* had attracted *converted* natives into the Spanish school and its liberal idea of the West. And that, the perception of national liberation was begun in native *Filipino* graduates who started to demand for further social equality and an anti-corruption program proposed to the Spanish governor. Being ignored, it had fueled the Philippine revolution against the Spaniards which also faced the American support for the locals and its participation in the revolution.

Even though they helped the Filipinos, American started to 're-govern' (Asani, 1985) the Filipino as a new foreign ruler, disappointing the Filipinos. After the reestablishment of the colonial rule, the Moro had started another uprising in the early 1900s to resist another colonization, but it ended as the Moro defeat in 1914 which some sultans and datus decided to reconcile with the American. During its administration, the foreign governor acknowledged the necessity to separate the Christian community (Luzon and Visayan islands) and Muslim community (Mindanao,

Basilan, Palawan, and Sulu archipelago). By granting the national constitution of the Philippine state, the colonial Philippine government had attempted to annex the Moroland into its national territory which was strongly opposed by Moro leaders that to live with American rule was better than not to live separately and independently.

The notion of Islam might be raised during the post-colonial rule of the Marcos administration that he decided to launch the 'cultural' integration of Mindanao and Sulu through the massive Christian migration (Asani, 1985) from the north to the southern part of the Philippines which Marcos intended to reduce the Muslim population in these region into a minority to suppress its voice for independent movement. To 'assimilate' Muslim community into a bigger national community of the Philippines, Marcos used the integration program, but, for his territorial conflict with neighboring country such as the Sabah, he unconsciously misjudges the silence of the Muslim when the government authorized the infiltration unit to Sabah consisted of Muslim military specialists.

The Jabitah massacre, as we know, was a crucial incident which ignited the Moro resistance against the Marcos administration to oppose the grand migration program and the atrocities committed by the national armies of the Philippines. Indeed, the Moro National Liberation Front and the Mindanao Independence Movement were manifested through these resentments and while the latter failed to mobilized Moro masses, the MNLF had effectively gathered support from the Muslim (and indigenous) locals as well as foreign recognition from Islamic international organization such as the OIC, or Organization of the Islamic Conference and Malaysia (before the emergence of the MILF) to support the struggle. Though the implication of a word (political) 'Jihad' did not be vastly mentioned within the organization, but the Islamic nationalism was intensified according to some researchers (Molloy, 1988) that chairman Nur Misuari used to re-unite and reorganize the MNLF which to overcome the clan-based conflict among the Muslim moros by raising the notion of a common identity, Islam.

Chairman Nur had succeed to implement the Islamic nationalism to combat with the internal and foreign 'colonialism' while reconciling the Moro Muslim radicalists and Muslim conservatists because under a flag of the MNLF, in order to gain enough public support, it must rely on the local 'oppressed' Muslims, however the

interests between these sub factions were different. For the radicalists, they demanded for total separation of the state of the Bangsamoro from the Philippines while the Muslim conservatists, mostly the former elites in Moro societies, demanded to retake their power striped by the Christian.

Furthermore, regardless of factionalism within the organization and the Marcos' anti-rebellion program, the conflict between Christian and Muslim (Gowing, 1977) persisted since the colonization of the Spaniards in the Philippines that the former believed in the secularism and humanitarianism for the modernization of the Philippines while the latter believed that sovereignty belongs to Allah and the legal implementation of the Quran which were perceived as privilege rights that Christian cannot accept if these principles were allowed, thus the conflictual perception existed and fueled the Christian and Muslim atrocities.

We, the five million oppressed Bangsamoro people, wishing to free ourselves from the terror, oppression, and tyranny of Filipino colonialism, that had caused us untold sufferings and miseries by criminally usurping our land, by threatening Islam through wholesale desecration of its places of worship and its Holy Book and murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and folks in genocidal campaign of terrifying magnitude. Aspiring to have the sole prerogative of defining and chartering our national destiny in accordance with our own free will in order to ensure our future and that of our children. (Liow, 2016, pp. 66-98)

A manifesto of the Moro National Liberation Front announced in 1976 also proved the relation of the MNLF struggle with the notion of Islam as being said within this passage. This passage also confirmed the intention of chairman Nur Misuari to claim the religious linkage, despite being the Marxist-radicalist activists himself, within his leadership in the organization. As some authors may argue (Liow, 2016, pp. 66-98), the ideational ground of Nur Misuari is the Marxist-oriented revolutionary ideology which tends to motivate the secessionist movement to rebel against the established-and-perceived colonialist authority. He had fulfilled the requirement for other Muslim radicalists to join the MNLF by accusing the Marcos

government, that was in office when the manifesto was announced, for threatening the 'freedom' and 'national destiny' of the moros. However, as the double-edged sword, by imposing the Marxist idea, chairman Nur must eliminate all sources of 'elitism', 'colonialism', and other religious figure in the Philippines including the old Moro elite clans and other potential groups which would definitely reduce the Moro support for the MNLF.

Therefore, to hold support as much as he need to achieve his goal, Nur Misuari also implemented the Islamic conservatism to restore the balance of power between the Christian elites and the Moro elites to legitimize and to ensure the financial and armed support from those Muslim elites and from foreign countries.

As be mentioned in the manifesto that terror, oppression, and colonialism threatens Islam by 'desecration' and genocidal campaign, chairman Nur Misuari had linked the internal ethnic conflict with the religious existence, thus the struggle of his MNLF was to liberate the Moros not only from the oppressing government of the Philippines but also to secure the religious practices in Mindanao and neighboring regions.

Ironically, the co-founders of the MNLF including Nur Misuari were educated from the secular University of the Philippines (Asani, 1985) which they originally aimed to liberate the Mindanao which may have seen the failure of the Mindanao Independence Movement that struggled together with the MNLF that the MIM movement lacked the solid ideological motivation to support its legitimacy against Marcos administration. Therefore, by pursuing purely Marxist idea of liberation, the MNLF might end up the same position as the MIM movement, thus chairman Nur must include other 'element' to drive his rebellion, Islam. Logically, it was very effective to implement Islam into the group's agenda as it gave the MNLF authority to mobilize not only indigenous masses but also other Muslim zealots and local lords as I mention above, but, unfortunately, this tactic was a temporary success due to the lack of solid ends of the struggle between toward the 'Republic' or the 'Islamic' breakaway state.

Thus, President Marcos had used this opportunity to stop the resistance through the OIC's process of the peaceful negotiation in 1976 in Tripoli, Libya. As we all know, the Tripoli agreement failed because both parties decided to

leave the table and violate the peaceful settlement of conflict in the southern Philippines, but this agreement had proven Marcos' strategy true that the MNLF can be *mediated* with because this organization, even somewhat combined secular rebellion with religious struggle, cannot find its solidarity on what it fought for which deteriorate the legitimacy and mobilization of Moro masses, it was further reduced when chairman Nur decided to reconcile with the government even noticed that the autonomous region was reduced the affected Muslim-populated provinces in the initial ARMM agreement.

In short, the MNLF was indeed the Moro resistance movement in southern Philippines, but it was driven by the Marxist secessionist ideology to liberate the oppressed moros from the colonialism and social inequality, however chairman Nur Misuari had to gain external support and additional support from the locals through the implication of Islam in his manifesto of the MNLF's Bangsamoro struggle. From this perspective, we may see the linkage of religion with the political struggle of the MNLF, but chairman Nur had decided to abandon the total separation of the *Bangsamoro Republic* in favor of Marcos' autonomous region due to the lack of ideological solidarity and the internal factionalism of the organization. Nevertheless, the combined Islamic struggle of Nur Misuari, at least, shared some similarities with anti-Western Salafi Jihadist principles.

4.1.2.2 The MILF's *Jihad*

... What are the plans of the MILF on all domains (military, livelihood, security and education)?

The MILF led up a program to be implemented phase by phase in twenty years (from 1981-2000). This program covers all aspects of "Jihad in the way of Allah" and human endeavors, but it gives special attention to the following: Islamization of all aspects of life of the Bangsamoro people; Military build-up; Self-reliance; Strengthening and improvement of organizational, administrative and managerial capability.

Before the 20-years program expires in the year 2000, the MILF had already planned a new 50-year program which will start in 2001 and end in 2050. The plan was approved during the 15th General

Assembly of the Moro Islamic Liberation front in Camp Bushra on December 15-17, 1997. ... (“MILF Leader,” 1998)

Just shortly after the Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, we all know that Hashim Salamat’s faction did not agree with this reconciliation, with this *failure* agreement as Sheikh Salamat answered during his interview from Nida’ul Islam’s article. Clearly, he had mentioned the total submission to Allah, *Jihad in the way of Allah* (“MILF Leader,” 1998), and the Islamization of Bangsamoro people. From these answers, we can see the clear picture of the MILF after the separation from the MNLF group and pursue their own struggle to protect the Bangsamoro nation and to establish ‘justice’ and equal rights for the Moro people.

The Salamat’s MILF had combined a word *Jihad* with the practical implication of military build-up and also the governance system of the organization for its followers, thus, by addressing the supremacy of Allah, Hashim Salamat had claimed to pursue an independent movement through armed struggle against the established ‘colonialist’ government. He also addressed the MILF armed personnel as the Bangsamoro ‘mujahideen’ implied the idea of Muslim freedom fighter in Afghanistan with the Moro resistance in the Philippines which the Moro Muslim had fought for more than 400 years to protect the ‘Islamic’ way of life.

Interestingly, while separating from the MNLF branch, Salamat Hashim and his followers had operated the MILF organization almost the same way that chairman Nur had administered his group such as the implementation of unconventional combat tactics like hit-and-run strategy, or the self-determination of the Moro nation. However, one difference is the means to achieve Salamat’s Bangsamoro state was to mainly claim and imply Islam and the Holy Book which Sheikh Salamat argued that the pivotal principles of the MILF related with the religion, in this case is Islam. We would see from the organizational objectives which Salamat Hashim stated during his interview with Nida’ul Islam which almost of his perspective of the Bangsamoro struggle relied with the existence of Islamic way of practice and identity. As he clearly gave the notion of Jihad and Muslim mujahideen during his interview, he also proposed the methodology and objectives to the public as

Would you please give us a brief outline of the Moro Islamic Front?

Brief Account on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): ...

... c) Objectives; To make supreme the Word of Allah; To gain the pleasure of Allah; To strengthen the relationship of man with his Creator; To strengthen the relationship of man and man; To regain the illegally and immorally usurped legitimate and inalienable rights of the Bangsamoro people to freedom and self-determination; To establish an independent state and government and implement Sharia (Islamic Law). ("MILF Leader," 1998)

Undeniably, the main objective of the MILF was indeed the Bangsamoro independent state, though the means to achieve such goal must ally with the religious implication which the organization may attract more local Muslim physical and moral support to ensure the legitimate claim of the representative of Bangsamoro rebellion, after accusing the Tripoli Agreement as a failed negotiation that cannot solve the conflict let alone the moro issue. Chairman Salamat Hashim had strongly claimed that to fight alongside the MILF, the group would protect the *crystallization* of Islam through the teachings of Quran and *Sunnah* (the traditions and practices of Islam during the time of the Prophet Muhammad).

Despite the similar Bangsamoro struggle of both the Moro Liberation's group and Moro Islamic group, the MILF Salamat also accused his fellow organization for allying with the government by 'submitting' (or signing) to the ARMM initiative in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. He had blamed Nur's group for leaning toward the secularism and 'recognizing' the government of the Philippines and the national Constitution of the Philippines, meaning that the MNLF had fully accepted to be under the administration of the Filipino government and abandon its motivation of the total separation of the Bangsamoro Republic. Sheikh Salamat had openly accused the MNLF through the interview and also raised the importance of *Jihad* within his MILF organization as well.

How do you view the role of the Muslim communities in supporting the Jihad in Islamic Moro Islands?

The support of the Muslim Ummah all over the world to the Bangsamoro cause is very vital and much needed. Perhaps the Bangsamoro struggle for freedom and self-determination is the longest and bloodiest in the entire history of mankind. ... The Bangsamoro people fought against the Spanish invaders for 377 years and against American intruders for about 40 years and have been fighting Filipino barbarous colonial rule during the past 52 year.

In short, the Bangsamoro people fought for 469 years to preserve their Islamic faith and identity and to defend their legitimate rights to freedom and self-determination. They have no one to ask for help except Almighty Allah and then the Muslim Ummah, their brothers in faith. ("MILF Leader," 1998)

From his answer, Salamat Hashim had given his word to other 'Muslim' to support his struggle which was different when it came to the MNLF that need foreign support for the Muslim and the indigenous people of the Bangsamoro Republic. Nevertheless, by stating the significance of the 'Muslim ummah' or the Muslim communities abroad, it signified the Salafi-Jihadist strains within the MILF ideational framework, at least of the leader of this organization who also had received the education in Mekkah and al-Azhar University in Egypt where it produced the Salafi-Jihadist scholars and political activists. The objective to make a living practice of *Sunnah* was also manifesting the influence of Jihadism in the MILF's Bangsamoro resistance.

Another reflection from academics (Maqbool, 2009) also proved the influence of Salafi-Jihadism within the MILF and in Hashim's motivation to lead his struggle. The manifestation of religious and political conflict in Mindanao, for Salamat, had brought him to pursue the cause of Qutb's perceived Salafi-Jihadist ideology that focused on the 'Islamization' of all processes of the Bangsamoro state.

Furthermore, another Muslim intellectual figure in the Moro independence movement, named Sheikh Abu Zahir (1998), also prove the relationship between religion and ethnic rebellion in the ideological relevance in which the notion of *Jihad* is used, claimed, and to mobilize the Moro masses in order to drive the

separation of Bangsamoro state against the Philippine state. Zahir had used the term *Jihad* to describe, in general, the Moro struggle against various *invaders* and ‘the Philippine crusade’ since 1970 which he refers to the Ferdinand Marcos’ administrative acts over the Moro-populated region in Mindanao, Sulu, and other nearby regions.

... The Moro Jihad has been in three phases: First Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Spanish invasion (1521-1898) 377 years. Second Phase: the Moro Jihad against the American colonizers (1898 - 1946) 47 years. Third Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Philippine crusade (1970 - present). Since the granting of the Philippines Independence in the year 1946, the Manila government launched "settlement programs" for the Christians from Luzon and Visayas in the Moroland. Prior to that the Moro Muslims had been enjoying the administration of the region by themselves ... The Christian settlers, with the assistance of the Manila government, started to take over the strategic politic and socio-economic posts ... (Zahir, 1998)

Directly, Sheikh Abu Zahir had mentioned the term *Jihad*, *Crusade*, and *Christian* which those terms, by themselves, generate the religious explanation of the conflict between the Filipino and the Moro. Thus, with this perspective, the Moro rebellion since 1970 to present, as it was claimed by Zahir, was indeed the resistance against the ‘Western colonialism’ and ‘Christianity’ which are general claim for many anti-Western Muslim radicalist movement or so-called Islamic revivalist group that ‘interpret’ the teaching of Salafi-Jihadism and the ‘individualization’ of those teachings and implications influenced by the Muslim mujahideen, later known as the Al-Qaeda.

However, the struggle for autonomy of the Moro rebels may be understood as an act of religious zealots, but how can one describe the attempt of the ‘Muslim’ head of the MILF, the ‘Islamic’ Liberation Front, to reconcile with the ‘Christian’ leader, President Simeon Aquino III, when the peace agreement of the Framework Agreement of Bangsamoro was signed in 2012 restructuring the ARMM agreement to become the BARMM or Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

Despite the side-story fact of the ‘autonomous’ region for the Moro population, Abu Zahir also claimed the ‘behind the scene’ story of the Filipino

government over the grand migration policy to the Southern Philippines as he was interviewed and documented with Nida'ul Islam magazine published in 1998 stating that

Obviously, the motive of the Manila government behind the influx of the Christian settlers into the Moroland is not a mere settlement but to carry out its genocide campaign against the Muslims. This has been reflected by the organization of the Christian militia (armed) movement known as "illegal" to strike terror against the unarmed Moro civilians, especially among the rural areas. A large series of massacres and arsons were carried out. The Moro civilians leaving their homes and farms were compelled to seek refuge in the urban areas dominated by Muslims. These are the chances taken by the Christian terrorists to take over farms and lands vacated by the Moro refugees. (Zahir, 1998)

4.1.2.3 Abu Sayyaf & BIFF perception of Jihad

From his perspective over the oppression from the Christian settlement and the violent suppression of the Marcos government toward the Moro 'rebellion' had legitimized the continuity of the MILF to protect the oppressed moros and to maintain the order of Muslim community against the local Christian gangs or para militias known as the *Ilaga* (Asani, 1985) (The Bangsamoro people: a nation in travail). He also accused the authority for committing 'genocide' and the Christian criminals as 'terrorists' for targeting unarmed Moro civilians. Though, there was a fact about the illegal suppression of the Moro community done by the *Ilaga* and the national armed forces, there was also enough justification for the 'young Moro' to resist against this injustice and authoritative regime of the Filipino through the establishment of the MILF. from Abu Zahir statement, he claimed that while Islam came to the Mindanao long before any colonizers and their Christianity, Salamat Hashim was legitimized to arm his people and aim for the establishment of a 'sovereign' Moro 'Islamic' state openly implied the political notion of Islam to his struggle for autonomy.

However, his argument may not be able to answer the achievement of the MILF and the Simeon administration over the Framework Agreement on the

Bangsamoro in 2012 that did not grant the total separation of the Bangsamoro, but provide the improved self-governance autonomy for the Moro nation in Cotabato area.

On the other hand, when it comes to the Abu Sayyaf or the splinter BIFF, ones may argue that these radicalist terrorist groups, as many government or international organization had categorized them for using non-discriminating violence and pursuing the ideological establishment of their political community, had orbited around the Islamist radicalism which mostly aims for the reestablishment of the traditional Islamic state through Jihad, or the Holy Crusade against the ‘perceived’ infidels or unbelievers. Even though, their cause for ‘independent’ struggle may be a little bit more ‘controversial’ as we can see from the *Violence* section that explain the Abu Sayyaf, as an example, as the bandit group which only sustain its gang through kidnapping and ransom, but we should understand the initial moment of the Abu Sayyaf in the 1980s still involve the ideational motivation of the Salafi-Jihadist inspired Afghan mujahedeen which Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, a Tausog Filipino from Basilan, had participated in Afghanistan.

As many Southeast Asia specialists like R. C. Banlaoi (2014) had suggested, Abu Sayyaf, even was looked as a terrorist group, had once be recognized as the Moro separatist movement which fought for the establishment of the ‘independent’ ‘Islamic’ state in Mindanao. Abdurajak Janjalani had also organized the group as a ‘bridge’ between the MNLF and the MILF faction while recruiting other former MN/ILF followers to join the ‘bearer of sword’, the Arabic translation for Abu Sayyaf. Banlaoi also used the public proclamation of Janjalani which indeed involved the implication of Jihadism through his ‘Four Basic Truths’ of Abu Sayyaf Group (which RC Banlaoi quoted from Samuel K. Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle p. 96),

1. It is not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle that is against the teaching of Islam, especially the Koran ... 2. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a purely Islamic government whose “nature, meaning, emblem and objective” are basic to peace. 3. Its advocacy of war is necessity for as long as there exists oppression, injustice, ... imposed on the Muslims. 4. It believes that “war disturbs peace only for the attainment of the true and real objective of

humanity — the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the noble Quran and the purified sunnah. (Banlaoi, 2014)

Again, there is the linkage between the oppression, and injustice with the ‘justice’ (Helfstein, 2009) and ‘righteousness’ of the law of Quran seen within this statement of Janjalani when he mobilized his followers to liberate Mindanao against the Filipino government. It should be clear from Janjalani’s background in the Middle East that, at least, ideologically involved with Salafi-Jihadist scholar like Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, a Sunni-Jihadist influencer who aimed to ‘renew’ the Muslim *Ummah* and the use of Jihad to protect faith and the establishment of *al Hakmiya* that undoubtedly belongs to the Salafi-Jihadist ideology. Thus, mostly, one can say that Salafi-Wahhabism had penetrated the Abu Sayyaf structure, at least until the demise of Janjalani. While claiming Abu Sayyaf to fight for unifying all the Muslim communities in the Southern Philippines, Janjalani had criticized the roles of the MNLF and the MILF for not committing to wage the ‘real Jihad’ against the Christians. It is clear that Janjalani and his Abu Sayyaf had been influenced and funded by the infamous Jihadist forerunner like the Al-Qaeda which Janjalani had some personal relationship with, including Osama Bin Laden himself.

If we look at the ideological motivation behind this ‘insurgent’ group in Mindanao, the jihad of *Fi-Sabil-lillah* is emphasized, according to Renato Cruz De Castro (2009), which is translated into *a struggle in the cause of Allah*. From this way of interpretation, Janjalani had also criticized the wrong practices of general Moro-Muslim scholars. Furthermore, he was known to have the same teacher as Bin Laden, Abdallah Azzam who was one of the founding fathers of Al-Qaeda, thus the (Al-Qaeda based) Jihad was one of the core principles of Abu Sayyaf, regardless of the abstractive explanation and practical evidence, where there must be the responsibilities for all Muslims to wage *Jihad* against the infidels, otherwise, those Muslims would fall under the status of unbelievers.

Another Quranic implication (Helfstein, 2009) of the Jihadist movement like *Janjalani’s Abu Sayyaf* is the Azzam’s *al-Qa’ida al-suhbah*, or the vanguard of the strong to authorize the independent Islamist movement around the world to establish the *Ummah* for the Islamic context of governance. Within this sense,

the justification of Abu Sayyaf's extreme tactic was done in order to sustain its *Jihad* by kidnapping and extortion for money. Scott Helfstein (2009) also argued that the implication of Islamic fundamentalism also was seen in Abu Sayyaf to eradicate all *evil* of community through the words of the Prophet and Muslim wise.

Moreover, the implication of *Jihad* by Abu Sayyaf had justified the use of terror tactics and banditry as these strategies can sustain the 'independent' act of Abu Sayyaf to wage an individual *Jihad* with or without the consent from the rest of the Muslim communities abroad. However, ones may see a strain of transnationalism from the Abu Sayyaf 'manifesto' as it was stated as

The Mujahedeen will not fight for the sake of the Bangsamoro only or any tribe or nationality. Islam has no borders, no tribalism, no nationalism, or any ism! The Mujahideen are fighting the enemies of Allah for the sole purpose to implement the divine laws, which is the Shariah, legislated by God the Almighty Allah for the entire human race, applicable to Muslims and non-Muslims, it is a perfect law! For Allah is perfect. (Castro, 2009) written by Abu Ramadan, an author of the *Jihad in the Philippines*, the pamphlet in the Basilan camp of Abu Sayyaf.

Even though many would agree to mention Salafi-jihadism in the initial stage of Abu Sayyaf, some may argue that despite the good start for Abu Sayyaf in this category, the ASG had already lost its ideological purpose which Janjalani strived for. Author like Christoph Schuck (2020) argues that Abu Sayyaf after Abdurajak Janjalani and his brother Khadaffy Janjalani fell down toward factionalized Muslim extremist movements which operate separately, in Jolo and Basilan as examples, which the Basilan group, led by Isnilon Hapilon had joined the ISIS flag for the struggle of the perceived *Ummah* or global Muslim community. For Schuck, even within the leadership of Janjalani brothers, Abu Sayyaf also cannot be considered as Salafi-Jihadist movement due to its perception of *Jihad* which, for Salafi-Jihadists, establish the *pure* Islamic community without boundary or any form of Western governance system that Janjalani claimed his struggle for the establishment of Bangsamoro state. Schuck uses the 'patriotism' to describe the initial stage of Abu

Sayyaf and its use of *Jihadism* for securing foreign Islamist support especially in Khadaffi leadership.

Despite the core, or at least mostly mentioned group when one talks about the Moro insurgency and terrorism, organization which imply the principle of, *perceived and individualized*, Jihadism toward the cause of Moro resistance and the liberation of Bangsamoro state including Abu Sayyaf, at least accounted for Janjalani's intention before his death, we could look at the potential Moro armed separatist group called the BIFF when we consider a trace of Jihadism in the Moro struggle.

As it is claimed by Yves Boquet (2017, pp. 661-701), the intention of BIFF, despite being disappointed when the MILF accepted the peace deal with the Filipino government, is to establish, again, an Islamic state with the implementation of Sharia law. This group as we already know has been led by Umbra Kato educated from Saudi Arabia in Wahhabi school of thought (Zahid, 2014) who was claimed to lead a struggle within and outside Mindanao. He also was known to have personal relationship with the ISIS group, a Muslim radicalist group that operated in Syria and Iraq, which also influenced Kato's agenda to include *Jihad* for his justification to break away from the MILF. The BIFF also is well-known to implement the same tactics and also both groups pledge allegiance to ISIS and are recognized as ISIS satellite states in the Philippines, if not Southeast Asia.

By considering these network, we would see the implication of Jihadism in the BIFF through the ISIS self-implication of Salafi-Jihadism, though the goal of the BIFF, besides the establishment of an Islamic state, is linked toward the transnational agenda of the ISIS, a splinter group of Al-Qaeda, to establish the *ISIS* Islamic state in the Philippines rather than *Moro* Islamic state.

4.1.3 Transnational movement within the conflict

Even without direct claiming, the struggle of the moros does definitely involve transnationalism in a sense of both ideational and practical motivation and support. As we all know that the globe has become interconnected and intertwined together where all, at least most, part of states, nations, and others are linked through direct and indirect channels of communication and transportation. Thus, the results are the increasingly 'fused-or-split' identities of the those who live in or between, if we consider the idea of Peter Mandaville's Transnational Muslim Politics

(2001), the 'nation-state' boundaries which they are kept exposed to transnational flows of various ideas and discourses.

One of the most impacted communities from the transnational world can be the Muslim societies, though it is not to say that transnationalism is here to be blamed for the extremist, radicalist or *Jihadist* movement around the world instead transnationalism creates a channel with various people can interact and exchange the ideas of, for an example, what the ideal community ought to be and that simple idea would be transformed into many discourses of *imagined* Muslim communities where the Islamic law is enforced and implemented without the strain of *Western* modernity. The movement of people and ideas is indeed creating the contradiction, or confrontation at most, of the way of *local* life through comparing, migrating, and oppressing, if we use the Moro claim for their cause of resistance, which the locals have to interact to fuse themselves with the flow or resist the changes. And go with that, the discourse of something *pure* or *traditional* kind of forms of society is implanted within the locals' mind especially when they are directly exposed to a certain modernity or western *civilization* that the implementation of Islam is *bent* to cope with the expansion of western modern knowledge of nation-state, territorial boundary, or human notion of state sovereignty, as the examples, however, that *bending* idea can also build another concept of modern Islam, the attempt to restore the traditional and 'pure' imagined Muslim community through a certain kind of ideological motivation such as the Salafi-Jihadism or Islamic fundamentalism from Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.

So as in Southern Philippines, the introduction of Islam to the local tribes came before the Spaniard landing which indicates the very first exposure toward a particular 'foreign' belief, as we all know that Islam, as a term for Muslim religion, was applied to almost every Middle East kingdom. The very first transaction of concept and belief of how the proto-Moro tribes should govern their communities as well as how to conduct relationship between their communities and neighboring seas, Malay and Indo tribes who is also spread the teaching of Islam to the Philippines.

Ironically enough, the first transection of idea was from foreigner to the locals of the Philippines where Islam was flourished, but such stable extension had been put in question when the Spanish arrived and implemented the use of force to colonize and govern the Philippines. It is this 'foreign' invader who threatened the

Moro, a Spanish-invented term for local Muslim, community in which Islamic way of life had been subdued under the Christianization through violence. As we know, the resistance was done, in the controversy of the Moro unity, and was supplied by another ‘foreigner’, the American, which had once again colonized the Philippines after the retreat of the Spaniards. Though the Moro resistance occurred when the social assimilation happened in post-colonial Philippine government through the migration program to suppress the Muslim constituencies in Mindanao and nearby regions. The resistance of the locals was changed, could be argued as after the Jabitah massacre, to be more systemic and politicized which the insurgents demanded for separation of territorial boundary and self-determination. However, these concepts of resistance may be questionable and not genuine due to the identity of Moro secessionist movement that improvised an idea of *Western* nation-state and *modernized* form of administration which the national government is required within the system. It is not to discredit the determination and faith that all Moros, Muslim or not, had given up their lives to, but rather to remember their causes through the different path of idea and understanding.

... *The political struggles of Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Thailand, have also featured some measure of transnational linkage to the Middle East and South Asia.* ... (Mandaville, 2009)

Mentioned by Peter Mandaville’s another work, *Transnational Islam in Asia: Background, Typology and Conceptual Overview*, the trend of transnational Islam should be observed when the rising ideology of Islam in South Asia and the Middle East where the implications vary and influence the religious implementation of Islam in Southeast Asia and, lastly, cause a spark in the Muslim revolution in Mindanao, thus it might worth to explore the development of Islamic approaches in South Asia, in according to the Middle East practices. The emergence of Islam in South Asia was a starting point of the transnational Muslim movement which motivated the Moro rebellion especially the groups with the regionwide-global wide ideology of the establishment of Islamic state, such as the MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf.

Islam in South Asian states such as India, and Pakistan at that time, just like the Southeast Asia, came with Muslim merchants and scholars particularly from Saudi Arabia in which those merchants and scholars had established the political

ties across the East Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia that this route maintain the exchange of goods, and cultures lying with the conversion of Islam toward their customers. Another hub for the expansion of Muslim traders was from Iran which participated in the creation of political authority, according to Islam which, at that time, implemented the Sufism branch of Islam in India.

Though the Islamic practice in South Asia was not purely in accordance with the Middle East, but rather the mixed form of Islam and local Hinduism that emphasize a certain social hierarchy, or the caste system, but the long term exposure to Islam had given the South Asian states the Islamic sub-groups to sustain the trading route of goods and intellectuals to the Middle East which, in their returns, inspired their local Muslim communities to commit the *correct* spiritual practices and maintaining the Sufi routes with the Middle East . While maintaining the major influence of Islam, the very first transnational Islamist movement had occurred such as the Maududi's Jamaat-e-Islami which was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood built by Hassan al-Banna whose aimed for the Pan-Islamism, or the united and single Islamic state.

The growing presence of political Islamist and Salafi movements contributes to the rapid erosion of traditional Muslim elites' authority as well as the increasing competition between traditional Sufi groups and modernizing reformist movements.

... Pietist movements should be given suitable channels for expression. Many Muslims suffer discrimination and political exclusion. Providing these communities with channels for expression will help Muslims openly fulfill their political and spiritual aspirations. Repressive measures will only create hatred and resentment. ... (Horstmann, 2009)

As claimed by Alexander Horstmann, some transnational movement had also received massive public support, the group such as Tablighi Jamaat which operate in South Asia that provided carrier opportunity and education to the newcomers, in exchange for the proselytizing toward Islam. The group also acted as the missionary movement active in Malaysia, Indonesia as well the Philippines which its presence had

influenced the unequal life standard toward the Muslim minority which witnessed the modernity of the group through financial and educational support. The economic marginalization within its national state, as Horstmann argues, also was seen through the Tablighi Jamaat network that provided local Muslims, maybe, more than the society can offer.

However, as also mentioned by Horstmann, Tablighi Jamaat was not the only transnational group that operated in Southeast Asia, he also considered the Saudi Arabia-supported- Wahhabi movement which spread the Salafi ideology upon this area especially after the 1970s that Saudi government had officially funded the Salafi-oriented movement such as the Muslim World League promoting the principle of *tawhid* through sponsored education and charity activities in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines as examples. Horstmann also mentions the importance of Internet as another channel to spread Salafism that protest against the old Sufi-Shi'a ideology which was condemned as the outsider of Islam. The group also propagated the implication of *Jihad* against the *threat* toward Islam in the form of violent political activity.

Instead of being the diaspora in other religious territory, the Muslim Mindanao are long before the established native and very well-gotten used to the implication of Islam that the Muslim *Other* may not be signified during the resurgence in Southern Philippines, though the notion of *Otherness* still exist and prolong after the expansion of *Christian* migration wave to the South where Muslims were forced to become the minority within their homeland. Vice versa from the standard Muslim diaspora in other European countries, these Muslim Mindanao would fall under the *settlement* category that they are the natives and be exposed to *foreign* culture, despite the Arabic religious influence, such as Christianity, however the trace of transnational movement abroad, still, imply some certain behavior to the Moro leaders especially during the Marcos administration that the fire of rebellion was ignited. Some well-known writer like Banlaoi may argue that the rebellion in the Middle East caused by nationalism and Islamic revivalism had motivated the muslim leaders in the Philippines to fight for its independence.

If not first-hand experience (Banlaoi, 2009) (Transnational Islam in the Philippines), the Moro Muslims may be exposed to some ideology when they were

studying in the core university like Al-Azhar University of Egypt where it produced those Filipino muslim activists ready to return to their homeland. Undeniably, the core event of foreign muslim activists were emerged in the Middle East such as the new Islamic implication of the Salafi-Jihadism by Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-'Ala al-Mawdudi and others also provide a theoretical framework for other Muslim minority, or in the Philippines case, the *oppressed* to strive for their self-determination. The core activists like Salamat Hashim also were educated and influenced from Cairo in which the Pan-Islamism of Nasser of Egypt was very-well known for giving major scholarship to Muslim abroad for education. Other countries would be Saudi Arabia or Libya. Even though the practical migration of radicalist or *exiled* Muslims were not mostly found in the context of the Moro struggle, the ideational motivation toward the separatism of the Moro minority was indeed a product of the transnationalist program and movement. Though the returnee did not possess an idea of separatism by themselves, but rather debate between the assimilation and secession which the latter was much preferred due to the political conflict between Marcos and the volunteered moros toward Sabah dispute.

The Afghan War, as an example, was another pivotal stage for the Moro Muslims to see the *practical* implication of political Islam through Salafi-Jihadism in which it was interpreted by the Afghan mujahedeen, later became the Al-Qaeda. As Banlaoi (2009) uses a term 'new worldview', the Moro insurgents were exposed to this transnational implication of Islam and how to physically imply it had received a new definition of the independent struggle, to *purify* their faith.

Moreover, through transnationalism of the Moro rebellion, the state activities are also conducted through the sense of transnationally-influenced Moro insurgent groups. It means other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Libya and others also participated in the peace process of the struggle through the OIC. Thus, the involvement of these countries also motivated the Moro struggle toward the *equality, justice, and self-determination* through the financial and hardware support considered the Moro rebellion as another attempt of the *Jihad* that many transnational Muslim movement with or without armed branch pursue. "...state-affiliated conduits of transnational Islam in the Philippines have heavily influenced the dynamics of the Moro insurgency" (Banlaoi, 2009).

Malaysia, for an example, was another actor to shape the meaning of the Moro struggle through the *common* identity of Islam between the Malaysian and the moros, thus it provided the positive ambience for both *nation* to communicate, support, and operate in both channel as we can see from the case of Zulkipli bin Hir who fled to Mindanao and conduct a training ground for Jemaah Islamiyah unofficially supported by the MILF, the Malaysian-Indonesian Muslim radicalist movement, to be sent back to Malaysia. Another case would be Malaysia as a facilitator for the Philippine government and the MILF through peacekeeping operation and ceasefire agreement. Unarguably, there lies the trace of transnational movement within the Bangsamoro struggle in both ideological and practical implementation of autonomous struggle in the Southern Philippines.

Nonetheless, the role of Westphalian state does matter, so do the role of non-state actor which Banlaoi (2009) also mentioned in his work, the Tabligh Jamaat was also well-known as the *conduit* transnational Muslim movement involving in the Moro struggle. The first penetration into the Philippines was through the Pakistani priests in Basilan and Lanao del Norte and used the Marawi city as the headquarter. The group also received Moro scholars who graduated from Iran and Libya for its propaganda program. Though, the group's follower were varied from traditionalism to secularism, but the core principle of Tabligh Jamaat was to behold the orthodox form of Islam to the Muslim. The Moro followers from TJ also participated in the traditional political parties in the Philippines, even though the political parties were the *western* concept of governance. Although the route to the Moro struggle was indirect, but as the transnational Muslim movement consisted of various ideas, one of the group's followers was able to establish his own organization to materialize the TJ's inspiration, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani's infamous Abu Sayyaf which he established the ASG in Basilan and Zamboanga. The Abu Sayyaf, as Banlaoi claimed, had applied the same structure of the Hezbollah of Iran.

Moreover, other transnational organizations like International Islamic Relief Organization or IIRO also played an important role in pushing the Moro struggle. Even though this group did not directly organize by the Moro natives, but the founder of the group, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa who was the brother-in-law of Osama Bin Laden of Al-Qaeda, still cannot be ignored in this consideration. Khalifa had used

IIRO to conduct the charitable activities, though he inserted the radicalist propagation, to convert any non-Muslim locals to join his faith. Thus, the group activities were under the monitor of the Philippine authorities which they also claimed to detect the network between the IIRO and the ASG, and the MILF in the way that the IIRO had graduated many hardliners and religious radicalists to join those latter groups. The IIRO also funded the infrastructure development in Mindanao and nearby areas and also aided the Moro organizations to improve their brethren.

However, during the investigation in 2006, the Philippine government decided to freeze the IIRO bank accounts to prevent any further support to the ASG *terrorist* activities and also cooperate with the US Department of Treasury to monitor the linkage between the IIRO Philippine and the Indonesian branch which also was branded as the Al-Qaeda-funded program.

As the NGOs operating in the Philippine Muslim territory, the state's countermeasure especially for the Khalifa's *charity* organization was through the security scrutiny (Banlaoi, 2009) and often fall under the suspicion of providing cover for Muslim fugitives and radicalist propagation in the Philippines. There is also the negative representation of the NGOs when Janjalani who was educated from one of the transnational groups had established his Abu Sayyaf, which implement the violent *jihadism* and infamously-known for kidnapping and extortion even Muslim innocents, though several reports, claimed by Banlaoi, suggested that Philippine state should not blame the transnational groups like the TJ for recruiting *terrorists*, since Janjalani did not totally accept the group's ideology, but rather the individual implementation of Islam. There are also state accusations against some TJ members that provided support for the ASG members. With the Islamic implication of *da'wah* (or to make others embrace Islam), the Philippine government was believed that this doctrine was a cause for transnational movement to settle its ideology within the Muslim locals' mind which the state lacks the overall understanding of the transnational groups and transnational terrorist which both groups had influenced the Muslim moros, but the weans to achieve their goals varied.

The Whole of Government (Banlaoi, 2009), as an example, was a peace strategy for settling terrorism through communal development in Mindanao which the government aimed to implement WOG to defeat the Moro rebellion in

Basilan, Lanao del Norte etc. Even though the strategy was magnificent, the implementation and the officials' understanding of the plan was a failure resulting in the misunderstanding and abandoning the peace framework of Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain or MOA-AD which led to another violent conflict between the state and the MILF. The interfaith program, such as Bishop-Ulama Conference, was another state's project to reconcile the long-lasting conflict between Muslim and Christian population which the Philippine government believed that it might counteract the transnational Muslim movement in Mindanao through mutual understanding. *"The Philippine government lacks a coherent and nuanced understanding of transnational Islam. It tends to equate transnational Islam with transnational terrorism"* (Banlaoi, 2009).

Though it may not contribute as a direct explanation of the transnationalism in the Moro struggle, the movement of foreign fighters were still seen during the various occurrences in many Moro insurgencies such as the MNLF, or Abu Sayyaf. Even though the foreign fighters tended not to contribute major ideational changes in the Moro context, but rather the certain Moro struggles were able to *attract* the flow of foreign fighters from various regions such as the Middle East, and Africa. It would be in the same method of the early Islamic scholars and Muslim merchants travelling to the Philippines in which the foreign fighters had travelled into the conflict of the Philippine insurgents through many channels such as general transportation or smuggling, but instead of spreading religious implication of Islam, the foreign fighters joined the fray due to a certain circumstance such as when some Moro groups possessed the particular Islamist ideologies or declared to join some foreign radicalist Muslim movement, then those Moro groups were *qualified* for foreign fighters to join their fighting.

As Thomas Hegghammer (2010) mentioned in his work, transnational Muslim movement was not united and singular entity, but rather varied in many beliefs and schools of thought. Nonetheless, he suggested the difference between the transnational Muslim movement and the foreign Muslim fighters, though both group possess the *transnational* capacity to go beyond border, as the latter was not governmental-funded and not the beneficiaries of the conflict abroad, rather the foreign fighters join in the conflict when the local insurgents or armed groups decide to *escalate*

the conflict into international arena and the local's ideology decide to shift for the global scale, the global Muslim *ummah*, as an example or when the conflict generate a *threat* toward the Muslim-occupied territory in general such as the 1980s Afghan War.

The foreign fighters in the faith of Osama Bin Laden, for example, were the believers in the global *jihad* in any place and anywhere, then the Moro groups, which acquired this belief such as the Abu Sayyaf, and the BIFF, then the possibility of non-governmental intervention would likely occur. Though, the physical presence of these foreign fighters in the Philippines may not redefine the definition of the Moro struggle by itself, but rather it gives a suggestion that the Moro secessionist movement has already tuned its motivational cause to support the foreign fighters' ideological drives.

But, why do these foreign radicalists have to offer their helping hand to the moros. The reason may be, as Zachary Abuza (2003) suggested, the tempting financial opportunities for the foreign extremists like Al-Qaeda to invest without serious state monitoring. To fund the local Southeast Asian radicalists, Al-Qaeda may use its regional *cells* to collect and distribute wealth to the locals. The ideational cause is very important for Al-Qaeda to offer support to the local radicalist movement, but the group's financial stability is also undeniably significant. The Islamic charity organization, as example, also sustain the funding system of Al-Qaeda outposts in Southeast Asia including the Philippine cell where the local *zakat*, Muslim donation, was done to sustain the Muslim community. Another example would be the Khalifa's business group which was emphasized earlier through both legal and illegal *charity* organization.

The organization also operated in the MILF zone of control where it developed the local well-being and spread propaganda. The *hawala* system, Muslim term for money transfer system, also was exploited by Al-Qaeda to gain revenues in many weak banking systems such as Malaysia, and the Philippines where state monitoring was low and was not fixed the exchange rate. The *hawala* was intertwined between the local money pool and foreign pool without actual name or provable account which was difficult to trace the transfer and, moreover, the Philippines still rely its internal economy with this system where the local Muslims were convenient to use *hawala* system for trades and surpass state's capital control even investors were not

from the Al-Qaeda-involved shady business. Thus, to intervene in this kind of banking system, the state may lose the potential source of incomes in general.

Ironically, the Abu Sayyaf bases also received the Al-Qaeda funds through the personal relationship of Janjalani, the older brother, and the Afghan mujahedeen through Muslim charities, thus after the Janjalani brothers were killed, the group had lost its ties with the Al-Qaeda networks and resulted in kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking which may not serve the original goal of the group.

Al-Qaeda is really a social movement. People think of it as a hierarchical organization, like a military organization, but it was never that. It was always a network, like a peace movement, coalescing together for peace demonstration on a certain Sunday ... It has very fuzzy boundaries. Some people are part of it, some people are not. To think of it as having a fixed membership is an illusion. (Sahrasad et al., 2019)

Interestingly mentioned by Marc Sageman (Sahrasad et al., 2019), he had given another explanation to the perceived terrorist organization. The social movement, as being claimed, communicate through various channel and network which in case of Al-Qaeda, it is through international Muslim community that it can spread radicalist ideology and secure the funding systems, as we know from other sources. The capacity to cross back and forth between the border helps stateless or non-state actor to support its followers or beneficiaries abroad as well as conceal the *true* identity to divide between the followers and unbelievers, as we can see from the US military hardship in Iraq to separating between innocent citizens, crime sympathizers, and actual terrorists, as a part of Bush's War on Terror for the invasion of Iraq.

From Sageman's argument, we would be able to solidify the transnational movement from various countries, regardless of state border, flowing into the Philippines. Though, the ideational or practical transportation between the Moro movement and foreign radicalist group, at least with Al-Qaeda, is something regularly mentioned statement when one consider the transnationalism in local insurgency or domestic secessionist movement, but his argument provide another description of the transnational terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda as another social movement that,

without the western stereotype of *terrorist* organization, operate ordinarily like other NGOs through the established channel that other groups also use to build their local headquarters in other region, Al-Qaeda's base in Indonesia and unofficial training camp in Mindanao.

Indirectly stated by Paul J. Smith (2002) (Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities), the transnational movement, including illegal groups, is the supporters and result of the interconnectedness of the globe where the transportation is internationally available for any potential actors. As we know from the initial practical background of the Salafi-Jihadism, the Afghan War was an important evidence that prove the successful of mass mobilization of Muslim unconventional fighters pouring into Afghanistan under the *Jihad* against the Soviet Union to prevent the fall of Islam-oriented state under the secular Russian. The connected channels were ones which support this mobilization as well as the post-Afghan war veterans to return back and tell their experiences of glory and brotherhood of Muslim fighters when facing a *threat* to their Islam.

Vice versa, from Smith's explanation on transnational movement and terrorist organization, the Moro elites also shared a part from this network as a product of the Afghan war veterans and graduates from the Middle East scholarship program which shaped their understanding of secessionist movement to include the extraterritorial element to secure a better chance of winning their goals against the Philippine government by proposing a recognition status from the international Islamic organization or declaring themselves as the followers of foreign Muslim extremist group to grant them self-sustaining fund and logistical support which may be difficult to crackdown the entire network due to its availability for legal transportation that even states still benefit from such system which no state can solely monitor.

Like many multinational corporations, al Qaeda is both the product and beneficiary of globalization. The organization took advantage of the fruits of globalization and modernization—including satellite technology, accessible air travel, fax machines, the internet, and other modern conveniences—to advance its political agenda. No longer geographically constrained within a particular territory, or financially tied to a particular state, al Qaeda emerged

as the ultimate transnational terror organization, relying on an array of legitimate and illicit sources of cash, including international charities that were often based in the West (Smith, 2002)

Especially, when we consider the fighters trained and educated in the Middle East where the Al-Qaeda and other radicalist movement located, we should see the linkage between the Moro movement and the *Islamist* radicalist movement that support the Moro groups to achieve their goals, though the goals must support the foreign radicalist purposes such as the establishment of global Muslim *ummah*, the Muslim community, or the *jihad* without border against the United States and its allies. The link would not be strict for the motivational or ideological influence from the foreign group, as being discussed, but also include the physical link through financial support or logistical support for the moro rebels, such as the MILF, and Abu Sayyaf.

The MILF, as an example (Quilala, 2007), had received funds from the Al-Qaeda, through Khalifa's charity model for example, as well as the military training in Afghanistan which the trainees would be recruited in the Afghan mujahideen camps as a result of the personal relationship between Bin Laden and Hashim. In return, the MILF's Abubakar camp also gave the training operation to the Al-Qaeda initiates and also the Jemaah Islamiyah operatives from Malaysia and Indonesia. Despite the direct linkage between the MILF and Al-Qaeda, the regional relationship between the MILF and JI also signified the network of Islamist radicalist *cells* in Southeast Asia, especially after the 9/11 incident, that sustain the role of foreign Muslim radicalism in the Philippines. So do the United States role in the peace process as well, due to the famous *War on Terror* that drove the US diplomacy and military into the unknown lands where the *terrorist* lies, it had *concerned* the Philippine peace process between the MILF and the GRP that Hashim may involve in the *terrorist* act in Southeast Asia regarding to the Al-Qaeda presence and influence.

Though, many peace treaties were signed and recognized with the MILF, the US presence in this conflict still play a crucial role, as a main sponsor of the Philippine government, in the MILF peace process which, in 2003, Hashim had sent his letters to the US president to clarify the linkage between him and Bin Laden and reject any *relationship* between the group and Al-Qaeda, even though the networks were maintained and sustained by Muslims, local and abroad, in order to avoid the US

threatening perception of terrorism which may lift the *internal conflict* into *international* intervention.

Born by separation and secured lifelines (Evans & Johnston, 2015), if not evolution of Al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the ISIL/ISIS had been built under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Al-Qaeda head in Iraq, in which the group was inspired by the extremist perception of Islam as well as the group was known for its participation in Iraqi civil war in 2003 as its main target was Shia community. Though, the use of violence of this group was similar to the main Al-Qaeda group through indiscrimination and suicide attacks, by targeting other Muslim, Zarqawi was criticized for his ideational goal by killing another Islamic sect which he perceived as a *greater threat* the group and Iraq. Thus, the Iraq branch's momentum was shifted away from the main Al-Qaeda by mobilizing support from other Sunni jihadist groups to form up the Islamic caliphate in Iraq with the majority population belong to Sunni sect. The group also participated in the civil war in Syria in which the coalition's Iraq branch had significantly controlled Syrian and Iraqi territory that challenged the authority and leadership of Al-Qaeda. The result was the separation of the Al-Qaeda and the newly born ISIL commanded by the *Command of the Faithful*, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who consolidated the radicalist operation in both Syria and Iraq while aiming to establish the Islamic state which he *gathered* all sources of manpower, skilled or not, to support his proclamation.

In order to support the foundation, regardless of the indiscriminate violence and destructive behavior of ISIS, al-Baghdadi improvised the innovation of the Internet and its media channel, especially with Twitter, where ISIS was not chained by state boundary or state authority. The use of mass propaganda and solid assets which ISIS had cautiously aware of its oil industry in its territory, ISIS can effectively implement its radical goal by establishing a real Islamic state in Syria and Iraq while *idealizing* the well-being of ISIS followers through inspirational videos and music to persuade other Muslim-or-not people to join the black flag of ISIS promising stability and a place in the paradise, though women were enslaved, raped, and mutilated. When it was at its peak, ISIS could control and defend its occupied cities, though the method of funding was done through extortion and kidnapping which some resulted in decapitation.

Interestingly, ISIS also intensified the Millenarian ideology (Celso, 2014) which the End-Time prophecy was popular among some muslim population, though the Al-Qaeda was not signified this ideology since Bin Laden and al-Zarwahiri was not given in to this belief (ISIS / Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), some extremist elites such as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, and Zarqawi which the latter was a founder of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of ISIL/ISIS, which ISIS had propagated the Apocalyptic Salafi ideology in *Dabiq* online magazine to recruit newcomers while demonizing opponents.

... between the camp of the kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy and the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin and the camp of the Jews, crusaders, their allies and with the them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews (Celso, 2014)

Within *dabiq*, ISIS had used the implication of *Khilafah* (Celso, 2014) to justify the global recruitment of jihadist fighters through Quran verses which claimed Allah's word to gather Muslim for unity to cleanse the apostasy and implement the *ummah* or Islamic community which both religious and political remain under the *Caliph*, legitimate ruler. Other than attacking the *infidels*, ISIS still use a *takfir* to excommunicate, and legitimize any unjust Muslim killings. The group also excommunicated the Shi'ite minorities and Sunni *apostate* government. With these implication, the hardline ideology and considerable income for newcomers was another attraction to other foreign fighters willing to join ISIS, plus the propagation of Islamic caliphate under al-Baghdadi, ISIS may be perceived as the end of the imagined Muslim community with real and effective governance where members had role to play and with capability to enforce authority when needed to both members and outsiders.

Though, the order enforcement in ISIS governance underlies the extreme form of violence such as beheading, but the reckless use of force had brought other jihadist groups which dissatisfied with the main Al-Qaeda to join the group. Moreover, while implementing the End-Times prophecy, ISIS had weakened the legitimacy of Al-Qaeda for pursuing the establishment of Islamic state that ISIS had

both territory and government operating as an ordinary state, though governed by spiritualistic-and-administrative leadership of al-Baghdadi.

Consequently, the expansion of extremist ideology of ISIS had attracted the Moro *jihadi* fighters such as the BIFF and Abu Sayyaf to join its cause over the self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate which, within Lanao del Sur province (Abinales, 2018), there was also an armed incident between the ISIS-pledged Muslim groups and the Philippine combined armed forces when the jihadist fighters decided to take over the Marawi city where the ISIS standard flew high. The occupation was done under the joint forces of ISIS loyalties and local *criminal* clan, the Maute brothers, Abdullah and Omar Maute, that had established the ISIS caliphate at Marawi in 2012 and ended in 2017 after the military siege campaign. The fighting between the military and armed jihadists ended in a 5-month direct engagement in combat which reaped over a thousand casualties.

Similarly, to other elderly Moro leading figures, the Maute brothers had educated in religious theology from Egypt and Jordan, then both had respectively travelled to Syria where the brothers were exposed to ISIS ideology on Islamic caliphate. When returned, the brothers started to mobilize the Moro supporters who were dissatisfied with the everlasting peace process between the MILF and GRP which, in the Maute's perspective, would not be solved once and for all. Their main targets were young students from Moro-sponsored University, former MNLF and MILF personnel which witnessed the failure of ARMM, and the family network of the Maute clan, as well as the Jemaah Islamiyah operatives who helped train the fighters in urban warfare. It was also the ISIS support through propagation through Abu Sayyaf under Hapilon and the Jemaah Islamiyah which idealized the Southeast Asian section of the main Islamic Caliphate of ISIS.

Though, some MILF members had allegedly supported the occupation, after 2017 siege, the core MILF had objected any further links between the group's members and the *remnants* of the ISIS fighters in Mindanao and prevented further support to this radical and extreme implication of Islam that the MILF claimed to be out of any Islamic teachings. As the MILF religious expert claimed a *fatwa* against the ISIS-linked group in Marawi to fight the violent extremism and protect its people.

The ISIS occupation of Marawi also implied another step of the Moro struggle that many Moro splinter groups such as Abu Sayyaf and the BIFF *evolved* toward the entanglement of transnational movement, terrorist network, pursuing not only just the liberation of Moro state, but also the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate which included Moro Muslim territory in the Philippines. However, the implication of transnationalism of ISIS network generated a further step of the struggle for self-ruling and determination that shifted the nationalist-Islamist oriented revolutionary into a bigger picture of pan-Islamic extremism of ISIS, which also was the evolution of the splinter Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq, that, in the Middle East theatre, was losing its territorial control to the joint counterterrorism operations of the western allies thus, the spiritual motivation for its members was required to fight for its cause. Therefore, the recognition of the Philippine branch, which the local insurgencies and Islamists were well-established like in Malaysia, and Indonesia, would create an impact on the transnational jihadism as Rohan Gunaratna (2017) would argue,

As the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group evolves into the next phase of its life cycle, it is operationalizing its so-called wilayats (governorates) in different parts of the world. In June, with the loss of ground in Iraq and Syria, IS has made significant territorial gains in the Philippines along with carrying out a high-profile terrorist attack in Indonesia. (Gunaratna, 2017)

He also stresses another transnational movement, foreign fighters, to *migrate* into the Philippines if they cannot manage to the Middle East front which ISIS may intend to generate another wave of ISIS recruits into Southeast Asia where online propagation and actual recruitment were available combining with the tropical and archipelagic geography of the Philippines facilitating the recruitment and ideational infiltration of ISIS radicals. ISIS online operation was reported to use the public and enclosed applications such as WeChat, Telegram, and WhatsApp which can penetrate into *vulnerable* Filipino youth ready to be radicalized. Moreover, as a radicalized Sunni jihadist, ISIS had exploited the Quranic verses to serve its purpose in which preserve the identity of ISIS even though the top elites were killed or apprehended.

Furthermore, as claimed by Mustafa Selçuk and Nikos Panagiotou (2020), social media also served as an operator for ISIS to settle its foundation not only in the Philippines, but also across the border to Malaysia and Indonesia. The ISIS affiliates had been beneficiaries for accepting the allegiance of Moro insurgencies through the territorial occupation of Basilan and Sulu which were near Malaysian and Indonesian border facilitating its shipment of goods and human assets. It was stated that the ISIS extremist was *transitional* and the affiliates were *connected* which help explain the strong ISIS network in Southeast Asia. The multi-language propaganda also helped ISIS to penetrate even more into Malaysia and Indonesia which both have Muslim majority, thus, even the siege of Marawi by the state security was successful impairing the ISIS grand-scale offensive in Mindanao, but the network may remain settled in multi-state young population accessible for modern social media which was vulnerable to the radicalization of ISIS extremism.

Radicalization is not a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia. Islamic radicalization has increased and became a significant issue in Southeast Asia since 2001. Faith-based organizations have supported the radical spreading of misinformation, and therefore various measures have many casualties. the development of Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia is starting to spread in Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, mostly via social media. (Selçuk & Panagiotou, 2020)

It is evident that when the ISIS occupation of Marawi was done, the terrorist sympathizers were numerous and prepared to support the ISIS loyalties which we can see from the local *radicalized* magazine which encouraged Muslims to participate in the *Global jihad* to expand the Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia. The social media also created a channel for foreign fighters and returnees from Syria and Iraq to join the SEA branch which Indonesia was the most affected country from those radicalized returnees as well as the inspirational figure of ISIS mujahideen that keep the local extremist such as Jemaah Islamiyah healthy. Though the state monitoring of online networks was active, the suspicious activities still surfed the Internet which required state censorship and online monitoring.

Ironically, the influence of ISIS in the Philippines was also a product of the hardline domestic policy of the current president Rodrigo Duterte (Amadar & Tuttle, 2018) who proposed the anti-drug campaign in which ISIS expansion in Southeast Asia since 2014 was overlooked. The president intended to enforce law and order, though the enforcement against drug trafficking was done through extrajudicial killings and extreme measure, in Luzon rather than to address the ethnic conflict in Mindanao, Sulu, or Lanao del Sur which the last was the training ground of ISIS affiliated Abu Sayyaf, BIFF, Maute group, and other radical group.

As Edwin Enriquez Amadar and Robert W. Tuttle claimed by using a statement from the *New York Times*,

While President Rodrigo Duterte focused his energies during his first year in office on waging a brutal campaign against suspected drug dealers and users, a motley coalition supporting the Islamic State — former guerrillas, university students, scions of political families, Christian converts to Islam— grew into a fighting force with surprising staying power. (Amadar & Tuttle, 2018)

Another impacting factor was the US military presence in the Philippines which seemed to be on decline, although the US-Philippines military coalition was tight and constructive particularly after the 9/11 incident that the United States announced the global war on terror and provide counter-terrorism support to its allies including the Philippines. The withdrawal of the US armies had signified the rising potential of local insurgency and terrorism. It was at this time, in 2014, when ISIS had spread to other regions and received much allegiance from local jihadists including the Moro Muslims from Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF, and Maute clan as the authors mentioned the RAND Corporation report of the US Special Operation in the Philippines stated that

Specifically, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a threat with potential global appeal and reach caused some speculation regarding the possibility of a resurgent threat of extremist violence in the southern Philippines. In July and August 2014, the ASG and BIFF (a splinter group of the MILF) both

released videos declaring their support for ISIL, but Lt. Gen. Rustico O. Guerrero stated that there was no indication of a “direct linkage” between the groups and ISIL. (Amadar & Tuttle, 2018)

4.2 Critical Assessment of Discursive Conflict

Postructuralism would explain the shifting trend over the rationale of Moro insurgencies which originated from one movement separated into many splinter groups while claiming for the same thing, though some groups were ready to point into something new. As the news expressed, the intra-group conflict was also seen through times which serves the suspicion that the notion of Moro liberation is of course a one and only goal, but the means and ends from that goal were varied, thus I would suggest the discourse analysis to detect the key concept from the findings.

First of all, it should be noted that the struggle for independence of Moro Muslim in Southern Philippines had indeed contained various kinds of explanation, motivation, and justification for the leading groups to pursue their ideal goals. As we all know, the struggle for autonomy of the Moro was done through the political-religious movement throughout the 20th century to the present day which many peace process and armed confrontation were witnessed, though the first movement built upon the controversial event involving the murders of Filipino Muslim army recruits and the sole survivor testimony. The event sparked the resistance, but the narrative of the resistance was represented in many different ways depending on the representing groups claiming to be a “voice of the Moro” in order to raise the Muslim (and other locals) support as well as draw international recognition of the conflict.

The group such as the Moro National Liberation Front had received an additional legitimacy from the international community as a sole representative of the Moro minority in the Philippines. In order to acquire this prestige, Nur Misuari had to unite the disarray and diverse local clans and religion, since the group’s motivation was to totally liberate the Moro and establish the *Bangsamoro republic* inspired by the secularist tradition of Communist influence due to Nur’s relation with the Communist Party of the Philippines.

In contrasted with the MNLF, Salamat's context of the struggle, as an example, must be done in the name of Islam, as it may draw the *Islamic* support and network from both state and non-state organization as the group was repeatedly accused by the AFP for being linked with neighboring armed movement in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the notorious Al-Qaeda. For the relationship with state organization, the MILF, just like MNLF, established the link through personal background of the leader and educational scholarship of its member to Islamic-oriented university. Thus, it was the MILF that openly claimed jihad *for* the Moro separation.

Nevertheless, the narratives of the Moro struggle must be settled through the 3-part analysis according to my hypothetical structure in which all 3 factors had emerged and faded through time and event. Such an anti-post-colonial rule of the MNLF, as a quick example, was not rooted in the historical context of the *failed attempt* of Spaniard to fully colonize the Philippines, but this story was told to justify Nur's violent struggle for self-determination.

Thus, by introducing the discourse analysis, we should see what drove the struggle into a way it seems to be through each named Moro insurgencies. Rather than pushing the groups' motivation and action right into the consideration, one should also look at the factors causing those ideational motivations and its repercussion within the context of Moro insurgency. As the poststructuralist argues, the discourse tends not to be used to explain certain action or reaction, but rather discourse should be used to explain both the action and those who act as well as what constitutes them to take an action in the first place.

It is through the abstract idea of what the struggle should be or what kind of members it ought to be, the image of the promising movement that can *liberate* the people of the Moroland was visualized through an organized violence to raise the bargain for the Moro leaders or to take the group into the transnational network to receive fund and charity or to partake in the international religious movement for seeking out foreign support on logistical support or faithful recruitment. It is also important to note that the spirit of transnationalism also takes a piece of this cake. The role of transnational community also participates in the evolution of some Moro rebels from the local (with transnational influence) insurgency to abandon, sort of, the Moro liberation and look toward a *bigger* picture of the global rise of ideal Muslim

community, regardless of tools to achieve it. The Moro perception of independence also differs through what the representing group promises and negotiates with the superior Philippine government, thus it is this stage where the meaning of independence is shifted, and shaped to suit the current situation.

Within the violent nature of the Moro conflict from the perspective of the MNLF leader, Nur Misuari, we would see the definition of armed struggle for deterrence and assurance in which he had explained the use of force to defend the group's occupied territory as well as to signal the Philippine government a message of determination to bring violence into the negotiation table if the needs were not met. It is also his voice which we have learnt that MNLF, despite being a representative of Moroland independent movement, also uses its representation to intervene in the Sabah conflict supporting Malaysian government and pressuring the GRP to drop the claim. By threatening to use force, the MNLF also justified its revolutionary motivation through the narrative of injustice, inequality, and colonialism. Chairman Nur had represented his organization to fight against the *conqueror*, as he mentioned, to protect his land resource, though the armed struggle was reduced when the peace process was prevailed with the third-party mediation, then the peace was settled with an agreement for the *autonomous* rule of the Moro and indigenous nation of the Southern Philippines.

Figure 4.1

The Represented Ideas Which Drive the Moro Struggle from the MNLF and MILF



The peace process, in that time was the 1976 Tripoli agreement, was successful, but it is worthy to look at the abstraction of the peace agreement itself. The definition of the peace agreement was to abandon the violent cause of conflict and stop the devastation which tells us that the violent nature of the Moro conflict, perceived by MNLF can be negotiated even if the needs were partially met. The total independence was minimized into the autonomous region of Mindanao which Misuari, more or less, agreed to this proposal. The abandonment of the Bangsamoro republic of the MNLF did not mean the group would become the political movement and autonomous governor and stop the determination for Bangsamoro, but rather, as we see from the failed attempt of Nur Misuari to reelect himself as the second-term ARMM governor, the threat to use force was seen to dictate the ARMM governorship under the MNLF again, though chairman Nur was not elected.

By implying the religious connotation, indeed, Nur is, first and foremost, a Muslim, thus the religious connotation was implied within the MNLF in a form of Islamist extremism aiming to create a new community with all equal under the God even though Nur Misuari had compromised the group with the local clans and politicians. Then, under the MNLF flag, the religious connotation was not the main driving force to pursue self-determination as it remained the factor to persuade young Muslim to join the revolutionary MNLF.

Though, the MNLF was compromised with the ARMM agreement. The violent nature of the conflict did not fade away as the MILF, the splinter group led by Salamat Hashim, once again waged *jihad* against the government and rejected the 1976 Tripoli agreement and the compromises that the MNLF agreed to decrease the number of autonomous districts. Moreover, this time the MILF had the local Muslim support as the group strongly represented the Islamic movement and penetrated the locals through spreading of training camp and stronghold around Mindanao, though the violence was conducted, like the MNLF, as an instrument for political goal, for the group it is the establishment of Islamic state, as Hashim answered to use violence when an opponent eagers to fight and to talk when the situation shifts toward it. This implies the strategy was a defensive stance as he claimed the words of God to be prepared for both war and peace. The group was motivated with the same thing the MNLF had witnessed, the

Jabidah massacre which prompted the young Muslims and activists all over Mindanao to topple down the *dictatorship* of Ferdinand Marcos.

Although Salamat's men were ready for Misuari's command, after the peace agreement, the MILF, then, realized that the old MNLF *secular-nationalist* strategy was not ideal and was needed for a replacement. The idea of *jihād*, as some may argue, would not be genuine for the Moro leaders, at least not generally known for ordinary Moro Muslims, rather it is a product and a schematic from the Sunni school of thought combined with the militarist extremism where the purity and anti-Western ideology were intensified, thus the result was the same justification of the MILF to lead Muslims into the *defensive jihād*, despite the fact that the Moro struggle was an internal insurgency and hardly contribute to the establishment of global Islamic community. Nevertheless, the image of Islamic community had been implanted in the general agenda of the MILF which, in return, it can now access to the extremist network abroad which contained funding programs to those self-claimed *jihād* fighters and training camps facilitated by global transportation.

Unlike the MNLF, the threat of violence by the MILF was longed for decades from the late 1970s, during its time, the group joined Nur's banner, to the mid-2010s and had faced many peace attempts and results.

Evidently, the image of Mindanao conflict and a struggle of independence was portrayed through Nur Misuari and Salamat Hashim as a nation's on trial in which the necessity of armament to ensure the continuity of power transition process that the Moro representatives can access to the Philippine administrative power to govern their ancestral territory, though the supreme goal of independent state might not be granted and, instead, the negotiation granted an autonomous region for the Moro movement. Correct, Salamat's MILF was not pleased by the agreement, but rather maintained his cause, and his successor cause, throughout the organizational timespan, the MILF showed an adaptability of the group to address the struggle within the Government of the Republic of the Philippines arrangement of peace transition. For example, the MILF had accepted the MOA-AD agreement on ancestral domain in 2008, though the agreement was become unconstitutional (International Crisis Group, 2016) through local Christian leaders in the South, thus Arroyo and the Moro had to draft another comprehensive act.

One example would be the 2018 Bangsamoro Basic Law, a legislative act for the implementation of the government BARMM or Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the successor of the ARMM in which Duterte's GRP and MILF were core players to establish the renewed autonomous region granting more independent administrative rights, while promising the anti-corruption and effective governance unlike during the ARMM system. The law itself does not pass without reaction, during the drafting of BBL, but the public trust on such autonomous act to the South Muslim was low and resulted in due to the decades of conflict and Filipino propaganda on anti-Bangsamoro.

In addition of the changing paradigm toward autonomous region, the MILF, even after Salamat's demise, still represent the ongoing Moro political organization which balanced the use of force and paper against the Philippine government, though we cannot overlook the peace agreement may lead to another violent incident such as the Mamasapano incident, operated by the Philippine National Police to subdue the high profile JI operatives in Mindanao which ended in lasting gunfights between police and combined MILF and BIFF fighters. The incident caused the government to freeze the BBL parliamentary process.

Ideologically, the abstraction of the Moro conflict featured many ideologies and influences which motivated the movement to push their agenda for self-determination. For example, the introduction of nationalism in the post-colonial era was a particular concept that the Moro elite used to push the *national liberation* of the Moro Mindanao which was through armed struggle and was regularly mediated by the Philippine government through peaceful settlement. If we push this nationalistic abstract that a state must serve a certain occupied nation in which such national identity must include a sovereign or independent rights and territory, the Moro conflict was indeed the struggle of Moro identity to build its own state, regardless of the amount of different ethno-linguistic groups in the Southern Philippines, separating its ideal state territory with the *Filipino* Philippines.


Therefore, within the narrative of national identity, the interpretation of the Bangsamoro nation was fixed with the rationale of which population was portrayed as Moro or Filipino, let alone this criterion, was different from each representing Moro organization depending on the leaders' agendas on the struggle. For example, the

MNLF openly included the indigenous population to join its national revolution, but the MILF exclusively fought for the Muslim well-being and the establishment of the Islamic state while remaining opened for indigenous people who dissatisfied with the ARMM to join the group. Then, the identity of the Moro representing groups was not singular as the total population of the Southern Philippines, but rather the *pick-and-choose* population that also represented the different demands of the local clans and politicians.

The image of Moro liberation for both MNLF and MILF tell us the role of self-defense in armed struggle, as claimed by their leaders, and the mass mobilization of young population in the Southern Philippines while the MILF shift the current toward more Islamic way of strive, but both group maintain their revolutionary struggle of independence that can be mediated and included in the Philippine parliamentary process for conducting political autonomy. But, for some splinter groups, independence was attractive for bandwagon with the elder groups, but when subgroups' ideologies were not met with the result of the struggle, such as the ARMM and BRMM project which compromised the Moro liberation into a special political area. As we see from the narrative of violence in Mindanao resurgence, the political context of the struggle can be changed to the point that militant radicals or extremists are disappointed with such a peace agreement with the government.

Figure 4.2

The Linkage between the Implication of Jihad as the Justification



Some militarist Muslims such as Janjalani, who experienced the glory of *holy war* against the western secularist government in Afghanistan from the Soviets to Americans, may decide to form his own violent struggle against the Filipino government which was an ally of the United States certainly after the 9/11 incident through global war on terror doctrine. The groups like Abu Sayyaf decided to follow the previous movement toward the Moro liberation and Islamic state in Mindanao, which the image should be the same, but as the Janjalani brothers were dead, Abu Sayyaf was underfunded from foreign Muslim movement had compensated through extortion and kidnapping both Muslim and non-Muslim which deviated the image of Moro struggle into Abu Sayyaf struggle that changed the group representation of Moro representative for armed struggle into some kind of jihadist-related criminal group. Moreover, since the death of Janjalani brothers, the Abu Sayyaf narrative was portrayed as anti-American extremist movement considering the speech of the group spokesman and the method of operation that involves incapacitation or beheadings. There are also confessions from ex-member and other victims of Abu Sayyaf telling that the group was extremely violent, motivated by money and the penalty of wrong-doings in its camp was death. Though the group's national identity may not be enough to explain the Moro mobilization, Abu Sayyaf, as an example for geographical explanation, can remain partly due to the local support of Basilan and Jolo population where the state facility still does not support the well-being of the locals there.

Interestingly, the Bangsamoro Freedom Fighter, as a former self of the militant branch of the MILF, also participated in the shape of Moro conflict since the group, at least for the duration of Umbra Kato leadership, claimed for being the *jihadi* warrior fighting for the true Bangsamoro liberation and as Umbra argued that his armed wing had been left out during the ceasefire agreement between the MILF and the GRP forcing him to abandon the group and began his own struggle. This signified the disunity even within the representative organization for the Bangsamoro struggle that the MNLF and MILF suffered from the politics among their rank and the clan-based issues which deteriorated the legitimacy of the group as well as indirectly enhanced the possibility of organizational breakdown into many splinter groups.

The BIFF, like Abu Sayyaf, also fought for the same goal, the *Bangsamoro*, but the method of operation may lean toward the foreign extremist group in which

penetrated the Muslim society in the South, in this case was the ISIS group that both BIFF and ASG had already pledged allegiance to the ISIS attracting foreign fighters and monetary support to sustain their motivational cause. Though, the representation of the BIFF within the context of the Moro conflict, at the starting point, was the same as other Moro movement, but after the separation and the death of the first leader, Umbra Kato, the group showed the next motivational drive, just like the Abu Sayyaf, not to fight for the Muslim liberation, but rather to fight for its survival, since the group alongside the Abu Sayyaf were excluded from the Philippine peace process and were accused for terrorism non-negotiable for the government.

Now, we should see an another dynamic of the Moro conflict that the terrorism, as the status for those who commit crime in extreme violence and indiscriminate atrocities, was separated from the narrative and even the same Moro group also *cut off* any relationship with the terrorist group as well as the Philippine government also excluded them from receiving the same negotiation power as other *recognized* Moro independent movement. The criteria was different, but it should be noted that the struggle for autonomy should not be understood as a linear interpretation of the Moro yearning sense of independence, thus we could see from the decades of fighting and still see the new group emerged from the old groups and wage war against the government, such as the BIFF, or the local clan-based Maute group.


Other than the Moro narrative of violent conflict, the violence also came from the opposition group namely the Philippine government, and local Christian population in the South, especially the local mafia *Illaga*. As we all know that within the armed conflict, the disputed parties would exchange both gunshots and the justification for their shooters which, in the case of Moro conflict, some Christians were threatened by the practical emergence of the *Muslim* armed insurgents which demanded for the total separation of the Philippines and their ancestral lands, the lands that now occupied by the Christian migrants, thus they must require a form of insurance that the Christian community would not be annihilated by the fire of war and that is where the suspicion of the Christian started to become local armament even though the some Muslim movement such as the MNLF declared that the organization would focus on the independence of the Mindanao and other southern area while retaining not to touch the religious connotation in the movement, regardless of the disunity of the local

Muslim clans and radical Muslims toward which goal it had to pursue whether the secular Bangsamoro state or the Islamic Bangsamoro state, the difference that narrates the story of Bangsamoro identity.

The Filipino government also helped shaping the Moro conflict through negotiation and the use of suppressive force. For example, the political significance of the use of infiltration operation in Aceh during Marcos administration had influenced head of state to use Muslim recruits, though the military disobedience resulted in a controversial execution of Muslim officers. Another example would be during Arroyo administration that the United States had become another factor in the Moro conflict through the Global War on Terror campaign that *allows* the United States to intervene the conflict suspected for the involvement of terrorism, in the case of the Philippines was the MILF, Abu Sayyaf, and BIFF which were accused for having a network with Al-Qaeda and the ISIS. By being accused for terrorism, the Moro movement would become a subject under an influence of the United States within the peace process through the pro-US government, such as Arroyo administration, which may shift the negotiation agenda to settle the Mindanao insurgency into the suppression of Muslim terrorist organization.

Figure 4.3

The Relationship of Transnationalism in the Philippines from the Spaniard to the Post-Colonial Rule



Technologically supported, the Moro conflict is undeniably utilizing the transnational-linked technology that connects not only people, but also the idea as well. Starting with the Moro nationalistic movement, this kind of ideational motivation did not be borne by itself, but rather the western idea which dominated within the post-colonial occupied territory including the Southern Philippines. The Muslim Mindanao movement, the predecessor organization to the MNLF, was also a result of the nationalistic ideology combined with the self-determination and sense of autonomy which many ethnic minorities eager to fight for its liberation. This abstract ideology had been solidified through armed struggle, with the justified cause of protecting the minority and its identity, the identity which was portrayed as the nation within nation or the nation against foreign invaders that this explanation of Moro identity was heavily portrayed during the struggle of the MNLF that Nur Misuari emphasized the role of colonialism and foreign invaders as a just cause for the existence of the Moro National Liberation Front. Furthermore, as the time flew by, the introduction of global transportation and international scholarship also created an opportunity for Moro leaders to find another meaning for fighting when the ultimate goal was not met through both armed struggle and peace negotiation.

Though, the educational plan in the Middle East countries or other leading countries such as Egypt was not itself the study of how to implement Islam into an armed conflict, but rather the study provide the broader view of the implementation of Islam in a certain aspect which allows the *necessary* use of force when the *threat* was at home front as claimed by many defensive *jihadist* scholars who implemented the use of unconventional warfare to fight against the western power or any *infidel* countries. The use of charitable organization and religious propagation also proved the effective penetration within local Muslim community in Mindanao such as the Khalifa's charities as a cover for Al-Qaeda recruitment in the Philippines or the spreading booklets of Abu Sayyaf to attract young Muslims. In contrast to the radical propagation, for the peace process, the exchange of idea with sympathy and mutual understanding was done through the joint radio debate between Muslim scholar and Christian priest which was another government campaign to extinguish fire of war associating with religious conflict and suspicion between the implementation of Islam and Christianity in the Philippines.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary

As the research shows, the Moro struggle for autonomy had proved my hypothetical framework in which consists of 3 components that participate within the conflict in both the insurgencies and the government shaping and reshaping the conflict to illustrate the importance and how valuable the independence would be. Though, the method of operation is various, but tends to have the structure and linguistic measure that the Moro groups use to receive the public support and the international recognition by stressing the significance of their manifesto, and objectives, as well as applying the definition for those goals to favor the target groups which are different through the groups' criteria. The study shows the legitimate use of violence in which the Moro leaders tend to define violence as an assurance for the groups' existence, while other groups use it as to attract the target group or to pull the foreign support both state and non-state groups. Moreover, the use of religious connotation is evident within the narrative of the conflict whether it is the religious war or not. It has portrayed the implication of the Holy Book to attract and justify the means for independence of the Moro group, regardless of the autonomous result. Also, the representation of the legitimate Moro group mainly possesses the image of faithful follower of their God not only to draw an attention from the Islamic community abroad, but also bring the conflict into the international stage, as we see from the OIC negotiation table during the Tripoli peace deal. More importantly, the strand of transnational movement of the Moro conflict is relevant for discuss due to the fact that many ideational motivation or ideologies of the insurgencies are from other region through transportation and global-wide communication that facilitate the spread of influence of transnational organization as well as the individual mobilization in and out of the Philippines in which can impair the peace process of the conflict and also to persuade the globally-spotlighted transnational group to recognize and enhance the Moro group's reputation. The transnational movement also propagate its hidden ideology through financial and infrastructure development among the Moro communities, particularly penetrating the

Muslim occupied territory, but such penetration also proves an ideational shift of the Moro movement for international orientation superseding the Moro perception of autonomy for global Muslim struggle.

As the research shows, the Moro struggle for autonomy had proved my hypothetical framework which consists of 3 components that participate within the conflict in both the insurgencies and the government shaping and reshaping the conflict to illustrate the importance and how valuable the independence would be. Though, the method of operation is various, but tends to have the structure and linguistic measure that the Moro groups use to receive the public support and the international recognition by stressing the significance of their manifesto, and objectives, as well as applying the definition for those goals to favor the target groups which are different through the groups' criteria. The study shows the legitimate use of violence in which the Moro leaders tend to define violence as an assurance for the groups' existence, while other groups use it as to attract the target group or to pull the foreign support of both state and non-state groups. Moreover, the use of religious connotation is evident within the narrative of the conflict whether it is the religious war or not. It has portrayed the implication of the Holy Book to attract and justify the means for independence of the Moro group, regardless of the autonomous result. Also, the representation of the legitimate Moro group mainly possesses the image of faithful followers of their God not only to draw attention from the Islamic community abroad, but also bring the conflict into the international stage, as we see from the OIC negotiation table during the Tripoli peace deal.

More importantly, the strand of transnational movement of the Moro conflict is relevant for discuss due to the fact that many ideational motivation or ideologies of the insurgencies are from other region through transportation and global-wide communication that facilitate the spread of influence of transnational organization as well as the individual mobilization in and out of the Philippines in which can impair the peace process of the conflict and also to persuade the globally-spotlighted transnational group to recognize and enhance the Moro group's reputation. The transnational movement also propagate its hidden ideology through financial and infrastructure development among the Moro communities, particularly penetrating the Muslim occupied territory, but such penetration also proves an ideational shift of the

Moro movement for international orientation superseding the Moro perception of autonomy for global Muslim struggle.

From the research findings, we see the development of the Moro discourses of the perceived autonomy in which they perceived each different way on how to achieve the Moro independence. Starting from the beginning of the struggle, the MIM and the MNLF started the political movement as the secularist-oriented organization which the latter outlived the former and carried on the independent movement from armed struggle to parliamentary process. The MNLF, as a representing Moro movement, had been received the international recognition from the international Islamic organization as well as the group also participated in the international peace process to settle the revolution against Marcos administration, though the group's manifesto was not achieved as the Bangsamoro Republic became the Muslim autonomous region that, from the Tripoli agreement, did not include all proposed Muslim provinces. Thus, Nur Misuari's goal was mediated and peacefully settled.

Even though one insurgent group ended its violent struggle, another splinter group emerged after the declaration of an autonomous region. The MILF, led by Salamat Hashim, perceived the ARMM agreement not the true form of the Bangsamoro nation, he started from criticizing Nur Misuari for his leaning toward Marxist-secularist ideology, while the MILF stood for Muslim minority and claiming the group as a legitimate Moro movement to liberate the Southern Philippines through Islamist-oriented organization which included the new element of the genuine Moro political struggle, the implication of Islam and Jihad. Like the MNLF era, the MILF political struggle also received the international attention especially from neighboring Muslim countries due to the existing network between the MILF and other transnational Islamist movement.

However, unlike the MNLF, the peace proposal of the Philippine government toward the MILF, especially during Duterte administration, had taken another step from the special region within the unitary state into the federalist development of the ARMM granting the baseline for self-governance for the BARMM region. Though the government attempt to settle this Moro independent movement by federalism, but it required the constitutional reform in which the public support must agree with the changes as well as the risk of the failure to carry the reform that may

drive the peace process back into another armed struggle, especially after the 2016 Marawi incident done by the ISIS-affiliated Muslim armed fighters that the event could postpone the reform and the development of BARMM region.

Being different from those 2 Moro groups, Abu Sayyaf and the BIFF, despite their claims for Moro independent struggle, mainly operated within the international Jihadist network and finally shift the Moro independence into ideal global muslim community with anti-United States and Western ideologies. The method of operation for Abu Sayyaf tended to finance the group through violent means indiscriminately whether the victims were Muslims or not. The group was also accused by its extreme violence as a bandit group or terrorist organization allied with the Al-Qaeda and ISIS group. For the BIFF, it is evident that Umbra Kato led the armed branch of the MILF to struggle in his own way when the peace process neglected his faction. The BIFF started as another splinter Moro armed movement aimed for the Moro Islamic state. Being rejected, the group bent toward the transnational jihadist group and fought for its cause instead due to shared similarity of jihadist political goal over the role of Islam and Jihad. The result is the shifted goal from the Moro Islamic state to the global Jihad against the West, the same as Abu Sayyaf.

Table 5.1

The Comparison between All Selected Moro Movement in the Conflict

Moro political movement	Ideology and motivation	Portray for Moro people	Ultimate goal	Outcomes from the conflict
Moro National Liberation Front	Nationalism	Southern Mindanao regardless of ethnicities or religion	<i>Bangsamoro Republic</i>	Tripoli agreement (1976) → ARMM (1989)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	Islamism	Southern population particularly Moro Muslim	<i>Islamic Bangsamoro state</i>	FAB (2012) → federalist BARMM (2019)
Abu Sayyaf	Islamist extremism	Moro Muslim, foreign fighters, and extremist sympathizer	Moro independence / Islamic State	Remnants of ISIS in Southeast Asia
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	Islamist extremism	Moro Muslim, foreign fighters	Moro independence / Islamic State	Remnants of ISIS in Southeast Asia

5.1.1 Reflection and research answer

Since, there are lots and lots of researches in the Southern Philippine topic specifically the Mindanao conflict where the Philippine government and local insurgencies clashed since the Marcos era, it would be typical if this research follows the other studies over Mindanao, but the method of understanding the conflict of this research is different, because the conflict itself is not generated from the violence against the Moro minority alone, or the expanding Christianity in Mindanao only, but the Moro conflict since the emergence of the MNLF is shaped by the historical and foreign atrocities which violence, the perceived significance of the role of Islam, and the support from other region all define how do the Moro political struggle ought to be and also redefine the new meaning of independent struggle against the Philippine authority. Moreover, since the conflict is not linear, the understanding of the narrative is important and requires all 3 elements of violence, Jihadism, and transnational movement to see the overall picture of the Moro conflict. Thus, the knowledge from this study can contribute as another way of understanding the very dynamic ethnic conflict that rather than focusing on the violent nature of the conflict which continues the use of force between the conflictual parties, there should be other elements that shape the conflict. From the findings, we can see the dynamics of the Moro conflict in which the sole understanding of independent struggle was to pursue the sole objective of national liberation, as the research says, even if the goal is simple and straightforward, the way to achieve or the meaning of being independent is diverse. Thus, this research attempts to investigate the definition of how to attain Moro autonomy and the evolution of the word autonomy or independence claimed by many representing movements. If the Moro conflict is from the atrocities of the Marcos regime, a single peace agreement should be enough to settle the insurgency, which is not due to the element of perceived threat of Christianity that a Moro Muslim cannot trust a Christian, a religion from the Spaniard colonizers. Though if we consider the violent and religious implication to investigate the Moro movement, it is not enough because the influence from international actors also define what Moro stands for. For example, the role of OIC redefines the MNLF agenda from the Moro republic into the acceptable ARMM autonomous region, or the role of Al-Qaeda and ISIS that influence Abu Sayyaf and BIFF to include the ideal Islamic community and change the groups'

agenda from Moro independence into global Jihad against the West. Also, within this study, we can see the different nature of each selected Moro movement due to its ideologies, target groups, and foreign supporters such as the nationalist-secularist nature of Nur Misuari and Islamist nature of Salamat Hashim. As other authors claim, the Moro resistance is united and solely goes against the Philippine government to establish the Moro independent state which some researchers counter-argue through the different ideologies and ethnicities within each Moro group. Though, the linkage between the different ideologies, agendas, and foreign influence of each Moro groups is still not clarified in which this research tries to connect these dots to see that the Moro conflict itself is the sum-up of violent narrative of the conflict parties that in some groups also imply the role of religion to further their agenda as well as to gain recognition or support from foreign actors.

Though, this research does not include the depth of international participation within the conflict as well as the divergence of Moro ethnicities in each different Moro populated region in Southern Philippines, but if these 2 components are observed, it would take a long effort as well as efficient fund in which, during the time of this research, the global pandemic strikes in and burdens the research method that I have to limit the core principles of the research as well as to include as much information as possible.

Nonetheless, the answers for my research are that the discourse of Bangsamoro varies through each individual group and creates different governmental responses, though the core ideas i.e. self-determination, colonialism, or cultural assimilation are shared among all groups, but the political ideology and religious implications are different between the MNLF-MILF and ASG-BIFF. The use of three components also explains the need for the Moro movement to draw local support and legitimacy. The changing agenda or trends among the Moro movement happen when the outcomes and the perceived goals are not met and when the Moro organization The Marawi incident is a result of transnational mobilization, and creates the possibility of the evolution of Moro struggle into the global context of anti-Western hegemony. 'Transnational terrorist' versus 'Domestic insurgency' become a debate for the Moro context of struggle due to the involvement of transnational jihadist movement.

Now, if we try to apply the 3 component analysis into other Muslim insurgency like the Southern Thailand conflict, since the violence, role of religious implication, and transnational movement may be founded within the Southern Thailand, the conflict of identity of the Moro and Malay Muslim fight against the national state which both group become alienated minority population during the nation-building of the Philippines and Thailand as well as both group had witnessed the state violence that, in return, motivates the minority to rebel more.

One thing that should be noted is the elements of the conflict in Mindanao can be mediated into the peace process, even the power transition occurs, thus, within Southern Thailand, the consistency of government willingness for the peace process is required to soften the hardline agenda of the insurgency. The decentralization of state administration happens in the Duterte government which enhance the autonomous government of the BARMM region to cool down the heat of ethnic conflict as well as prevent Moro hardliners from joining other transnational jihadist movement, though, within Southern Thailand, we may not see the state's attempt to decentralize administrative power to allow the minority share the sovereignty in a form of constitutional reform, regardless of the outcome from Duterte federalist agenda.

5.2 For Future Research

Due to the lack of substantial information over the transnational movement in the conflict, there should be recommendation for further analysis over each individual international actor such as Muslim neighboring countries, Islamic international network, and the influence of transnational Islamist movement. Furthermore, the statistical data over the armed confrontation during the conflict is recommended to strengthen the commitment for the use of armament on both conflicting parties, thus it supports the argument of the use of violent struggle and also it may help solidifying the armed trade and smuggling outside the Philippines which may come from different sources and, thus may influence or implant foreign ideologies of the Moro movement. More importantly, the analysis over the BIFF in the future is

crucial, since this Moro movement is newly born which there are less available document because of the size of the group and how it participates in the conflict.



REFERENCES

- Abinales, P. N. (n.d.). *Moro Societies in the Philippines before and after the 2017 Marawi Crisis*.
- Abuza, Z. (2003). Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 25(2), 169-199. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798639>
- Alipala, J. (2005, April 5). Peace Advisor ignores warning of US on MILF. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, p. 17. Retrieved May 6, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2479&dat=20050405&id=BFg1AAAIIBAJ&sjid=iCUMAAAAIIBAJ&pg=692,34136283>
- Alipala, J. S. (2002, October 4). AFP, PNP chiefs: Abu Sayyaf did it. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, p. 1. Retrieved May 5, 2002, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=83UE6yvegO4C&dat=20021004&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>
- Asani, A. (1985). The Bangsamoro people: a nation in travail. *Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. Journal*, 6(2), 295-314. doi:10.1080/13602008508715944
- Banlaoi, R. C. (2009). "Radical Muslim Terrorism" in the Philippines. In R. C. Banlaoi, *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World* (pp. 45-68). Boca Baton: Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
- Banlaoi, R. C. (2009). Transnational Islam in the Philippines. In F. A. Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics* (pp. 167-188). Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research.
- Banlaoi, R. C. (2009a). In R. C. Banlaoi, *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World* (pp. 45-68). Boca Baton: Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
- Banlaoi, R. C. (2014). Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed Movements in the Southern Philippines: Threats to Philippine National Security. *The Study of National Security at Fifty: Re-awakenings*, 163-181. Retrieved June 15, 2021

- Boquet, Y. (2017). Towards a Bangsamoro in Mindanao? In Y. Boquet, *The Philippine Archipelago* (pp. 661-701). Dijon: Springer International Publishing.
- Burgos, R. G. (1994, June 8). MNLF joins war against Abu Sayyaf. *Manila Standard*, pp. 1,3. Retrieved May 6, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=8cBNEdFwSQkC&dat=19940608&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>
- Campbell, D., & Bleiker, R. (2013). Poststructuralism. In M. K. Tim Dunne, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (pp. 223-243). Oxford University Press. Retrieved December 20, 2020
- Castro, R. C. (2014). The Influence of Transnational Jihadist Ideology on Islamic Extremist Groups in the Philippines: The Cases of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Rajah Solaiman Movement. In S. Helfstein, *The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia* (p. 54). New York.
- Celso, A. (2014). Dabiq: IS's Apocalyptic 21st Century Jihadist Manifesto. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 2(4), 1-4. doi:10.4172/2332-0761.1000e111
- Craig A. Evans, J. J. (2015). *Jesus and the Jihadis: Confronting the Rage of ISIS: The Theology Driving the Ideology*. Shippensburg: DESTINY IMAGE.
- Crescent International. (1999, March 16-31). *Bangsamoro Muslims' determination to establish an Islamic State*. (Muslimedia, Ed.) Retrieved April 30, 2021, from amalnet.tripod.com: <https://amalnet.tripod.com/NotYet/Interview%20with%20MILF's%20Salamat%20Hashim.htm>
- David Campbell, R. B. (2013). Poststructuralism. In M. K. Tim Dunne, *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity* (pp. 223-243). Oxford University Press. Retrieved December 20, 2020
- Diaz, G. T. (2000, June 20). A victory for the people. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, p. 11. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2479&dat=20000620&id=0IU1AAAIIBAJ&sjid=aiUMAAAIBAJ&pg=544,24741604>

- Eaton, W. D. (Ed.). (1911, December 16). Americans slain by Moros. Natives killed in progress of Campaign for suppression of Organized Brigandage in Mindanao. *Clinton Mirror*, p. 4. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2281&dat=19111216&id=48MnAAAIIBAJ&sjid=5QQGAAAAIIBAJ&pg=4922,6683856>
- Edwin Enriquez Amadar, R. W. (2018). *The emergence of ISIS in the Philippines*. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.
- Erik Melander, T. P. (2016). Organized violence, 1989–2015. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(5), 727–742. doi:10.1177/0022343316663032
- Fernandez, E. O. (2000, November 4). New clashes' toll: 10 MILF men, 3 soldiers. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, p. 12. Retrieved May 5, 2021
- Firestone, R. (2012). "Jihadism" as a new religious movement. In M. R. Olav Hammer, *The Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements* (pp. 263–285). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CCOL9780521196505.018
- Gomez, J. (2003, March 6). Philippines rules out U.S. troops. *Ocala Star-Banner*, p. 8. Retrieved May 6, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=20030306&id=HtUpAAAIIBAJ&sjid=EAKAAAAIIBAJ&pg=6806,3433966>
- Gowing, P. G. (1977, December). OF DIFFERENT MINDS: Muslim and Christian Perceptions of the Mindanao Problem. *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society*, 5(4), 243–252. Retrieved March 17, 2016, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29791565>
- Gunaratna, R. (2017). The Siege of Marawi: A Game Changer in Terrorism in Asia. *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, 9(7), 4–8.
- Hashim, S. (1998, April-May). The Moro Jihad Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines. (A. Zahir, Interviewer) Nida'ul Islam. Retrieved June 15, 2021, from Federation of American Studies Web site: <https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ph1.htm>
- Hegghammer, T. (2010). The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters Islam and the Globalization of Jihad. *International Security*, 35(3), 53–94.

- Helfstein, S. (2009). The Landscape of Jihadism in Southeast Asia. In S. Helfstein, *The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia* (p. 4). New York.
- Herdi Sahrasad, Y. S. (2019). Osama and The Entry of Al Qaeda to Southeast Asia in Historical Perspective: A Preliminary Note. *Budapest International Research and Critics Institute-Journal*, 2(2), 7-21.
- Horstmann, A. (2009). Transnational Ideologies and Actors at the Level of Society in South and Southeast Asia. In F. A. Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics* (pp. 45-52). the national bureau of asian research.
- International Crisis Group. (2016). *The Philippines: Renewing Prospects for Peace in Mindanao*. Brussels. Retrieved June 10, 2021
- Interview with Nur Misuari, Chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front. (1978). *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 8(2), 297-299.
doi:10.1080/00472337885390221
- Jewell, W. S. (1903, April 25). A Story By Chaffee: Throws light on character of the Moro of Mindanao-are willing to fight for us-if given a chance to kill off old enemies. *The Telegraph*, p. 2. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2209&dat=19030425&id=hgpAAAABIAJ&sjid=IKQMAAAAIBAJ&pg=999,266960>
- Julie Alipala-Inot, C. P. (2000, April 18). Now, Abu Sayyaf threatens to kill, kidnap Americans. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, p. 1. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=83UE6yvegO4C&dat=20000418&printsec=frontpage&hl=en>
- Kato, A. U. (2011, February 16). Philippine rebel vows to fight. *Al-Jazeera Executive*. (Al-Jazeera, Interviewer) Al-Jazeera English. Retrieved April 29, 2021, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEDJuecCL34>
- Khalid, A. (2007, Sep 17). Abu Sayyaf fighters speak out. (M. Ortigas, Interviewer) Al Jazeera English. Retrieved April 25, 2021, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wToFtiJnji0&t=94s>

- Liow, J. C. (2016). Southern Philippines: Reframing Moro Nationalism from (Bangsa) Moro to Bangsamoro. In *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, 62-98. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316711811.005
- Liow, J. C. (2016). Southern Philippines: Reframing Moro Nationalism from (Bangsa) Moro to Bangsamoro. In J. C. Liow, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (pp. 66-98). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Logan, M., Zimmerman, L., Parker, B., & Ligon, G. (2020). Terrorism in the Philippines and Its Influence on Great Powers. 1-11.
- Macabalang, J. D. (1994, December 15). Cotabato firefight erupts anew. *Manila Standard*, p. 3. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1370&dat=19941215&id=pa8mAAAIIBAJ&sjid=PgsEAAAIAIAJ&pg=4759,2417055>
- Maher, S. (2016). *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea*. New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved June 10, 2021
- Mandaville, P. (2001). *Transnational Muslim Politics; Reimagining the umma*. Routledge.
- Mandaville, P. (2009). Transnational Islam in Asia: Background, Typology and Conceptual Overview . In F. A. Peter Mandaville, *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia Movements, Networks, and Conflict Dynamics* (pp. 2-20). Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research.
- Mansoor, S. A. (2019, April 14). Philippines army and Muslim rebels join forces against ISIS. (H. C. Sandra Petersmann, Interviewer) DW News. Retrieved April 29, 2021, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j-BAuTCPTMg&t=139s>
- Maqbool, S. A. (2009). *Islamization of thought and society; A critique of Sayyid Qutub*. PhD Thesis, Aligarh Muslim University, Department of Islamic Studies, Aligarh. Retrieved June 20, 2021, from <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144524636.pdf#page=162>
- Maragay, F. V. (1996, October 22). Exploratory gov't-MILF talks very urgent, says Palace exec. *Manila Standard*, p. 4. Retrieved May 3, 2021, from <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1370&dat=19961022&id=FGYVAAAIAIAJ&sjid=zQoEAAAIAIAJ&pg=2430,3503377>

- Michael K. Logan, L. Z. (2020). Terrorism in the Philippines and Its Influence on Great Powers. 1-11.
- Misuari, N. (2013, May 18). Talk to Al Jazeera - Nur Misuari: 'We had to fight for it'. (V. Pedrosa, Interviewer)
- Misuari, N. (2016, May 11). Fighting for Peace in the Philippines: VICE News Interviews Nur Misuari. (V. News, Interviewer)
- Molloy, I. (1988). The decline of the Moro national liberation front in the Southern Philippines. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 18(1), 59-76.
doi:10.1080/00472338880000051
- Murad, A. H. (2012, October 15). *Speech of the Chairman of the MILF during the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, October 15, 2012*. Retrieved April 29, 2021, from Official Gazette Web site:
<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2012/10/15/speech-of-the-chairman-of-the-milf-during-the-signing-of-the-framework-agreement-on-the-bangsamoro-october-15-2012/>
- Mustafa Selçuk, N. P. (2020). Impact of Isis on Radical Groups of Southeast Asia Countries. *Islamic World and Politics*, 4, 1-14.
- Nida'ul Islam. (1998, April-May). *MILF Leader to "Nida'ul Islam"*. Retrieved April 24, 2021, from Federation of American Scientists Web site:
<https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ph2.htm>
- PDI Mindanao Bureau, Martin Marfil. (2003, February 14). Fighting Escalates, 137 Moros rebs slain. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, pp. 1,21. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from
<https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2479&dat=20030214&id=N1U1AAAIIBAJ&sjid=fCUMAAAAIIBAJ&pg=449,6469115>
- Polk, W. R. (2018). The Moro "Rebellion" in the Philippines. In W. R. Polk, *Crusade and Jihad The Thousand-Year War Between The Muslim World and The Global North* (pp. 469-480). London: Yale University Press.
- Pratt, S. (2010, December 21). *What is the difference between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism?* Retrieved from E-International Relations: <https://www.e-ir.info/2010/12/21/what-is-the-difference-between-counter-insurgency-and-counter->

terrorism/#:~:text=The%20difference%20between%20counter%2Dterrorism,o
ut%20by%20minority%20groups%2C%20both

- Quilala, D. (2018). Narratives and Counter-narratives: Responding to Political Violence in the Philippines. *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 285-296. Retrieved June 4, 2020, from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26492782>
- Quilala, D. F. (2007). The GRP-MILF Peace Process After September 11 and the Involvement of the United States. *Philippine Political Science Journal*, 28(51), 85-108. doi:10.1080/01154451.2007.9723503
- Ramos, F. V. (1996, September 6). *Speech of President Ramos at the signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front*. Retrieved April 23, 2021, from www.officialgazette.gov.ph:
<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1996/09/02/speech-of-president-ramos-at-the-signing-of-the-final-peace-agreement-between-the-government-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-moro-national-liberation-front/>
- Ressa, M. (2016, April 27). Who are terror group Abu Sayyaf? *CBC News: The National*. (A. Arsenault, Interviewer) CBC News. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yHurmehUXU>
- Sabaya, A. (2001, June 1). Abu Sabaya interview transcript. (R. M. Network, Interviewer) CNN. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/06/01/philippines.transcript.sabaya/index.html>
- Schuck, C. (2020). How Islamist is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)? An ideological assessment. *Asian Security*. doi:10.1080/14799855.2020.1742700
- Smith, P. J. (2002). Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities. *Parameters*, 32(2), 33-46.
- Subandi. (2020, July 18). Terrorist Pirates of Southeast Asia. (A. Renaldi, Interviewer) VICE. Retrieved May 1, 2021, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgYH3X7JY28&t=131s>
- Toledo Weekly Blade. (1903, April 26). Bacolod Taken. Moro stronghold captured by American under Capt. Pershing. *Toledo Weekly Blade*, p. 7. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from

[https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1350&dat=19030416&id=7OISAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=iP4DAAAIBAJ&pg=2605,2305978](https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1350&dat=19030416&id=7OISAA
AAIBAJ&sjid=iP4DAAAIBAJ&pg=2605,2305978)

Vincent Cabreza, J. R. (2002, December 15). Not with MILF. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, p. 7. Retrieved May 5, 2021, from


[https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2479&dat=20021215&id=B1k1AA
AAIBAJ&sjid=iyUMAAAIBAJ&pg=476,35416205](https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2479&dat=20021215&id=B1k1AA
AAIBAJ&sjid=iyUMAAAIBAJ&pg=476,35416205)

Zahid, F. (2014). The Expanding World of ISIS: Affiliates and Associates. 2-13.

Zahir, S. A. (1998, April-May). *The Moro Jihad continuous struggle for Islamic independence in Southern Philippines*. Federation of American Studies.
<https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ph1.htm>



APPENDICES



APPENDIX A

**Interview with Nur Misuari, Chairman of the Moro National
Liberation Front (1978)**

Question: Can you tell our readers, what factors led to the breakdown of the truce agreement?

Misuari: There are various factors that led to the resumption of the war. The most important ones: Firstly, the negation of the Tripoli Agreement by the martial law regime of President Marcos, through its treacherous activities like the sabotage of the February-March negotiation, the April Manila negotiation, and the holding of illicit referendum, I called it illicit because it is not part of the agreement. Secondly, series of violations committed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its terrorists front, masquerading as civilian home front militia, and outright bandit groups, which took place in the course of the implementation of ceasefire to early October. The most important of this is the launching of search and destroyed campaigns by Admiral Romulo Espaldon, Chief of the Southern Command. The attacks against our forces and people in South Cotabato and Lanao del Sur, which led to the killing of scores of our freedom fighters and civilians, the burning of their houses, and their sacred places, as well as their plantations. Several thousands of our civilians were forcibly thrown out of their homes and villages. Other factors include the unlawful arrest of one of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ceasefire mission, Fiscal Abdul-Asia Al-Matondo, Jr. of the city of Davao, during the implementation of the ceasefire on charges of subversion. The declaration of President Marcos, in violation of the Tripoli Agreement branding Moslem and non-Moslem who support and sympathize with MNLF ceasefire commissions. The provocative statement of Adm. Espaldon, telling MNLF to surrender or they will face death. Secretary of Defense, Enrile, during the 1st of May celebration at the South Command in Zamboanga City announced that if blood is necessary to protect the dignity of the country, then let blood flow. And he added by declaring that if anybody wants to test the capacity of the Armed Forces, let them test it. The forced withdrawal of our ceasefire mission in Palawan, and the massacre of families of those identified with our ceasefire missions in Palawan. The success of the Philippine

Government in exploiting the ceasefire by bringing troops and military supplies, obtaining first hand information about our forces and strength, the occupation of strategic areas by their forces by exploiting the free movement provided for by the Tripoli Agreement. There were external factors as well. The expectation of the Philippine Government and AFP to get military supplies from the United States, following the negotiation with Kissinger earlier. The promise by the Japanese Government to give them economic assistance. Another factor is Marcos success in getting certain ASEAN regimes against the MNLF. Following the Summit Conference in Asean last August, Marcos declared to Manila that Indonesia and Malaysia have agreed on a joint patrol border agreement around and within our people's territorial water, ostensibly against smugglers, drug trafficking and bandits. In reality, this aimed at strangulation of MNLF and our people by limiting their movement within their area. Plus, the success of AFP Chief of Staff, General Espino in acquiring military supplies, particularly military aircrafts from Israel, after his official visit in February 1977.

Your original demand was. for a Moro Republic, while at the conclusion of the Tripoli Agreement, you reduced it to autonomy. Why did you settle for less?

It was in agreement with the resolution of the Islamic Conference in May 1974, calling for a just, peaceful, political solution within the framework of the Philippine Republic and sovereignty. In deference to this, the MNLF toned down its political and territorial demands. Before we asked for the whole Moslem land, but to end the war, we reduced our demand.

Now that the Tripoli Agreement is no longer working, will you still ask for autonomy?

In view of the violation of the Tripoli Agreement, and the resumption of the genocidal war in the Philippines, and consequently the impossibility of arriving at a peaceful solution to the problem, the MNLF and the people are now decided to return to our original intention of seeking national independence and freedom for the whole Moslem national homeland of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Palaway, as a reflection of our realization that indeed such is the only solution in bringing about the liquidation of Pilipino colonialism in southern Philippines, and insured the restoration of freedom and sovereignty of our people. Our people are a nation of their own, with 500 years of

Islamic civilization. And they have fought a long anticolonial war throughout our history.

Abroad, the Moro rebellion is posed as a religious war? Is this so?

The revolutionary struggle in southern Philippines is basically a political struggle, primarily intended to bring about political, economic, social and cultural emancipation of our people from the strangle-hold of Philippine colonialism. Beside, this is intended to defeat the genocidal campaign of the Philippine Government against our people. The Bansang Moro revolution is designed to protect the sovereignty and integrity of our Islamic and indigenous culture and civilization, which is threatened by the cultural genocide being carried out by the Philippine Government in the guise of cultural integration. Economically, as a colonized people, our homeland is considered as the richest part of the Philippines. And in the course of this colonial domination, our land has been unlawfully usurped by the Philippine Government and carpetbaggers, as well as the Philippine colonial settlers who were being used as an instrument for the perpetration of colonial hegemony in southern Philippines.

What kind of economic system are you envisioning for Bansang Moro?

The economic system which we are now gradually implementing is one which is consistent with all genuine revolution throughout the world, characterized by a just distribution of wealth and design to combat all forms of human exploitation in whatever guise. This system is influenced largely by our historical, philosophical and cultural outlook. At the same time it is influenced by progressive ideological outlook in the world today. What is your attitude toward foreign investment? The foreign investors will have room within the context of our revolution. But we shall see to it that it is both beneficial to both the investors and our people. We believe, the wealth of our people belongs to our people, including the peaceful Christian settlers who will cooperate with us.

What is the strongest asset of your movement?

The universal consciousness of our people that we are fighting for a just cause. We are fighting an exploitative and oppressive colonial system which is not dissimilar in many parts of the world. The revolutionary struggle following the experiences of the peoples of the world is the only way to end this colonial situation and ensure the freedom of our people. Your principal limitation? Our lack of support at

the moment from the revolutionary world, economically, politically and morally. But we shall not lose hope because we believe henceforth we shall be making fruitful relations with them.

Do you have any estimate of casualties for both sides?

According to the estimate of our 9 provincial commands, we have inflicted 30,000 casualties against the regular armed forces and 10,000 to paramilitary units. Against these figures, about 55,000 Moslem civilians and 3,000 of our troops have been killed. There is no way of knowing the Christian civilian casualties. There are many Christians caught in the cross-fire. About 200,000 Moslem homes have been burned and 539 mosques destroyed. There are at present 92,000 Moslem refugees in Sabah. Is there any possibility of another round of negotiation? The possibility is very dim. Specially now, when Marcos has declared that the Islamic Conference has no more room for this avenue. The violation of the ceasefire was protested by the Islamic Conference. Marcos has declared that the war is an internal problem. Marcos has closed the door for peaceful settlement. We believe, only if the Philippine Government will decide to stop its genocidal war, and the flame coming out from the barrel of their guns will our people stop fighting. As long as they continue the war, we will never stop until final victory and freedom shall be achieved. Marcos is using the Moslem problem in the south, as a means to perpetuate himself and his martial law regime in power. He confessed openly that there will be no lifting of the martial law unless and until the Moslem problem in the south is solved, arguing that it is not possible to compartmentalize the country by lifting martial law in one part and continuing in another part. Many of the generals and cahoots of Marcos have enriched themselves through the use of power and they want to maintain themselves in power by continuing the war in southern Philippines, thus to justify and insure the continuity of their power and the use of their power to further enrich themselves.

APPENDIX B

Speech of President Ramos at the signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (Ramos, 1996)

Break not the peace: 'We are all victors'

TODAY we not only witness history: we make it. Today, with the formal signing of this Final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front, we bring to a close 25 years of conflict, at the cost of more than 120,000 Filipino lives.

Today we launch a new era of peace and development for Southern Philippines, and for the Philippines as a whole.

On behalf of all our people and the Philippine Government, let me convey my highest commendations to the members of the negotiating panels, Chairman Manuel Yan of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Chairman Nur Misuari of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

Forging the peace first

Here in our own land, this agreement falls squarely into our aspiration of total peace and development for all, especially the millions of poor and destitute masses in our southern regions. That we have made Mindanao the focus of our concerns fittingly demonstrates its vital role in the overall enterprise of nation building. We must forge the peace first in Mindanao because it has suffered the most and harbors many of the most depressed communities in the land.

The cycle of poverty and conflict must finally be broken, and this peace agreement is the cutting edge of our determined efforts. And it is bound to succeed not merely by force of the noble intentions of its participants, but because it rides the crest of mankind's universal aspirations.

We could never have contemplated these dreams, however, if we did not have good allies in our quest. Here and now, we are proud to have with us one of the best teams of peacemakers in the world.

I speak of the distinguished Indonesian delegation led by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, a master of principled negotiation and the key troubleshooter of the Cambodian peace settlement—a man of eloquence, profound intellect and a deep sense of humanity. I remember very well that it was in Cipanas, Indonesia, in April 1993, where he proposed the first step in the Mindanao peace process—the signing of an interim cease-fire agreement—that came into fruition in November of that year.

Negotiators and troubleshooters

Our people are grateful, indeed, to the Indonesian Government and President Soeharto, who placed his most qualified and experienced officials at the presiding end of the negotiating table.

We have here with us Ambassador Wiryono, the presiding officer of the plenary sessions, also a veteran of the Cambodian peace talks, former Indonesian ambassador to France, and now to Australia; Dr. Nur Hassan Wirayuda, an unassuming man of commitment and persistence—the presiding officer of the mixed committee; Ambassadors Pieter Damanik and Abu Hartono, former and present Ambassadors of Indonesia to the Philippines, respectively—who performed the crucial role of principal coordinators of the committee meetings in the Philippines; Brigadier Generals Asmardi Arbi and Kivlan Zen, former and present heads of the cease-fire observer and monitoring team, respectively—who traversed Mindanao to help resolve critical problems attendant on the implementation of the interim cease-fire agreement; and all the other officials of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—the chairmen of the support committees, the secretariat staffs and scores of others who quietly worked to ensure the smooth forward movement of the entire process.

The Filipino people also convey their gratitude to the Libyan Jamahiriyah under the leader of the first of September Revolution, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, his Foreign Secretary, Al Mountaser, who promoted the progress of our joint efforts, joined by other stalwarts of the Jamahiriyah such as Undersecretary Ahman bin Khayyal, presiding officer of the first exploratory talks held in Tripoli in October 1992; Undersecretary for Asian Affairs Salim Amer; and the indefatigable and most dedicated secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau in the Philippines, Ambassador Rajab Azzarouq, who played a lead role not only in facilitating the peace talks, but also in

essential humanitarian endeavors related to hostage negotiations in the wake of past terrorist kidnappings in Mindanao.

Shepherds of peace

We thank the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) under Secretary-General Dr. Hamid Algabid, who also consistently placed its best and most dedicated officials to help the negotiations, starting from the constructive participation of Deputy Secretary-General Ibrahim Saleh Bakr in Cipanas; and his successor, Ambassador Mohammad Mohsin, who brought practical good sense to many aspects of the peace talks, together with his assistant, Ambassador Ali Zwawi.

And there are many more who deserve our accolade, especially those who inspired and gave impetus to our efforts. I speak of King Fahd of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who holds our nation and people in great esteem, the national leaders of Senegal, Bangladesh and Somalia, and their respective Foreign Ministers—all represented here under the collective banner of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six—who have been supportive of our peace process all the way.

All these leaders, workers and shepherds of peace have made immeasurable contributions toward shaping this agreement, which is a monument to national solidarity and international friendship. We are all humbled by their devotion to our common cause of peace and, most of all, by their affection for our country and the Filipino people.

The Malabang encounter

I have the highest regard for the statesmanship and moderation with which Chairman Misuari has conducted his end of our discussions throughout this process. Just two weeks ago, Brother Nur and I met in the town of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. It had been some 10 years since we two last met in Jolo, Sulu—in September 1986, during his meeting with former President Corazon C. Aquino, who must be credited with forging the first Mindanao-wide cease-fire with the MNLF.

Those 10 years—and what we have done since then to gain each other's trust and move peace ahead—have made all the difference. Our people in the South and all over our Republic can now rejoice and embrace one another as brothers and sisters of one family. There has been no moment more joyful and more auspicious in our recent history—not since we overthrew the dictatorship at EDSA 10 years ago. Today we are

all victors once again. We stand triumphant over war and violence—over fear and mistrust—over disunity and despair.

It is most fitting that this agreement is signed 14 days after that encounter at Malabang, and just two days after it was announced that the gross national product of our country posted its highest rate of economic growth since 1990. Political stability and economic growth are mutually reinforcing elements. And as we begin the journey to permanent stability in Southern Philippines, I assure you that we can now strive for higher economic growth never heretofore imagined or anticipated by our own economic planners.

Mindanao lies at the heart of the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area, one of the most vibrant transnational growth areas in the world today. And as we fit the scenario of total peace and development into the coming era of free trade in the 21st century—we shall have acquired an economic momentum not merely rising to the challenge of sustainable development, but also injecting the vigor of ASEAN into the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Today we reclaim for ourselves and for one another—as well as for all those who will come after us—the blessings and the bounties of enduring peace, social justice and people empowerment, which this agreement promises.

Necessarily, to reach this accord, both sides had to accept the spirit of give-and-take. Without such accommodation—as we know well from any and all negotiations to end protracted conflict—no end to strife is possible.

Making peace work

Along the way, we in Government recognized the necessity of harmonizing the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement— which the MNLF viewed as basic to a settlement—within the mandates of the Philippine Constitution and existing laws.

The MNLF for its part recognized the necessity of democratic consultation within the affected communities as essential to a doable formula for peace and development.

It has taken us some time—47 months of sustained and sometimes contentious negotiations—and great effort on all sides to come to this agreement. Now we must match the due diligence and the intensity of purpose with which the two panels, assisted by the OIC, crafted these terms with an even greater—and no less sincere—

commitment to making peace work. While we may have stilled the guns of war, the more complex and arduous tasks of peace and development have just begun.

At this juncture, I pay special tribute to our Government panel, under the leadership of Chairman Manuel Yan, for a job well done. It is not too well known that Chairman Yan—former four-star General and Chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, our Ambassador to various countries, and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs—is the one and only remaining veteran of World War II still in the active service of the Philippine Government—a record of public service that spans 60 years.

Sharing a common vision

His able coworkers include Congressman Eduardo Ermita (Vice Chairman), and members: Vice Governor Nabil Tan of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), former Senator Santanina Rasul, Professor Rudy Rodil, and the late former Maguindanao governor Sandiale Sambolawan, plus advisers Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, Senator Orlando Mercado and Congressman Nur Jaafar, Congresswoman Belma Cabilao, Congressman Antonio Dequina and House Deputy Speaker Simeon Datumanong, who drafted the original working papers for the ZOPAD/SPCDP with Secretary Alexander Aguirre.

The root causes of the problems that led to these decades of conflict in Mindanao will not go away with this agreement. Left unattended, they can worsen and undo much of the confidence and optimism created by the goodwill between us.

By this agreement, however, we have resolved to deal decisively with those problems—to do battle against poverty and injustice—together, as one people and one national team.

We have come to share this common vision because we have come to see and to accept—with pride and with affection—our common lot as Filipinos. It is not only the great island of Mindanao that all Filipinos share, but the entire Republic and our people's future. Whether we are Christian, Muslim or indigenous peoples, we face the same challenges and opportunities in the new century of growth. Our collective responsibility now is to ensure that we can enter the 21st century together, vigorously—on the same footing—with stronger capabilities to make the best of our potentials—and to compete successfully with the rest of the world.

Development cannot be an exclusionary process. If the nation is to progress, it must do so as a whole—and to do so as a whole, it must think and act as a whole, as Filipinos, and not just as Christians or Muslims or individuals of other backgrounds or beliefs.

We have fought hard for peace in Mindanao—for genuine and lasting unity among all our people—so that we can devote our energies to our most cherished goals, employing our most positive qualities. There is too much at stake in the Filipino future for us to impair our chances with continued partisan conflict and discord.

The welfare of the native land

The opportunities for greater trade and commerce with our neighbors in Asia, the Middle East and Africa are as rich and exciting as ever, and the rising expectations of all Mindanaoans for a better quality of life demand an immediate and concerted response.

All over Mindanao, one senses a tremendous reserve of vigor and talent waiting for an opportune moment to be unleashed. That moment has come—and the growth this peace should generate will become its own assurance that never again must Filipinos be so desperate as to take up arms against one another.

This agreement brings us closer to realizing the true national community that our heroes dreamed, and fought and died for: Jose Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar, Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto, Graciano Lopez-Jaena, Emilio Aguinaldo, Apolinario Mabini and Ninoy Aquino, and a host of others who now are part of our revolutionary heritage.

More than a hundred years ago, Rizal himself enunciated the principle by which this day's commitments can be best described: "Let this be our only motto," Rizal wrote his friend Mariano Ponce, *"For the Welfare of the Native Land,"*

We must have faith in one another, in our capacity to do good, to build, to help. Again I must draw on the wisdom of another hero, Ninoy Aquino, who wrote—in that speech he would have delivered at the airport upon his return on August 21, 1983: *"Must we relive the agonies and the blood-letting of the past that brought forth our Republic, or can we sit down as brothers and sisters and discuss our differences with reason and good will?"*

In *Mi Ultimo Adios* Rizal enjoined our people, thus: “When my death is forgotten, my grave unmarked, let the plow turn the earth where I lie. May my dust make fertile the fields. Where the grass grows thickly, there I dwell.

“When night comes and my grave in darkness lies, break not the peace, kneel before the mystery. If you hear the sound of music, be not afraid. It is I.”

As we approach the celebration in 1998 of the centennial of our nation’s independence, we can offer no greater gift to our heroes and to our people than this gift of peace and unity.

The nation of our dreams

This is what the Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development stand for—an opportunity for all of us to work together, to prove our commitment to the greater community of the nation.

Indeed, while the Council has drawn the most attention and controversy, I believe that the far more important decision we have taken is to create a zone of peace and development from out of our 14 southern provinces and the 9 cities therein, with a precious undisturbed period of two or two and a half years for rebuilding.

If the zone succeeds, then our entire country will move up—and without leaving any region, any province, any social group behind. Even more important, by creating ZOPAD, by binding the 14 southern provinces together in ties of economic interdependence and mutual benefit, we will enable diverse Southern peoples—Muslims, Christians and indigenous peoples alike—to forge for themselves one community, which shall then become fully integrated into the larger zone of peace and development we want the Filipino nation to become.

Today we have all come closer to becoming that nation of our dreams. By our resilience and political will, we have proved ourselves worthy of our nationhood. And again I thank all those who made possible this historic opportunity for us to come together and to work in unity as brother and sister Filipinos.

APPENDIX C

MILF Leader to "Nida'ul Islam": "Perhaps the Moro struggle for freedom and self-determination is the longest and bloodiest in the entire history of mankind" (Nida'ul Islam, 1998)

What is the Sheikh's organisational role in the MILF?

Name: Salamat Hashim.

Amir of the Bangsamoro Mujahideen and Chairman of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Would you please give us a brief outline of the Moro Islamic Front?

Brief Account on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF):

a) Background:

The MILF is the vanguard of the Islamic movement in the Bangsamoro homeland in Mindanao and the neighbouring islands.

Its emergence is the crystallisation of the widespread animosity and deep-rooted displeasure of the Bangsamoro people vis-a-vis the illegal and immoral usurpation of their freedom and self-determination.

The Bangsamoro territory, which is the ancestral homeland of the Bangsamoro Muslims, was illegally and immorally annexed when the United States of America granted the Philippines independence in July 4, 1946.

The MILF is the realisation of the ideas, efforts and sacrifices of Bangsamoro students in the Middle East who banded together and clandestinely organised themselves in 1962. Those students were kindled and unified by the common feelings concerning the usurpation of their legitimate and inalienable rights to freedom and self-determination, and that the usurpation of Moro land was a plot against Islam and the Muslim people in the area. Furthermore it was a wanton design to destroy their identity and to liquidate them. Those students urged their counterparts in the Bangsamoro homeland and the Bangsamoro people in general to return to the fold of Islam and fight against the aggressors. They exhorted them to follow the path of Allah and launch Jihad in the Way of Allah. <

b) Methodology

The methodology of the MILF is complete submission to the Will of Allah. This is manifested and crystallised in the verse number 56, Surah 5: *"I have only created Jinn and Man that they may serve Me."*

The MILF makes sure that all its policies and activities are in conformity with the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah and its members and followers adapt a system of life in accordance with the teachings of Islam.

c) Objectives

- ✦ To make supreme the Word of Allah
- ✦ To gain the pleasure of Allah
- ✦ To strengthen the relationship of man with his Creator
- ✦ To strengthen the relationship of man and man
- ✦ To regain the illegally and immorally usurped legitimate and inalienable rights of the Bangsamoro people to freedom and self-determination
- ✦ To establish an independent state and government and implement Shari'ah (Islamic Law).

d) Magnitude and Strength

The great majority of the Bangsamoro Muslims sympathise with and support the MILF.

However, there is no reliable statistics on the number of the Bangsamoro Muslim population in the area due to the usual distortion of facts about the Muslims by the government.

Sometimes they say more than two million. In some occasions they say more than four million. This was the number of Muslims in the area more than twenty years ago. Our rough estimate is about eight million or more, and 85% actively support the MILF, and the rest, with exception of about one percent, sympathise with the Islamic Front.

About 90% of the Bangsamoro Muslims supporting the MILF aged between 16-60 were trained in combat and arms handling and are therefore warriors and combatants.

How can we differentiate between the Moro National Front and the Moro Islamic Front?

If you look at the ideology and way of life adopted by each of the two fronts you will see the great difference. The MILF adopts the Islamic ideology and way of life. Furthermore, the Islamic Front believes in the Islamic concept of state and government. In contrast to this, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is more inclined to secularism.

At present, the most distinct difference is that the MNLF recognised the Philippine Constitution and works under the Philippine government, whilst the MILF does not recognise the constitution of the Philippines and fights against the government.

What are the motives behind the Bangsamoro Muslims' uprising which started 30 years ago?

The main reason behind the struggle of the Bangsamoro Muslims is the illegal usurpation of their legitimate rights for freedom and self-determination. The Bangsamoro Muslims are the native inhabitants of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan Sulu and Palawan. They were independent hundreds of years before the creation of the Philippines by Spain and the USA, her colonial masters. With the help of the latter the newly created imperialist puppet succeeded in her plot to annex the Bangsamoro homeland when she was granted independence by the USA in 1946.

It is worthwhile mentioning that the Philippines has inherited and developed a deep hatred against Islam and the Muslim people. After annexing the Bangsamoro homeland, a systematic design to liquidate Islam and to destroy the Islamic identity of the Bangsamoro Muslims was launched. The following are some of the methods used in the genocide:

- ✚ Grabbing Muslim lands
- ✚ Establishment of Christian settlements
- ✚ Individual and group migration from Luzon and Visayas to the Bangsamoro homeland
- ✚ Systematic killing of individual Muslims
- ✚ Group or mass massacres of Muslims including women, children and the aged
- ✚ Burning Muslim houses, Mosques, Madrasas (Islamic schools), taking livestock for food or selling, and the destruction of Muslim farms and orchards.

To make such a wanton design more destructive, the government exploited the natural resources of the Bangsamoro homeland to deprive them of such natural and God-given wealth.

The Moro National Front signed a peace treaty with the government of Manila, can you explain the reasons for your opposition to such a treaty? Have your concerns been justified after the full or partial implementation of the treaty? And what was the fate of the Tripoli agreement which gives the Muslim people the right of autonomy? The MILF did not recognise the so-called peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippine and the MNLF for the following reasons:

- ✚ The agreement considered side issues only and never touched the core of the Bangsamoro problem which is the illegal and immoral usurpation of their ancestral homeland and the barbarous usurpation of their legitimate rights to freedom and self determination.

- ✿ The agreement is devoid of justice and freedom for the Bangsamoro people and peace without justice and freedom for the aggrieved party is another form of colonial oppression.
- ✿ The agreement is a solution to the problem of the GRP only but not the Bangsamoro problem.
- ✿ The GRP-MNLF agreement is a violation of the Tripoli Agreement which is now nowhere due to that agreement. The MILF expected that the GRP-MNLF agreement concluded last year will be a total failure and that expectation is now a reality. In fact, a top MNLF officer said: "the outcome of the GRP-MNLF agreement is a double zero" because it did not solve Bangsamoro problem and caused the abandonment and total failure of the Tripoli Agreement.

The Filipino government is carrying out an intensive media onslaught which accuses the Mujahideen with crimes against the Filipino people, what is your response to this?

The accusation is entirely baseless and categorically not true. It is a black propaganda against Islam and its followers and a brazen lie which aims at inverting the issue.

The Bangsamoro Mujahideen are strictly following the teachings of Islam. As such, they do not commit any crime. The Philippine authorities are the ones committing crimes against the Bangsamoro people and even the Filipino people whom they are supposed to be serving are not spared.

Can you explain in detail the ugly massacres that were carried out by the Filipino army and by its partisan militias against the Moro Muslims?

Perhaps hundreds of pages will be needed to write the inhumane atrocities and heinous crimes and massacres perpetrated by the barbarous Armed Forces of the Philippines and its militia against the Bangsamoro Muslims. One example is the notorious Manili Massacre where seventy nine Muslim men and women were killed at point-blank range inside a mosque. Besides this is that barbarous Tacub massacre where sixty innocent Muslims were ordered by a unit of the AFP to lie down then shot at them until they were all killed. There is the infamous Colongcolong massacre where more than seven hundred Muslims, men and women including children, were massacred by the barbaric Armed Forces of the Philippines. There is also the New Pasi massacre of nineteen innocent Muslims and the Tago-ig massacre of ten school girls plus their teacher.

Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Muslim houses, mosques and Islamic schools were deliberately burned by Philippine authorities. In addition, their farms, orchards and other

sources of livelihood were destroyed by the AFP and its militia. In short, a genocidal war is being launched against the Muslims.

How do these delinquent practices reflect upon the Muslims' subsistence and the need for immigration in lieu from the violence of terrorists and their agents?
The barbarous massacres and heinous crimes perpetuated by the Government of the Philippines against the Bangsamoro people have a serious repercussion in their life. It caused them untold hardship, indescribable poverty and an unfortunate situation.

Which parts of the Moro Islands have so far been liberated? How does the Front manage its affairs with the lack of financial support?

The Liberated areas in the Bangsamoro homeland is less than one fifth of the previously independent Muslim areas. These areas are mostly in the countryside and highland covered by thick jungles.

Why does the MILF continue to negotiate with the Filipino government who as you know conceal ill intentions?

Many people in the world do not know the ill-will and bad intentions of the Government of the Philippines towards the Bangsamoro people. We hope that during the process of the negotiations her deceptive design will be exposed.

What are the latest military and security developments in the Moro Islands?
Throughout the last month of Ramadhan corresponding to the month of January 1998, there were heavy armed engagements between the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) and the AFP.

The most fierce encounters between the two armed forces took place in the provinces of Basilan, Zamboanga del norte, Zambaona del sur and in Buldon and Datu Piang in the province of Maguindanao. Enemy forces suffered casualties in terms of lives and equipment: fifty seven soldiers were killed including three high ranking officers and three battle tanks were destroyed. The Bangsamoro Mujahideen captured thirteen assorted firearms.

During the month of February 1998, exchange of artillery fire between the two warring parties continued. From the first week of this month (March 1998), fighting erupted at the demarcation lines between the two forces. And to this date, sporadic armed encounters occur in different areas. In short the Bangsamoro region is in a state of war and nothing can stop this war except the realisation of the Bangsamoro people's objectives.

What are the plans of the MILF on all domains (military, livelihood, security and education)?

The MILF led up a program to be implemented phase by phase in twenty years (from 1981-2000). This program covers all aspects of "Jihad in the way of Allah" and human endeavors, but it gives special attention to the following:

- Islamisation of all aspects of life of the Bangsamoro people
- Military build-up
- Self-reliance
- Strengthening and improvement of organisational, administrative and managerial capability.

Before the 20-years program expires in the year 2000, the MILF had already planned a new 50-year program which will start in 2001 and end in 2050. The plan was approved during the 15th General Assembly of the Moro Islamic Liberation front in Camp Bushra on December 15-17, 1997.

The new program will continue the previous tasks but will give special attention to the following:

- ✪ To establish justice
- ✪ To ensure full freedom and respect of human rights
- ✪ To overcome criminalities, poverty, ignorance and sickness
- ✪ To ensure equal opportunity and equal rights to earn and live honourably
- ✪ To ensure the establishment of equal rights
- ✪ To overcome grafts and corruption and exploitation of public properties for personal interest
- ✪ To undertake proper measures to solve social problems.

How do you view the role of the Muslim communities in supporting the Jihad in Islamic Moro Islands?

The support of the Muslim Ummah all over the world to the Bangsamoro cause is very vital and much needed. Perhaps the Bangsamoro struggle for freedom and self-determination is the longest and bloodiest in the entire history of mankind. It started in 1521 when Spain invaded the Bangsamoro homeland 29 years after the fall of Andalusia. The Bangsamoro people fought against the Spanish invaders for 377 years and against American intruders for about 40 years and have been fighting Filipino barbarous colonial rule during the past 52 year.

In short, the Bangsamoro people fought for 469 years to preserve their Islamic faith and identity and to defend their legitimate rights to freedom and self-determination. They

have no one to ask for help except Almighty Allah and then the Muslim Ummah, their brothers in faith.


Do you have a final word to address your brothers around the world?

We in the MILF would like to take this opportunity to inform the Muslim Ummah through your magazine about the predicament of the Bangsamoro Muslims here in this part of the world.

Islam made its foundation here in about the year 1310 CE, and independent Islamic principalities were established in the beginning of the 15th century. After one hundred years of Islamic grandeur in this part of the globe, the blooming Islamic states were invaded by foreign intruders. Since then and until now, the Bangsamoro Muslims were still fighting to preserve their Islamic identity and regain their usurped freedom and independence.

Hence we are calling upon the Muslim Ummah all over the world to stand by our side and give the Bangsamoro Muslims moral, spiritual and material support.

Allah will surely compensate and reward you here in this world and in the Hereafter.



APPENDIX D

Speech of the Chairman of the MILF during the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, October 15, 2012

(Murad, 2012)

[Greetings in Arabic]

Good afternoon.

His Excellency President Simeon Aquino III; His Excellency Prime Minister Dato' Sri Mohammad Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak; Her Excellency Datin Sri Rosmah Mansor; Ms. Kris Aquino; His Excellency, Professor Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, OIC Secretary General; excellencies of the Foreign Diplomatic Corps; honorable members of the President's Cabinet; honorable members of the Prime Minister's Cabinet; honorable members of the Government [of the Philippines] Peace Panel; members of the MILF delegation; honored guests, friends, brothers, sisters in Islam:

Again, good afternoon.

As-salamu alaykum.

Your Excellencies:

I must confess that this is the first time in my life to step in the grounds of Malacañang. [Applause] Never in my wildest dreams since I was a child or when I join the Bangsamoro struggle more than 40 years ago that one day I will see the interior of this building that once housed the Spanish and American Governors General and now the Presidents of the Philippines. Today, I am here not as a tourist, nor as a politician who seeks personal political favors from the President of the Philippines but as the humble Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front mandated by our brothers and sisters on the ground and by the Bangsamoro people to witness a historic agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the leadership of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III that would, *Insha Allah* [Allah willing], usher in a just and enduring peace in the Bangsamoro homeland. [Applause]

It is in the context that I come in peace and to forge a partnership of peace on the basis of the Framework Agreement between the MILF and the Philippine Government.

Your Excellencies, almost five centuries of foreign invasions and dominations have given birth to what we now call the *Bangsamoro question*. In the course of these centuries of conflict, we have seen the loss of our traditional Moro Sultanates. Expropriation of our sovereignty as a free Moro Nation and consequently our relegation into a state of captivity that

eradicated our Bangsamoro identity and reduced our ancestral homeland into small parcels of gerrymandered territories called provinces all of which lead to the marginalization of our people within a larger domain dominant Philippine society that barely took cognizance if at all of our forebears and broken struggle for freedom even before the Philippine Republic saw the light of the day in 1898 and in 1946.

This unjust condition that sustained this conflict in our generation made it inevitable for the Moro Liberation Movements to emerge. And from the womb of the Moro Liberation Movement, would be born the Moro National Liberation Front and consequently the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The peace negotiations that took place first in 1976 in Tripoli, Libya, under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference and unto 1996 in Jakarta, Indonesia, between our brethren in the MNLF and the Philippine Government were all geared towards addressing historical and foreign grievances of the Bangsamoro people. But unfortunately, the negotiation came short of going further deep of the root cause of the Moro question. Thus, the appropriate political formula to correct the historical and current injustices committed on the Bangsamoro people remain elusive. Political palliatives and economic cosmetics under the rubric of counter-insurgency which were successively put in place to resolve the Moro question prove to be failed experiments in political autonomy, the latest of which is the ARMM, and so that conflict remain that has invariably taken a heavy toll on the lives, properties, and livelihoods of our people—Moro-indigenous communities and settlers in Mindanao and Sulu.

Under such dire circumstances peace negotiations were unable to alter let alone normalize the adversarial relationship between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine State and it was this adversarial relationship that continued to fund the armed sovereignty based conflict in our homeland and that construct the attainment of a just and enduring peace as requisite to normalization. It was for this reason that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front under the leadership of the late Chairman and Mujahedeen Sheik Salamat Hashim, may *Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala* accept his sacrifices, decided to engage in peaceful negotiations with the Philippine Government in 1997. The basic principle underlying this most important decision by the MILF leadership is that negotiated political settlement is the most civilized and practical way to solve the Moro problem. This principle laid down by Sheik Salamat Hashim became a consistent policy.

We, in the MILF Central Committee did not waiver and vacillate in pursuing it to the end despite the devastating three all-out wars in 2000, 2003, and 2008 waged by previous regimes in the MILF. This was the legacy of Sheik Salamat Hashim, the legacy of Sheik Salamat leadership which I, when I took over the leadership of the MILF after he passed away

in 2003, inherited and continued to pursue with unclenching determination and with great personal sacrifice despite tremendous pressures from some restive quarters of our Moro populace on one hand and provocation by forces hostile to the Bangsamoro cause on the other to abandon peaceful negotiation and relentlessly take the path of war.

Today, it humbles me to say before you that we have stayed the course. Our perseverance has prevailed over those whose obsession is to perpetuate war and conflict in Mindanao and Sulu for self-aggrandizement. Today, after almost 16 years of hard negotiations, interfered with armed confrontations on the ground, we have inked the most important document in the chapter of our history—a landmark document that restores to our people their Bangsamoro identity and their homeland, their right to govern themselves and the power to forge their destiny and future with their very hands.

Today, we are here to celebrate a victory for the Bangsamoro people and the Filipino nation that is shared by the international community and the Muslim world, the victory earned not by war but by that collective desire tempered by the inner nobility of human nature to restore justice and peace to a troubled land. Today, we are here to put an end to the adversarial relationship between the Bangsamoro and the Philippine nation and what makes this more significant and quite touching on our part is that this is happening under the administration of President Noy-Noy Aquino [*applause*] whose martyred father, Senator Ninoy Aquino, and mother, the late President Cory Aquino fought on the same side of the fence with us against the dictatorship that devastated our homeland and the lives of thousands of our people. [*Applause*]

Today, we extend the hands of friendship and partnership to the President and the Filipino people as we jointly embark on the historic journey to rebuild our homeland, institute justice and occupation, end the reign of violence, and restore normalcy to the lives of the masses of our people in Mindanao and Sulu with the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. We pray never to see again refugee camps crammed with old folks, women, and children wallowing in squalor and misery, as well as never again witness the recurring wholesale violation of human rights that comes with oppression, all of which deface the landscape of our Bangsamoro homeland and denigrate the lofty human values long held by its civilized and just society.

Today, I would also like to announce to all that we dedicated this Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro to our departed leaders: the late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim, the late MILF Vice Chairman Ali Abdul Mimbantas, Ustadz Abuhalilyaya, Ustadz Sainon Zaman, among others, and to all our Mujahedeen martyrs whether MILF or MNLF. [*Applause*] They sacrifice their lives for the cause of Allah and for the Bangsamoro. To them and to all peace loving people in this country, this agreement shall stand as our greatest tribute.

Let me also have this opportunity to call on an appeal to our MNLF brethren to support the Framework Agreement and take this historic journey with us to rebuild our Bangsamoro homeland on the gains given to us by the agreement. This is not the time for recriminations; this is the time for unity, the time for all of us to think, act, and speak as one Bangsamoro as we summon all our strengths to face the daunting task of home rule.

Finally, on behalf of the Bangsamoro people and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, may I extend our heartfelt thanks to His Excellency President Benigno Simeon Aquino III; His Excellency Prime Minister Dato' Sri Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak; His Excellency Dr. Mahathir Mohammad the former Prime Minister in whose term of office, peace negotiations were done in Malaysia; to His Excellency Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, OIC; and to the Malaysian Facilitator and Secretariat; likewise, to all the State and Non-State actors that composed the International Contact Group (ICG), the Government of the United Kingdom, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and its international NGO components, Conciliation Resources, Mohammadiyah, The Asia Foundation, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, The International Monitoring Team (or the IMT), and its Civilian Protection Component, Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, Japan, Norway, Indonesia, and the European Union, the Non-Violent Peace Force, Mindanao Peoples Caucus, Mindanao Human Rights Action Center, and Muslim Organization of Government Officials and Professionals, and to all those world organizations and countries that sent their message of support to the Framework Agreement such as the United Nations, the European Union, United States of America, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as well as to those individuals and those in and out of the homeland who believed in the justness of our cause, and who bear with us through thick and thin in our long struggle for justice and peace. We convey our sincerest gratitude.

Thank you and May Allah *Subhanahu wa ta'ala* may be with all of us.

APPENDIX E

Abu Sabaya interview transcript (Sabaya, 2001)

Translated transcript of responses from Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya to interview questions on Radio Mindanao Network (RMN), Friday morning, June 1, 2001

Sabaya: We were forced to exchange fire a while ago...the execution may push through.

On the hostages' whereabouts at the time of the interview:

Sabaya: I don't know. I'm not with the captives. I'm 100 meters away from them.

(Sound of gunfire in the background)

Sabaya: We have more hostages now. We have 30 hostages now. We abducted 10 fishermen when we left Palawan on the way to Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. So we can't be blamed now if we make good what we said earlier that we will execute the hostages one by one. It's up to you.

(Another burst of gunfire in the background)

Perhaps Gloria (President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo) thinks we can be frightened. All the more we'll keep adding hostages, even if they reach a thousand.

On any U.S. assistance in the hostage crisis:

Sabaya: We're raring to fight. We want to fight with the U.S.. Tell them to reinforce their troops, if they want. Maybe they think we'll be frightened. Well, all I can say is it's up to the government. They think that they can beat us in a gun battle. They think we will bend. We would relish dying than surrendering to them. Remember.

On food and medical supplies:

Sabaya: Food? There's no problem about food and medicine. If the rebels die, should there be need to treat them?

On the release of any hostages:

Sabaya: Well, we can't talk about any release at this time. The government might think we're afraid of them. The fight goes on. The military thought that the hostages were our comrades, so two of them were killed. But I can't tell you their

nationalities nor identities. What we will do now, perhaps today, we will expect the execution but we cannot tell how many and what time. Tell the government not to worry. We will start the execution to help them. We will help the government so that it won't get exhausted in sacrificing the hostages. The gunfire has subsided. If we were the one overrun, I won't be able to answer you.

On arrival of U.S. troops for joint exercises in the Philippines:

Sabaya: Welcome to the party. If the U.S. troops come here, they're the ones we want to fight.

On the Philippine government's offer of a reward for their capture:

Sabaya: Well, the government is so stingy. Do you know how much damage we are causing the Philippine government? Billions. All I can say is why we are banking on ransoms. Because if we talk about our rights, we won't be heard anyway. So there, our last option is money to prepare for the fight against the Philippine government. But remember this, you can't solve this with arms. How many presidents have passed: Ramos, Erap (Joseph Estrada), and now Gloria (Arroyo). She's just a woman. The Philippine government does not value the lives of the hostages, what more ours?



BIOGRAPHY

Name	Mr. Jirapat Suwandee
Date of Birth	September 9, 1998
Educational Attainment	2019: Bachelor of Political Science (Politics and International Relations)
Work Position	Student
Scholarship (If any)	none
Publications	none
Work Experiences	none

